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The present thesis gives an edition of John Locke’s Of the Conduct of the Under-
standing that is based, for the first time since , on the original manuscripts,
MS Locke e. and MS Locke c.. The text has been provided with a text-critical
apparatus and with historical and philosophical notes.
The editor’s General Introduction is divided into two parts. The first part,
‘Context’, discusses Locke’s analysis of the nature of error, the causes of error and
the prevention and cure of error in the Conduct. His enquiry is placed in the
context of his way of ideas as given in his Essay concerning Human Understanding.
Locke’s two-stage way of ideas, his occupation with our mental faculties and
with method form the interrelated main ingredients of his logic of ideas. There
is a complicated relation of continuity and change between the content and the
structure of this new logic on the one hand and the content and structure of works
by both scholastic predecessors (Du Trieu, Smith, Sanderson) and representatives
of the new philosophy (Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche) on the other hand.
Once this context is taken into account, the Conduct can be understood as a
work that has a function within the structure of Locke’s informal logic of ideas
that runs parallel to the function of the De sophisticis elenchis in the Aristotelian
Organon.
The second part of the General Introduction, ‘Text’,gives a description of the
relevant MSS, an overview of references to the Conduct in Locke’s correspondence,
a history of the genesis of the Conduct until its first publication in  in the
Posthumous Works, an analysis of the evidence provided by the MSS on how the




AND USE OF CALENDAR SYSTEMS
Editorial reference to passages in the Conduct is by the paragraph numbers as
established in the present edition. Other works by Locke that are frequently cited,
are abbreviated as follows:
Corr. The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. de Beer. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, - . Cited by letter number, vol-
ume and page number.
Drafts, I John Locke, Drafts for the Essay concerning Human Un-
derstanding, and Other Philosophical Writings. Vol. I: Drafts
A and B, eds. Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, .
Education John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, eds. John
W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
.
Essay John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed.
Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, . Cited by
book, chapter, section and page number.
O- Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke: viz. I. Of the Conduct
of the Understanding. II. An Examination of P. Malebranche’s
Opinion of Seeing all Things in God. III. A Discourse of Mir-
acles. IV Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration. V. Memoirs
relating to the Life of Anthony first Earl of Shaftesbury. To
which is added, VI. His New Method of a Common-Place-
Book, written Originally in French, and now translated into
English. London: A. and J. Churchill, .
W- John Locke, The Works of John Locke. A New Edition, Cor-
rected ( vols.). Aalen: Scientia,  (repr. of W-).
For the abbreviations of all other (works comprising) editions of the Conduct see
below, ‘Bibliography’, §. Works by other authors are also given in abbreviated
form; here are some of the most frequently cited abbreviations:
 abbreviations of titles and use of calendar systems
AT René Descartes, Œuvres de Descartes, eds. Charles Adam
and Paul Tannery ( vols.). Paris: J. Vrin, -.
Bacon, Works The Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding, Robert
Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath ( vols.). Stuttgart:
Frommann,  (repr. of London: Longman, -).
CSM Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated
by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch
and (Vol. III) Anthony Kenny ( vols.). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, -.
Harrison/Laslett John Harrison and Peter Laslett, The Library of John Locke.
Oxford: Oxford Bibliographical Society, .
King Peter, Lord King, The Life of John Locke, with Extracts from
his Correspondence, Journal, and Commonplace Books (
vols.). Bristol: Thoemmes,  (repr. of London: H. Col-
burn, ).
Logique [Antoine Arnauld], La Logique ou l’Art de Penser. Con-
tenant, Outre les Regles communes, plusieurs observations nou-
velles, propres à former le jugement [=La Logique de Port-
Royal]. Paris: En la Boutique de Ch. Savreux, Chez G. des
Prez, .
OED J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, eds., The Oxford En-
glish Dictionary. Second Edition ( vols.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press, .
Recherche Nicolas Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité où l’on traite de
la nature de l’esprit de l’homme et de l’usage qu’il en doit faire
pour éviter l’erreur dans les sciences, ed. Geneviève Rodis-
Lewis (Œuvres de Malebranche, Vols. I and II). Paris: J.
Vrin, -. Cited by Volume, Book, Part (if appropri-
ate), Chapter, and page number.
French and Latin designations for ‘Volume’, ‘Book’, ‘Part’, ‘Chapter’ and ‘Section’
are abbreviated with their English equivalent: ‘Vol.’, ‘Bk.’, ‘Pt.’, ‘Ch.’ and ‘Sect.’.
Translations of Latin and French quotations are by the editor, unless stated
otherwise.
Dates of letters contained in Locke’s correspondence are those provided by
De Beer, who gives Old Style for letters written in Britain and both Old Style
(first) and New Style (second) for letters produced in the Dutch Republic and
France. This convention is also used in other cases. Years start on  January.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
CONTEXT
John Locke continued to revise his Essay concerning Human Understanding from
its first appearance in  until his death in October . Even while the
Third Edition was being prepared in , he was already corresponding with his
Irish friend William Molyneux (-) about new additions. In his letter to
Molyneux of  March  he discusses the possibility of adding something on
‘Enthusiasm’ and on ‘P. Malbranche’s [sic] opinion concerning seeing all things
in God’.1 In the next letter, dated  April , he announces his intention
to add ‘Enthusiasm’ as a separate chapter, to drop the attack on Malebranche
and to add some remarks concerning the ‘Connexion of Ideas’.2 Locke expected
the new additions concerning enthusiasm and the association (‘connexion’) of
ideas to appear first in the Latin translation of the Essay that Molyneux was then
trying to arrange. However, De intellectu humano did not appear until  and
the new chapters on enthusiasm and association would appear for the first time
in the Fourth Edition of the Essay, which went to the press in  (the Latin
translation by Ezekiel Burridge would be a translation of this Fourth Edition).
‘Of the Association of Ideas’ formed Chapter xxxiii of Part II and ‘Of Enthusiasm’
Chapter xix of Part IV.
It was only in , probably two years after he had started work on ‘Enthu-
siasm’ and ‘Association’, that Locke embarked on another projected addition to
the Fourth Edition of the Essay, i.e. a chapter with the title ‘Of the Conduct of
the Understanding’. On  April of that year he wrote to Molyneux:
I have lately got a little leisure to think of some additions to my book, against the next
edition, and within a few days have fallen upon a subject that I know not how far it will
lead me. I have written several pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the
more upon me, and I cannot yet get sight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will
be Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which, if I shall pursue, as far as I imagine it
will reach, and as it deserves, will, I conclude, make the largest chapter of my Essay.3
 Corr. , V, p. .
 Corr. , V, pp. -.
 Corr. , VI, p. .
 general introduction
On  May Molyneux, whose answer had been delayed because of the death of
his brother-in-law, reacted with his usual enthusiasm to Locke’s latest project:
You never write to me, that you do not raise new expectations in my longing Mind
of partaking your Thoughts on those Noble Subjects you are upon. Your Chapter
concerning the Conduct of the Understanding must needs be very Sublime and Spacious.4
However, the Conduct was never finished and its author broke off mid-sentence
in a paragraph that until now has remained unpublished. The Conduct was
published by A. and J. Churchill in the Posthumous Works (= O-) in Trinity
Term . Using the abbreviation Conduct is convenient, but should not allow
us to forget that at the moment of Locke’s death there was only an unfinished and
unpublished piece of work. The text published in O- was based on MS Locke
e. and on MS Locke c.. All subsequent editions are derived from O-. The
present edition, for the first time since , is based on the original MSS. Both
MS e. and MS c. are now shelved in the Locke Room of the Bodleian Library.
The latter MS covers only a small part of the Conduct. The copy text for the
present edition is MS e., but this MS is collated with MS c.. For more detailed
information on these MSS and on the editorial principles see below in ‘Text’.
The century of Locke’s death saw a ready dissemination of the Conduct,
together with his other works. This popularity was maintained during the en-
tire nineteenth century, despite Locke’s allegedly diminished reputation in this
period.5 From the nineteenth century onwards the Conduct has been regarded
primarily as a work on education. In  it was printed (in an abridged version)
in one volume together with Some Thoughts concerning Education.6 This combi-
nation was repeated in c. 7 and also in  in an edition titled The Educational
Writings of John Locke, by J. W. Adamson, who describes the Conduct as a short
treatise that ‘was written to serve as a manual of self-instruction’.8 Likewise, in
his  edition of the Conduct, F. W. Garforth points to the many similarities
between this work and Education.9 Most recently, in , the Conduct appeared
in one volume with Education in an edition by R. W. Grant and N. Tarcov, who
describe these works as Locke’s ‘two most important writings on education’.10
 Corr. , VI, p. .
 Cf. Aarsleff, ‘Locke’s Reputation in Nineteenth-Century England’, passim.
 AS- (for abbreviations of titles see Bibliography, §).
 AS-.
 O-, p. .
 C-, p. .
 ‘Introduction’ to O-, p. vii.
context 
In the following sections I shall discuss the central theme of the Conduct, error,
and give due attention to the educational reflections that this theme occasioned.
However, I shall argue that the Conduct was considered by its author and by its
eighteenth-century readers to be as much a work on logic as on education. I shall
contend that the Conduct must be understood in relation to the Essay, of which
it was originally meant to be a part, and I shall assert that both works should
be placed in a context that has its roots in Aristotelian textbooks on logic. The
structural relation between the Conduct and the Essay and that of both works
with the products of a changing logical tradition is a largely unstudied topic.
A more detailed examination of this subject throws light on the nature of the
Conduct itself, teaches something about its great parent work and finally leads to
remarkable parallels between Locke’s work and his Aristotelian predecessors.
. Locke’s later years
In September  Locke left England for the Dutch Republic. He felt obliged
to take the same course as his patron, Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of
Shaftesbury, who had run into political trouble with King Charles II and fled to
the Netherlands in November , where he had died in January of the next
year. On  November  Charles deprived Locke of his studentship at Christ
Church, Oxford. On  February  James II succeeded his brother on the
throne. On / May of the same year his agent Bevil Skelton presented a list to
the Dutch States General, asking for the extradition of  English and Scottish
refugees. The last name on the list was Locke’s. However, his personal safety in
the Netherlands was never seriously endangered. His involvement there in the
political activities to topple James in favour of William of Orange has never been
clarified but some of his noble friends in Holland took an active part in the various
schemes and it is clear that he shared their hostility to the Stuart kings.11 The
ensuing enterprise in , helped by a favourable eastern ‘Protestant wind’, was
a success and allowed Locke to put an end to his exile. He returned to England
in February , in the party that accompanied Mary Stuart, the Princess of
Orange. She and her husband were crowned joint sovereigns of England in the
same year.
Locke first stayed in London but made long visits to Oates, an Essex manor
house where he was invited to stay permanently by Sir Francis Masham (-
), husband of his old friend Damaris, Lady Masham (-). Locke’s
health had started to decline and Oates proved to be more congenial to his
 Cf. Goldie, ‘John Locke’s Circle’, p.  ff.
 general introduction
asthmatic constitution than the air of London. From  until his death in ,
Oates was to be his chief place of residence. It was agreed that he should pay a
pound a week for his and his servant’s keep and a shilling a week for his horse.12
Damaris Masham was the daughter of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth
(-). In / she and Locke had formed a romantic attachment,
which had included the writing of love letters under the names of ‘Philoclea’ and
‘Philander’. Maurice Cranston is not sure whether ‘Locke wished to be Damaris
Cudworth’s husband as well as her loving admirer’.13 However this may be, by
the time Locke returned from his Dutch exile Damaris had married. When
Locke moved to Oates, he came into a house that was already well occupied. Sir
Masham had sons and a daughter from his first marriage and a son by Damaris,
Francis Cudworth Masham (-). Locke took an interest in the education
of this child. Francis’ mother taught him Latin according to Locke’s method;14
the philosopher provided him with books,15 introduced the French tutor Pierre
Coste (-)16 to him and at his death bequeathed him half his library.
Francis may have been in Locke’s mind when he was giving advice to young
gentlemen in the Conduct.
The Masham family made Oates a place of agreeable retirement where the
ageing philosopher could receive his many friends and acquaintances. One of
his oldest friends was the prosperous landowner Edward Clarke (c. -c. ),
whose wife Mary Jepp (d. ) was related to Locke. It was not until after the
Glorious Revolution that Clarke came into public life. He entered the House of
Commons for Taunton in  and from  until  he was a Commissioner
of Excise. In Parliament he vented many of Locke’s political and monetary opin-
ions. His questions concerning the upbringing of his son Edward were at the root
of Locke’s Some Thoughts concerning Education.
Another important relation in Locke’s later years was his second cousin Peter
King (-), who was created Baron King of Ockham in  and who
served as Lord Chancellor from that year until . King assisted Locke in his
business affairs and his correspondence. He inherited the other half of Locke’s
library together with his cousin’s manuscripts, including those of the Conduct.
He was also entrusted with the execution of Locke’s last will and was the recipient
 Cranston, John Locke, p. .
 Ibid. p. .
 Corr. , V, p. , Locke to Molyneux,  July .
 Corr. , VI, pp. -; ibid. , VII, pp. - and ibid. , VII, p. .
 Corr. , VI, p. ; Coste produced French translations of Some Thoughts concerning
Education (), The Reasonableness of Christianity () and the Essay ().
context 
of a letter with instructions concerning the publications of the Conduct and
some other unfinished works. King had a keen interest in theology and he wrote
An Enquiry into the Constitution, Discipline, Unity and Worship, of the Primitive
Church () and The History of the Apostles Creed (). It was probably King
who took care of the First Edition of the Conduct in .17
A more recent friend was Anthony Collins (-), a young Etonian
with whom Locke had become acquainted as late as the Spring of . Collins
was to publish two tributes to Locke in  and . He became a deist and a
freethinker and in the appendix to his Scheme of Literal Prophecy considered ()
he would make a significant contribution to the development of modern biblical
criticism with his arguments for the assertion that the Old Testament Book of
Daniel is a forgery. Another intimate friend was the historian and political writer
James Tyrell (-), with whom Locke shared much the same Whig views
and with whom he had collaborated (in -) in writing an (unfinished)
pamphlet in defence of Nonconformity as opposed to religious conformity.18
Tyrell took care of some of Locke’s books during the latter’s Dutch exile. Other
visitors at Oates were the Deist philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper (-),
third Earl of Shaftesbury, grandson of the first Earl and Locke’s former pupil,
and Isaac Newton, with whom the philosopher liked to discuss such theological
matters as their heterodox opinions concerning the Trinity. These meetings may
have prompted the scientist to complain about his host’s loquacity.19
Until  Locke was still a relatively unknown scholar with hardly anything
in print. However, in that year appeared his Epistola de tolerantia, the Two Treatises
of Government and An Essay concerning Human Understanding (a French summary
had appeared a year before). The first two works werepublished anonymously, but
the Essay, unlike any of his other major works, was published under his own name
and brought him swift renown. After the Glorious Revolution Locke became one
of the wise old men of the Whig party. In  King William offered him the
post of Ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg, an offer that Locke declined
to accept on account of his fear that the cold air of the country and the ‘warme
drinking’ of its inhabitants might be contrary to his frail constitution.20 Another
offer of high office by William in , possibly that of Embassy Secretary in
 See below, ‘Text’, § [].
 The pamphlet had been designed as an answer to the ‘Mischief of Separation’ () and
‘The Unreasonableness of Separation’ () by Edward Stillingfleet. See Corr. , I, p. ,
note, and Cranston, John Locke, pp. - .
 Harrison/Laslett, p. .
 Corr. , III, pp. -.
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Paris, was also turned down.21 However, in  Locke had accepted the light
function of Commissioner of Appeals and from  until , when health
problems became an insurmountable barrier, he held the more substantial post
of Commissioner at the Board of Trade.
In spite of his administrative duties and his bad health, Locke managed to
maintain a high level of productivity during the last fifteen years of his life. He
kept up a voluminous correspondence; two-thirds of the , numbered letters
in De Beer’s edition (containing letters of Locke but also of his correspondents)
were written after  January . In  he published A Second Letter concerning
Toleration, and in  the Third Letter appeared. The year  saw the publi-
cation of Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and
Raising the Value of Money. In  followed Some Thoughts concerning Education.
In this period he also started to write additions for the Second Edition of the Essay
(). Early criticism of the Essay by John Norris (-), an admirer of the
philosophy of Malebranche, occasioned Locke to draft three replies: JL Answer to
Mr Norris’s Reflection, Remarks upon some of Mr Norris’s Books and An Examination
of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God. Eventually Locke decided
against including this polemical material in the Essay (the Examination would be
published in O-). What he did include, though, was the problem named
after William Molyneux.22 In  appeared The Reasonableness of Christianity
which, after attacks by the extreme Calvinist John Edwards (-), was fol-
lowed by a A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity () and a Second
Vindication (). In  he also published his Short Observations on a Printed
Paper, Intituled, For encouraging the Coining Silver Money in England, followed
in the same year by Further Considerations concerning Raising the Value of Money.
Finally, this year saw the publication of the Third Edition of the Essay, which did
not contain substantial changes.
In the early Spring of , recuperating at Oates from illness after a season
filled with activities for the Board of Trade in London, Locke made a start with
the Conduct. However, in this period he also had to fend off theological attacks
on his Essay by Edward Stillingfleet (-), Bishop of Worcester. Locke
acquitted himself of this task in three lengthy public letters, of which the first two
were published in  and the third in . This last year also saw the Fourth
Edition of the Essay, with the new chapters on ‘Association’ and on ‘Enthusiasm’.
These items formed the last additions to the Essay that Locke was to publish. At
about this time he may also have produced the Elements of Natural Philosophy.
 Cranston, John Locke, pp. -.
 Cf. Conduct, par. .
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This elementary treatise on the contemporary state of knowledge in the various
sciences was probably written for Francis Cudworth Masham and was clearly
influenced by Newton.23 In  he wrote a Discourse of Miracles (published in
O-) and shortly before his death he started the Fourth Letter on Toleration
(published in part in O-). In his last years Locke devoted his waning energy
mainly to work on his voluminous Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul,
which would be published posthumously in -.
Locke’s public and polemical activities until  and his steadily declining
health may in large part account for the fact that the Conduct was never finished.
In addition, it should not be forgotten that he never had been given to philosophy
exclusively and that this discipline had always been in competition with other
pursuits. Subject analysis of Locke’s final library tells us that only  of the ,
titles, a mere . per cent, consisted of books on what would nowadays be called
philosophy. The nature of his other interests changed in the course of his life. In
the earlier catalogue that he made of his books in Oxford in  (comprising
not more than  titles), . per cent were medical, . scientific and only .
per cent theological;24 in the catalogue of his final library, medical and scientific
titles had gone down to . and . per cent respectively, while the proportion
of theological works had risen to . per cent.25 On  December  he wrote
to his Dutch friend, the Remonstrant theologian Philippus van Limborch (-
), that he wanted to give his mind chiefly to theological studies,26 and in
a letter of  September  he informed William Molyneux that ‘having now
wholly laid by the study of physick, I know not what comes out new, or worth
reading, in that faculty’.27
Locke had always been the kind of thinker that needs a sounding-board. It is
well known that he first came to the subject matter of his Essay in the company
of ‘five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber’28 and he continued to organize
similar gatherings during his Dutch exile.29 Molyneux was the main stimulus and
recipient of Locke’s mature philosophical thought and what has remained of later
 Bourne, Life of John Locke, II, p. , n.  and Axtell, ‘Locke, Newton’, p. .
 The Oxford catalogue does not list the books that Locke had in London, which means
that the balance between the different categories of books listed in this catalogue may not
completely reflect the proportions within the complete collection of his books in .
 Harrison/Laslett, p. .
 Corr. , V, p. : ‘Theologiam tuam Christianam quamprimum otium nactus fuero
diligentius perscrutabo, his enim jam fere studiis mihi vacandum censeo.’
 Corr. , VI, p. .
 Essay, ‘The Epistle to the Reader’, p. .
 Cranston, John Locke, pp. -.
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letters suggests that no serious successor to this role appeared after the former’s
death in . On  June  he had written to Molyneux:
My health, and business that I like as little as you do those you complain of, make me
know what it is to want time. I often resolve not to trouble you any more with my
complaints of the distance between us, and as often impertinently break that resolution.
I never have any thoughts working in my head, or any new project start in my mind,
but my wishes carry me immediately to you, and I desire to lay them before you. You
may justly think this carries a pretty severe reflection on my country, or my self, that
in it I have not a friend to communicate my thoughts with. I cannot much complain
of want of friends to other purposes. But a man with whom one can freely seek truth,
without any regard to old or new, fashionable or not fashionable, but truth merely for
truth’s sake, is what is scarce to be found in an age, and such an one I take you to be.30
This effusion implies little appreciation of the intellectual endowments of his
immediate surroundings, including his former ‘Philoclea’. King and Collins,
whose acquaintance Locke made after having written this letter, may have been
able to fill something of the vacuum that was left by the demise of Molyneux,
but their interests were theological rather than philosophical. The same holds
true for such important correspondents in his later years as Van Limborch and
the Calvinist encyclopaedist and biblical scholar Jean le Clerc (-). Locke
had started his adult life with a keen interest in medicine, physics and chemistry,
and he died a theologian.31 The Conduct was his last sizable contribution to
philosophy.32
. Errors of the first and the second kind
In the introductory paragraphs to the Conduct, Locke stresses the importance of
the understanding, its liability to errors of all kinds and the possibility of curing
these errors:
… there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment
which are over looked and wholy neglected. And it is easy to perceive that men are
guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the
minde which hinders them in their progresse and keeps them in ignorance and error
all their lives.33
 Corr. , VI, pp. -.
 Cf. Coste, ‘Lettre de Mr. Coste’, p. , on Locke’s last years at Oates: ‘Durant cet agréable
séjour, il s’attachoit sur tout à l’etude de l’Ecriture Sainte; & n’employa presque à autre chose
les derniéres années de sa vie.’
 In - Locke also managed to make some alterations intended for the Fifth Edition
of the Essay. However, these were not very substantial; cf. Nidditch, ‘Introduction’ to Essay,
pp. xxxi-xxxii.
 Conduct, par. .
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He then proceeds in a very loose way to describe the nature and causes of these
errors and to formulate remedies. At the start of paragraph  he suggests that in
the previous pages he has given ‘the common and most general miscariages which
I thinke men should avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their understandings’.
In par.  he announces the intention of continuing more particularly with
‘several weaknesses or defects in the understanding’. This very broad division into
general and particular errors is only roughly adhered to. Nevertheless, although
its catalogue of errors, causes of error and remedies for error is rather bewildering
in its lack of order, the Conduct has a clear function within the context of Locke’s
work.
An important step towards a delineation of the function of the Conduct can
be made once it is appreciated that most errors discussed by Locke fall into one
of two major categories. In par.  Locke neatly sums up both types in a single
clause:
… [] the want of determined Ideas and [] of Sagacity and exercise in finding out and
laying in order intermediate Ideas …
This distinction should be placed in the larger framework of a parallel distinction
in Locke’s ‘way of ideas’ as presented in the Essay. A discussion of this complicated
topic can start with two words taken from the above quotation: ‘Ideas’ and
‘determined’. First, ‘idea(s)’ is the most frequently used noun in the Essay.34 Since
the prime subject of the Essay is supposed to be the understanding,35 it might
be asked why such excessive attention should be devoted to ideas. In the final
paragraph of the Introduction Locke gives both an answer to this question and a
definition of ‘idea’:
Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occasion of this Enquiry into
humane Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this
Subject, I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of
the Word Idea, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being the Term, which,
I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a
Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species,
or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ’d about in thinking; and I could not
avoid frequently using it.36
 According to Malpas, ‘An Electronic Text of the Essay’, p. , the word Idea occurs ,
times and the word Ideas , times. The only words which exceed the combined , are:
‘a’, ‘and’, ‘be’, ‘in’, ‘is’, ‘it’, ‘of ’ and ‘to’.
 Essay, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, p. : ‘the Subject of this Treatise, the UNDERSTANDING’.
 Essay, I.i.: .
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So, since the understanding has no other object but its ideas, any discussion
of the former implies scrutiny of the latter as well; ‘Since the Mind, in all its
Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas,
which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our Knowledge is only
conversant about them.’37
Second, there is the word ‘determined’; it is related to the expression ‘clear
and distinct’. In an addition to the ‘Epistle to the Reader’ that was included in
the Fourth Edition of the Essay, Locke proposes to replace ‘clear and distinct’
by ‘determinate’ or ‘determined’.38 Yet ‘clear and distinct’ was allowed to remain
a current expression in both the Essay and the Conduct.39 Clearness pertains to
the relation between an idea and the object or objects from which it is taken.
In the Essay Locke states that simple ideas are clear ‘when they are such as the
Objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered
Sensation or Perception, present them’.40 Complex ideas are clear in so far as the
simple ideas of which they are composed are also clear. The opposite of a clear
idea is an obscure idea. Obscurity of ideas can be caused by ‘dull Organs; or
very slight and transient Impressions made by the Objects; or else a weakness
in the Memory, not able to retain them as received’.41 Distinctness on the other
hand, is a property of the relation between one idea and all other ideas. Locke
defines a distinct idea by comparing it with a clear idea: ‘As a clear Idea is that
whereof the Mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from
an outward Object operating duly on a well-disposed Organ, so a distinct idea is
that wherin the Mind perceives a difference from all other …’42 The opposite of
a distinct idea is a confused idea: ‘and a confused Idea is such an one, as is not
sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different’.43
Strictly speaking, confusion between different ideas is impossible:
For let any Idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the Mind perceives it to
be; and that very perception, sufficiently distinguishes it from all other Ideas, which
cannot be other, i.e. different without being perceived to be so. No Idea therefore can
 Essay, IV.i..: . For two short introductions to the heavily debated topic of the precise
nature of Lockean ideas, cf. Yolton, ‘Idea’, in: A Locke Dictionnary, pp. - and Ayers,
‘Ideas and Objective Being’, pp. -.
 Op. cit. pp. -.
 However, for two instances of Locke actually replacing ‘clear and distinct’ by ‘determined’
see MS Locke e., p.  and p.  (Conduct, par. , text-critical notes). For the influence
of Descartes on Locke’s use of ‘clear and distinct’, see below, §.
 Essay, II.xxix.: .
 Essay, II.xxix.: .
 Essay, II.xxix.: .
 Essay, II.xxix.: .
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be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you
would have it different from it self: for from all other, it is evidently different.44
However, we give names to our ideas and we should not forget that every idea,
whether simple or complex, should have a precise name and every name should
refer only to this idea and not to another idea. The problem is that human beings
have great difficulty in adhering to this fundamental law and this opens wide
scope for confusion: ‘Now every Idea a man has, being visibly what it is, and
distinct from all other Ideas but it self, that which makes it confused is, when it is
such, that it may as well be called by another Name, as that which it is expressed
by …’45 So, confusion is not really a property of the relation between ideas, but
rather of the relation between words on the one hand and ideas on the other.
The activity of ‘discovering how far we have clear and distinct Ideas’46 forms
the first stage in Locke’s way of ideas. The second stage consists of the subsequent
reasoning based on ideas that should all be clear and distinct. Reasoning becomes
necessary when we look for the intermediate idea or ideas between the two
ideas that we want to connect. Reasoning results in knowledge only after we
have perceived the agreement or disagreement between each pair of adjacent
ideas in the chain. Locke’s most substantial discussion of reasoning is given
in the context of his discussion of the three degrees of knowledge: intuitive,
demonstrative and sensitive. Intuitive knowledge occurs when ‘the Mind perceives
the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without
the interventionor any other’.47 However, if the mind is not capable of perceiving
at once the agreement or disagreement of two ideas it must reason and this results
in demonstrative knowledge:
… when the Mind cannot so bring its Ideastogether, as by their immediate Comparison,
and as it were Juxta-position, or application one to another, to perceive their Agreement
or Disagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of other Ideas (one or more, as it happens)
to discover the Agreement or Disagreement, which it searches; and this is that which
we call Reasoning48
Although clear and distinct ideas are necessary for the subsequent generation of
knowledge, this is not a sufficient condition. In addition, if we want this process
to be efficient, it is desirable that we do not ‘dwell upon only particular Things’.49
 Essay, II.xxix.: .
 Essay, II.xxix.: .
 Essay, IV.iii.: .
 Essay, IV.ii.: -.
 Essay, IV.ii.: .
 Essay, II.xxxii.: .
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Rather, we should make use of abstract ideas. Abstract ideas form the elements
of the abstract principles that underpin scientific and moral knowledge. In the
Conduct Locke dedicates glowing words of praise to principles:
There are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom as the bassis upon which a great
many others rest and in which they have their consistency, these are teeming truths rich
in store with which they furnish the mind, and like the lights of heaven are not only
beautiful and enterteining in them selves, but give light and evidence to other things
that without them could not be seen or known.50
However, abstract ideas are not formed at once; in the Essay it is pointed out that
the mind has to bind its individual perceptions ‘… into Bundles, and rank them
so into sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with
assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger steps in that which
is its great Business, Knowledge’.51 All this means that the relation between the
two stages of the way of ideas is one of a complicated interaction. On the one
hand the first stage provides the building bricks, consisting of abstract ideas that
are clear and distinct, for the subsequent process of reasoning in the second stage.
On the other hand, the clearness and distinctness and the abstractness of these
elements is not given, but the result of previous polishing by reasoning.
Parallel to the two interrelated stages of the way of ideas run two kinds of
equally related errors. An error of the first kind is to accept ideas that are obscure
or confused as the basis of subsequent reasoning; an error of the second kind is a
defect in reasoning itself. These are the two categories that were given above in
the quotation from par.  of the Conduct:
… [] the want of determined Ideas and [] of Sagacity and exercise in finding out and
laying in order intermediate Ideas …
In par.  Locke refers to a specific error of the first kind, consisting of ‘a custom
of takeing up with principles that are not self evident and very often not soe
much as true’. In so far as principles form the basis of subsequent reasonings,
having wrong principles forms a serious error of the first kind; thus Locke writes
in the Essay: ‘the way to improve our Knowledge, is not, I am sure, blindly, and
with an implicit Faith, to receive and swallow Principles; but it is, I think, to
get and fix in our minds clear, distinct, and complete ideas …’52 The error of not
examining our principles looms large in the Conduct and has a prominent place
amongst ‘the common and most general miscariages which I thinke men should
 Conduct, par. ; cf. pars.  and .
 Essay, II.xxxii.: ; cf. Conduct, par. : abstract ideas are ‘Framed by the understanding’.
 Essay, IV.xii.: .
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avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their understandings’.53 When discussing
this error, Locke gives special attention to Aristotelian schoolmen who waste the
time of their pupils with ‘purely logical enquirys’54 and to the ‘zealous bigots’55
of the various religions; both fail to analyse the principles they build on. In the
Essay Locke clearly links this error to the theory of innate ideas. By telling their
followers that the content of certain principles is innate, ‘Masters and Teachers’
try to dissuade their followers from inspecting these tenets.56 Another error of the
first kind is not so much that of having wrong principles, but that of starting with
one-sided principles: ‘that the principles from which we conclude the grounds
upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part some thing is left out which
should goe into the reconing to make it just and exact’.57 The case of erecting
our opinions ‘upon one single view’, and the error of intellectual one-sidedness
in general, is again used for a thinly veiled attack on Aristotelian logic.
Once we have taken the first hurdle of a prior examination of our principles,
we have in our subsequent reasoning to take care of ‘observeing the connection
of Ideas and following them in train’.58 Things go wrong at this stage when we
reason either erroneously or not at all. On the whole Locke seems to be more
afraid of errors of the first kind than of errors in reasoning itself. Once we have
managed to get before us the basic material, clear and distinct ideas, we are
not likely to make mistakes in any subsequent reasoning. Thus he writes in the
Conduct: ‘The faculty of Reasoning seldom or never deceives those who trust
to it. its consequences from what it builds on are evident and certain but that,
which it oftenest if not only misleads us in, is that the principles from which we
conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part …’59
This point is also borne out by a passage in the Essay where he gives five instances
wherein reason may fail us: want of ideas, obscure and imperfect ideas, want of
intermediate ideas, wrong principles and doubtful terms; with the exception of
want of intermediate ideas, these are all clear instances of errors of the first kind.60
However, in the second stage hovers the ‘ill habit’ of not reasoning at all.61 So, we
should be aware of error in both stages of the way of ideas, if only because errors
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Essay, I.iv.: -.
 Conduct, par. ; also: pars. ,  and .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Essay, IV.xvii.-: -.
 Conduct, par. .
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of the first kind and of the second kind have a tendency to reinforce each other.
Our reasonings have no use unless they are based on correct principles and it is by
reasoning that we come to the clear and distinct ideas of which these principles
should consist.
. Causes of error
What leads us to error? Why is it that we take obscure, confused or one-sided
principles and why do we fail to reason as we could and should? Locke discusses
two general causes of error. Some errors arise because factors from outside impede
the proper functioningof our understanding. Other errors are caused by defects in
the understanding itself. The main extraneous cause of our errors is an ‘uneasiness
of desire’, which usually takes the form of a passion, such as aversion, fear, anger,
envy and shame.62 Passions tend to blind us by interposing themselves between
us and the truth.63 Passions often determine our will, and when this happens, we
are prone to error.64 However, our mind has the power to suspend the immediate
execution and satisfaction of our passions and has the capacity to examine them
closely before they are allowed to influence our judgements and actions. When
this happens, we are free.65 So, our free will ultimately depends on the powers of
our mind.
However, when Locke in the opening paragraph of the Conduct reduces the
faculty of the will to that of the mind, he is primarily referring to a desirable
situation. The rest of the Conduct is devoted to harsh reality. The desire that
our opinions be true forms a great hindrance to our knowledge;66 our ‘natural
tempers and passions’ influence our judgement;67 men ‘espouse opinions that
best comport with their power, profit or credit’;68 their partiality prompts them
to ‘a phantastical and wilde attributeing all knowledg to the Ancients alone or
to the Modernes’;69 and passion is mentioned first when Locke gives several
causes for the ‘transferring’ of thoughts. Transferring happens when our mind
 Essay, II.xxi.: -; see also: ibid. II.xx: -.
 Conduct, par. : ‘there is a correspondence in things and agreement and disagreement in
Ideas discernable in very different degrees and there are eyes in men to see them if they
please, only their eyes may be dimned or dazeld and the discerneing sight in them impaired
or lost. Interest and passion dazels …’
 Cf. Essay, IV.xx.: : ‘Quod volumus, facilè credimus; what suits our Wishes, is forwardly
believed, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented …’
 Essay, II.xxi.: .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
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is hindered in concentrating on the object we have chosen. One possible cause
for this phenomenon is when ‘Love, or Anger Fear or Greif ’ bring us ‘under the
power of an inchantment’.70
Much of Locke’s attention for the passions as sources of error is in line with
the preoccupations of other philosophers in the seventeenth century.71 Of more
interest is his discussion of the causes of error that pertain not to our passions,
but to defects in our understanding itself. Here the great problem is habit or
custom. It is custom that causes a ‘takeing up with principles that are not self
evident and very often not soe much as true’.72 The most interesting instance of
the nefarious influence of ‘the empire of habit’ is that of the wrong association
of ideas. Although Hobbes73 contributed at least as much to an associationist
psychology as Locke, it was the latter who coined the term ‘association of ideas’
and it was he who would be most important for subsequent developments of the
theme during the eighteenth century.74 Locke mentioned the concept first in MS
e., in what was projected as an addition to the Fourth Edition of the Essay. As
was noted above, work on this subject had probably started at about April ,
when it was mentioned to Molyneux.75 The lines on ‘Association’ cover pp. -
in MS e.. However, Locke did not include all this material in the new chapter
on ‘Association’ in the Essay (Bk. II, Ch. ), but used only the part covered by
pp. -. It was only later that he decided to use the remaining part, covered by
pp. -, for the Conduct (pars. - of the present edition).76 In the part that
was to belong to the Essay, Locke points out that besides natural correspondence
and connection,
… there is an other Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas that
in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that ’tis
 Conduct, par. .
 Cf. James, Passion and Action, pp. -.
 Conduct, par. .
 See Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. I, Ch. ii-iii, pp. -.
 For Hobbes and Locke on association, cf. Warren, A History of the Association Psychology, pp.
-; Kallich, The Association of Ideas, pp. - and Gibson, Locke’s Theory of Knowledge,
p. .
 This letter of  April , Corr. , V, p. , does not betray much awareness of Hobbes’s
contribution to the subject: ‘I think I shall make some other additions to be put into your
latin translation, and particularly concerning the Connexion of Ideas, which has not, that I
know, been hitherto consider’d and has, I guess, a greater influence upon our minds, than is
usually taken notice of.’
 See below, ‘Text’, § ().
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very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at
any time comes into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it …77
Similarly, in the Conduct-part he remarks that ‘Such unnatural connections be-
come by custom as natural to the mind, as sun and light’.78 In the Essay-part on
‘Association’he gives the following cause for the growth of unnatural connections:
Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in
the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in
the Animal Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the same steps they have
been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion
in it becomes easy and as it were Natural.79
Like many other seventeenth-century philosophers Locke used the ‘Trains of
Motion in the Animal Spirits’ to give a mechanical explanation for psychological
and physiological phenomena.80
For Locke, wrong association of ideas is a very important cause of error. In
the Essay-part of ‘Association’ he says ‘that, perhaps, there is not any one thing
that deserves more to be looked after’ and in the Conduct-part he points out that
it is ‘as frequent a cause of mistake and error in us as perhaps any thing else that
can be named’.81 The particular danger for Locke in the wrong association of
ideas is that it impedes the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our
individual ideas. Another reason why he is so afraid of wrong association is that a
man is prone to it in every state of mind, not only when he is ‘under the power of
an unruly Passion’, but also ‘in the steady calm course of his life’;82 and since it is
‘a very hard thing to convince any one that things are not soe, and naturaly soe as
they constantly appear to him’,83 it is an error difficult to eradicate. By corrupting
the very basic material of our reasonings, the habit of wrong association is a
powerful cause for errors of the first kind. Indeed, in the Conduct it is given as
cause for the process by which ‘loose foundations become infallible principles’.84
 Essay, II.xxxiii.: .
 Conduct, par. .
 Essay, II.xxxiii.: .
 Cf. Malebranche, Recherche,Vol. I, Bk. II, Pt. I, Ch. v, p. : ‘… que peu à peu les esprits
animaux par leur cours continuel ouvrent & applanissent ces chemins, ensorte qu’avec le
tems ils n’y trouvent plus de résistance. Or c’est dans cette facilité que les esprits animaux
ont de passer dans les membres de nôtre corps, que consistent les habitudes’; ibid. Vol. I, Bk.
II, Pt. II, Ch. ii, pp. -. See also Descartes, Les Passions de l’Ame, Pt. I, Art. vii, AT XI,
pp. -.
 Essay, II.xxxiii.:  and Conduct, par. .
 Essay, II.xxxiii.: .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. ; cf. par. .
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The general importance of habit as a cause of (moral) error is already promi-
nent in Francis Bacon’s De dignate et augmentis scientiarum.85 Furthermore, the
force of habit and custom seems to have a special relevance for the second of the
‘Idols’ that are presented in the ‘Aphorisms’ to the Novum Organum:
The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the
errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts
and discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature;
or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the
authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions,
accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind
indifferent and settled; or the like.86
Although the precise extent of Bacon’s influence on Locke’s Essay in general
remains to be assessed,87 there can be found clear instances in the Conduct where
Locke seems to hark back to Bacon, not only in his discussion of habit as a cause
of error, but also in his discussion of individual habits and of their remedy. Bacon
is one of the few philosophers mentioned by name in the Conduct.88 It may not be
a matter of coincidence that we see the clearest sign of Locke reading the Novum
Organum appearing in  at the earliest, which is after the completion of the
Essay but well before work had started on the Conduct.89
 Op. cit. Bk. VII, Ch. iii, Works, I, p.  on Aristotle: ‘Attamen, utcunque hoc se habeat,
quo magis verum fuerit tam vertutes quam vitia in habitu consistere, eo magis ei contenden-
dum fuerat ut normas præscriberet, quomodo hujusmodi habitus fuerint acquirendi aut
amovendi.’
 Bacon, Novum organum, Aph. xlii, Works, I, p. : ‘Idola Specus sunt idola hominis
individui. Habet enim unusquisque (præter aberrationes naturæ humanæ in genere) specum
sive cavernam individuam, quæ lumen naturæ frangit et corrumpit; vel propter naturam
cujusque propriam et singularem; vel propter educationem et conversationem cum aliis; vel
propter lectionem librorum, et authoritates eorum quos quisque colit et miratur; vel propter
differentias impressionum, prout occurunt in animo præoccupato et prædisposito aut in
animo æquo et sedato, vel ejusmodi …’, transl. in: Bacon, Works, IV, p. .
 Cf. Wood, ‘The Baconian Character of Locke’s “Essay”’, p. : ‘In sum, the evidence
is compelling that Locke is a Baconian, and that the Essay concerning Understanding is
fundamentally Baconian, whether directly or indirectly derivative’, with more wary remarks,
e.g. Romanell, ‘The Scientific and Medical Genealogy in Locke’s “Historical, Plain Method”’,
pp. - and Ayers, ‘Theories of Knowledge and Belief ’, p. .
 Conduct, pars. -.
 Locke’s interleaved copy of Blount’s Censura Celebriorum Authorum, London,  (Har-
rison/Laslett, nr. , p. ), contains extracts from Book I, aphorisms  and  (Locke
mistakenly gives the number ‘’),  (all opposite p. , ‘Plato’) and  (again) and 
(both opposite p. , ‘Aristotles’ [sic]); I thank Dr. J. R. Milton for bringing this information
to my attention.
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. Prevention and cure of error
In the Conduct Locke notes that there are ‘a great many natural defects in the
understanding capable of amendment’.90 His favourite remedy for error is mental
exercise or practice. The relation between errors caused by habit or custom, and
remedies consisting of practice, is one of similia similibus curantur. Wrong habits
or customs are caused by the frequent repetition of ‘Trains of Motion in the
Animal Spirits’ (see above, §) and wrong repetitions must be prevented or cured
by right repetitions provided by practice; ‘practise must setle the habit’.91 The
important role of habit or custom as both cause and remedy for error is clearly
present in the case of wrong association of ideas. This wrong custom must be
prevented by gradual and repetitive training. Educators should ‘take heed as
much as may be that in their [young pupil’s] tender years Ideas that have noe
natural cohesion come not to be united in their heads and that this rule be often
inculcated to them …’92 In Education Locke remarks that in this way ‘you may
turn them as you please’.93 The mind is like the body; both can be raised to a
higher pitch only by repeated actions.94 Since ‘we are of the ruminating kinde’,95
repetition corresponds well with our nature. Locke’s stress on the importance
of practice, the analogy between mind and body and the gradual development
of our mental capabilities was not new. These themes can also be found in the
works of such recent precursors as, for instance, Francis Bacon96 or John Amos
Comenius (-).97 However, Locke used these well-known topics within
the frame of the two stages of his analysis of ideas. In the first stage we often fail
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Op. cit. §, p. .
 Conduct, pars. ,  and .
 Conduct, par. .
 ‘Of Studies’, Works, VI, p. : ‘They [studies] perfect nature, and are perfected by experi-
ence: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need proyning by study; and studies
themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by expe-
rience’; ibid. p. : ‘Nay there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought
out by fit studies: like as diseases of the body may have appropriate exercises’.
 Magna didactica, p. : ‘… perduci ad soliditatem non posse eruditionem sine repetitionibus
et exercitiis quam creberrimis et quam dexterrime institutis’; and p. : ‘Exercitia hæc
continuanda sunt, donec habitum artis inducant. Nam Solus et artifices qui facit, usus erit ’.
Quotation from Ovid, Ars amatoria, Bk. II, -: ‘Adde, quod est illis operum prudentia
maior, / Solus et artifices qui facit, usus adest’, ‘Add this, that they have greater acquaintance
with their business, and they have experience, which alone give skill, upon their side …’,
transl. J. H. Mozley.
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to look into our own principles because this is ‘a freedom which few men have
the notion of in them selves and fewer are allowed the practise of by others’.98
Second, as to reasoning, it is practice that helps us ‘in finding out and laying in
order intermediate Ideas’.99
Since Locke in the Conduct presents not only an analysis of error but also
discusses ways to prevent and remedy errors, it is not surprising that his work
has come to be regarded as a work on education. Education, mental practice
included, pertains to our mental faculties. In a letter to Cary Mordaunt, Countess
of Peterborough, possibly written in September or October , Locke gives the
following advice concerning the education of her son: ‘When a man knows the
termes sees the method and has got an entrance into any of the sciences, twill
be time then to depend upon himself relye upon his own understanding and
exercise his own faculties which is the only way to improvement and mastery.’100
A reasonably comprehensive description of mental faculties is given in the Essay,
Book II, Chapters ix-xi. In each instance Locke underlines the relation between
faculties and ideas. First, there is the faculty of (sensory) perception, which is
‘the first Operation of all our intellectual Faculties’.101 Our capability of having
ideas at all is bound up closely with the faculty of perception: ‘To ask, at what
time a Man has first any Ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having
Ideas, and Perception being the same thing.’102 A second faculty is that of the
retention of ideas; this task is performed either by actually contemplating ideas
or by storing them in our memory.103 Next, there is the faculty of discerning
and distinguishing between our ideas.104 Other mental faculties, by which the
mind operates ‘about’ its ideas are those of comparing, composition, enlarging
and abstraction.105 More generally, when he compares it with the will, Locke
speaks about the faculty of understanding.106 This is the ‘most elevated Faculty
of the Soul’.107 The understanding is at work in both phases of the way of ideas;
it takes our ideas apart until they are clear and distinct and it compares them
to generate knowledge. Thus, in the Conduct he states that ‘great care should be
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Corr. , VI, p. .
 Essay, II.ix.: .
 Essay, II.i.: .
 Essay, II.x: -.
 Essay, II.xi.-: -.
 Essay, II.xi.-: -.
 Essay, II.xxi.: , see also Conduct, par. .
 Essay, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, p. .
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taken of the understanding to conduct it right in the search of knowledge and in
the judgments it makes’.108
The prominent place attached in the Conduct to practising our faculties,
is connected with distinct views on the chief aim of education. Locke stresses
the importance of raising pupils who take ‘the pains and trouble of thinkeing
and examining for themselves’.109 It is not enough to passively cram our heads
with particular facts. This results in ‘noething but history’.110 Habit is a powerful
source of error, and the aim of education is teaching pupils to make an optimal
and free use of their mental faculties in all directions, rather than to produce
specialists who are bound by the habits that were instilled by their masters.
The businesse of Education (…) is not as I thinke to make them [‘the yonge’] perfect
in any one of the sciences but soe to open and dispose their mindes as may best make
them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it. If men are for a long time
accustomd only to one sort or method of thoughts, theyr mindes grow stif in it and
doe not readily turne to an other. Tis therefor to give them this freedom that I thinke
they should be made looke into all sorts of knowledg and exercise their understandings
in soe wide a variety. But I doe not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledg but
a varietie and freedom of thinkeing as an increase of the powers and activity of the
minde, not as an enlargment of its possessions.111
Locke’s educational programme can be seen as a plea for formal practice. This
practice is formal in contradistinction to the material content of knowledge itself.
Locke’s preference for education as ‘an increase of the powers and activity of the
minde’ instead of education as ‘an enlargment of its possessions’ is exemplified in
what he has to say about principles. As principles to be scrutinized he mentions
material principles, such as the ‘principles in this or that science’112 or ‘principles
of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists’.113 However, the aim of education
is not that of replacing false material principles with true material principles.
Rather, we must learn how to put principles to the test, and for this we must
develop the general capacity of making a maximal and free use of our mental
faculties, first of all our understanding: ‘This and this only is well principleing,
and not the instilling a reverence and veneration for certain dogmas under the
specious title of principles …’114 Our ‘natural reason’ is a ‘touch stone’, but it does
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
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not provide us with material principles; rather, it is a formal faculty that needs
training and guidance and that must be used to put these material principles to
the test.115
Locke’s predilection for a formal practice of the faculties very well matched
the needs of the audience that he targeted with the Conduct. The work was
not written for specialized scholars but for a general public of gentlemen, for ‘the
ingenuouspart of man kind whose conditionallows them leisure and letters’,116 or
more bluntly, for ‘men of little businesse and great leisure’.117 Locke’s pedagogical
advice in the Conduct is in line with a tradition of courtly education in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The general aim was to produce individuals
who were fit to govern in peace and to serve in war. The members of the ruling
classes did not need specialized forms of learning and, as Locke was keen to point
out, they could do without scholastic training in particular.118 Rather, they were to
be trained with a mixture consisting of moral, religious, intellectual and physical
elements that were meant to further personal integrity, intellectual proficiency,
physical preparedness, and a civilized style of living.119 The services that Locke
had rendered to the Shaftesbury family had made him well acquainted with the
educational needs of the upper classes. The clearest connection between these
needs and the importance of a formal exercise of our faculties is made not in the
Conduct, but in Education:
The great Work of a Governour is to fashion the Carriage, and form the Mind; to settle
in his Pupil good Habits, and the Principles of Vertue and Wisdom; to give him by
little and little a view of Mankind; and work him into a love and imitation of what is
Excellent and Praise-worthy; and in the Prosecution of it to give him Vigour, Activity,
and Industry. The Studies which he sets him upon, are but as it were the Exercises of
his Faculties, and Imployment of his Time, to keep him from Sauntering and Idleness,
to teach him Application, and accustom him to take Pains, and to give him some little
taste of what his own industry must perfect.120
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Cf. Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, p. : ‘… he [Locke] shrewdly appropriated the language
employed by the humanists in their ideal of education only to strip it of the substantial
scholarly content they had invested in it’.
 Cf. Locke, ‘Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study’, p. : ‘he who would be
universally knowing must acquaint himself with the objects of all sciences. But this is not
necessary to a gentleman, whose proper calling is the service of his country, and so is
most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge’. See also Stephens, The Courtly
Tradition, pp. -.
 Education, §, p. ; see also ibid. §, p. : ‘That which every Gentleman (that takes
care of his Education) desires for his Son, besides the Estate he leaves him, is contain’d (I
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Since the pedagogic advice given in the Conduct is destined for young gentlemen
rather than for small children, Locke cannot limit himself to advice concerning
the prevention of error. In addition, he feels obliged to tell something about the
removal of errors that have accumulated in earlier years by wrong habits, instilled
by a defective education. Once things have gone wrong in this respect, it is not
easy to administer effective cures. However, when he concludes a discussion of
the prevention of error he does try to suggest a cure: ‘This is for caution against
this evil before it be throughly rivited by custom in the understanding, but he
that would cure it when habit has establishd it, must nicely observe the very quick
and almost imperceptible motions of the minde in its habitual actions.’121 He
refers here to the ‘Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits’ that he regards as the
mechanical causes for habitual errors. So, in cases where the damage is already
done, the first requirement for cure is an appreciation of the workings of our
own mind. This is indeed the central subject of the Essay, as is witnessed by the
opening sentence of the first chapter: ‘Since it is the Understanding that sets Man
above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion,
which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleness, worth
our Labor to enquire into.’122 Locke promises many practical advantages from
this study and its relevance for the central theme of the Conduct, that of error, is
already very eloquently formulated in his early essay ‘Of Study’ ():
It will be of no hindrance at all to our studies if we sometimes study ourselves, i.e. our
own abilities and defects. There are peculiar endowments and natural fitnesses, as well
as defects and weaknesses, almost in every man’s mind. When we have considered and
made ourselves acquainted with them, we shall not only be the better enabled to find
out remedies for the infirmities, but we shall know the better how to turn ourselves
to those things which we are best fitted to deal with, and so to apply ourselves in the
course of our studies as we may be able to make the greatest advantage.123
In order to cure the errors of our understanding, we should study it; which poses
the question by means of what method we should embark on this inquiry.
suppose) in these four Things: Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning ’. Virtue, not learning,
is accorded the first place; ibid. §, p. : ‘I place Vertue as the first and most necessary of
those Endowments, that belong to a Man or a Gentleman; as absolutely requisite to make
him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himself ’. Also: ibid. §, p.
 and ibid. §, p. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Essay, I.i.: .
 Op. cit. p. .
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. Two methods
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a substantial growth in the attention
to methodological questions. One reason for this phenomenon was a growing
discontent with the methods of scholastic philosophy, which were perceived to
block further advances in learning. Another motive was provided by sceptical
tendencies that had gained force from the sixteenth century onwards. This de-
velopment not only drew attention to the errors of our mental faculties, but also
contributed towards the development of new methods that were meant to stem
the pyrrhonist tide. Method is a vital subject in the Essay. The subject continued
to intrigue Locke after the appearence of the First Edition in . Method has
a prominent place in ‘Enthusiasm’, in ‘Association’ and in the Conduct, which
are all (projected) additions to the Essay. A connection between at least one of
these additions and the subject of method is borne out by MS Locke c. fols.
-, ‘Understanding A’, dated c.  by P. Long,124 in which a fragment titled
‘Method’ is preceded by the heading (not followed by any text) ‘Enthusiasm’.
In the Essay, Locke did not prescribe one single philosophical or scientific
method, to be applied to all branches of knowledge. His point is rather that our
method should depend on the kind of objects that we are dealing with. These
objects are ideas.125 Two kinds of ideas are of special relevance here. Firstly, there
are modes, ‘such complex Ideas, which however compounded, contain not in them
the supposition of subsisting by themselves’.126 The absence of this supposition
implies that there is no difference between the nominal essence and real essence
of these ideas; we can have completely adequate ideas of an ellipse or a triangle.
An important category of modes is formed by the abstract ideas of mathematics,
and the method suited for the study of modes is that of Euclid’s geometrical
demonstration.127 Locke, in accordance with most of his contemporaries, is an
admirer of this method and points out that it can also be used in ethics, provided
we give precise definitions of basic concepts like ‘property’ or ‘injustice’.128 There
is no limit to our knowledge of the relations between these ideas.
Secondly, Locke remarks that we are less fortunate with regard to our ideas
of substances. Substances can be material or spiritual and the last category can
be subdivided into finite (human minds) and infinite (God). The problem with
substances is that since we have no knowledge of their real essence, we are in
 Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. .
 Cf. Essay, IV.xii.: .
 Essay, II.xii.: .
 Essay, IV.xii.: .
 Essay, IV.iii.xviii: -.
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the dark about the necessary coexistence of the diverse qualities that follow from
this essence. More particularly, our ignorance concerning matter springs from the
fact that we have no knowledge of its micro-structure. We can obtain knowledge
of particular qualities of material substances one by one, but we cannot ‘from a
Discovery of their real Essences, grasp at a time whole Sheaves’.129 Corpuscular
physics was freshly revived in Locke’s time and getting enthusiastic attention
by mechanistic philosophers. Locke accepted the ‘corpuscularian Hypothesis’ as
being more likely than other accounts of material substances.130 His collaboration
in Oxford with Robert Boyle, whom he had first met in , had given him
first-hand knowledge of corpuscular theories. However, given the difficulties in
observing corpuscles and in describing their mutual relations, atomism for Locke
seems to figure more as a confirmation of our limited capabilities than as a
promising prospect for future scientific research. This view may have caused
him to neglect contemporary developments in microscopy.131 The method to
be followed concerning material substances is that of experience and history of
macro-objects, which have the advantage of being readily apprehended by our
bare senses. This method will not yield general knowledge, but can nevertheless
be of great practical use in our daily life:
This way of getting, and improving our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience and
History, which is all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of Mediocrity, which
we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is
not capable of being made a Science. (…) Experiments and Historical Observations
we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby
increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our Talents
reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.132
When inquiring into human understanding, Locke’s preferred method is rather
the one prescribed for material substances than the one associated with modes.
In the introduction to the Essay, he declares that he wants to consider our mental
faculties according to a ‘Historical, plain Method’.133 This well-known phrase
can be broken down into three main aspects.134 First, there is the importance of
experience. In the case of material substances, as opposed to modes, ‘the want of
Ideas of their real Essences sends us from our Thoughts to the things themselves, as
 Essay, IV.xii.: , cf. Essay, IV.iii.: -.
 Essay, IV.iii.:  and Education, §, pp. -.
 Cf. Wilson, The Invisible World, pp. -.
 Essay, IV.xii.: .
 Essay, I.i.: .
 For a somewhat different treatment of the subject cf. Romanell, ‘The Scientific and Medical
Genealogy of Locke’s “Historical, Plain Method”’, passim.
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they exist’.135 In the same way, if we want to give a history of human knowledge,
we must appeal to experience and observation, and ‘… examine Things as really
they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy our selves, or have been
taught by others to imagine’.136 In the early modern era, philosophers as diverse
as Bacon,137 Digby,138 Comenius139 and Malebranche140 can frequently be seen
to use expressions like ‘Things as really they are’ in contradistinction to ‘words’,
which places these terms in an anti-Scholastic context that is also present in the
following passage in Education, where Locke discusses traditional rhetoric and
logic: ‘Truth is to be found and supported by a mature and due Consideration
of Things themselves, and not by artificial Terms and Ways of Arguing …’141
However, Locke’s ‘progressive’ anti-scholastic predilection for things themselves
instead of words goes hand in hand with his ‘conservative’ preference for readily
observable macro-objects rather than the investigation of micro-objects. When
he delimits ‘the discerning Faculties of a Man’ in the introduction to his Essay as
the object of his investigation, he utters clear aversion to prying into the physical
micro-structure of our mental faculties:
I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble
my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or
Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any Ideas
in our Understandings; and whether those Ideas do in their Formation, any, or all of
them, depend on Matter, or no.142
The objects of Locke’s plain historical method are those that are readily accessible
to our experience. This is the case for both material macro-objects and for our
mental faculties.
Second, Locke’s method is historical. Like other contemporaries, he uses the
term ‘history’ in both a general and a particular way. The general way is consistent
with the primary connotation of the Greek word óôïòÝÆ, meaning enquiry or
 Essay, IV.xii.: .
 Essay, II.xii.: . Cf. Conduct, par. . See also Yolton, Locke and the Compass of Human
Understanding, pp. -.
 ‘Præfatio’, Instauratio Magna, in: Works, I, p. .
 Two Treatises, p. .
 Magna Didactica, p. .
 Recherche, Vol. II, Bk. IV, Ch. vii, p. .
 Op. cit. §, p. .
 Essay, I.i.: .
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investigation, or the report containing the results of such an enquiry.143 These
meanings are present in his introductory statement of the aim of the Essay:
It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as
they are employ’d about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine
I have not wholly misimploy’d my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion,
if, in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways, whereby our
Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down
any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Perswasions,
which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different and wholly contradictory
…144
In addition, Locke uses the word ‘history’ in the more limited meaning of events
happening in time, or the result of an inquiry into these events. The previous
quotation suggests this meaning as well, but it is present more clearly in the
following contention, made later on in Book II: ‘And thus I have given a short,
and, I think, true History of the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge; whence the
Mind has its first Objects, and by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying
in, and storing up those Ideas, out of which is to be framed all the Knowledge
it is capable of …’145 The diachronic nature of the object of Locke’s enquiry
is matched by the step-by-step method by which he tries to investigate it; the
operations of our understanding are like material substances in that they cannot
be grasped at a time by ‘whole Sheaves’.
Third, although Locke’s step-by-step history of our mental faculties has a
limited scope of generalization, this is compensated by the fact that it can have
great practical value in our daily life. Here we encounter another aspect of Locke’s
pervasive polemic against the ‘useless Imagination of the Schools’.146 Also, there
is again a parallel with material substances, of which we cannot have more than
a narrowly circumscribed knowledge either, which however may give us great
‘Advantages of Ease and Health’. In a similar way it may be of great practical
use to know the limits of our understanding: ‘If we can find out, how far the
Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty;
and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content our
selves with what is attainable by us in this State.’147 The parallels between Locke’s
method for the investigation of material substances and of mental substances
 For the use of ‘history’ by Locke and some predecessors, cf. Buickerood, ‘The Natural
History of the Understanding’, p. , n. .
 Essay, I.i.: -.
 Essay, II.xii.: .
 Essay, IV.vi.: .
 Essay, I.i.: .
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are a reflection of his view that both form a part of one and the same nature,
created by God. This ontological relation between nature and our natural faculties
guarantees an epistemological fit between natural object and natural subject.
Provided our understanding is properly trained, we are able both to perceive
the natural connections between our ideas and to see the difference between
natural and unnatural connections and associations. Whether this basic trust
was justified is of course open to discussion, but it explains much of Locke’s
impatience with philosophical scepticism, which he has been noted to treat ‘in a
cavalier fashion’.148 He fails to see the practical point of scepticism in our present
state:
That the certainty of Things existing in rerum Naturâ, when we have the testimony of
our Senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our Condition
needs. For our Faculties being suited not to the full extent of Being, nor to a perfect,
clear, comprehensive Knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the
preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of Life: they serve
to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those Things,
which are convenient or inconvenient to us.149
The mental faculties that God has given us come ‘exceeding short of the vast
Extent of Things’.150 The topic of the narrow cognitive limits which God has
conferred on us in our ‘present state’ is stressed repeatedly in the Essay, especially
in Book IV.151 However, God has given men ‘Light enough to lead them to the
Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties’.152 In general, our
natural faculties tell us what things are good and thus to be pursued and what
things are bad and thus to be avoided, and this makes them suitable enough
for our present state. Provided that they are guided by a historical method, our
natural faculties can supply us with valuable knowledge about material substances
or about these faculties themselves, and in so far as this is the case, sceptical doubts
are largely irrelevant. Locke’s methodological interest was rooted more in a desire
to further practical knowledge than in a wish to silence pyrrhonism.
Locke’s historical method is largely in accordance with the empirical tenets
embraced by Bacon and the Royal Society. However, it may be possible to detect a
more specific early influence that occurred well before he started work on even the
 Yolton, Locke and the Compass, p. ; cf. Rogers, ‘Locke and the Sceptical Challenge’, esp.
pp. -.
 Essay, IV.xi.: .
 Essay, I.i.: .
 Essay, IV.iii.: -; ibid. IV.iii.: ; ibid. IV.iv.: ; ibid. IV.xi.: -; ibid.
IV.xii.: ; ibid. IV.xiv.:  and ibid. IV.xvi.: -; see also ‘Of Study’, p. .
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first Draft of his Essay. In  he left Oxford to join the household of Anthony
Ashley Cooper (Earl of Shaftesbury in ) in London. An interesting aspect
of Locke’s years in the capital was his friendship with Thomas Sydenham (-
), the famous physician and author of the Methodus Curandi Febres Propriis
Observationibus Superstructura (). Locke worked together with Sydenham,
largely as a junior partner, on a practical and theoretical level. There are two
manuscripts, both kept in the Public Record Office in London, that are a fruit
of this co-operation. Anatomia,153 dated , is in Locke’s handwriting, except
for the opening sentence, which is in Sydenham’s hand. De arte medica,154 dated
, is entirely in Locke’s handwriting. These works can be used as indicators for
the degree to which Locke was immersed in Sydenham’smedical methodology.155
In De arte medica a method is defended that combines a maximum of
patient, step-by-step observation of particular cases of illness with a minimum
of theoretical constructions. Strong aversion is uttered against the ‘speculative
theorems’ of scholastic philosophers, which are contrasted with ‘useful arts’ which
have all ‘sprung from industry & observacion’.156 In the same vein, Anatomia
stresses the importance of the ‘history & the advantage of a diligent observation
of these diseases, of their beginning progresse & ways of cure’.157 While De arte
medica is fairly middle-of-the-road in its anti-scholastic purport, the Anatomia
is more remarkable in what it has to say about the limitations of anatomy. In
this work it is maintained that ‘removeing the pains & maladys of mankind’ is
hampered by the fact that anatomy is not able to show us the causes of diseases.
The reason why it fails to do this, is that ‘though we cut into the inside we see but
the outside of things’.158 Anatomy considers organs on a macro-level, whereas the
causes for diseases are situated on a micro-level, consisting of particles that are
‘too small & too subtile for the observation of our senses’.159 An anatomist who
on a macro-level knows everything about the part of the body where a ‘virulent
gonorrhaea’ can be found ‘is as far from knowing the cause of ye yellownesse or
acrimony of the seed at that time as he that has never seen any more of a testicle,
 PRO /// fols. -.
 PRO /// fols.-.
 On Anatomia and De arte medica cf. Walmsley, John Locke’s Natural Philosophy, pp. -
and pp. - respectively.
 Op. cit. fol. r. Quotations from Anatomia and De arte medica are taken from the transcrip-
tion by Walmsley, John Locke’s Natural Philosophy, pp. - and pp. - respectively,
reference is to the fol. nos. of the MSS.
 Anatomia, fol. v.
 Op. cit. fol. r.
 Op. cit. fol. r.
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than a dish lambstones fried & served up to a table’.160 So, most elements of the
historical method that Locke used in writing the Essay, including a preference
for the experience of ‘things themselves’ on a macro-level, accompanied with an
acute sense of the limitations of this level, can be found already in the Anatomia
and in De arte medica; and it has been noted that much of Locke’s subsequent
influence followed from his application of this method of natural philosophy to
the study of the human mind in the Essay.161
The methodological themes of De arte medica and of the Anatomia can be
found already in the drafts for the Essay. Drafts A and B are both dated ,
which is the year that Locke hit on the subject of the Essay. It is doubtful whether
these documents contain Locke’s first thoughts on the matter, but they form the
earliest extant material.162 The short Draft A does not yet contain a clear reference
to Locke’s historical method, but in the longer Draft B, §, there is the following
passage:
It shall suffise to my present purpose to consider the discerning facultys of a man as
they are imploid about the objects which they have to doe with & I shall have on
this occasion if I can give any account of the ways whereby we come to atteine the
knowledge of things & set downe any measures of the certainty of our knowledg or the
grounds of those perswasions which are to be found amongst men soe various different
& wholy contradictory …163
This passage was repeated almost literally in the introductory chapter to the Essay
(see quotation above, second aspect of historical method). The only difference
is that the passage in Draft B does not yet contain the phrase ‘Historical, plain
Method’. However, in Draft C (written in ) we see appearing at the parallel
place ‘historical plain method’.164
The subject of method in general occupies a central place in the Conduct.
The problem of how to prevent and cure the errors of our understanding is of
a methodological nature. However, our choice of method itself is as liable to
the nefarious forces of habit and custom as anything else: ‘If men are for a long
time accustomd only to one sort or method of thoughts, theyr mindes grow
stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other.’165 Thus it is imperative that a
 Op. cit. fol. r.
 Aarslef, ‘Locke’s Influence’, p. .
 Rogers, ‘Introduction’ to Drafts, I, p. xiii.
 Drafts, I, p. .
 Op. cit. Bk. I, Ch. , Sect. , fol. . I thank Prof. G. A. J. Rogers for his permission to use
his transcription of Draft C. Reference is to the fol. nos. of the MS.
 Conduct, par. , cf. par. .
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man should actively ‘seek out methods of improveing his mind’.166 Locke uses
the plural form when he speaks about ‘methods of enquiry’167 and ‘methods of
learning’.168 Indeed, the Conduct contains reiterations of the point made earlier
in the Essay, i.e. that our method should depend on the kind of objects that we
are dealing with: a man should ‘pursue his thoughts in that method which will
be most agreeable to the nature of the thing’.169
When Locke in the Conduct stresses the importance of experience of things
themselves, his historical method again plays an important role: ‘For example
were it my Businesse to understand physick would not the safer and readier
way be to consult nature her self and informe my self in the history of diseases
and their cures than espouseing the principles of The Dogmatists, Methodists
or Chymists engage in …’170 Even more interesting is his use of the historical
method in writing the Conduct itself. His approach here is very much in line
with the prescriptions in Anatomia and De arte medica. We have noted Locke’s
penchant in the Conduct for comparisons between our mind and our body (above,
§). The central theme of the Conduct, that of error, its causes and its remedies, is
frequently expressed in terms analogical to that of bodily diseases and their cures:
There are several weaknesses or defects in the understanding either from the natural
temper of the minde or ill habits taken up which hinder it in its progresse to knowledge.
Of these there are as many possibly to be found if the minde were throughly studyd
as there are diseases of the body, each wherof clogs and disables the understanding to
some degree and therefor deserve to be looked after and cured.171
More light on the importance of this frequently used analogy is thrown by Locke’s
last letter to Peter King, dated  and  October , where he informed his
cousin about his wishes concerning MSS that contained unfinished work. Locke
stresses that these papers amount to
very little more than extemporary views, layd down in suddain and imperfect draughts,
which though intended to be revised and farther looked into afterwards, yet by the
intervention of business, or preferable enquiries happend to be thrust aside and so lay
neglected and sometimes quite forgotten.172
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. ; cf. pars.  and .
 Corr. , VIII, p. . Cf. a similar remark to E. Clarke on  December  /  January
, Corr. , II, p. , about Draft C of the Essay, which was, until the isolation of a
winter in Utrecht, ‘a subject which I had for a good while backwards thought on by catches
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One of these unfinished works was the Conduct, and on the first page of MS e.
he had indeed written: ‘Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out
under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd and
ranged according to their natural order.’ Now, what the ailing philosopher has to
say on the Conduct in the farewell letter to his cousin, seems first of all to confirm
the unfinished character of this work: ‘… what I have done in it is very far from
a just treatise. All that I have done has been, as any miscariage in that point has
accidentaly come into my minde, to set it downe, with those remedies for it that
I could think of.’ However, Locke then continues: ‘This method though it makes
not that hast to the end which one would wish, is yet perhaps the onely one can
be followed in the case, it being here as in physick impossible for a physitian to
describe a disease or seek remedies for it till he comes to meet with it.’173 So, the
disparate step-by-step discussion of errors and their cures in the Conduct is not
just a symptom of haste and imperfection; it is at the same time an application of
the historical method as formulated in the early medical manuscripts on a range
of diseases — the disease in this case being not of a physical but of a mental
nature.
We have noticed the paradigmatic role accorded to mathematics by Locke in rela-
tion to modes in the Essay. A final remark should be made on the methodological
role accorded to this discipline in the Conduct, where he pays ample tribute to
the importance of mathematics in the formal training of our mind. Mathematics
settles in the minde ‘an habit of reasoning closely and in train’.174 It performs
the task of teaching how to ‘reason well’,175 and in this respect it is a viable
alternative to scholastic logic.176 This aim can be accomplished without it being
necessary that men should try to become ‘deep mathematicians, but that haveing
got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the minde to they
might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledg …’177 The importance
that Locke ascribed to mathematics in the Conduct is thus of a predominantly
didactic character. In this context Locke has little interest in the more technical
and set downe without method severall thoughts upon as they had at distinct times and on
severell occasions come in my way and which I was now willing in this retreat to forme into
a lesse confused and coherent discourse …’
 Corr. , VIII, p. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 On mathematics as an alternative for logic in Locke, cf. Feingold, ‘The Mathematical
Sciences’, pp. -.
 Conduct, par. ; cf. par .
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aspects of mathematics, and when he embarks on one of his many attacks against
methodological one-sidedness, he does not forget to deride men who have ‘soe
used their heads to mathematical figures that giveing a preference to the methods
of that Science they introduce lines and diagrams into their study of divinity
or politique enquirys as if noe thing could be known without them …’178 The
evaluation of mathematics in the Conduct was summed up elegantly by Voltaire,
who in his Lettres philosophiques would write about Locke: ‘He had never been
able to submit himself either to the drudgery of calculations or to the aridity of
mathematical truths, which at first offer nothing to the mind that is appreciable;
and no one proved better than he that one can have a geometrical mind without
the help of geometry.’179 In the Conduct mathematics has the propaedeutic and
formal function of exercising our mind; this implies repetition by pupils of what
is already known, without adding much to the content of human knowledge.180
In the Essay on the other hand, mathematics is not merely presented as
a predominantly didactic instrument, but linked to a promising kind of new
knowledge that is a goal in itself and that is exemplified by ‘Mr. Newton’, who
‘in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several Propositions,
which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther
Advances in Mathematical Knowledge …’181 New knowledge is very much the
result of ‘the discovering, and finding out of proofs’;182 and this means discovering
intermediate ideas. Thus, from each of Newton’s new propositions it can be said
that it rests on ‘that admirable Chain of intermediate Ideas, whereby he at first
discovered it to be true’.183 When Locke stresses the success of mathematics in
finding intermediate ideas, he especially mentions algebra.184 Algebra is capable
of finding the proofs that are exposed in a geometrical demonstration: ‘Till
Algebra, that great Instrument and Instance of Humane Sagacity, was discovered,
Men, with Amazement, looked on several of the Demonstrations of ancient
 Conduct, par. .
 Op. cit. ‘Treizième lettre. Sur M. Locke’, p. : ‘Il n’avait jamais pu se soumettre à la fatigue
des calculs ni à la sécheresse des vérités mathématiques, qui ne présente d’abord rien de
sensible à l’esprit; et personne n’a mieux prouvé que lui qu’on pouvait avoir l’esprit géomètre
sans le secours de la géométrie.’
 Cf. Education, §, p. : ‘For who expects, that under a Tutor a young Gentleman should
be an accomplished Critick, Orator, or Logician? Go to the bottom of Metaphysicks, Natural
Philsophy or Mathematicks?’
 Essay, IV.lxxiv: ; cf. Essay, IV.xii.: ; Education, §, p. ; and ‘Second Reply to
the Bishop of Worcester’, in: W-, IV, pp. -.
 Essay, IV.xvii.: -.
 Essay, IV.i.: .
 Essay, IV.iii.:  and IV.xii.: .
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Mathematiciens, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those
Proofs to be something more than humane.’185 Locke is probably referring here
to Descartes’s new analytical geometry that, by reducing geometrical lines to
algebraical symbols, had opened up new vistas in the search for the intermediate
ideas that are required for mathematical proofs.186 However, in the Conduct Locke
hardly discusses the discovery of intermediate ideas or the important role that
algebra can play in this process.187 Here he mentions mathematics in a context
that does not go much beyond ‘teaching it [Science] to others as far as it is
advanced’, while in the Essay it is related to a ‘Method of raising any Science’.188
. An anti-scholastic logic of ideas
Locke’s two stage analysis of ideas should be understood within the context of a
reaction against what he saw as the predominant features of scholastic logic. From
the late sixteenth century onwards syllogisms had held a place of eminence in the
study of valid inference.189 They formed the principle butt of Locke’s attacks on
Aristotelian ‘Masters of Logick’.190 As we have noted, the first stage of his way
of ideas implies a careful inspection of the clarity and distinctness of our ideas.
However, Locke’s problem with syllogisms is that they are used, and can be used
correctly, without this prior inspection. Syllogisms merely consist of words, and
for a syllogism to be correct, its words do not have to correspond with clear and
distinct ideas. This makes syllogisms eminently suited for senseless disputations.
As to the second stage: Locke is confident about the capability of our natural
faculties in tracing the natural connections between our ideas. His point about
syllogisms is that their order is not natural, but very artificial. This makes them
superfluous to say the least; God has provided mankind with ‘a Mind that can
reason without being instructed in Methods of Syllogizing: The Understanding
is not taught to reason by these Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the
Coherence, or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any
such perplexing Repetitions’.191 If syllogisms have any use at all in ‘the Schools’, it
 Essay, IV.xvii.: .
 See Descartes, La Géométrie, AT VI, p. : ‘Mais souuent on n’a pas besoin de tracer ainsi
ces lignes sur le papier & il suffist de les designer par quelques lettres, chascune par vne
seule.’
 For a short remark on algebra in the Conduct, see par. .
 Essay, IV.vii.: .
 Ashworth, ‘Traditional Logic’, p. .
 Essay, III.vi.: . Locke’s most comprehensive discussion of syllogisms is in Essay, IV.xvii.-
: -.
 Essay, IV.xvii.: .
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is that they allow their members ‘without Shame to deny the Agreement of Ideas,
that do manifestly agree …’192 Also, syllogisms can be used for the exposition
of existing knowledge, but are of no use for the generation of new knowledge.
This is produced by the discovery of intermediary ideas, and we have seen him
giving praise to the method used by mathematicians. The order of syllogisms is
the product of a previous quest for intermediary ideas, not their source: ‘A man
knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that Syllogism comes
after Knowledge, and then a Man has little or no need for it.’193
Locke’s distinction between errors of the first and the second kind, and the
relevance of this distinction for the specific weaknesses of Aristotelian logicians,
is graphically illustrated by his distinction between madness and foolishness. In
the Essay he points out that madmen are especially prone to errors of the first
kind: ‘having joined together some Ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for
Truths; and they err as Men do, that argue from wrong Principles. For by the
violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make
right deductions from them’.194 Wrong association of ideas is a major cause of
errors of the first kind, and wrong association is indeed described as a ‘sort of
Madness’.195 On the other hand, idiots or ‘Naturals’ are easy victims to errors
of the second kind, not in the sense that they reason wrongly but because they
do not reason at all: ‘In fine, the defect in Naturals seems to proceed from want
of quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are
deprived of Reason …’196 In King’s The Life of John Locke there is a passage taken
from Locke’s MSS on ‘Error’ that makes a similar distinction between errors of
the first and the second kind by ascribing the first to madmen and the second
to fools: ‘where a man argues right upon wrong notions or terms, he does like a
madman; where he makes wrong consequences, he does like a fool …’197 On the
same page, Locke again intimates that madness is a graver defect than foolishness.
Here his motivation for this choice is clearly connected to his assault on scholastic
logic: ‘For in the discursive faculty of the mind, I do not find that men are so
apt to err; but it avails little that their syllogisms are right, if their terms be
insignificant and obscure, or confused and indetermined, or that in their internal
discourse deduction be regular, if their notions be wrong.’ Scholastic logicians
 Essay, IV.xvii.: .
 Essay, IV.xvii.: .
 Essay, II.xi.: .
 Essay, II.xxxiii.: .
 Essay, II.xi.: -.
 King, II, p. .
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reason, sometimes even brilliantly, on notions and principles that they have not
looked into; this makes them comparable to madmen.
The purport of the Conduct is just as anti-scholastic as that of its parent work.
In the introductoryparagraphs Locke launches an attack against Aristotelian logic
with a quotation from Bacon’spreface to the Instauratio Magna, in which the Lord
Chancellor complains that traditional logic ‘has served to confirme and establish
errors rather than to open a way to truth’.198 Other parts of the Conduct contain
variations on Locke’s disparaging introductory remarks: it is a mistake that a
‘few rules of Logick’199 are of help against the neglect of our understanding and
the old logic tries to show ‘where in right reasoning consists’, without thereby
producing ‘a strict reasoner’.200 Finally, there is the anti-scholastic contribution in
the Conduct to Locke’s theory of ‘probability’.His enquiry into our understanding
comprises not only knowledge (which is always certain), but faith and opinion
(which is not certain) as well. One of the eminently important aspects of his
Essay is that he gives a separate and respectable status to probable knowledge by
a detailed examination of ‘the Reasons and Degrees of Assent ’.201 In the fourth
part of his Essay he tries to give precise criteria for the acceptability of various
degrees of probable knowledge.202 (Since according to Locke all knowledge is
certain, ‘probable knowledge’ is strictly speaking a contradiction in terms; his
own preferred expression is ‘probability’.)203 One of Locke’spoints in the Conduct
is that when we enquire into probability it is not enough to analyse one argument
to its source. Instead, we will have to analyse and then to weigh different chains
of argument against each other.204 He stresses that the old logic does not provide
the instruments that are needed for such an analysis, so that on this subject
 Conduct, pars.  and .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 Essay, I.i.: . For Locke on ‘probable truths’ see also: ‘Miscellaneous Papers’ in King, II, p.
. Cf. Daston, Probability and Evidence’, p. -. A very interesting topic is that of the
interplay between probabilistic notions developed in theological writings and in other fields,
as well as the importance of Locke’s writings for this interaction, cf. Shapiro, Probability and
Certainty, p. : ‘The ultimate spokesman of this generation was John Locke, who voiced
the shared concerns of scientists, theologians, historians, and lawyers. (…) For Englishmen,
the central intellectual phenomenon of the second half of the seventeenth century was the
peculiar interaction between efforts to establish a rational basis for an historically based,
nondogmatic, Protestant Christianity and comparable efforts to achieve a probabilistic basis
for the factual assertions of scientists, historians, and lawyers.’
 Essay, esp. IV.xvi.-: -.
 Essay, IV.xv.: .
 Conduct, pars.  and .
 general introduction
its adherents are led completely astray: ‘nor is it to be wonderd since the way of
disputeing in the schools leads them quite away from it [truth] by insisting on one
topical argument by the successe of which the truth or falsehood of the question is
to be determind …’205 According to Locke, instead of comparing different chains
of arguments, as should be done in the case of probable knowledge, scholastic
logicians ignore the arguments that do not fit in with their pre-conceived theses.
The Essay not only contains a massive assault on scholastic logicians, it provides
us with an alternative as well. The separate elements of this new logic have been
discussed in the previous sections and can now be summarized. Firstly, there is his
two stage way of ideas. In the first stage we must make sure that we start with clear
and distinct ideas. The second stage consists of the perceptionof the agreement or
disagreement of two clear and distinct ideas. In reasoning this activity is repeated,
resulting in a chain of ideas that connects two ideas between which a connection
was not at first perceived. We are naturally capable of perceiving the agreement or
disagreement of ideas. For reasoning well, we do not need cumbersome syllogisms.
Secondly, instead of focusing on the formalization of reasonings, the new logic
concentrates on a prior inspection of the mental faculties. Ideas and faculties
are closely connected. Thanks to our faculties we are furnished with ideas and
capable of processing these ideas; and ideas are the objects which our faculties
have ‘to do with’. Thirdly, there is a preoccupation with method that is intimately
connected with both ideas and faculties. The problem of method comes down to
the question of how we can best use our faculties in our pursuit of either certain or
probable knowledge. The kind of method to be used depends on the kind of ideas
that are presented to our mental faculties. In the case of modes the paradigmatic
method is that of mathematics and in the case of ideas of material substances or
of our own understanding, the preferred approach is the plain historical method
of Sydenhamian medicine. The result is a logic that is less formal, that is more
subject-oriented and that is focused more on epistemological and psychological
questions than on what Locke in his Conduct described as the ‘Logic now in
use’.206 His logic is a ‘logic of ideas’.207
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
 For the term ‘logic of ideas’, cf. Yolton, ‘Locke and the Seventeenth-Century Logic of Ideas’,
passim. Cf. Buickerood, ‘The Natural History of the Understanding’, passim, who instead
uses the term ‘facultive logic’, which is plausible, given the close connection between ideas
and faculties. However, in Locke’s logic the accent is rather on the former than on the latter.
For an exemple of what with more justice could be called a ‘facultative logic’ see below, §,
in my discussion of Malebranche.
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The Conduct forms an integral part of Locke’s logic of ideas. It presents a
discussion of the nature of the two kinds of error that are relevant to the two
phases of his logic and gives causes for these errors and suggestions for prevention
and remedy. Now that the Conduct is presented as part of Locke’s logic, we must
come back to the undeniable presence of pedagogical aspects in this work. The
new logic possessed some features that caused a blurring of the line by which it was
separated from strictly pedagogical treatises. In its protest against the syllogistic
subtleties of scholastic logicians it was informal to an aggressive degree. As a
result it lost most of the technical characteristics that had set it apart from other
disciplines. Moreover, Locke’s eminently practical outlook did not allow him to
confine himself to an analysis of the nature and causes of errors. He felt obliged to
continue with advice on how to prevent and cure them. He was not only interested
in understanding the understanding but also in how to conduct it. This caused
him to cover subjects in the Conduct that he had already treated more fully in his
more exclusively pedagogical Education. However, in this respect the Conduct is
not unique. In the Essay a similar reflex had made him cross the thin line between
his new logic and pedagogy. When he describes the dangerous phenomenon of
wrong association of ideas he continues with the exhortation ‘that those who
have Children, or the charge of their Education, would think it worth their while
diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue Connexion of Ideas in the
Minds of young People’.208 Most of Locke’s manifold pedagogical thoughts were
not original. Classical authors, especially Aristotle, and later writers as Montaigne
and Comenius, Englishmen such as Francis Bacon, George Puttenham (c. -
), Richard Mulcaster (c. -), Samuel Hartlib (c. -) and John
Milton (-), as well as French authors who were Locke’s contemporaries,
have all been suggested as sources of influence.209 However, in the Essay and
the Conduct, much more than in Education, Locke’s educational views, whether
original or not, are presented in the specific context of his logic of ideas. This logic
was not developed de novo. In the next section Locke’s logic of ideas in general
and the Conduct in particular will be placed in the even wider context of the
content and structure of works by both Aristotelian and Cartesian predecessors.
 Essay, II.xxxiii.: .
 Cf. Smith, ‘Some Ideas on Education before Locke’, passim; Mason, ‘The Literary Sources
of John Locke’s Educational Thoughts’, passim; Yolton, ‘Introduction’ to Education, passim;
and Stone, review of this Yolton-edition, passim.
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. Aristotelian textbook writers
Locke’s years as student and tutor in Oxford had offered him ample opportunity
to become acquainted with Aristotelian logic. However, his repeatedly evoked
spectre of the old logic (like that of innate ideas) is partly a caricature of his
own making. At the beginning of the seventeenth century key disciplines in the
Aristotelian tradition such as logic, physics and metaphysics, had already ceased
to be the chief studies at Oxford (and at Cambridge as well). Nor was reading
confined to commentators on Aristotle. Rather, the curriculum had acquired a
distinctly humanistic tincture that showed especially in the attention given to
language and literature. In the English Renaissance Thomas Elyot (c. -),
Roger Ascham (-) and Puttenham had given new actuality to the rhetorical
works of Cicero and Quintilian.210 Logic was still an important element of the
undergraduate curriculum at Oxford, but had to share this role with the other
parts of the trivium (rhetoric and grammar) and also with moral philosophy,
political philosophy, geometry and music. A large influx of upper-class students,
who mostly felt no need to graduate, had prompted educators to include many
subjects in the undergraduate curriculum. The inclusion of a wide range of topics
in this programme had partly been made possible by a transformation in the
grammar schools. These had started to produce students who were well versed
in Latin and Greek and who had often already received a grounding in logic and
rhetoric before they went up to Oxford or Cambridge.
Humanist attacks on the highly specialized and technical character of tra-
ditional logic were not only matched by a change in its relative weight vis-à-vis
the other parts of the trivium, but also by changes in its perceived function. Its
value for generating new truths from given truths was under increasing attack,
especially in the freshly developing field of natural philosophy; this was the point
of Bacon in his preface to the Instauratio Magna in the passage quoted by Locke in
the Conduct (pars. -). Bacon attacked traditional logic because it ‘comes very far
short of the subtilty in the reall performances of nature’.211 However, in the same
passage he still gives it a function ‘in civil affairs and the Arts which consisted
in talke and opinion’. Whereas many scholastic philosophers had valued logic as
a science that was capable of generating new knowledge, many scholars with a
humanistic background tended to regard logic as an instrumental art that helped
 On the role of rhetoric in Renaissance Britain, cf. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the
Philosophy of Hobbes, pp. -.
 Cf. Tyacke, ‘Introduction’, to The History of the University of Oxford, Vol. IV, p. : ‘that the
attacks on logic by seventeenth-century contemporaries were largely confined to the realm
of natural philosophy’.
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pupils in directing their minds and in organising knowledge they had already
acquired by other means. Although logic thus gained a new relevance due to its
perceived capability of forming the minds of the young, it had to share this role
with mathematics. Given their role of propaedeutic studies which should foster
the primary mental skills of young students, it is not surprising that both logic
and mathematics were placed in the first years of the curriculum.212
This short sketch shows that the term ‘Aristotelian logic’ refers to a discipline
that was rather more adaptable than Locke himself was prepared to acknowledge.
His educational aims, especially that of a formal training of our mental faculties,
were already announced by what by then was perceived as the function of logic in
seventeenth-century Oxford: that of training the minds of young students. For
most contemporaries of Locke (and also for many of his successors) there was no
conflict between the contribution of traditional Aristotelian logic and that of the
freshly reinvigorated discipline of mathematics towards this same instrumental
goal. For example, although Thomas Sprat (-), founding member of the
Royal Society, denied the usefulness of Aristotelian logic in the generation of new
knowledge, he at the same time acknowledged that disputing, a favourite activity
of traditional logicians, ‘is a very good instrument, to sharpen mens wits, and
to make them versatil, and wary defenders of the Principles, which they already
know …’213 If Locke showed more aggression here, this was because he wanted
to supplant Aristotelian logic with his own logic.
The Bodleian Library MS Locke f., fols. v.-, gives us some information
about the Peripatetic works on logic that Locke is likely to have been acquainted
with. It is a small booklet with accounts of money received from and disbursed
for his pupils from  to , when he was Tutor at Christ Church. Amongst
items such as shoes, stockings, wood and chamber pots, Locke also entered the
authors of the books that were bought for the students under his supervision. He
gives three specific references to works on logic: ‘Du Trieu’s Logick’, ‘Sandersons
Logick’ and ‘Smith’s Logic’.214 In addition he gives some names of authors that
are known to have written works on logic, without mentioning, however, the
title of these works: Martin Smiglecki (-),215 John Flavell (-),216
 Cf. Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, passim.
 Sprat, History of the Royal-Society, p. .
 MS Locke f., resp. fol. r, v and again v.
 MS Locke f., fol. r and again fol. v. Smiglecius, Logica.
 MS Locke f., fol. v. Flavel, Tractatus de demonstratione methodicus et polemicus.
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Griffith Powell (-)217 and, most famous, Jacobus Zabarella (-).218
My discussion will concentrate on Du Trieu, Sanderson and Smith; their works
are mentioned by name and in addition these are works on logic in general,
which is important if we want to gain insight in structural developments. The
names entered by Locke in his booklet reflect the then common preponderance
in Oxford of contemporary authors of textbooks over the works of mediaeval
logicians or Aristotle’s Organon itself. The use of compendia was the consequence
of the limited role of logic in an undergraduate curriculum that was filled with
many other subjects. These compendia can be seen as answers, often quite apt,
to changed curricular circumstances and their authors should not necessarily be
considered ‘second-rate or worse’.219
By the seventeenth century Aristotelian textbooks had become imbued with
numerous mediaeval and some stoic elements. However, their basic content and
structure was still largely in accordance with Aristotle’s logic itself. The order
of his logical works as it has come down to posterity is probably based on
editorial interventions by Andronicus of Rhodes (b. First Century BC),220 while
the collective name Organon (‘instrument’ of science) has been used since about
 AD.221 The first book of the Organon is the Categories, which treats of simple
terms: subjects and predicates. In De interpretatione the core subject is that of the
propositionswhich are formed by these terms. Propositions in their turn form the
elements of syllogisms, which are treated in both Analytics. The Analytica priora
gives a formal analysis of the structure of syllogisms in general. The Analytica
posteriora is about the type of syllogisms that are used for a demonstration or
scientific proof, and discusses themes related to the philosophy of science and
to scientific method (e.g. the question of how we can find the first principles of
the different sciences). The Topica is on dialectics, and deals with the practice of
reasoning on probable rather than scientific or certain premises. Finally there is De
sophisticis elenchis, which has the same theme as the Conduct, namely that of error.
Sophistical arguments have the appearance of being good dialectical arguments,
but in fact their premises or the deductions based on these premises are wrong.
So, Aristotle’s logic is structured into three levels: terms (subjects and predicates),
 MS Locke f., fol. v. Powel, Analysis lib. Aristotelis De sophisticis and id., Analysis analyti-
corum posteriorum sive librorum Aristotelis de Demonstratione.
 MS Locke f., fol. r (more on Zabarella below).
 Milton, ‘The Scholastic Background to Locke’s Thought’, p. : ‘Most of the [scholastic]
authors whom Locke read were second-rate or worse.’
 Barnes, ‘Life and Work’, pp. -.
 E. S. Forster, ‘Introduction’ to Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, p. .
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propositions and syllogisms. Syllogisms can be demonstrative (certain), dialectical
(probable) or sophistical (contentious).
Philippe du Trieu’s (-) Manuductio ad logicam, sive dialectica, studiosæ
iuventuti ad logicam præparandæ is a textbook that was wide-spread and that went
through at least  editions.222 The Jesuit Du Trieu taught philosophy in the
French town of Anzin (near Valenciennes). Locke owned a copy of the Manuductio
himself.223 In addition, the Bodleian collection of Locke’s manuscripts contains
a notebook that is partly filled with notes on the Manuductio. However, it is
uncertain whether these notes are in Locke’s own hand.224 Du Trieu never forgets
that he is writing for propaedeutic students and tries to give a simple introduction
to logic.225 The structure of his work faithfully mirrors that of the Organon:226




This division reflects the tripartite structure of Aristotle’s logic: term (terminus) —
proposition (enuntiatio) — syllogism. The third treatise discusses demonstrative
syllogisms and the fourth treats of dialectical and sophistical syllogisms. Du Trieu’s
treatment of error follows the basic division made by Aristotle in De sophisticis
elenchis,227 between refutations that depend on speech and refutations that are
independent of speech. This holds true also for the subsequent subdivisions.228
However, all this does not imply that Du Trieu gives something like a direct
summary of the Organon; his Manuductio is the product of a scholastic tradition
in which, for example, his skipping methodological problems was not at all
unusual.
The Aditus ad logicam in usum eorum qui primò Academiam Salutant ()
by Samuel Smith (-) of Magdalen College, Oxford, presents a more
 Risse, Logik, I, p. , n. . Inspected copy is from .
 Harrison/Laslett, nr. , p. .
 MS Locke f., fols. -, covers the Manuductio from the start up to and including Tract. II,
Pt. I, Capt. iii, Art. i; cf. Kenney, John Locke and the Oxford Training, pp. - and Milton,
‘The Scholastic Background to Locke’s Thought’, p. .
 Op. cit. ‘Ad lectorem’, fol. v: ‘memor me tironibus scribere’
 Du Trieu, Manuductio, ‘Ad lectorem’, fol. r: ‘Ordinem Aristotelis ferè sequor’
 Op. cit.  b-b.
 Manuductio, Tract. IV, Pars Post., Ch.  ‘De fallaciis in dictione’, pp. -, discusses ‘fallacia
Æquiuocationis, Amphiboliæ, Compositionis & Diuisionis, Accentus, Figuræ dictionis’;
ibid. Ch.  ‘De fallaciis extra dictionem’, pp. -, treats of ‘fallacia accidentis, Dicti
secundùm quid & dicti simpliciter, Ignorationis elenchi, Consequentis, Petitionis principij,
Non causæ ut causæ, Plurium interrogationum ut vnius’.
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interesting case.229 Its division into three books (all without titles) is conventional
enough: I. terms (voces simplices); II. propositions (voces complexæ); III. syllogisms
(including demonstrative, topical and sophistic syllogisms). The discussion of
sophisms is along the lines of the conventional distinction between fallacies
within speech and fallacies that are independent of speech. However, the Aditus
gives attention to a subject that is absent in the Manuductio: that of method. The
last part of Book III contains a brief section on order. The subject of order is
presented as a natural sequel to that of syllogistic reasoning; both are a part of
discourse, although they present different levels:
In the same way as syllogistic discourse teaches how to demonstrate one thing by means
of another, discourse that is concerned with order shows how the definitions, divisions
and other parts of any art or science are properly connected one with the other, so that
some precede and others follow.230
‘Order’ can also be called ‘method’; in Smith’s rendering both terms refer more
to the arranging of existing knowledge than to the generation of new knowledge.
He continues the above quotation:
This is commonly called order or method; indeed we use both names indiscriminately
where things are thereby arranged in such a way that we become acquainted with them
more easily.231
The process of ordering can proceed in two different directions. The first is
synthetical or compositive and goes from principles to conclusions. The second
is analytical or resolutive and goes backward from conclusions to the principles
from which these have been inferred.232 The subject of method with the logical
text as its locus had been revived in the sixteenth century by Petrus Ramus (-
) and Zabarella. Ramus had ended his Libri Scholarum dialecticarum with a
book on method, which for him consisted mainly in a (dichotomous) ordering
of existing bodies of knowledge; thus the book on method is called aptly ‘de
Elenchis dispositionis’.233 However, in Zabarella’s De methodis libri quatuor we
 Copy examined is from .
 Op. cit. Bk. III, Sec. iii, p. : ‘Sicut discursus illativus aliud ex alio probare docet, ita
ordinativus ostendit, quomodo definitiones, divisiones, & reliquæ partes cujuslibet artis aut
scientiæ rectè inter se connectantur, ut aliæ præcedant, aliæ consequantur.’
 Op. cit. Bk. III, Sec. iii, p. : ‘Hic vulgò ordo aut Methodus vocatur: ambo enim vocabula
nos promiscuè usurpamus, quatenus per illa res disponuntur, ut facilius eas cognoscamus’;
cf. ibid. Bk. III, Sec. i, Ch. , p. -: ‘Ordinans est cum intellectus humanus ab una parte
doctrinæ ad aliam procedit, adminiculo præceptorum Ordinis & Methodi’.
 Op. cit. Bk. III, Ch. i, p. -.
 Op. cit. Bk. XX, Ch. i, in: Scholæ in liberales artes, col. . On Ramus’ preference for
dichotomous keying, cf. Jardine, ‘Humanistic logic’, p. -.
context 
find, in addition to a discussion of the disposition of entire bodies of existing
knowledge, an examination of methods for finding and proving the answers for
individual new problems by methodus demonstrativa and methodus resolutiva.234
Smith’s concern for order shows the influence of Ramus and his distinction
between compositive and resolutive that of Zabarella.
A second point of interest in the Aditus is that it provides us with an early
glimpse of a subject-oriented understanding of this discipline. This is how Smith
opens the first section of his third book:
In the first book we discussed simple terms and in the second book complex terms,
where the former guide the first and the latter guide the second operation of the mind;
what remains is the third part of logic, which guides the third operation of the mind
and is called discourse.235
However, not too much should be made of Smith’s division of logic into three
acts of the mind. It did not change the established division of logic into terms,
propositions and syllogisms. The possibility of building this division around
our intellectus operationes had been discussed already in the sixteenth century by
Zabarella in his De natura logicæ.236 In the case of Smith, the sporadic mentioning
of this principleof organisation does not have any consequences for the traditional
content of his Aristotelian logic.
Thirdly, the Aditus might be taken to pay an early tribute to what was to be
another important theme in Locke’s logic of ideas, that of probable knowledge.
Smith defines logic as ‘the science of discoursing probably and closely on any
subject’.237 However, his reason for giving this definition is anything but forward
looking. Logic is the art of disputation; and about things that are certain, there
can be no disputes, so logic must be about things that can only be probable.238
Yet Smith does not seem to take this argument very seriously himself. When he
starts his discussion of demonstrative reasoning in the second section of Book III,
 Op. cit. Bk. III, Ch. ii, col. : ‘Ordo totam scientiam respicit, methodus verò problemata
singula’.
 Op. cit. p. : ‘In primo libro de vocibus simplicibus, in secundo de complexis egimus,
quatenus per illas prima, per has secunda mentis operatio dirigitur; restat jam tertia Logicæ
pars tertiam mentis operationem dirigens, quæ vocatur Discursus.’
 Op. cit. Bk. II, Ch. ii, in: Opera logica, col. ; for earlier instances see Ashworth, ‘Introduc-
tion’ to Sanderson, Logicæ artis compendium, pp. xli-xlii.
 Op. cit. Bk. I, Ch. i, p. : ‘Logica est Scientia de quovis themate probabiliter, & angustè
disserendi.’
 Op. cit. Bk. I, Ch. i, pp. -.
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he immediately points out that it has a necessary or apodictic — and thus not a
probable — character.239
The Logicæ Artis Compendium ()240 by Robert Sanderson (-),
Bishop of Lincoln (-), was the most popular textbook on logic in
seventeenth-century England.241 Locke mentions Sanderson in a letter to W.
Molyneux as someone who owed his mastery of Latin to repeated readings of
Cicero.242 Locke owned a copy of the Compendium and also two other works243
by the same author. He had probably known Sanderson personally. The Bishop
was an important source of influence on Locke’s early Essays on the Law of Nature
(written shortly after ).244 As is the case with Du Trieu and Smith, Sander-
son’s logic remains firmly within Peripatetic bounds, and in the first appendix the
author gives generous praise to the medium that was to be mercilessly attacked
by Locke: that of the disputation.245 The Compendium is organized according to
the familiar tripartite division of terms–propositions–syllogisms:
I. De Simplicibus Terminis
II. De Propositionibus
III. De Discursu
The last part comprises a discussion of demonstrative, topical and sophistical
syllogisms. The discussion of the last category is again according to the Aristotelian
division into fallacies that are dependent on speech and fallacies that are not. The
third part ends with some cursory remarks on ‘Ordo seu Methodus’. Sanderson
remarks that some authors assign to method a function that is distinct from
ordering: that of inferring. However, for him (like Smith) this point is of little
interest. According to Sanderson, method is a device for ordering rather than for
generating new knowledge.246
 Op. cit. Bk. III, Sect. II, Ch. i, p. ; also: ibid. Bk. III, Sect. II, Ch. iii, p. .
 Inspected copy is from .
 Ashworth, ‘Introduction’ to Sanderson’s Logicæ artis compendium, p. xvi. Locke’s entry
‘Sandersons Logick’ is ambiguous, in so far as there circulated in England a text on logic by
another Sanderson, whose first name was John: the Institutionum dialecticarum libri quatuor
(). However, this book was less well known than the work by Robert Sanderson, and it
does not have the word ‘logic’ in the title.
 Corr. , V, p. ,  July .
 De juramenti promissorii obligatione prælectiones septem and De obligatione Conscientiæ, nos.
 and  in Harrison/Laslett, p. .
 von Leyden, ‘Introduction’ to Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, pp. -.
 Op. cit. ‘Appendix Prima’, Ch. , pp. - (a new sequence of page numbers starts from
the first appendix onwards).
 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. , pp. -: ‘Qui accuratiùs ista [Ordo seu Methodus] distinguunt,
Ordinem volunt esse integræ alicujus disciplinæ, Methodus etiam particularium conclu-
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Sanderson shows humanist influences in his definition of logic; it is not a sci-
ence but an ‘instrumental art that guides our mind in becoming acquainted with
everything intelligible’.247 Corresponding to this view of logic as an instrument in
directing our minds is his likening of the three principal parts of logic to the three
principal activities of the mind: the conception of simple terms; the composition
and division of propositions; and argumentation and method, the instruments
of discourse. However, as is the case with Smith, for Sanderson this appreciation
of a psychological side of logic has no consequences for its conventional content
nor for its equally conventional division into three parts. At least, this holds true
for the main text of the Compendium. The second appendix is more interesting,
since its first chapter comes closer to an attention for the faculties of the mind in a
logical context than anything that can be found in either Du Trieu or Smith. The
title of this chapter is ‘De Quinque Habitibus mentis’, ‘On the five states of the
mind’. Different disciplines require different mental states248 and it is important
to have a knowledge of these states, of which there are five: knowledge of prin-
ciples (intellectus principiorum), pertaining to philosophical knowledge; science
(scientia); wisdom (sapientia), all needed for forms of speculative knowledge; pru-
dence (prudencia); and art (ars), both required for forms of practical knowledge.
The first state is required for the knowledge of causes while the remaining four
are required for the knowledge of different kinds of consequences.
Sanderson draws consequences from his explicit attention to mental states
as a factor in the acquisition of knowledge that we have encountered already
much more extensively in Locke’s logic of ideas. First, Sanderson points to the
importance of repetitive exercise when he declares that mental states are qualities
that must be acquired by ‘many actions’.249 Second, there is the acknowledgement
that in this context errors are not to be sought in the reasonings of adversaries,
but in the workings of our own mind. He points out that error itself is a mental
state: ‘Error is a state by which the mind is inclined to assent without fear of
sionum; atque Ordinem disponere, Methodum etiam inferre: Nos vtrumque habemus pro
eodem. Est autem Ordo, seu Methodus, ratio ita disponendi partis alicuis Disciplinæ vel
Tractationis ut facillimè à nobis integra discatur’.
 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. , p. : ‘ars instrumentalis, dirigens mentem nostram in cognitionem
omnium intelligibilium’; also: ‘Appendix Prima’, p. ; and ‘Appendix Posterior’, p. :
‘Logica rationem dirigit, & ordinatur ad intellectum perficiendum …’ Cf. Smith, above,
who defines logic not as an art but as a science.
 Op. cit. ‘Appendix posterior’, pp. -: ‘Nulla potest tractatio ritè institui, nisi ad propriam
suam Disciplinam revocetur; nec Disciplinæ dextrè distingui ab invicem, nisi priùs constet
ad quem habitum mentis quæque sit referenda.’
 Op. cit. ‘Appendixposterior’, p. : ‘Est autem Habitus mentis, qualitas actionibus acquisita,
per quam intellectus proximè disponitur ad assentiendum alicui veritati infallibiliter.’
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what is false’.250 Thus he seems to present an important argument for the use
of a logic that examines our mental states. However, at the beginning of the
chapter Sanderson declares that his remarks on mental states do not belong to
logic proper. The chapter is part of an appendix that has been given the extremely
noncommittal title of ‘Miscella’. In addition, it is telling that for his enumeration
of five mental states he does not draw on Aristotle’s Organon, but on a passage
in the Ethica nicomachea.251 Still, the fact remains that Sanderson includes this
subject in a textbook on logic, if only in an appendix. He hopes that although
this general subject does not belong to logic proper, it may be of use to young
students.252 This may be an expression of his opinionconcerningthe instrumental
function of logic as a general art that is supposed to direct and order the intellect.
Sanderson was influenced by the trend of a growing attention to psychological
and epistemological aspects within logic, but had not yet reached a verdict on
the best place for these subjects within the frame of an Aristotelian textbook on
logic.
To summarize, the logics of Du Trieu, Smith and Sanderson have a tripartite
structure that reflects the main levels in Aristotle’s logic: those of terms, propo-
sitions and syllogisms. The content of their works remains largely conventional,
but some elements, such as a casual treatment of methodological problems, a
passing glance at probable knowledge and a limited interest in a more subject
oriented logic, point to future developments. Finally, Sanderson’s treatment of
mental states in an appendix entitled ‘Miscella’ calls attention to a problem that
was to gain increasing relevance: that of the relation between traditional structure
and novel content.
 Op. cit. ‘Appendix posterior’, p. : ‘Error est habitus, quo mens inclinatur ad assentiendum
sine formidine falsitati.’
 Op. cit. .. b-: ‘\°òŒÀíåîïØ ïsî îö'åî ðåòd Æôî ðÀìØî ìÛçöíåî. óôö äc ïx÷
ìŁ'åàåØ  ªøłc ôÿ ºÆôÆæÀîÆØ j aðïæÀîÆØ, ðÛîôå ôeî òØ'íÞîfl ôÆôÆ äÕ óôd ôÛłîŁ
ðØóôÜíŁ æòÞîŁóØ÷ óïæÝÆ îï÷fl ðïìŁªåØ çaò ºÆd äÞŒFŁ îäÛłåôÆØ äØÆªåàäåó'ÆØ’,
‘Let us begin, then, from the beginning,and discuss these states once more. Let it be assumed
that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are
five in number, i.e. art, knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, comprehension;
for belief and opinion may be mistaken’, transl. Barnes, II, p. .
 Op. cit. ‘Appendix posterior’, p. : ‘Appendicem hanc Miscella quædam generalia com-
plectentem (illa quidem pleraque non propriè Logica, sed quæ tamen juvenibus studiosis




The logical textbooks that Locke had first prescribed, and later came to vilify,
foreshadow some elements of his informal logic. Moreover, these scholastic works
provided both context and point of departure for subsequent structural changes.
However, we must turn to Descartes as the most influential philosopher in
developing each of the main characteristics of the content of the new logic. In her
letter of  January , containing biographical information about Locke that
Jean le Clerc was to use for his ‘Eloge’, Damaris Masham wrote:
The first Books (as Mr Locke himself has told me) which gave him a relish of Philosoph-
ical Studys were those of Descartes He was rejoyced in reading of these because tho’ he
very often differ’d in Opinion from this Writer, he yet found that what he said was very
intelligible: from whence he was incourag’d to think That his not haveing understood
others, had, possibly, not proceeded altogether from a defect in his Understanding253
Locke possessed the principal works of Descartes as well as an edition of his
correspondence.254 During his stay in France he had made a detailed list of the
Frenchman’s works in his Journal ( August ).255 On  March , between
two observations about a female patient suffering from ‘a violent loosnesse’, he
even entered a more comprehensive ‘Methode pour bien etudier la doctrine de
Mr de Cartes’, advising readers to start with the Discours de la méthode while also
giving the works of some well-known Cartesian philosophers.256 Locke was not
only indebted to Descartes for much of the positive part of his logic, but also
for the pars destruens. The privileged position of the syllogism had been under
fierce attack ever since the Renaissance, and its most prominent critics before
Locke had been Francis Bacon and Descartes. Locke’s point that syllogisms are
based merely on words and that the Aristotelians fail to check the correspondence
between words and things, had already been made by Bacon.257 Furthermore,
the assertion that the syllogism is first of all an expository device that does not
add much in the way of finding new knowledge was already put forward by both
Bacon and Descartes.258 Next, we have seen Locke making the explicit charge of
 Amsterdam University Library, MS R.K., J a (no page numbers).
 Harrison/Laslett, nos. a-, pp. -.
 MS Locke f., pp. -.
 MS Locke f., pp. -; transcribed in: Locke, An Early Draft, pp. -.
 De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, V, ii, in: Works, I, p. : ‘Nam syllogismi ex proposi-
tionibus consistunt; propositiones ex verbis; verba notionum tesseræ sunt; quare si notiones
ipsæ (quæ verborum animæ sunt) male et varie a rebus abstrahuntur, tota fabrica corruit’;
cf. Novum Organum, Aph. xiii and xiv, in: Works, I, p. .
 Bacon, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, V, ii, in: Works, I, p. -; Descartes, Discours
de la méthode, Pt. II, AT VI, p. : ‘ie pris garde que, pour la Logique, ses syllogismes & la
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the circular character of syllogisms; if they do not give rise to new knowledge, this
is because they are not the source but only the product of new knowledge. The
same complaint is made by Descartes in his Regulae ad directionem ingenii (of
which the very title prefigures Of the Conduct of the Understanding).259 Finally,
Locke echoes Descartes in his way of deriding the unnecessary artificial character
of syllogisms. However, this last point is explained best when we look at the
influence of Descartes on the positive side of Locke’s logic of ideas.
The trend towards a deeper interest in the epistemological and psychological
aspects of human cognition that had announced itself in some of the logical
textbooks that Locke had prescribed, was developed more forcefully in the novel
systems of decidedly anti-scholastic thinkers in the seventeenth century. In his
Regulæ Descartes writes about the importance of surveying our instruments of
knowledge as an important step in the development of his new method.260
The most important of these instruments is the intellect, to which are added
imagination, sense-perception and memory.261 In what has been dubbed his
‘facultative model’,262 the laws of logic are dictated by the laws of thought, rather
than the other way round. This orientation forms the background for Descartes’s
attack on the artificial character of Aristotelian logic. According to Descartes, the
main weakness of Aristotelian formal logic was its inability to reflect the natural
powers of our mental faculties, which left to themselves are quite able to make a
correct inference. This is thanks to what he called our lumen naturale or intuitus,
by which he did not understand
… the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgement of the imagination
as it botches things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so
easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding.
pluspart de ses autres instructions seruent plutost a expliquer a autruy les choses qu’on sçait,
ou mesme, comme l’art de Lulle, a parler, sans iugement, de celles qu’on ignore, qu’a les
apprendre’.
 Op. cit. Rule X, AT X, p. : ‘nullum posse Dialecticos syllogismum arte formare, qui
verum concludat, nisi priùs ejusdem materiam habuerint, id est, nisi eandem veritatem, quæ
in illo deducitur, jam antè cognoverint’. The Regulæ were not published in the Latin version
in which they were originally written until , but during the time that Locke was working
on his Essay, its contents may very well have been available to him; manuscript copies are
known to have circulated in the Netherlands and France, a Dutch translation was published
in  (Locke was able to read Dutch), and the Second Edition (and subsequent editions)
of the Logique of Port-Royal () contained substantial passages based on this work. Cf.
‘Avertissement’ to the Regulæ, AT X, pp. - and Bonno, Les Relations intellectuelles, p.
.
 Descartes, Regulæ, Regula VIII, AT X, p. .
 Descartes, Regulæ, Regula XII, AT X, p. .
 Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic, p. .
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Alternatively, and this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception
of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason. Because it
is simpler, it is more certain than deduction, though deduction, as we noted above, is
not something a man can perform wrongly.263
It is thanks to this intuitus that he knows that he exists, that he thinks and that
a triangle is bound by just three sides and a sphere by a single surface.264 Locke
has much the same confidence in our ‘native rustick Reason’.265 He seems to
be echoing Descartes when he writes about intuition: ‘This part of Knowledge
is irresistible, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be
perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room
for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with
the clear Light of it.’266 It is thanks to this natural ease by which the process
of inference can be accomplished that errors of the second kind, concerning
inference, are to be feared less than errors of the first kind, concerning the basis
of inference, i.e. our ideas. The important place of intuition is an instance of the
trend towards a more subject oriented logic. Instead of trying to convince others
by discursive means, the goal of the logic of ideas was personal assurance.267
The use of ‘idea’ in the seventeenth century, the key concept in the logic of
ideas, can in most cases be traced back to its (re)introduction by Descartes.268
Rather than making a comprehensive comparison between the ways in which this
term was used by Descartes and Locke, I shall focus on one vital aspect: that of
clearness and distinctness. Descartes had stressed the importance of starting our
reasonings with concepts that are analysed to such a degree that they are clear
 Descartes, Regulæ, Regula III, AT X, p. : ‘Per intuitum intelligo, non fluctuantem sensuum
fidem, vel malè componentis imaginationis judicium fallax; sed mentis puræ & attentæ tam
facilem distinctumque conceptum, vt de eo, quod intelligimus, nulla prorsus dubitatio
relinquatur; seu, quod idem est, mentis puræ et attentæ non dubium conceptum, qui à solâ
rationis luce nascitur, & ipsâmet deductione certior est, quia simplicior, quam tamen etiam
ab homine malè fieri non posse suprà notavimus’, transl. CSM, I, p. .
 Descartes, Regulæ, Regula III, AT X, p. .
 Essay, IV.xvii.: .
 Essay, IV.ii.: .
 Cf. Gaukroger, Cartesian logic, p. - and Kennedy, ‘The Alliance between Puritanism
and Cartesian Logic’, p. -.
 Cf. Nuchelmans, ‘Logic in the Seventeenth Century’, p. . The use of ideas in a theory of
language, as a third element together with words and things existing outside us, was by no
means new. Many scholastic authors used a similar triad consisting of words, concepts and
things. However, their opinions tended to diverge about the exact relation between these
elements; cf. Ashworth, ‘“Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?”’, pp. -. The triad of
words, concepts and things is not mentioned in Du Trieu’s Manuductio and only very briefly
in Smith’s Aditus, Bk. I, Ch. , p.  and Sanderson’s Compendium, Pt. I, Ch. , p. .
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and distinct, and we have already addressed the same point in Locke’s philosophy
(above, §). However, Descartes and Locke give different thrusts to the criterion
of clarity and distinctness. Descartes’s prime objective is to chase away the spectre
of scepticism. Clear and distinct ideas have the vital function of bridging the gap
between what we think and what exists outside our mind. Thus, at the start of the
Third of his Meditationes Descartes thinks that he can ‘… lay it down as a general
rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true’.269 Clearness and
distinctness is here doing a job that cannot be left to the senses. This point is
made in the quoted definition of intuitus; instead of setting his stakes on ‘the
fluctuating testimony of the senses’, Descartes confides in clear and distinct ideas
that proceed ‘solely from the light of reason’.
Against this, Locke does not think that the clarity and distinctness of ideas
can be used as a bridge to the existence of things, nor does he think that he needs
such a link. For him this function is performed by the senses, and we have noted
his testiness concerning scepticism about the relation between our ideas and their
sensory cause (see above, §).270 When speaking about the intuition of clear and
distinct ideas, Locke is primarily interested in another relation, that between an
idea and another idea; knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement
or disagreement of ideas. For Locke the relevance of intuition is not that it is a
power that gives us knowledge about the existence of things. For him intuition
is first of all a faculty that enables us to see that different ideas are not the same
and that the same ideas are not different and thus ‘… that White is not Black,
That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal to One
and Two’.271 Thus, in so far as clarity pertains to the relation between ideas and
things and distinctness to the relation between ideas (but see above, §), it can be
said that for Descartes the most relevant dimension of intuition is clarity while
for Locke this is distinctness.
Another aspect of Locke’s logic of ideas is its preoccupation with method.
Locke formulated, as noted earlier, two different methods, depending on the kind
of ideas he surveyed: a demonstrative method very much inspired by mathematics
for modes and his plain historical method coloured by his medical background
for material and mental substances. Descartes also espoused two methods, also
 Op. cit. AT VII, p. : ‘ac proinde jam videor pro regulâ generali posse statuere, illud omne
esse verum, quod valde clare & distincte percipio’.
 For the empiricist background to Locke’sconcept of intuitive knowledge, cf. Ayers, review of
Chappell, The Cambridge Companion to Locke in The Locke Newsletter, () pp. -.
 See Essay, IV.ii.: . For the different opinions of Descartes and Locke on the problem of
scepticsm, cf. Rogers, ‘Descartes and the Mind of Locke’, passim.
context 
depending on the objects under scrutiny. This may seem a surprising statement,
given the emphasis that Descartes puts on the unity of all knowledge. In the
preface to the French translation of his Principia philosophiæ he makes the well-
known comparison of his philosophic system with a tree, its roots forming his
metaphysics, its trunk his general physics and its branches individual disciplines:
medicine, mechanics and ethics.272
When speaking about his system as a whole, Descartes indeed stresses its
mathematical certainty. When he gives his famous four methodical rules in the
second part of his Discours he not only points out that they are modelled on the
‘long chains of reasonings’ of mathematicians, but also that these rules can provide
us with certainty about ‘all things that can fall under the knowledge of human
beings’.273 The Cartesian vision is that of one science, a mathesis universalis, with
one method.274 Whitin this general mathematical method, that was supposed to
have use outside the field of mathematics itself, Descartes made the Zabarellian
distinction between analytical and synthetical reasonings. In the Second Replies to
the Meditationes, Descartes explains that we can proceed either synthetically, and
start with general axioms from which we can deduce conclusions about particular
truths, or analytically and start with particular problems until we have arrived at
their constituent clear and distinct ideas.275 The first direction is most suited for
the proof of truths that we have already obtained and was used most typically in
traditional geometry. The second direction is especially apt for the discovery of
new truths and used with great success in Descartes’s analytical algebra. Locke did
not make an explicit distinction between analysis and synthesis, but he was well
aware of the difference in using our reason in discovering proofs and in proving
them (see above, §).276
 Op. cit. AT IX-B, p. : ‘Ainsi toute la Philosophie est comme vn arbre, dont les racines sont
la Metaphysique, le tronc est la Physique, & les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes
les autres sciences, qui se reduisent à trois principales, à sçavoir la Medicine, la Mechanique
& la Morale, j’entens la plus haute & la plus parfaite Morale, qui, presupposant vne entiere
connoissance des autres sciences, est le dernier degré de la Sagesse.’
 Op. cit. AT VI, p. : ‘Ces longues chaisnes de raisons, toutes simples & faciles, dont les
Geometres ont coustume de se seruir, pour paruenir a leurs plus difficiles demonstrations,
m’auoient donné occasion de m’imaginer que toutes les choses, qui peuuent tomber sous la
connoissance des hommes, s’entresuiuent en mesme façon …’
 Descartes, Regulæ, Rule IV, AT X, p. .
 Op. cit. AT VII, pp. -.
 Cf. the difference between the first and the second degree of reasoning, made in Essay,
IV.xvii.: .
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Although Descartes boasts that his philosophy contains no explanation ‘that
is not mathematical and evident’,277 the reality of his system belies the vision.
There is a rift running right through the middle of the Cartesian system, and
this has far-reaching methodological consequences. These can be appreciated by
first having a closer look at Descartes’s system as it was exposed in the Principia
philosophiæ (). In Part I he starts with the Archimedean point of his cogito.
The existence of his own spirit subsequently gives him assurances of the existence
of God thanks to whom we know that we are not deceived in the truth of our
clear and distinct ideas of immaterial things. From the metaphysical principles of
the existence of an immutable God, Descartes then deduces in Part II the general
principles of his mechanistic physics of matter in motion, comprising his three
Laws of Nature and the statement that nature has a corpuscular structure.278 The
exact way in which he deduces his Laws of Nature from God’s immutability need
not detain us here; the main point is that this deduction has an a priori character,
in the sense that it goes from cause (metaphysical principle) to effect (physical
principles) and that Descartes here completely omits sensory knowledge. Ideally,
Descartes would like to continue this, according to him, certain deduction by
deducing the explanation of ‘other things’ from his physical principles. However,
here his project grinds to a halt; the reason for this is given most clearly not in
the Principia, but in the Discours:
But I must also admit that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these
principles so simple and so general, that I notice hardly any particular effect of which I
do not know at once that it can be deduced from the principles in many different ways;
and my greatest difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways it depends on
them. I know no other means to discover this than by seeking further observations whose
outcomes vary according to which of these ways provides the correct explanation.279
 Letter to Plempius,  October , AT I, p. : ‘nempè, quod eo philosophandi genere
vtar, in quo nulla ratio est, quæ non sit mathematica & euidens …’
 Laws of Nature: Principia, II, xxxvii, xxxix, xl, AT VIII-A, pp. -; corpuscularism: ibid.
II, xxxiv, AT VIII-A, pp. -.
 Discours, AT VI, pp. -: ‘Mais il faut aussy que i’avouë, que la puissance de la Nature est
si ample & si vaste, & que ces Principes sont si simples & si generaux, que ie ne remarque
quasi plus aucun effect particulier, que d’abord ie ne connoisse qu’il peut en estre deduit
en plusieurs diuerses façons, & que ma plus grande difficulté est d’ordinaire de trouuer en
laquelle de ces façons il en depend. Car a cela ie ne sçay point d’autre expedient, que de
chercher derechef quelques experiences, qui soient telles, que leur euenement ne soit pas le
mesme, si c’est en l’vne de ses façons qu’on doit l’expliquer, que si c’est en l’autre’, transl. in
CSM, I, p. . For the contrast between ideal and reality in Cartesian method cf. Rogers,
‘Descartes and the Method of English Science’, pp. -.
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Descartes’s physical principles are so wide that it is possible to deduce more than
one explanation for each of the different physical phenomena. On this level of
his physics, the ideal method of geometrical a priori demonstration has to be
supplemented with a method that is a posteriori and that goes from effect to
cause with the help of sensual experience. On this level of the explanation of
the individual physical phenomena, treated in parts III and IV of the Principia,
Descartes uses theoretical models, which consist of hypotheses about the corpus-
cular micro-structure of nature that are illustrated by mechanical analogies with
objects on a visible macro-level. These models form part of a larger theory formed
by his Laws of Nature and are presented not as certain knowledge but as merely
plausible accounts of reality.280 On this level of the explanation of phenomena,
Descartes makes extensive use of sensory experience. This at least is the method
that he pretends to follow; in a letter to Huygens he even goes so far as saying
that he has checked his physical explanations with as many ‘experiences’ as there
are rules in his writings.281
So, Locke’s interest in method, and the choice of two kinds of methods, de-
pending on two main categories of objects, are present already in Descartes.
Descartes’s ideal of a geometrical demonstration, which he thought he had
brought into practice on the level of metaphysical and physical principles, is
to a large extent the method that Locke propounded for the analysis of modes.
Moreover, the importance of sensory experiences in Descartes’s ‘way of models’ is
at the heart of Locke’s historical method. However, the resemblances stop here.
Descartes wanted to use experiences as a means of testing the plausibility of the
hypotheses of his physical models. With these hypotheses he tried to bridge the
gap between the visible world and the invisible micro-structures of his corpuscu-
lar physics. Much of the polemic thrust in Locke’s historical method is directed
exactly against such ventures into the invisible. They form the background of his
dislike for hypotheses; in a letter to William Molyneux of  June  he wrote: ‘I
have always thought, that laying down, and building upon hypotheses, has been
one of the great hindrances of natural knowledge …’282 By insisting that we stick
to the level of the immediately observable, Locke’s historical method remains
 Cf. Schuurman, Principia en præcognita, pp. -.
 Letter of June , AT IV, pp. -: ‘Car i’admire que, nonobstant que i’aye demonstré,
en particulier, presque autant d’experiences qu’il y a de lignes en mes écrits, & qu’ayant
generalement rendu raison, dans mes Principes, de tous les Phainomenes de la nature, i’aye
expliqué, par mesme moyen, toutes les experiences qui peuuent estre faites touchant les cors
inanimez, & qu’au contraire on n’en ait iamais bien expliqué aucune par les principes de la
Philosophie vulgaire, ceux qui la suiuent ne laissent pas de m’obiecter le défaut d’experiences.’
 Corr. , VI, p. .
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much more in line with the common sense character of Aristotelian philosophy
than is the case with Descartes’s abstract physics of corpuscular matter in motion.
Another difference is that in practice Descartes, and even more so his followers,
emphasized his first method, while in practice Locke stressed his own second
method.
The two methods of both Descartes and Locke reflect a bipartition of the two
kinds of objects to which these methods were supposed to belong. Their divisions
are however not the same. Descartes’s bipartition runs, remarkably enough, right
through his physics. On one side of the line are the abstract principles of his
physics and on the other side are his explanations for the different phenomena
in nature. Locke’s division is more straightforward in the sense that the study of
modes is confined to the field of mathematics and to ethics, i.e. disciplines that
do not posit the existence of things outside us that correspond to the ideas we
have of them, while on the other hand this correspondence is assumed for ideas
of substances, which comprise the entire field of physics, without a distinction
between principles and phenomena. For Descartes, there is no fundamental
difference between the principles of physics and those of mathematics.283 For
Locke on the other hand, physics is an object of empirical investigation while
mathematics are not.
To sum up, it can be said that the main aspects of Locke’s logic of ideas
share vital characteristics with Descartes’s philosophy. Of course, Locke used his
analysis of our faculties and the way these faculties generated ideas, as an argument
against forms of innate knowledge:
For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the
Ideas of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to
receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no less unreasonable would it be
to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when
we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain Knowledge of
them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the mind.284
And Descartes and the Cartesians are generally taken to be the principle butt
of this attack. Nevertheless, Locke shared with Descartes some fundamental
preconceptions that formed a logic wide enough to accommodate either innate
knowledge or empirical knowledge. These similarities include the central place
 Principia, II, lxiv, AT VIII-A, p.  (in margin): ‘Non alia principia in Physicâ, quàm in
Geometricâ, vel in Mathesi abstractâ, à me admitti, nec optari …’; cf. Conversation with
Burman, AT V, p. .
 Essay, I.ii.: .
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given to clear and distinct ideas, a subject-oriented approach that is focussed on
our mental faculties, and the first of their two methods.
. The structure of Cartesian logic: Arnauld and Malebranche
The main points in Descartes’s logic of ideas were never brought together under
the name of ‘logic’ by the philosopher himself. He left that to his successors,
to some of whom we will turn now. La logique ou l’art de penser (), better
known as the Logique de Port-Royal, occupies in many ways an intermediary po-
sition between Locke and his Aristotelian predecessors. It was written by Antoine
Arnauld (-) and some collaborators, including Pierre Nicole (-).
During his second stay in France (-), Locke had read numerous French
philosophers, including works by Arnauld and Nicole.285 Locke owned various
editions of Nicole’s Essais de morale.286 Although this work, by its attention to the
force of passions and habits covers partly the same ground as the Conduct, there is,
typical enough in the case of Locke, little evidence for any direct borrowing by the
Englishman. Locke nevertheless produced a partial translation of this work that
he offered to Margaret, Countess of Shaftesbury, as ‘a new French production, in
a dress of my own making’.287
In France Locke bought a copy of the Logique.288 In the list of Cartesian
philosophers that he entered in his Journal on  March  (see above, §),
he describes the Logique (in far from impeccable French) as ‘un ouvrage les plus
accompli qui ait encore paru en ce genre’.289 The Logique proved indeed to be a
very successful work and it was frequently reprinted right from it first appearance
in . The author used these occasions to answer his critics by numerous
additions and changes, generally resulting in a softening of the bolder statements
in the First Edition.290 I use the edition of which Locke had a copy in his library,
i.e. the Paris  re-issue of the Fourth Edition of .291 The Logique is divided
into four parts:
I. Containing reflections on ideas, or the first action of the mind, which is called
conceiving.
II. Containing reflections people have made about their judgements.
 Bonno, Les relations intellectuelles, pp. - and Rogers, ‘The Writing of Locke’s Essay’,
p. .
 Harrison/Laslett, nr. a, p. .
 Nicole, Discourses, p. xxiii.
 Locke’s Journal of , MS Locke f., p. : ‘L’Art de penser ˚’.
 MS Locke f., p. .
 von Freytag Löringhoff, ‘Préface’ to [Arnauld], L’Art de Penser, Vol. I, p. vii.




The subject matter of the first three parts coincides roughly with each of the
three parts of the logic as treated in Aristotelian textbooks. However, some
significant developments can be detected. In the case of Smith and Sanderson,
the three main levels of logic were compared to three acts of the mind, without
any consequences for the content of the three corresponding books or parts. The
Logique on the other hand, while maintaining the format and much of the content
of an Aristotelian textbook, makes much larger strides towards a ‘facultative’ logic.
The title of each of the four books points to an operation of the mind: conceiving,
judging, reasoning and ordering. A novel orientation is already announced by the
subtitle of the work itself: l’art de penser. Logic is not the science of syllogisms
but an art meant to develop our mind by means of a better understanding of
this faculty. The aim of logic should not consist in teaching us technical tricks,
‘but in reflecting on what nature makes us do’,293 i.e. on what we are already
capable of without a prior immersion in Aristotelian logic. Mental activities can
be executed as well, and sometimes even better, by those who have not learnt any
rule of logic.294 The reflections that Arnauld proposes instead enable us, ‘by the
natural light of reason alone’, to discover and understand errors and faults in our
understanding.295
The first activity of the mind is that of conceiving. The direct individual
objects of this activity are not terms, but ideas. There is a revolutionary sub-
stitution of words by Cartesian ideas as the basic element of logic within the
format of a logical textbook immediately at the start of Part I: ‘As we can have no
knowledge of what is outside us except by means of the ideas in us, the reflections
we can make on our ideas are perhaps the most important part of logic, since they
 ‘I. Contenant les Reflexions sur les idées, ou sur la premiere action de l’esprit, qui s’appelle
concevoir. II. Contentenant les reflexions que les hommes on faites sur leur jugemens. III.
Du Raisonnement. IV. De la Methode.’ English translations of quotations from the Logique
are taken from Jill Vance Buroker, whose translation of the Fifth Edition () matches
with the quotations presented here from the Fourth Edition.
 Op. cit. p. : ‘Ainsi cét art ne consiste pas à trouuer le moyen de faire ces operations,
puisque la Nature seule nous le fournit en nous donnant la raison: mais à faire des reflexions
sur ce que la nature nous fait faire …’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. p. : ‘Tout cela se fait naturellement, & quelque-fois mieux par ceux qui n’ont
appris aucune regle de Logique, que par ceux qui les ont apprises’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p.
.
 Op. cit. p. : ‘Car il arrive souvent que l’on découvre par la seule lumiere naturelle qu’un
raisonnement est faux …’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. .
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are the foundation of everything else.’296 Although Arnauld does not explicitly
make clearness and distinctness a criterion of truth, he stresses the importance
of having clear and distinct ideas and of knowing which are and which are not
fulfilling this criterion.297 His prescription later on in the Logique of establishing
principles on clear and evident principles amounts to the first stage of a logic
of ideas, while that of giving subsequent proofs that are orderly and based only
upon these principles intimates the second stage.298 However, after the first part
on ideas, Arnauld does not continue with a second part on the combinations
of ideas. Rather, he continues with a conventional second part on propositions
and an equally conventional third part on syllogisms. Since propositions were
supposed to consist of terms and not of ideas, a second part on propositions does
not form a plausible continuation. Arnauld does not show much awareness of
this problem.299 Rather than giving a solution to the problem of the compati-
bility of ideas as the principal element of a newer logic and that of words as the
central element in the older logic, he simply stops talking about ideas after the
first paragraph of the second part and continues with words as the elements for
propositions (and propositions as elements for syllogisms in the third part). This
procedure confirms the transitory character of his Logique.
Like Descartes and unlike Locke, Arnauld denies that all ideas can be directly
or indirectly derived from the senses.300 For instance, our ideas of being and
of thinking have a non-sensory origin.301 Arnauld targets the senses as a major,
if not the only source of error.302 Error is indeed an important subject in the
Logique. In the first of the two introductory ‘Discours’, lack of attention, lack
of application, and wrongly used words are listed among the causes of error.303
Arnauld, in accordance with the new logic of ideas, makes a distinction between
errors of the first kind and errors of the second kind. As is the case with Locke,
he thinks that errors of the first kind are the most serious: ‘The majority of
people’s errors, as we have already said elsewhere, are caused rather by reasoning
 Op. cit. Pt. I, p. : ‘Comme nous ne pouvons avoir aucune connoissance de ce qui est hors
de nous, que par l’entremise des idées qui sont en nous, les reflexions que l’on peut faire sur
nos idées, sont peut-être ce qu’il y a de plus important dans la Logique, parce que c’est le
fondement de tout le reste’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. viii, p. .
 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. iii, p. .
 Locke’s solution for this problem would be to distinguish not only verbal but also mental
propositions; see below, §.
 Cf. Arnauld’s Des vrayes et des fausses idées, Ch. xxvii, ‘De l’origine des idées’, pp. -.
 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. i, pp. -.
 Op. cit. ‘Premier Discours’, p. .
 Op. cit. ‘Premier Discours’, p. -.
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based on false principles, than by reasoning incorrectly from their principles.’304
The most extensive discussion of error is given at the place where it was also
discussed by Du Trieu, Smith and Sanderson: at the end of Part III. Chapter
xviii is called ‘Different ways of reasoning badly, which are called sophisms’305
and contains much that can be traced back to Aristotle’s De sophisticis elenchis.
However, Arnauld is not very interested in the subject and does not bother to
discuss the full Aristotelian catalogue of sophistical errors, ‘… since some are so
obvious that they are not worth mentioning’.306 Rather, he adds another long
chapter, the last of Part III, where he concentrates not so much on the errors
by which we try to fool others, as on faults by which we lead ourselves astray:
‘Fallacies committed in everyday life and in ordinary discourse’.307 Some of the
errors that Arnauld gives here are of the kind that we have encountered already
in the Conduct, such as the role of our passions in causing our errors and the
fatal influence of believing on force of authority (although Arnauld is careful
to except the authority of the Catholic Church).308 As to the chapters in the
third part that precede his discussion of error, Arnauld’s critique of Aristotelian
syllogisms echoes Descartes and anticipates Locke: the old logic only proves what
we have come to know by other means already.309 However, Arnauld’s critique is
less one-sided than it had been in Descartes and would be in Locke. Syllogisms
are given a positive role in the exercise of our mind and in forestalling errors that
are made by inattentive minds.310
The fourth part of the Logique is on method. Whereas the topic of method was
not discussed at all by Du Trieu and very summarily by Smith and Sanderson at the
end or after the third part of their logic, it is deemed important enough by Arnauld
to give it a separate part. Arnauld presents method as a natural sequel to the
triad word/idea–proposition–syllogism. A syllogism forms one raisonnement, and
method is concerned with demonstration, which consists of various raisonnements
 Op. cit. Pt. III, p. : ‘La pluspart des erreurs des hommes, comme nous avons déja dit
ailleurs, viennent bien plus de ce qu’ils raissonnent sur de faux principes, que non pas de
ce qu’ils raisonnent mal suivant leurs principes’ (cf. ibid. ‘Premier Discours’, p. ), transl. is
after J. V. Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. ‘Des diverses especes de mal raisonner, que l’on appelle sophismes’, transl. J. V.
Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. xviii, pp. -: ‘… y en ayant quelques-vns de si grossiers qu’ils ne
meritent pas d’estre remarquez’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. ‘Des mauvais raisonnements que l’on commet dans la vie civile & dans les discours
ordinaires’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. xix, resp. pp. - and pp. -.
 Op. cit. Pt. I, Ch. iii, p. .
 Op. cit. Pt. III, pp. -.
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(a similar point had been made by Smith). The Port-Royal decision to include a
fourth part on method is in line with a trend that is present in other seventeenth-
century texts, in which the methodological tenets of Ramus and Zabarella can be
found in various degrees.311 A similar pattern is also followed by Thomas Hobbes
in the ‘Logica’ of his De Corpore ()312 and by Pierre Gassendi in his Institutio
Logica in Quator Partes Distributa ().313
Arnauld’s conception of method is heavily influenced by the paradigmatic
role given to mathematics by Descartes and also by Blaise Pascal. Arnauld was well
versed in mathematics and amongst his many publications there is a long treatise
on geometry, Nouveaux éléments de géometrie, contentant des moyens de faire voir
quelle lignes sont incommensurables,314 and a shorter essay on magic squares.315
However, in the Logique mathematics is given the more general instrumental
role that it was to play in Locke’s Conduct. Arnauld quotes the four well-known
methodical rules that were given in the second part of Descartes’s Discours, but
stresses that analysis ‘consistsmore in judgment and mental skill than in particular
rules’.316 The capacity of our mind should be developed by slowly accustoming it
to mathematics and other things that are difficult.317 Finally, another noteworthy
feature in the part on method is the uncartesian attention to probability that
governs the field of ‘human and contingent events’.318 In the case of probable
propositions we cannot take recourse to geometrical methods. Rather we must
carefully investigate the circumstances to which the propositions refer.319
 Cf. Dear, ‘Method and the Study of Nature’, p. -.
 Op. cit. . De Philosophia; . De Vocabulis; . De Propositione; . De Syllogismo; . De
erratione, Falsitate, & Captionibus; . De Methodo.
 Op. cit. I. De Simplici Imaginatione; II. De Propositione; III. De Syllogismo; IV. De
Methodo.
 Op. cit. in: Œuvres, Vol. XLII, pp. -.
 ‘Solution d’un des plus célebres et des plus difficiles problèmes d’arithmatique’, in: Œuvres,
Vol. XLII, pp. -.
 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. ii, p. : ‘Voilà ce qu’on peut dire generalement de l’analyse, qui consiste
plus dans le iugement & dans l’adresse de l’esprit, que dans des regles particulières’, transl.
J. V. Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. ‘Premier Discours’, p. : ‘La capacité de l’esprit s’étend & se resserre par
accoûtumance, & c’est à quoy servent principalement les Mathematiques, & generalement
toutes les choses difficiles, comme celles dont nous parlons. Car elles donnent une certaine
étenduë a l’esprit, & elles l’exercent à s’appliquer davantage, & à se tenir plus ferme dans ce
qu’il connoist.’
 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. xii, p. : ‘les évenemens humains contingens’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p.
.
 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. xii, p. -. Cf. Pascal, Pensées, Série XXII, -, in: Œuvres
Complètes, p. , on the difference between ‘esprit de géométrie’ and ‘esprit de finesse’.
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Arnauld’s substitution of terms by ideas in Part I and his stress on the
methodological value of mathematics in Part IV on the one hand and his largely
conventional treatment of propositions in Part II and syllogisms in Part III on the
other, give the Logique a hybrid character. If Arnauld can be called a Cartesian,
this should not be done without caution. He himself might have liked to qualify
this epithet; as the author of the Fourth Set of Objections against Descartes’s
Meditationes de prima philosophia, he was one of the first to have pointed to
a circular element in Descartes’s proof of God.320 Nevertheless, it is clear that
Arnauld’s predilections went in the direction of the more novel elements of his
logic. When comparing the fourth part of the Logique with the third part he
states that it is more important to order our thoughts than to know the rules
of syllogism.321 In the ‘Premiers Discours’ to the Logique he also gives a place
of honour to the fourth part when he admits that in this part he has included
subjects that he might have discussed in the second or third parts as well:
But we did this on purpose because we thought it useful to see everything required for
perfecting knowledge in one place, which is the main point of the work on method
treated in Part IV. This is why we reserved the discussion of axioms and demonstrations
for that section.322
While Arnauld is so mild as to give here, in the Fourth Edition, only a practical
reason for the weight given to the fourth part, his motivation for this predilection
on the parallel place in the First Edition (which has only one ‘Discours’) had
been more drastic and coloured by doubt about an essential structural feature of
Aristotelian textbooks on logic:
But we did this on purpose, as much because we thought it useful to see everything
required for perfecting knowledge in one place, as because we thought that there would
be many persons who can be satisfied with the first and last parts of this work, since
there are few things in the other two parts that good sense could not supply, without
having to make a special study of them.323
 Op. cit. AT VII, p. .
 Op. cit. Pt. IV, p. : ‘que le tout est de bien arranger ses pensées, en se servant de celles
qui sont claires & évidentes, pour penetrer dans ce qui paroissoit plus caché’.
 Op. cit. p. : ‘Mais on l’a fait à dessein, parce qu’on a jugé qu’il estoit utile de voir en un
mesme lieu tout ce qui estoit necessaire pour rendre une science parfaite, ce qui est le plus
grand ouvrage de la methode dont on traitte dans la quatriéme partie. Et c’est pour cette
raison qu’on a reservé de parler en ce lieu là des Axiomes, et des demonstrations’, transl. J.
V. Buroker, p. .
 Op. cit. (edition von Freytag Löringhoff), ‘Discours’, p. : ‘Mais on l’a fait à dessein, tant
parce qu’on a jugé qu’il estoit vtile de voir en vn mesme lieu tout ce qui estoit necessaire
pour rendre vne science parfaite, que parce qu’on a crû qu’il auroit beaucoup de personnes
qui se pouvoient contenter de la premiere & de la derniere parti de cét Ouvrage, y ayant
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This is an ominous remark indeed. While Aristotelian logicians had structured
their textbooks in at least three parts (terms–propositions–syllogisms), which
could be followed by some remarks on method, we see Arnauld drawing here
structural conclusions from the content of a new logic of ideas that consists of
only two stages that consequently can be discussed in only two parts: one about
individual ideas (Part I of his Logique) and another about raisonnements that are
based on these ideas (Part IV).
A more undilutedly Cartesian specimen of the new logic of ideas is given in the
Recherche de la vérité où l’on traite de la nature de l’esprit de l’homme et de l’usage
qu’il en doit faire pour éviter l’erreur dans les sciences (-) by Père Nicolas
Malebranche (-). An entry in one of his notebooks indicates that Locke
bought the two volumes of the Recherche in March ,324 but it is not until 
March  that some brief notes in his Journal on the teaching of mathematics
give clear proof of his actual reading of the work.325 In the years that preceded
the production of the Conduct, Locke had produced his critical Examination of P.
Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, which eventually he decided
not to publish, ‘For I love not controversies, and have a personal kindness for
the author’.326 However, there are no clear indications that during his years in
France he ever met Malebranche.327 The Recherche gives a prominent place to our
mental faculties, to the clarity and distinctness of ideas, to method in general and
the importance of mathematics in particular. I shall focus on two remarkable and
closely interconnected aspects of the Recherche that are relevant for the context
of the Conduct: its discussion of error and its structure. Error and prevention of
error is the core topic of the Recherche (see the full title), which opens with the
following grand statement:
peu de choses dans les deux autres que le bon sens ne puisse suppleer, sans avoir besoin d’en
faire vne estude particuliere’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. , note c.
 MS Locke f., p. . Later he bought other editions; see Harrison/Laslett, nos. -a,
pp. -.
 MS Locke f., p. .
 Letter to W. Molyneux,  April , Corr. , V, p. -.
 Lough, Locke’s Travels in France, p. xxxix. See however a letter from Nicolas Toinard to
Locke, / March , Corr. , III, p. : ‘Je n’oublieray pas à vous dire que l’un des
exemplaires sera aussi donné au P. M.’
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Error is the cause of men’s misery; it is the sinister principle that has produced the evil
in the world; it generates and maintains in our soul all the evils that aﬄict us, and we
may hope for sound and genuine happiness only by seriously laboring to avoid it.328
The scope and sophistication of Malebranche’s subsequent taxonomy of error
is unsurpassed by any other seventeenth-century text, including Bacon’s Novum
organum with its four idola mentis. Malebranche’s analysis of error exemplifies the
subject oriented approach of the new logic. For him the relevant dichotomy is
not so much that between truth and falsity outside us, as that between truth and
error in the workings of our own understanding.329
When Malebranche gives his rules for the search of truth in the sixth and
last book of the Recherche, he hints at a two-stage analysis of error by stressing
the importance of starting with clear and distinct ideas as the basis of subsequent
reasonings.330 There can be no doubt about the central place of ideas in the
Recherche. The immediate object of our perception is not the sun, but our idea of
the sun.331 However, the remarkable thing in Malebranche’s investigation into the
causes and nature of error, is that it is not structured around ideas but around the
faculties that provide us with these ideas. Our mental faculties can be divided into
those of the understanding and those of the will. The faculty of the understanding
can be subdivided into the faculties of the senses, of the imagination and of pure
understanding. Perceptions of the pure understanding can be made without the
mind forming corporeal images; thanks to this faculty we apprehend things that
we cannot perceive with the faculty of imagination, such as spiritual beings or
figures with thousand sides.332 Malebranche’s rationalism consists in the fact that
according to him pure understanding can furnish us with ideas that are in no
way, either directly or indirectly, dependent on our senses. The pure intellect
does not function thanks to the mind’s union with the body, but because of its
 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. i, p. : ‘L’erreur est la cause de la misere des hommes; c’est le
mauvais principe qui a produit le mal dans le monde; c’est elle qui fait naître & qui entretient
dans nôtre ame tous les maux qui nous aﬄigent, et nous ne devons point esperer de bonheur
solide & veritable, qu’en travaillant serieusement à l’éviter’, transl. Lennon/Olscamp, p. .
 Cf. Risse, Logik, II, pp. -.
 Op. cit. Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. II, Ch. i, p. : ‘que les principes les plus clairs & les plus
simples sont les plus féconds’; ibid. ‘que nous ne devons raisonner que sur des choses dont nous
avons des idées claires’
 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. i, pp. -: ‘& l’objet immédiat de nôtre esprit, lorsqu’il
voit le Soleil par exemple, n’est pas le Soleil, mais quelque chose qui est intimement unie à
nôtre âme; & c’est ce que j’appelle idée. Ainsi par ce mot idée, je n’entends ici autre chose,
que ce qui est l’objet immédiat, ou le plus proche de l’esprit, quand il apperçoit quelque
objet, c’est-à-dire ce qui touche & modifie l’esprit de la perception qu’il a d’un objet’.
 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. iv, p. .
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union with God; strictly speaking its ideas are not in our mind at all, but in God’s
mind. The other main faculty, that of the will, consists of our inclinations and
our passions. All the perceptions of all the faculties of our understanding form as
many occasions for error, but the primary cause for every error lies in making a
wrong use of our will by giving a precipitous consent to a wrong judgement.333
Given the close relationship between faculties and ideas, Malebranche’s at-
tention to senses, imagination, pure understanding, inclinations and passions,
does not amount to much more than a shift in accent in the logic of ideas in so
far as matters of content are concerned. However, he dares to give huge struc-
tural consequences to his predilections. The Recherche is the first of the works
on logic we have encountered so far that is not built according to the basic
structure of words/ideas–propositions–syllogisms–(method). Rather, the errors
of the senses, imagination, pure understanding, inclinations and passions are
accorded one book each (followed by a last book on method that is largely in-
spired by Descartes). Whereas Locke gives a vertical discussion, first of ideas and
subsequently of reasoning that is based on these ideas, Malebranche presents a
horizontal review of each of our mental faculties.
Can it still be maintained that the Recherche is a work of logic at all once it is
admitted that Malebranche completely brushes aside the traditional structure of
logical text books? After all, he does not explicitly call his work a logic. Yet the main
elements of the Recherche, the attention to the errors of our faculties included,
clearly belong to the new logic of ideas. We have seen that these elements were
announced already in Peripatetic works on logic and were developed further by
Arnauld in a work that was still called a ‘logic’. Malebranche takes the development
one step further, by giving the new logic a structure that is in accordance with the
novel emphasis on the mental faculties and that allows him to bypass the technical
subject of propositions and syllogisms. We have already seen that the two latter
subjects were not at the heart of Arnauld’s interests. Finally, in the sixth and last
book of the Recherche, Malebranche explicitly presents his Cartesian method as
an alternative to ‘the ordinary sorts’ of scholastic logic:
… the whole art of making the mind more extensive and more penetrating consists
… in using its powers and its capacity sparingly, and not using it inappropriately on
matters unnecessary for the discovery of the truth it is seeking — and this is a point
that should be well noted. This alone shows that the ordinary sorts of logic are more
suited for diminishing rather than increasing the mind’s capacity, because clearly, if in
the search after a given truth one wishes to use the rules these logics give us, the mind’s
 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. v, p. , cf. Descartes, Meditationes, AT VII, p. .
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capacity will be so divided up that it will have less capacity for carefully understanding
the full extent of the subject under examination.334
. The structure of Locke’s logic
Peripatetic works on logic were tenacious enough to dictate their structure to
such outspoken enemies of Aristotelianism as Hobbes and Gassendi. However,
friction between old structure and new content was inevitable. Given the central
place of ideas and the mental faculties by which these were apprehended and
manipulated, there were roughly two ways of giving structural consequences to
the content of the new logic. One possibility was to build it around the faculties.
An eminent example of this model was given by Malebranche, whose logic of the
facilitates completely broke with the existing structure. Another strategy, slightly
less radical, was intimated by Arnauld, when he pointed out in the First Edition
of his Logique that for most readers the novel first part on ideas and the fourth
part on method will be more interesting than the second part on propositions and
the third part on syllogisms. This approach, resulting in a two-level structure, was
brought to a conclusion by Locke. When he embarks on his historical inquiry
into the human understanding in the Essay, he presents the following agenda:
First, I shall enquire into the Original of those Ideas, Notions, or whatever else you
please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his
Mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew, what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those
Ideas; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.
Thirdly, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Faith, or Opinion:
whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth
yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the
Reasons and Degrees of Assent.335
 Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. III, Pt. I, Ch. iii, p. : ‘De sorte que toute l’adresse qu’il y a pour le
[l’esprit] rendre plus pénétrant & plus étendu, consiste comme nous l’expliquerons ailleurs,
à bien ménager ses forces & sa capacité, ne l’emploïant pas mal à propos à des choses qui
ne lui sont point nécessaires pour découvrir la vérité qu’il cherche: & c’est ce qu’il faut
bien remarquer. Car cela seul fait bien voir que les Logiques ordinaires sont plus propres
pour diminuer la capacité de l’esprit que pour l’augmenter …’, transl. Lennon/Olscamp,
pp. -; cf. Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. II, Ch. i, p. : ‘Car l’expérience fait assez connoître,
que la Logique d’Aristote n’est pas de grand usage, à cause qu’elle occupe trop l’esprit, &
qu’elle le détourne de l’attention qu’il devroit apporter aux sujets qu’il examine.’
 Essay, I.i.: .
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These essential points were already given in much the same words in Drafts B
and C for the Essay and are present in a more implicit way in Draft A.336 The
first point runs roughly parallel to the first stage of his logic of ideas. The second
and the third points form the two main elements of the second stage: certain
knowledge and probable knowledge. Indeed, this two-stage division is reflected
in the basically bipartite structure of the Essay itself. If this fundamental point
has not received much attention in secondary literature,337 this may be due to the
simple fact that the Essay consists not of two but of four books:
I. Of Innate Notions
II. Of Ideas
III. Of Words
IV. Of Knowledge and Opinion
However, in Book II of the Essay Locke discusses all that is essential to stage one
of his logic (by giving his analysis and taxonomy of separate ideas) and in Book
IV he treats of the second stage (reasoning that is based on these ideas and that
terminates in knowledge or opinion). These two stages imply a simplification
compared with the more elaborate structure of the reasoning process as described
in Aristotelian textbooks. Here we first start with terms, which at a second level are
combined into propositions which on their turn are combined into syllogisms; it
is only at this third level that we reason and are able to draw conclusions. Locke’s
logic of ideas implies that in reasoning we can dispense with words, and also with
propositions and syllogisms which consist of words. Reasoning is a process that
is limited to ideas; ‘Illation or Inference’
… consists in nothing but the Perception of the connexion there is between the Ideas,
in each step of the deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the certain
Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives
 Draft B: §, Drafts, I, pp. -; Draft C: Bk. , Ch. , Sect. , fol. ; Draft A abounds
with discussions of the the first point (on individual ideas); on the second and third point
(knowledge and opinion) see esp. §, Drafts, I, p. : ‘… I shall come now haveing (as I
thinke) found out the bounds of humane knowledg, in the next place to consider the severall
degrees & grounds of Probability & Assent. or Faith.’
 See however, Martinak, Zur Logik Lockes, p. : ‘Von dieser [Lockes Fassung des Begriffes der
Logik] nun — dies sei vorausgeschickt — kann ich hier nur einen Theil bringen, (der etwa
den I. Haupttheil einer Logik Lockes bilden würde), — die Lehre von den Vorstellungen.
Einen II. Theil, enthaltend die Lehre von Urtheil im weitesten Sinne, war ich vorläufig
außer stande auszuarbeiten’; see also Kenney, John Locke and the Oxford Training, p. .
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at Knowledge; or their probable connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent,
as in Opinion.338
The separate levels of propositions and of syllogisms collapse into the second
stage of the logic of ideas. If one were to take an Aristotelian work on logic,
for instance Samuel Smith’s Aditus ad logicam, and replace its analysis of terms
by that of ideas, omit the part on propositions entirely, and replace a discussion
of demonstrative syllogisms and dialectical syllogisms by respectively an analysis
of certain knowledge and probable knowledge based on ideas instead of words,
one is left with a structure and content that correspond with Books II and IV of
the Essay. The main difference concerns method, not only in content but also in
structure. We have seen separate sections being assigned to this topic at the end of
both Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian textbooks. In the Essay its main discussion
is also at the end, that is to say, in Book IV; however, instead of dealing with one
method at the very end of this book, Locke discusses his two methods at different
places in Book IV in their separate contexts of certain and probable knowledge.
So much about Books II and IV; but what about Books I and III? Book
I contains Locke’s polemic against innate ideas. In the discussion of Descartes
(above, §) I already observed that views pro or contra the innateness of ideas
are strictly speaking not essential for the development of a logic of ideas. There
is some evidence that Locke himself might have agreed with this view. First, in
Draft A he had started right away with the positive side of his views on the origin
of our ideas: ‘I imagin that all knowledg is founded on and ultimately derives its
self from sense, or something analogous to it …’339 Not until the last sections of
this draft does it occur to him to discuss some arguments of those who attack
this view and who believe in innate ideas instead.340 Only from Draft B onwards
does he turn the tables on his adversaries by switching from a defence against
innatist attacks to the offensive himself and by placing this attack at the start of
his treatise.341 Not until Draft C do we see the discussion of innate knowledge
being accorded the separate position of Book I (even though this first book has
not yet been given a title). There is more that points to a relatively ephemeral
position of Book I in the structure of the Essay. Locke prepared an ‘Epitome’ of
 Essay, IV.xvii.: ; cf. ‘Of Study’, p. : ‘Words without doubt are the great and almost
only way of conveyance of one man’s thoughts to another man’s understanding; but when a
man thinks, reasons, and discourses within himself, I see not what need he has of them’.
 Drafts, I, §, p. .
 In Drafts, §, I, pp. -, he turns against the opinion that we have ‘certain Ideas or
principles’ in general and in ibid. §-, pp. -, he deals with the supposition that we
have a positive, and thus an innate, idea of infinity in particular.
 Op. cit. §§-, pp. -.
context 
the Essay that would be translated into French by Jean le Clerc and published in
, shortly before the First Edition of the Essay itself.342 In this ‘Epitome’ Locke
decided to skip Book I, declaring that it contained no more than a ‘preliminary
debate’:
In the thoughts I have had concerning the understanding I have endeavourd to prove
that the minde is at first rasa tabula. But that being only to remove the prejudice
that lies in some mens mindes I thinke it best in this short view I designe here of my
principles to passe by all that preliminary debate which makes the first book …343
The Oxford scholar John Wynne (c. -), who in  published an abridge-
ment of the Essay that was approved by Locke, suppressed the first book on similar
grounds.344
In Book III Locke’s principal target was scholastic rather than Cartesian.
Some of the topics discussed here had been addressed in a disparate way already
in Drafts A and B. It was only later that he decided to devote a separate book to
words. He admits as much at the very end of Book II. Having discussed separate
ideas (the first stage of his logic of ideas), he admits that the most logical next
step would be to proceed at once with knowledge (the second stage of his logic):
This was that, which, in the first general view I had of this Subject, was all that I
thought I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a
connexion between Ideas and Words; and our abstract Ideas, and general Words, have
so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly
of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the
Nature, Use, and Signification of Language; which therefore must be the business of
the next Book.345
The use of the term ‘proposition’ in this quotation in no way implies a priority
of words over ideas. For Locke, propositions do not have to consist of words. A
propositionconsists of signs that are joined or separated. These signs can be words
that form verbal propositions, or ideas that form mental propositions.346 What
the quotation does imply, however, is that words should be carefully scrutinized
and upon this task he embarks in Book III. His critical discussion of the instru-
 The French translation of the ‘Epitome’, ‘Extrait d’un Livre Anglois que n’est pas encore
publié, intitulé Essai Philosophique’, was first published as an article in the Bibliotheque
Universelle & Historique and later in the same year published separately, Abrégé d’un ouvrage
intitulé Essai philosophique. The dedication in the Essay to the Earl of Pembroke is still absent
in both the ‘Epitome’ and the ‘Extrait’, but is included in the Abrégé.
 MS Locke c., fol. r. I thank Prof. G. A. J. Rogers for permission to use his transcription.
 Wynne, An Abridgement, pp. iv-v.
 Essay, II.xxxiii.: .
 Cf. Essay, IV.v.-: - and IV.i.-: .
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ments that scholastic logicians forged out of words, i.e. verbal propositions and
syllogisms, is subsequently continued in Book IV. Rather than detracting from
the bipartite structure presented by Books II and IV, Books I and III are addi-
tions whose substantially polemical purport was meant to smooth the transition
to Locke’s logic of ideas. Book III has proved to be of eminent importance for
future developments in the philosophy of language. However, considered from
the structural perspective of the shift from a tripartite Aristotelian logic towards
a bipartite logic of ideas, this book is a mere side-show.
Now that the structure of the Essay has been defined more sharply, it is possible
to be more precise about the place of the Conduct within this structure. Although
the Conduct was conceived in  as an additional chapter (No. xx) to Book IV
of the Fourth Edition of the Essay, Locke at some moment changed his mind and
ceased to consider it as part of the Essay.347 However, there is no reason to assume
that this was because of radically changed views about the relation between the
content of the two works. In the Conduct Locke certainly concentrates more on
errors and on their remedies than he did elsewhere in the Essay, but as we shall soon
see these topics had already been addressed in the latter work as well. Moreover, as
has been shown previously, the kinds of error discussed in the Conduct fit in the
logical context provided by the Essay. The reasons for not including the Conduct
were probably of a practical nature. We are sure that it was not finished by the
time the Fourth Edition of the Essay was issued in , since it was not even
finished when Locke died in . The large size of the Conduct may also have
counted against including it as a chapter in the Essay. This would not have been
the only case in which practical deliberations influenced a decision on whether or
not to incorporate a new passage in the Essay.348 So, there is no reason to assume
that when Locke decided against including the Conduct in the Essay, he ceased
to consider the former as part of his logic of ideas.
Locke ends each of the last three books of his Essay with a discussion of errors
that are relevant to the subject at hand. In Book II, the last five chapters are
devoted to errors of which we can be guilty in respect of individual ideas:349
 See below, ‘Text’, §.
 See above, §, on Locke’s decision not to publish the Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion.
 Locke clearly sets apart this discussion of errors from the previous chapters of Book II, by
starting Chapter xxix thus: ‘Having shewn the Original of our Ideas, and taken a view of their
several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex; and observed
how the complex one are divided into those of Modes, Substances, and Relations, all which,
I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself throughly with the
progress of the Mind, in its Apprehension and Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be
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xxix. Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas;
xxx. Of Real and Fantastical Ideas;
xxxi. Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas;
xxxii. Of true and false Ideas;
and finally the new chapter, added in the Fourth Edition:
xxxiii. Of the Association of Ideas.
Book III ends with two chapter on errors concerning words and language in
general:
ix. Of the Imperfection of Words;
x. Of the Abuse of Words;
followed by remedies:
xi. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.
The last chapter of Book IV contains Locke’s general ‘Division of the Sciences’,
which however is immediately preceded by two chapters on aberrations that keep
us from knowledge or from justified assent. The chapter
xix. Of Enthusiasm
was newly added in the Fourth Edition and part of it (without the chapter number
it was to receive in the Essay) can be found in the same MS e. that also contains
other additions for this edition (including ‘Association’ and the Conduct). ‘Of
Enthusiasm’ is followed by
xx. Of wrong Assent, or Errour,
which covers some of the ground that would also be discussed in the Conduct,
however with special attention for ‘Wrong Measures of Probability’.
The inclusion of the Conduct as Chapter xx would have placed it at the end
of Book IV, after the last chapter on error (and only before the last chapter on
the Division of the Sciences), assuming that Locke had not yet discounted the
inclusion of the other addition, on ‘Enthusiasm’, in the numbers of the chapters.
Given the fact that the main subject of the Conduct is error, and given the fact
that the chapters on error are placed at the end of each of the three last books, the
projected place of the Conduct is plausible. However, why did Locke intend to
place the Conduct at the end of Book IV and not at the end of another book? Since
the oldest part of what would become the Conduct is probably on association,
thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of Ideas. I must, nevertheless, crave
leave to offer some few other Considerations concerning them’, Essay, II.xxix.: -.
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and since this part was originally a continuation of the part on association that
became the last chapter of Book II of the Essay, the inclusion of the rest of the
Conduct at the end of this book might seem a plausible possibility. However,
the analysis of error in the Conduct is of a general character, it gives attention to
aberrations that are relevant for both phases of Locke’s logic of ideas, and thus it
cannot be confined to any one of the books of the Essay. His point in wanting to
place the Conduct at the end of Book IV was not so much that it was of special
importance to this particular book, as that he wanted to give it a place at the end
of the Essay as a whole, thereby stressing the general character of the analysis of
error in the Conduct. Since the Conduct covers the whole range of Locke’s logic, it
was inevitable that sometimes there are overlapping passages between the Conduct
and the Essay. Sometimes he stops embarking on a subject in the Conduct because
he has treated it already in the Essay, as some of his references in the former work
to the latter clearly indicate; this is done at least three times concerning the abuse
of words,350 a subject which, after its extensive treatment in Book III of the Essay
(including remedies) remains indeed largely untouched in the Conduct.
Apart from being plausible, the projected place of the Conduct in the Essay
fits in with a long logical tradition. On the one hand, it should be admitted that
there are fundamental differences between the content of the analysis of error
in the Aristotelian Organon and in Locke’s logic of ideas. At the start of De
sophisticis elenchis Aristotle announces his attention to treat ‘of arguments used in
competitions and contests’.351 The context of the subsequent discussion of error
is polemical itself; it is concerned with ‘fighting contentious persons’352 and ‘how
we are to prove that our opponent is saying something false and make him utter
paradoxes’.353 It is difficult not to read these passages as early announcements of
scholastic disputations. By contrast, Locke’s logic of ideas tried to turn disputants
away from their presumed adversaries to their own faculties. He was not interested
in analysing the fallacies by which others try to deceive us (and we might deceive
others), but in the errors by which we fool ourselves. One of the constantly
recurring expressions in the Conduct is that of ‘imposing on ourselves’.354 This is
a very dangerous tendency; it is present all the time and we confront it with less
criticism than attempts by others to fool us: ‘The disposition to put any cheat
 Conduct, pars. , , .
 Op. cit.  b-: ‘ðåòd äb ôî çöîØóôØºî ºÆd òØóôØºî …’, transl. in Barnes, I, p.
.
 Op. cit.  a-: ‘ðòe÷ ôïf÷ òØóôØºïf÷ íÆłåôÛïî’, transl. in Barnes, I, p. .
 Op. cit.  a-: ‘ð÷ äåÝŒïíÛî ôå ªåøäÞíåîåî ºÆd ðÆòÀäïŒÆ ìÛçåØî ðïØÜóïíåî’,
transl. in Barnes, I, p. .
 Conduct, pars. , , ,  and .
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upon our selves works constantly and we are pleasd with it but are impatient of
being banterd or mislead by others.’355
On the other hand, however, a change in logical content is only one aspect of
this story. Structure proved to be rather more resilient. We have already compared
the place of knowledge and opinion in the structure of the Essay with that of
demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms in an Aristotelian work on logic by for
example Samuel Smith. We can now press the analogy further. When Smith
ended his Aditus with a discussion of sophistical fallacies, he did so in accordance
with a long logical tradition. There are clear indications that Aristotle considered
his work on error, De sophisticis elenchis, if not as an appendix to his whole logical
work, then at least as an appendage to his Topics.356 And whatever his own views
may have been, De sophisticis elenchis would be transmitted to posterity as the final
treatise of his Organon. In the same way as this final treatise gave an analysis of
errors that are relevant for Aristotelian logic in general and dialectic in particular,
it had been Locke’s intention to place the Conduct, containing a discussion of the
errors that are relevant for his logic of ideas, at the end of the Essay.357
. The appreciation of the Essay and the Conduct as texts on logic
We have seen Malebranche presenting his Recherche de la vérité as an alternative
to scholastic works on logic, although he refrained from giving it the explicit
name of ‘logic’. Locke’s Essay and Conduct provide us with a similar case. In the
seventeenth century ‘logic’ was Aristotelian logic. In the Essay, Locke uses the
word ‘logic’ or ‘logician’ most frequently in Bk. II, Ch. xvii ‘Of Reason’, and he
uses it in the clearly pejorative context of his attack against Peripatetic logicians.
Other places in the Essay contain similar references to ‘Logick and Dispute’358 and
‘logical Niceties, or curious empty Speculations’.359 This sequence is continued
in the Conduct with ‘a logical chicanner’360 and ‘disputes on logical questions’
that are equated with ‘airy useless notions’.361 Clearly, for Locke the term ‘logic’
was poor in positive connotations. This may explain why he did not attach the
 Conduct, par. .
 Dorion, ‘Introduction’ to Aristotle, Les réfutations sophistique, pp. -.
 Assuming this context, it is interesting to read in Hamblin, Fallacies, pp. -, that Locke
in his discussion of four sorts of arguments in general (Essay, IV.xvii.-: -) and
in his use of the term argumentum ad hominem in particular, is tributary to De sophisticis
elenchis, b .
 Essay, III.x.:  (marginal heading).
 Essay, III..: .
 Conduct, par. .
 Conduct, par. .
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name of ‘logic’ to what I have described as his ‘logic of ideas’, even although he
did present it as an alternative to the works of Aristotelian logicians. However,
a development can be traced in his views about what can be called by the name
of ‘logic’. In the Essay, after stating that cultivating our ‘native rustick Reason’
is more likely to generate knowledge ‘than any scholastick Proceeding by the
strict Rules of Mode and Figure’,362 he approvingly quotes from Of the Lawes
of Ecclesiasticall Politie by the theologian Richard Hooker (/-) about
the importance of ‘the right helps of true Art and Learning’ and then continues:
I do not pretend to have found, or discovered here any of those right helps of Art, this
great Man of deep Thought mentions: but this is plain, that Syllogism, and the Logick
now in Use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It
is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps, something out of the way, I am sure
as to me wholly new, and unborrowed, I shall have given Occasion to others, to cast
about for new Discoveries, and to seek in their own Thoughts, for those right Helps of
Art, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves to the
Rules and Dictates of others.363
In this passage Locke clearly presents his ‘Discourse’ as an alternative to Aris-
totelian logic. He speaks about ‘the Logick now in Use’, thus implicitly suggesting
the conceivability of another logic, i.e. his logic of ideas.
Next, there is the last chapter of the Essay (Bk. IV, Ch. xxi) with Locke’s
division of the sciences into æøóØºÜ, ðòÆºôØºÜ and óŁíåØöôØºÜ, ‘or the Doctrine
of Signs’. None of the previous divisions of the sciences in his MSS contain the
same taxonomy and there is some evidence to suggest that Locke came to envisage
semiotics as logic only shortly before the first publication of the Essay in ,
and that he attached the chapter containing this division only after the rest of the
Essay was largely completed.364 Drafts A and B of the Essay do not contain any
division of the sciences and we do not know about Draft C, since this contains
only Books I and II. The interesting point in this late addition is that here Locke
gives the only positive reference to logic in either the Essay or the Conduct:
The Consideration then of Ideas and Words, as the great Instruments of Knowledge,
makes no despicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of humane
Knowledge in the whole Extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed,
and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick, than
what we have been hitherto acquainted with.365
 Essay, IV.xvii.: .
 Essay, IV.xvii.: .
 Buickerood, ‘The Natural History of the Understanding’, pp. -.
 Essay, IV.xxii.: .
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This may very well be the point at which Locke starts to look upon his already
fully developed way of ideas as a logic in its own right, that is to say: as a logic of
ideas — so that here he has for the first time reason to use the word ‘logic’ in a
positive rather than in a pejorative sense. However, consider the first sentence of
the paragraph on óŁíåØöôØºÜ:
Thirdly, The Third Branch may be called óŁíåØöôØºÜ, or the Doctrine of Signs, the
most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed also ìïçØºÜ, Logick; the
business whereof, is to consider the Nature of Signs, the Mind makes use of for the
understanding of Things, or conveying Knowledge to others.366
This might suggest that Locke here gives words a bigger place than is warranted in
a logic of ideas. However, what he is doing in this quotation is merely referring to
both the etymological and the conventional meaning (‘the most usual’) of logic.
He then continues with a clear statement of the importance of ideas: ‘For since
the Things, the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides it self, present to
the Understanding, ‘tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation
of the thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are Ideas.’367 Only
after this does Locke mention words, in the role of mere secondary signs, that is
to say: signs of ideas.
Locke’s resolve in the Conduct to consider his way of ideas as a logic remained
at least as strong as it had been in the Essay. In paragraph  we again read critical
remarks about ‘The Logick now in use’, which this time however are accompanied
by a quotation from Bacon’s ‘Præfatio’ to the Instauratio Magna. In paragraph 
the Latin quotation is rendered in a translation of which the last sentence runs:
‘That it is absolutely necessary that a better and perfecter use and imployment of
the minde and understanding should be introduced.’ Whereas the first paragraph
of the Conduct is written on page  of the MS e., pars.  and  are written on
pages -. Locke must have attached considerable value to the quotation from
Bacon that forms the content of these paragraphs, since he added the following
remark to them: ‘NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin
this chapter of the conduct of the understanding’ and this is indeed the place
this fragment is given in both the later MS c. and in O-.368 Although the
overall structure of Locke’s logic of ideas is not substantially Baconian, it has been
noted that many individual points in the treatment of error in the Conduct betray
the Lord Chancellor’s influence (above, §). However, there may be more; after
the preface to the Instauratio, from which Locke quotes in the Conduct, Bacon
 Essay, IV.xxii.: .
 Essay, IV.xxii.: -.
 See also below, ‘Text’, § [] and §.
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gives the plan of his work (‘Distributio operis’). This is what he remarks about his
inductive method in the preface to the Novum Organum, which was the second
part of the Instauratio Magna:
Having thus coasted past the ancient arts, the next point is to equip the intellect for
passing beyond. To the second part therefore belongs the doctrine concerning the better
and more perfect use of human reason in the inquisition of things, and the true helps
of the understanding: that thereby (as far as the condition of mortality and humanity
allows) the intellect may be raised and exalted, and made capable of overcoming the
difficulties and obscurities of nature.369
Bacon had not only introduced ‘a better and perfecter use and imployment of the
minde’ as an alternative for traditional texts on logic, he also held this alternative
to be a logic. The old Aristotelian Organon was to be replaced by a Novum
Organum. Locke’s quotation from the Instauratio can be taken as an indication
that he had come to consider the Essay and the Conduct as his way of realizing
this Baconian design.
Locke’s ‘way of ideas’ started its long and successful career as a new logic. Already
in the dedicatory letter of his Dioptrica Nova, published , we see Molyneux
describing the Essay as the crowning achievement of a new approach that had
started with Arnauld and Malebranche, i.e. two philosophers that I have marked
out as Locke’s predecessors in the development of a new logic:
Logick has put on a Countenance clearly different from what it appeared in formerly: How
unlike is its shape in the Ars Cogitandi [= Arnauld’s Logique], Recherches de la Verite, &c.
from what it appears in Smigletius, [sic] and the Commentators of Aristotle? But to none
do we owe for a greater Advancement in this Part of Philosophy, than to the incomparable
Mr. Locke, Who, in his Essay concerning Humane Understanding, has rectified more
received Mistakes, and delivered more profound Truths, established on Experience and
Observation, for the Direction of Man’s mind in the Prosecution of Knowledge, (which I
think may be properly term’d Logick) than are to be met with in all the Volumes of the
Antients.370
Similarly, the clue that the Essay can be seen as a specimen of the third part
in Locke’s division of the sciences (logic), was not lost on John Wynne. When
he wrote on  January  to Locke with the proposition of producing an
 Op. cit. in: Works, I, p. : ‘Porro prætervecti artes veteres, intellectum humanum ad
trajiciendum instruemus. Destinatur itaque parti secundæ, doctrina de meliore et perfectiore
usu rationis in rerum inquisitione, et de auxiliis veris intellectus: ut per hoc (quantum
conditio humanitatis ac mortalitatis patitur) exaltetur intellectus, et facultate amplificetur
ad naturæ ardua et obscura superanda’, transl. in: Works, IV, p. .
 Op. cit. pp. xl-xli.
context 
abridgement of the Essay, he suggested that this could be used as a textbook
‘instead of those Triﬄing and Insignificant Books, which only serve to perplex
and confound’. He then continues: ‘I do not see that there is Any Thing wanting
In It to compleat The Third part In your Division of science.’371 On  April of
the same year Locke wrote to W. Molyneux about Wynne’s proposal (that was to
be realized) in joyful surprise:
The third edition of my Essay is already, or will be speedily in the press. But what
perhaps will seem stranger, and possibly please you better, an abridgment is now
making (if not already done) by one of the university of Oxford, for the use of young
scholars, in the place of an ordinary system of logick.372
Locke does not protest against calling the Essay a work of logic. What rather
surprises him is that the proposal comes from Oxford, which he had learnt to
perceive as a stronghold of Aristotelianism and where he had been deprived of
his Christ Church studentship:
From the acquaintance I had of the temper of that place, I did not expect to have it
[the Essay] get much footing there.373
Wynne’s favourable reaction proved to be more than a mere incident and his
abridgement was to contribute substantially to the dissemination of the Essay.374
In a letter to Locke (c.  April ) James Tyrell reported about a meeting of
the ‘Heads of Houses’ of Oxford in November , where the ‘great decay of
Logical Exercises’ was attributed to the influence of Locke’s Essay, and the work
of his admirer Jean le Clerc.375 However, these deliberations could not impede
the Essay’s popularity as a book on logic. In the dedication of the Second Edition
of his French translation of the Essay () Pierre Coste notes that in Oxford
and Cambridge this work has taken the place of Aristotle ‘and his most famous
 Corr. , V, p. .
 Corr. , V, p. .
 Corr. , V, p. .
 Rogers, ‘Introduction’ (no page numbers) to Wynne, An Abridgment of Mr Locke’s Essay.
 Corr. , VIII, p. . Le Clerc’s Logica sive ars ratiocinandi () is clearly influenced
by Locke’s logic of ideas but has the familiar quadripartite structure of logical textbooks,
although Le Clerc interchanged the third and fourth parts, resulting in a structure that
consists of ideas–propositions–method–syllogisms. William Molyneux, in his letter to Locke
from  December , Corr. , IV,p. , is sharply aware of the author’s debt to Locke’s
Essay: ‘I have Lately seen Johannis Clerici Logica, Ontologia and Pneumatologia, in all which
He has little Extraordinary but what he Borrows from you; and in the Alteration he gives
them he robbs them of their Native Beautys …’
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commentators’.376 Indeed, both in Oxford and in other places, the Essay was
incorporated in the curriculum as a work on logic, and often recommended as a
follow up to courses in Aristotelian logic.377 Edward Bentham’s An Introduction
to Logick () contains a list of ‘Scriptores consulendi de Quæstionibus Logicis,
tàm Veteres quàm Recentiores’378 that includes both Aristotle and Locke. In 
there were college lectures at Cambridge for freshmen in Locke and logic.379
The history of the reception of the Conduct in the century following Locke’s
death is less well documented. In his Historical Sketch of Logic () Robert Blakey
informs us that the Conduct ‘has often been employed as a logical textbook in
some of our English universities’.380 Similarly, in his Eighteenth-Century British
Logic and Rhetoric W. S. Howell writes that ‘The Conduct of the Understanding
and its parent work, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, were without
question the most popular, the most widely read, the most frequently reprinted,
and the most influential, of all books of the eighteenth century.’381 Additional
information about the influence of the Conduct in the eighteenth century can be
gauged from the sober facts of its rich printing history. It went through numerous
separate editions and was also printed together with the Essay, with other works
and in editions of the complete works (see below, ‘Bibliography’, §). The ‘Preface
by the Editor’ to the -edition of the Works contains the following remark (in
which the Conduct is mistakenly described as ‘early’):
 Locke, Essai philosophique, [p. viii]: ‘Enfin, ce qui met le comble à sa gloire, adopté en
quelque maniére à Oxford & à Cambridge, il y est lû & expliqué aux Jeunes gens comme le
Livre le plus propre à leur former l’Esprit, à régler & étendre leurs Connoissances; de sorte
que LOCKE tient à présent la place d’ARISTOTE & de ses plus célèbres Commentateurs,
dans ces deux fameuses Universitez.’
 Feingold, ‘The Mathematical Sciences and New Philosophies’, pp. - and Yolton,
‘Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy’, pp. -.
 Op. cit. p. .
 Wordsworth, Scholæ academicæ, p. .
 Op. cit. pp. . The Oxford Christ Church Collection Book, -, shelfmark li.b.,
containing reading lists that were given to individual students, gives ‘Locke’s Essays’ on fol.
vb (/); ‘Lock’ on fol. rb (twice, /) and on fol. rb (/); ‘Lock’s
Essay on Hum. Underst.’ on vb (twice, c. ); ‘d book [of the Essay] of Lock’ on ra
() and ‘Locks st book’ on rb (also ), but does not (yet) mention the Conduct,
although it covers the first fourteen years following the publication of O-. However,
the Christ Church Collections of Nobleman, Gentlemen and Commoners, quoted in Bill,
Education at Christ Church Oxford, p. , mentions the Conduct as an item on an under-
graduate reading list for . See also Yolton, ‘Schoolmen, Logic, Philosophy’, p.  and
Ashworth, ‘Oxford’, p. .
 Op. cit. p. .
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Connected in some sort with the forementioned essay, and in their way equally valuable,
are his tract on Education and the early Conduct of the Understanding, both very worthy,
as we apprehend, of a more careful perusal than is commonly bestowed upon them,
the latter more especially, which seems to be little known, and less attended to.382
The ‘Advertisement’ to the  edition of the Conduct contains a similar state-
ment: ‘The folowing valuable Work of Mr. LOCKE’s being very little known on
account of it’s scarcity, it has been thought advisable to print this cheap EDI-
TION to promote it’s circulation.’383 Neither quotation points to a very warm
interest of the public in the Conduct. However, these remarks may very well reflect
plain promotional intentions. The fact that the abundance of editions of Locke’s
Works and his Essay in the second half of the eighteenth century containing the
Conduct did nothing to stop the issue of several separate editions of this work in
the same period, point to its popularity. In his Advice to a Young Student, with a
Method of Study of the first four years (), Daniel Waterland praises the Conduct
as an introductory contribution to the ‘true Art of Reasoning’, as opposed to Aris-
totelian textbooks.384 The Conduct is included in ‘A Table Of the several principal
Writers of Logick’ in Edward Bentham’s Reflexions upon Logick (), written
‘To the Youth Of Oriel College and Christ Church’.385 In  an abstract of the
Conduct ‘For the Benefit of younger Scholars’ was presented by a ‘Mr Alexander
Simm, late Schoolmaster at Bathgate’.386 In addition, it became well-known on
the continent. Already in  Jean le Clerc published an extensive summary in
French of the Conduct and the other items included in O-.387 A complete
French translation of this volume was published in .388 The Conduct was
also studied in Germany. Syrbius, a professor of philosophy at Jena, lectured on
the French translation of  as early as .389 Johann Jacob Breitinger’s ‘IX.
Discours’ (written under the pseudonym ‘Michael Angelo’) in the first volume
() of his short-lived journal Discourse der Mahlern was manifestly influenced
 W-, Vol. I, p. x. This remark was repeated in W-, Vol. I, p. xiii.
 C-, p. iii.
 Op. cit. pp. -.
 Op. cit. p. ; examined copy is the Second Edition from . The table also gives Descartes,
Arnauld’s Logique and Malebranche’s Recherche.
 AS-, pp. -.
 AS-.
 Tr(Fr)-.
 Wundt, Die Philosophie and der Universität Jena, p. .
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by the Conduct.390 A German translation appeared at Königsberg in .391 The
eighteenth century also saw a translation of the Conduct in Italian.392
More information about the eighteenth-century development of the logic of
ideas in relation to Peripatetic logic in general, and about the influence of the
Conduct in particular, can be gained by an inspection of logical textbooks. I will
briefly discuss one specimen that was used at Oxford.393 Isaac Watts (-),
who is known to posterity chiefly as the father of English hymnody, also wrote
a Logick: or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth ().394 This
textbook proved to be very popular and was reprinted thirty times up to .395
The general structure of the Logick is conventional enough:
I. Of Perception and Ideas
II. Of Judgment and Proposition
III. Of Reasoning and Syllogism
IV. Of Method
However, in the title of the first part the predominantly Lockean content of
Watts’s logic is already shining through. In this part Watts gives a simplified
version of Locke’s catalogue of ideas and analysis of language as given in Books
II and III of the Essay respectively. Selections from the subject matter of Book
IV are discussed by Watts in parts II, III and IV. Watts’s discussion of method
in Part IV is confined to remarks about the distinction between synthetic and
analytic and to some rules ‘of true Method in the Pursuit or Communication of
Knowledge’,396 that have a largely though not exclusively Cartesian character.
The Logick bears all the marks of compromise. Watts very much admires
Locke and compares ‘… the great Lord Bacon, Copernicus, Descartes, with the
greater Sir Isaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle’.397 He follows Locke when
he declares that ‘True Logick doth not require a long Detail of hard Words to
amuse Mankind, and to puff up the Mind with empty Sounds, and a Pride
of false Learning’. However, he then continues: ‘… yet some Distinctions and
Terms of Art are necessary to range every Idea in its proper Class, and to keep our
Thoughts from Confusion’.398 Watts does not choose; he gives both Locke’s logic
 Op. cit. no page numbers; the ‘IX. Discours’ starts on quire I.
 Tr(Ger)-.
 Tr(It)-, Tr(It)- and Tr(It)-.
 See Yolton, ‘Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy’, passim.
 I have consulted the Eight Edition, .
 Editor’s ‘Note’ to Duncan, The Elements of Logick, no page number.
 Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. ii, p. .
 Op. cit. Pt. II, Ch. iii, sect. , p. .
 Op. cit. ‘Dedication’, no page number.
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of ideas (most of it in parts I and II, which make up the bulk of his treatise) and
also a largely uncritical if not very substantial discussion of syllogisms in Part III.
Whereas in the case of Arnauld we see a traditional structure being eroded from
within by a freshly evolving new logic, the case of Watts’s Logick is rather that of an
attempt to put the spirit of a by then fully developed new logic of ideas back into
old Peripatetic bottles. In his letter of  December  Molyneux had advised
Locke to produce a work ‘by Way of Logick, something accommodated to the
Usual Forms’, because ‘a Large Discourse in the way of a Logick would be much
more taking in the Universities’.399 Although Locke had not protested against
Wynne calling his Essay a work on logic, he very understandably did not like
Molyneux’s suggestion of squeezing his work into a traditional structure. When
he wrote back on  January  he informed his friend about his aversion to the
idea of ‘turning my Essay into a body of logick and metaphysicks, accomodated
to the usual forms’.400 However, this kind of accommodation was exactly the
underlying stratagem of Watts. In the introduction to his The Improvement of the
Mind (), he refers to his Logick as a work ‘… wherein it was my constant
Aim to assist the Reasoning Powers of every Rank and Order of Men, as well
as to keep an Eye to the best Interest of the Schools and the Candidates of true
Learning’.401
Watts’s attempt to accommodate the new bipartite logic of ideas to the tri-
partite structure of an Aristotelian textbook was bound to show signs of strain.
His strategy is based on Locke’s distinction between intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge (see above, §). Intuitive knowledge is based on the immediate com-
parison of two ideas, whereas demonstrative knowledge rests on the comparison
of two ideas by means of one or more intermediate ideas. Watts squares proposi-
tions with intuitive knowledge, his point being that just as we directly compare
two ideas in the activity of judging, we compare subject and predicate in a propo-
sition. He then proceeds to syllogisms, which are identified with reasoning proper
and compared to demonstrative knowledge, where we have ‘… to compare each
of them [subject and predicate] with some third Idea, that by seeing how far they
agree or disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they agree or disagree
among themselves’.402 Watts’s solution is disputable. With ‘judgment’ he refers
to the direct and certain knowledge that is produced by intuition, whereas Locke
 Corr. , IV, pp. , .
 Corr. , IV, p. .
 Op. cit. p. . On the relation between The Improvement of the Mind and the Conduct, cf.
Blakey, Historical Sketch of Logic, p. -.
 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. i, p. .
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in the Essay403 uses ‘judgment’ for indirect knowledge that is merely probable.
However, the relevant point here is not so much whether Watts’s solution was
right or wrong, but that it is a typical example of an attempt to accommodate
Locke’s logic within the framework of an Aristotelian textbook. This attempt was
also made in other eighteenth-century works, for instance in William Duncan’s
The Elements of Logick () and in Bentham’s Reflexions upon Logick and An
Introduction to Logick.404
In addition to the general influence of Locke’s way of ideas, Watts’s Logick
contains specific traces of the Conduct. This is perhaps the case in Part II, Chapter
iii on ‘The Springs of False Judgment, or the Doctrine of Prejudices’ and more
positively in Part III, Chapter iv, which gives ‘Some general Rules to direct our
Reasoning’. In this chapter Watts uses a quotation from the Conduct (par. ) to
illustrate his point about the importance of a formal role for the ‘mathematical
Sciences’ in education: ‘Something of these Sciences should be studied by every
Man who pretends to learning and that (as Mr. Locke expresses it) not so much
to make us Mathematicians, as to make us reasonable creatures.’405 The following
longer passage in the same chapter, where Watts highlights the importance of the
two stages of the logic of ideas (‘conceiving clearly and reasoning right’), gives
verbal quotations from the Conduct, par. :
This Habit of conceiving clearly, and of judging justly, and of Reasoning well, is not to
be attained merely by the Happiness of Constitution, the Brightness of Genius, the
best natural Parts, or the best Collection of logical Precepts. It is Custom and Practise
that must form and establish this Habit. We must apply ourselves to it till we perform
all this readily, and without reflecting on Rules. A coherent Thinker, and a strict Reasoner
is not to be made at once by a Set of Rules, any more than a good Painter or a Musician
may be formed extempore by an excellent Lecture on Musick or Painting. It is of infinite
Importance therefore in our younger Years to be taught both the Value and the Practise
of conceiving clearly and reasoning right: For when we are grown up to the middle of
Life, or past it, it is no Wonder that we should not learn good Reasoning, any more
 Op. cit. ..: : ‘Judgement, is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree, or disagree,
by the intervention of one or more Ideas, whose certain Agreement, or Disagreement with
them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual’.
 Neither Duncan nor Bentham give much attention to error, and thus it is not surprising that
their works do not show any substantial influence of the Conduct. Cf. Duncan, op. cit. Bk.
III, Ch. V, sect. xii, p. : ‘… I hold it needless to enter upon a particular Consideration,
of those several Species of false Reasoning, which Logicians distinguish by the Name of
Sophisms. He that thoroughly understands the Form and Structure of a good Argument,
will of himself readily discern every Deviation from it’ (cf. Arnauld’s similar lack of interest,
above, §); Bentham, An Introduction to Logick, Pt. III, Sect. IV, pp. -, gives some
limited attention to ‘Irregular Syllogisms and Fallacious reasoning’.
 Op. cit. Pt. III, Ch. iv, pp. -.
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than that an ignorant Clown should not be able to learn fine Language, Dancing, or a
courtly Behaviour, when his rustic Airs have grown up with him till the Age of Forty.406
Interestingly, this final chapter of Part III of the Logick comes immediately after
a chapter on ‘The Doctrine of Sophisms’. So, Watts repeats Arnauld’s procedure
of adding a chapter on errors that are relevant to the new logic immediately after
his discussion of errors that are relevant to Aristotelian logic, at the end of a third
part on syllogisms. By quoting the Conduct at exactly this place, he seems to
assume a parallel relationship between Conduct and Essay on the one hand and
between De sophisticis elenchis and the Organon on the other.
. Conclusion
Amongst many other things, Locke’s Essay provides an alternative for the logic
presented in Aristotelian textbooks. There are indications that he considered his
Essay to be offering a logic and there is unmistakable evidence that it was perceived
as such by contemporaries and eighteenth-century readers. The objects of his
logic are not words but ideas. The comparison of ideas results in either certain
or probable knowledge. In Locke’s logic there is no use for the formalization of
reasoning and it concentrates rather on a prior inspection of the mental faculties
thanks to which we are furnished with ideas. He discusses method as a means
of furnishing answers to the question of how we can best use our faculties in
our pursuit of certain or probable knowledge. The kind of method to be used is
determined by the kind of ideas that are presented to our mental faculties. Ideas,
faculties and method are thus the interrelated main elements of Locke’s logic of
ideas.
In the Conduct Locke discusses the errors that are relevant to his logic. Errors
of the first kind pertain to the individual ideas that form the basis of subsequent
reasoning. Errors of the second kind relate to aberrations in reasoning itself.
According to Locke, Aristotelian logicians were especially liable to errors of the
first kind, because they were blind to the need of obtaining clear and distinct
ideas before starting with reasoning at all. Errors can have causes outside the
understanding, such as our passions, or by defects in the understanding itself,
such as wrong habits. A major example of the last category is the wrong association
of ideas. Wrong habits can be prevented and cured by right habits, which must be
installed by gradual and repetitive practice of our mental faculties. Instead of being
filled with particular material principles, the faculty of the understanding should
be taught to develop the general formal ability of inspecting these principles. The
 Op. cit. p. .
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Conduct is not primarily an educational treatise. It is well-stocked with didactic
advice, but this is given in the context of prevention and cure of errors that are
relevant for Locke’s logic of ideas.
The content of Locke’s logic, especially its stress on clear and distinct ideas,
but also the place that is accorded to the mental faculties and methodological
questions, shows distinctly Cartesian influences. However, some of these ele-
ments were already anticipated in the works of Aristotelian textbook writers. This
background becomes even more important if one considers the structure rather
than the content of the logic of ideas. The tripartite structure of the Aristotelian
textbooks that Locke bought for his pupils at Oxford reflects the three basic
levels of Aristotelian logic: words, propositions and syllogisms. The third part on
syllogisms usually ended with a discussion of the errors that were relevant to this
logic: sophistical syllogisms. By contrast, Descartes’s analysis of ideas gave rise to
a logic that did not need three levels, but only two: that of separate ideas and that
of the combination of ideas. He bequeathed to his successors the question of how
to relate this essentially bipartite logic to the traditional tripartite structure of
Aristotelian logic. Arnauld’s Logique, Malebranche’s Recherche and Locke’s Essay
can be seen as different answers to this question. The urgency of this question
depended in large part on how much these successors were bent on presenting
something that would still be recognized and accepted by contemporaries as
‘logic’. The structure of Aristotelian logic is still very much present in Arnauld,
it is completely neglected in Malebranche, and its influence can still be detected
in the Essay. The function of the analysis of error as performed by the Conduct
within the frame of Locke’s logic, is comparable to that of De sophisticis elenchis
in Aristotelian logic. This comparable function is confirmed by a projected place
of the Conduct within the general structure of Locke’s Essay that is mirrored by
the place of De sophisticis elenchis in the Organon.
TEXT
The most important manuscript for the Conduct is MS Locke e.. It is filled with
projected additions to the Fourth Edition of the Essay, the largest of which is the
Conduct. This part remained unfinished, but the MS also contains substantial
parts on ‘Enthusiasm’ and ‘Association’ that were indeed published in the Fourth
Edition of the Essay. MS e. can be said to form one unit in the limited sense of
containing (projected) additions to this edition and also because of some material
characteristics. Since this MS forms one unit, it will be described as such, although
special attention will be given to the parts containing the Conduct. MS Locke
c. on the other hand, is not a unit. It is a collection of different MSS on various
philosophical and religious topics that were bound together and numbered only
after the transference of the Lovelace Collection to the Bodleian Library. Only
fols. - pertain to the Conduct and only this part of the MS will be described.
It gives a partial copy of MS e..
Locke’s papers and letters plus the moiety of his library (, books) that
was inherited by Peter King remained in the latter’s family until , when
their last owner, the Earl of Lovelace, deposited most of the MSS and some
of the books in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. In  the Bodleian purchased
this collection. Furthermore, a substantial part of Locke’s library in the King
moiety, consisting of about  items (including some  bound manuscript
volumes) was rediscovered in  by Peter Laslett and purchased by Paul Mellon,
who presented the material to the Bodleian. The MSS were ordered, bound and
shelved together with the books in a separate room named after the philosopher.
MSS e. and c. form part of this collection. Sometimes page numbers and folio
numbers were added by the librarian, as was the case with MS e. (partly) and
MS c. (completely).407
In what follows I shall give a description of the manuscripts and present an
overview of entries in Locke’s correspondence that are related to the Conduct. I
shall then continue with a history of the text of the Conduct until its posthumous
publication in  and discuss the relation between the Conduct and the Essay,
the problem of the copy-text to be used for the present edition and the question
of the order in which to present the material. Finally, I shall state the principles
that underlie this edition. For the sake of easy reference, the elements of the
description of the MSS, of the correspondence and of the history of the Conduct
 For the history of Locke’s MSS and books see Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. vii; id. ‘The
Mellon Donation’, passim, Harrison/Laslett, pp. -; and Laslett/Rogers, ‘The Recovery
of Locke’s Library’, passim.
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will be given progressive numbers between [ ]. For the relation between the pages
of MS e., the folios of MS c., the sections of the Conduct as given in O-,
the relevant parts of the Essay and the paragraphs of the present edition, see Table
, at the end of this chapter.
. Description of the manuscripts
MS Locke e..
Pp. vi+. Paper. Throughout the MS the main text is entered on the left-hand
even-numbered pages, while the right-hand odd-numbered pages are reserved for
corrections and additions.408
[] Formula. ð(-ð) A-N O-R. Explanation of the formula:409 quires A up to
and including N were given their respective signatures by Locke. The first quire
has no signature. Since this quire is placed before a quire that is marked ‘A’, it
is given the Greek letter ‘ð’. Quires O-R received no signature either and are
therefore given in italics. The superscripted numbers indicate the number of
leaves of each quire. Quire ð was originally  half sheet, divided with the longer
side horizontal by three vertical folds in  equal sections, resulting in  leaves = 
pages. However, the first leaf was lost (indicated by ‘-ð’ in the formula), leaving
quire ð with only  leaves =  pages, pp. i-vi (all page numbers in MS e. not






Figure : quire ð of MS Locke e.
The hypothesis concerning a missing first leaf in quire ð is confirmed by the fact
that the present length of ð is about / the length of  half sheet, as deduced from
the size of the quarter sheets that make up the remaining quires (see [] below);
by the place of the countermark (see [] below); and by the fact that the present
first page of the quire gives only the last part of an index to the Conduct (see
[] below). The original first leaf probably contained the first part of this index.
Quires A-N and O-R (together  quires) each consist of  sheet that was divided,
with the longer side horizontal, in  equal parts by  vertical fold, that was then
divided again, with the longer side horizontal, in  equal parts by  vertical fold
 For a comparable way of making additions to the Essay, see MS Locke c., fols. -.
 Cf. Bowers, Principles of Bibliographical Description, pp. - and Greetham, Textual
Scholarship, pp. -.
text 
and that was finally divided again, with the shorter side horizontal, in  equal
parts by  vertical fold, resulting in quires with  quarter sheets =  leaves = 
pages each, with the following page numbers:  -  -   - 
- - -  - -  -  -   
- - [= pp.]; number of p.  only partially legible; Locke miswrote
 as ,  as ,  as ,  as ,  as , - as - and 
as ; page numbers corrected by Locke (wrong ) right):  ) ; - )
-;  ) ;  ) ; - ) -; - ) -;  )
; ) ; -) -. The Bodleian librarian added some missing
page numbers in the MS: i, iii, v, , ,  and . He also corrected most
misnumberings left uncorrected by Locke himself:  ) ;  ) ;  )
; - ) a-a; - ) b-b;  ) ; - ) -.
However, in the present edition all reference to MS e. is by means of Locke’s
own page numbers (including miswritten page numbers) or by italicized page
numbers used for pages that Locke did not number himself. Reference is made
to corrected page numbers when the correction was made by Locke himself, but
no reference is made to the corrected page numbers as given by the Bodleian
librarian.
[] Quires. Quire ð has no signature; quires A-M have their signature at the top
of the first and last page; quire N has ‘N’ at the top of the first page but not on
the last page; quires O-R have no signature at all. On the first page of quire A
and the last page of quires B-M, the signature is preceded by ‘Understanding’. In
most cases ‘Understanding’ and the subsequent signature were entered together
and before Locke had started entering the text itself. An exception to this rule can
be found on the last page of quire A, p. , where ‘Understanding’ is entered at a
distance from ‘A’, after the page had already been filled with text.410 The number
of the first page of each quire is: ð i; A ; B ; C ; D ; E ; F ; G ; H
; I ; K ; L ; M ; N ; O ; P ; Q ; R .
[] Contents. Page i, from top to foot: the last part of an index to the Conduct (the
first part of this index was probably on a previous page that has been lost, see [],
but p. i must already have been the first page of what is now called ‘MS e.’ about
as long as p.  has been its last page, since both pages are discoloured in a similar
degree); instructions by Locke: ‘Mem: That these following discourses are to be
writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd
and ranged according to their natural order’, followed by the stamp of the Bodleian
 For a similar use of the word ‘Understanding’ for a quire that contains additions to the Essay,
see MS Locke c., fols. -.
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Library; and finally ‘MS Locke e.’ in the hand of the Bodleian librarian. Page
iv: the Ciceronian motto: ‘Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis
gravitate atque constantiâ, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quod non satis explorate
perceptum sit et cognitum sine ullâ dubitatione defendere? Cic: de Nat: deorum
l. ’ (see ill. ). Page : a list of some subjects (most of them deleted) that Locke
was to address in the Conduct and some loose remarks, anticipating the text of
the Conduct (see again ill. ). In addition, pages - contain substantial parts of
Essay, IV.xix ‘Of Enthusiasm’ (deleted), this chapter was included in the Fourth
Edition (and also in the Fifth Edition and subsequent editions) of the Essay. Pages
- contain an addition to Essay, IV.iii ‘Of the Extant of Humane Knowledge’,
section  (deleted), also included in the Fourth Edition. Pages -: a list of
scriptural passages. Pages -: a piece on ‘Association’ (deleted); pp. - were
included in the Fourth Edition of the Essay, II.xxxiii ‘Of the Association of Ideas’
(up to ‘… that follow’, §, p. , line  in Nidditch’s edition), while the text on
pp. - reappears later, as part of the Conduct, on pp. - in the same MS
(however, this later version is probably not copied directly from the first version;
see [] below). Pages -: a passage on ‘Reasoning’ (belonging to the Conduct
and continued on pp. - of the same MS). On p.  starts ‘B: IV C: XX
Of the Conduct of the understanding’ (see ill. ). The rest of the MS, up to and
including p. , is covered by the text of the Conduct, with the exception of p.
, which gives an addition to Essay, IV.xii. and p. , which has an addition to
Essay, III.vi. (both passages deleted); both passages were included in the Fourth
Edition of the Essay. Page  contains a short list (deleted), similar to the one on
p., of subjects that Locke was to address in the Conduct; and p.  ends with
an entry in the Bodleian librarian’s hand: ‘vi+ pages really  for ,  are
double’ and with again the stamp of the Bodleian Library. Deletion of the Essay
passages does not imply their rejection but their transcription elsewhere.
[] Marginal entries. All marginal entries in MS e. are in the left margin of the
text. These entries fall into  categories. () General headers placed at the top of
the margin. The pages containing the text of the Conduct, i.e. pp. -/-
 have the following general headers: ‘Association’ (pp. -); (‘Reasoning’
(p. ); ‘Conduct’ (pp. -, -); ‘Fallacies’ (pp. -); ‘Fundamental
verities’ (pp. -); ‘Bottoming’ (p. ); ‘Transfering’ (p. ). () Entries
stating the content of one or more paragraphs (headwords), placed at the start
of a new paragraph. From p.  onwards, headwords started in the margin are
continued into the space reserved for the main text, while no more keywords are
given. () Entries high-lighting a specific topic within a paragraph (keywords)
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and whose place can be anywhere in the margin alongside the text. It is not
always possible to distinguish with certainty between headwords and keywords
(headwords/keywords of the Conduct as given in MS e. are listed in Table , at
the end of this chapter). () Entries consisting of numbers that appear after some
headwords/keywords:p. : Reasoning ; p. : partial views ; p. : Introduction
 (‘’ superimposed on ‘’); p. : Parts ; p. : Practise ; p.: Habits ; p.
: Suffisance . () Entries consisting of a vertical line in the margin: pp. -,
- and -; the line signals the transcription of the text from these pages
to another document (see below []).
[] Catchwords. Most pages ending with text that is continued on the next page
have a catchword. In the few cases where they do not, there is no evidence of
discontinuity in the text.
[] Size. The  quarter sheets of each quire have the same size, but there is
variation between the different quires themselves. The sizes that follow are in
mm and not of the leaves but of the complete quarter sheets of the quires (the
size given for ð is of what has remained from what was probably one half sheet,
see []): ð ×; A ×; B ×; C ×; D ×; E ×; F
×; G ×; H ×; I ×; K ×; L ×; M ×; N
×; O ×; P ×; Q ×; R ×.
[] Stitchings and pins. The MS was bound after transference to the Bodleian
Library. However, traces of earlier stitching, in the form of small holes on the
folds, have remained in the quires. The distance between these holes is roughly
equal for all the quires, suggesting that they were all tied together. Quire ð is
again a special case. It has traces of previous stitching on one of its outer edges,
viz. the right edge of p. iv = the left edge of p. v. The Bodleian librarian stitched
it with the other quires with  of its  folds, viz. the fold separating pp. ii-iii on
the inside and vi-i on the outside (see above, Figure ). Finally, the leaves within
each of the quires A-N show signs of being held together by a pin.411
[] Watermarks. The half sheet of quire ð has no watermark, the countermark
gives the initials ‘CS’. The watermark of the paper of quire A consists of a large
medallion with the Seven Provinces’ lion, the countermark gives a combination
of the letters ‘P’ and ‘L’:412
 For a similar use of pins by Locke, see his Journal for , MS Locke f., pp. -.
 Cf. Heawood, Watermarks, Nr. .
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The watermark in quires B-C shows the London coat-of-arms (a shield in four
quarters with a sword in the first quarter), the countermark gives the initials ‘EB’.
The watermark in quires D-M shows a horn and baldric and the countermark
gives again the combination of the letters ‘P’ and ‘L’ (somewhat smaller than the
similar countermark on quire A). The watermark in quires N-O shows again a
London coat-of-arms and the countermark gives the initials ‘CS’ (as quire ð).
The watermark in quires P-R shows a small sword and the countermark is an ‘A’.
[] Scribes. MS e. is for the most part written in Locke’s hand. His handwriting
shows what may be signs of diminishing vigour towards the end of MS e.; this
seems to be the case at least for the last unfinished paragraph on ‘Custome’, p.
. The text of the Conduct was not entered entirely by Locke alone. MS e.
has some added and corrected page numbers and some other additions in the
hand of the Bodleian librarian (see [] and []). Moreover, there is the text on
pp. -, which largely repeats pp. -, i.e. the part of Locke’s remarks on
‘Association’ that he had previously chosen not to include in the Fourth Edition
of the Essay and that would be included in the Conduct. The text on pp. -
is in the hand of Locke’s amanuensis William Shaw (see ill. ; more on Shaw
below, []). At least part of the text on pp. - must have been copied by
Shaw from another source then pp. -; the text on pp. - contains a full
sentence that is absent from the text on pp. - (in the present edition this is
the last sentence of paragraph ).
[] Corrections and additions. Larger additions are mostly entered either on the
empty odd-numbered right-hand pages facing the even-numbered left-hand pages
on which the ‘first version’ text had been entered, or on new even-numbered pages
with a higher page-number. In the latter case Locke generally takes care to give
clear internal references to page numbers, allowing us to follow the various jumps
from one page to another. For example: the end of the paragraph on p.  of MS
e. (par.  of the present edition) is followed by: ‘vid  p. ’ (with ‘’ written
inside a square); the subsequent paragraph, on p.  (par. ) is then preceded
by: ‘v  p. ’ (with ‘’ again written inside a square). Most of the text in MS e.
is entered in black ink. However, the occasional use of ink that now looks brown
text 
(possibly caused by a chemical reaction in the paper) sets apart at least one layer
of corrections and additions.413
[] Printed notices. Long, A Summary Catalogue, pp. -; and Schankula, A
Summary Catalogue, pp. -.
MS Locke c., fols. -.
Fols. . Paper.
[] Formula. ð ð A B C D E F G;  leaves, fols. - (all folio numbers
were added by the Bodleian librarian). Each quire consists of  half sheet divided,
with the longer side horizontal, by  vertical fold in  equal leaves.
[] Quires. Quires A-C have their signature at the foot, left side, of the first page
of each quire. Quires ð-ð and D-G have no signature. The folio number of the
first leaf of each quire is: ð ; ð ; A ; B ; C ; D ; E ; F ; G
.
[] Contents and headings. Fol. r, the first page of the first quire (quire ð), starts
with ‘Of the conduct of / the understanding / Ch: I / Introduction’ (see ill. ); this
chapter covers fols. r-r and corresponds with MS e., pp. , -, -.
Fol. r, the first page of quire A, is headed ‘Ch: / Of Reasoning’. This entry is
repeated in the headers of fols. v-v (both recto and verso). The impression
is, at least on fols. r-v, that ‘Of Reasoning’ is inserted later between ‘Ch:’
and the main text. This chapter covers fols. r-r and corresponds with MS
e., pp. -, -. After a gap, consisting of several leaves that are now lost,
the text then resumes mid-sentence on the first page of quire D with the latter
part of what in the present edition is par.  plus pars. -. This part is covered
by fols. r-v and corresponds with MS e., pp. -. The next chapter is
headed ‘Ch. / Of Mathematicks’, covers fols. v-v and corresponds with MS
e., pp. -. The last chapter is headed ‘Ch. / of Religion’, covers fols. v-r
and corresponds with MS e., pp. -.
[] Marginal entries. Fols. - have an inner margin but no outer margin.
Fols. - have margins on both sides of the page. There are  kinds of marginal
entries, all appearing in fols. - and none in fols. -: () the number ‘’ at
the top of the margin of fol. r, the first page of quire ð; () the word ‘Conduct’
at the top of the margin of fol. r, the first page of quire A; () numbers in the
 The main instances of use of this different ink are listed in the annotation to the text.
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margin of fols. r-v: fol. r has ; fol. v ; fol. v ; fol. r 
and ; fol. r ; fol. v  and ; fol. r ; fol. v ; fol. r ;
fol. v ; fol. r ; fol. v ; fol. r ; fol. r ; and fol. v
has  at the end of the incomplete chapter on fols. r-v and again  at the
start of ‘Of Mathematics’; () other entries, such as an occasional expansion of an
abbreviation (fol. v) and an addition (fol. r). The headwords and keywords
in the margins of MS e. were not copied into MS c., unless they were used in
the latter MS as the title of a chapter.
[] Catchwords. All pages ending with text that is continued on the next page
have catchwords.
[] Size. Sizes given are in mm and not of the leaves but of the complete half
sheets of which each quire is made up: ð ×; ð ×; A ×; B
×; C ×; D ×; E ×; F ×; G ×.
[] Stitching. Quires ð-ð and A-C have holes that suggest earlier stitching.
These holes are not on the fold but - mm away from it, each hole perforating
both leaves of the quire. The distance between the holes in these quires suggests
that ð-ð have been stitched together and that A-C have been stitched together,
but that ð-ð and A-C remained separate from each other. Quires ð-ð and A-C
may have been parts of separate notebooks. Quires D-F show no traces of earlier
binding.
[] Watermarks. The watermark of the paper of quires ð and B shows a small
sword and the countermark of quires ð, A and C gives an ‘A’. It is likely that
quires ð-C all consist of the same paper. (The combination of a small sword as
watermark and an ‘A’ as countermark was already noted in the last quires, P-R,
of MS Locke e..) The countermark in quire D is a crown. The watermark in
quire E gives an elaborate horn and baldric. Quire F has neither watermark nor
countermark. The countermark in quire G gives the initials ‘IASH’. This means
that quires D-G consist of at least two different sorts of paper.
[] Scribes. Fols. -, i.e. the chapters ‘Introduction’ and ‘Of Reasoning’,
are largely in the hand of Locke’s amanuensis William Shaw (see [] below).
However, there are some exceptions. () The hand of Locke himself appears
briefly on fol. r to set up the text of the Conduct for his scribe; ‘Of the conduct
of / the understanding / Ch: I / Introduction / The last resort …’ is in Locke’s
hand (see ill. ). In the same way he had set up a new paragraph for Shaw on p. 
text 
in MS e. (see ill. ). () On fol. v the following sentence appears immediately
after the first introductory paragraph:
There is, tis visible, great variety in mens understandings: And their natural constitu-
tions put soe wide a difference between some men in this respect, that art and industry
would never be able to master and their very natures seem to want a foundation to
raise on it that which other men easily attain unto.
This sentence had also appeared after the first introductory paragraph of the
Conduct in the version of MS e., p. . However, on fol. v of MS c. a
foreign hand breaks in that deletes this sentence and then adds:
this is repeated again two leaves farther, where I think is its proper place. and it ought
to be omitted here.414
This hand is neither Locke’s nor Shaw’s, rather, it belongs to Peter King (see []
below). () Next, Locke made an addition on fol. r, at the end of chapter .
After Shaw had copied the last sentence:
And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and
improvement of this facultie of the minde which hinders them in their progresse and
keeps them in ignorance and error all their lives
Locke added the following sentence that is absent from MS e.:
Some of them I shall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for
in the following Chapters.415
() The title of the next chapter, on fol. r, ‘Of Reasoning’, is also in Locke’s
hand. () In addition, Shaw’s transcription of the chapters ‘Introduction’ and ‘Of
Reasoning’ has several minor additions and corrections by Locke and by King.
For instance, Locke made some additions on fols. r, v and v, while King’s
corrections can be found on fols. v, r and v. After fols. - follow
fols. -, which are in the hand of yet one other scribe, probably a scribe
employed by King (see [] below). However, a foreign hand breaks in shortly
on fol. v to write the head of the chapter ‘Of Mathematicks’ and its first four
lines (see ill. ). The writer of these lines is again King. Folios - no longer
show any trace of Locke’s hand. The scribe employed by King left open a space
on fol. r, so that a word he could not decipher could be entered later, but this
 The place that Locke prescribes here is indeed the place that it has been given both in
C- and in the present edition; this place results once his instructions in MS e. pp.
- concerning the introductory paragraphs on pp. - of the same MS are carried
out (see below, §).
 In the present edition, this sentence is given in the collation of MS e. with MS c..
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completion was never made. () Finally, all folio numbers in MS c. fols. -
were added by the Bodleian librarian.
[] Printed notices. Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. ; and Schankula, A Sum-
mary Catalogue, p. .
. The Conduct in Locke’s correspondence
The following passages constitute the main references to the Conduct in Locke’s
correspondence, either by himself or by his correspondents. Some allusions are
clear, others are more ambiguous. Some fragments were already presented above,
but are given here again for the sake of completeness.
[] Letter from Locke to William Molyneux,  April , where he announces
the start of work on the Conduct.
I have lately got a little leisure to think of some additions to my book, against the next
edition, and within a few days have fallen upon a subject that I know not how far it will
lead me. I have written several pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the
more upon me, and I cannot yet get sight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will
be Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which, if I shall pursue, as far as I imagine it
will reach, and as it deserves, will, I conclude, make the largest chapter of my Essay.416
[] Molyneux’s encouraging answer to this letter,  May .
You never write to me, that you do not raise new expectations in my longing Mind of
partaking your Thoughts on those Noble Subjects you are upon. Your Chapter con-
cerning the Conduct of the Understanding must needs be very Sublime and Spacious.417
[] Letter from Locke to William Molyneux,  September , in which he
complains that his polemic with Bishop Edward Stillingfleet distracts him from
working on additions to Education and to the Essay.
Pray give my humble service to your brother, and let me know whether he hath any
children, for then I shall think my self obliged to send him one of the next edition
of my book of Education, which, my bookseller tells me, is out of print; and I had
much rather be at leisure to make some additions to that, and my Essay of Humane
Understanding, than be employed to defend my self against the groundless, and, as
others think, trifling quarrel of the Bishop.418
[] Letter from Locke to Philippus van Limborch,  October , where the
author states that he has written some additions for the Fourth Edition of the
Essay ‘that are rather substantial’.
 Corr. , VI, p. .
 Corr. , VI, p. .
 Corr. , VI, p. .
text 
I had decided to make some additions and have already composed some that are rather
substantial and that might have appeared in their proper place in the Fourth Edition that
the publisher is preparing and I would readily have complied with your desire or that
of any of your friends by inserting the proofs of God’s unity that present themselves
to my mind. For I am inclined to believe that God’s unity can be demonstrated as
evidently as his existence and that this can be based on proofs that will not leave any
room for doubt. However, I like peace and there are people that are so much given
to bickering and vain quarrels that I doubt whether I should provide them with new
subjects for argument.419
[] Letter from Jean le Clerc to Locke, / October , probably referring to
the Conduct.
I have been told that you have produced another philosophical work, on the Conduct
of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. If this is indeed the case you risk being
somewhat importuned to publish it and finding me amongst those who will trouble
you, for there is no book that the public is more in need of.420
[] Letter from Locke to Peter King,  December , possibly making an
allusion to the Conduct (the letter from King to which this is a reply is not in the
Correspondence).
I received yours of the th and return you my thanks for it. I am sorry that Ideas are
such perverse things and soe troublesome to conducters. (…) Pray come as soon as you
can, that we may have time to consider this greivance of Conducters or some thing
else.421
 Corr. , VI, pp. -: ‘J’avois resolu de faire quelques additions, dont j’ai déja composé
quelques unes qui sont assez amples, et qui auroint pû hparoitrei en leur place dans la
quatriéme Edition que le Libraire se dispose à faire, Et j’aurois voluntiers satisfait a votre
desir ou au desir d’aucun de vos amys en y hinseranti les preuves de l’unité de Dieu qui
se presentent à mon Esprit. Car je suis enclin à croire que l’Unité de Dieu peut etre aussi
evidemment demonstre que son existance; et qu’elle peut etre établie sur de preuves qui ne
laisseront aucun suject d’en douter. Mais j’aime la Paix, et il y a des gens dans le monde qui
aiment si fort les criailleries et les vaines contestations, que je doute, si je dois leur fournir
de nouveaux sujets de dispute.’
 Corr. , VI, p. : ‘On m’a dit que vous aviez encore composé un autre Ouvrage de
Philosophie de la maniere de conduire son esprit dans la Recherche de la Verité. Si cela est,
vous courez risque de’être un peu importuné de le publier, et de me voir dans le nombre de
ces importuns. Il n’y a point de livres, dont le Public ait tant besoin que de ceux-là.’
 Corr. , VI, pp. -.
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[] Letter from Pierre Guenellon (-)422 to Locke, / July , proba-
bly referring to the Conduct. The letter was forwardedby Le Clerc on / October
.423
Mr. Le Clerc has told me that you are working on a new tract, the goal of which is the
discovery of the diseases of the mind. In that case the public will have a new obligation
towards you. How good it would be if you could cure men of their wrong ideas and by
the use of method put them on the course of truth.424
[] Again a letter from Guenellon to Locke,  December / January ,
addressing the same subject. No reaction by Locke has survived.
My friends who have read your Essay concerning Understanding often ask me, on what
they have been made to hope for, if your reflections on the errors of the understanding
will see light soon. The excellence of what you have published makes them expect that
the public will be much obliged to you.425
[] Letter from Peter King to Locke,  January , in which he informs Locke
about the latter’s apparent request concerning the transfer of some of his MSS
from London to, probably, Oates. (King announces that this material will be
taken along by Sir Francis Masham.)
I have opened your Standish, and found therein only One Key, which was the Key of
your square deal box, in which I found the thick quarto of Pamphlets bound together
in Parchment, Indors’d on the back, Unitarians, and also a manuscript concerning the
Conduct of the Understanding — In the deal box there was a bag, wherein are several
Keys, but there is not amongst them the Key of the large trunk, that stands in your
chamber, so That I could not open that — Sir Francis [Masham] will be so kind to
deliver you the above quarto and manuscript with the Observators you want …426
 Guenellon, born in France, was one of the principal doctors of the St. Pieters Gasthuis in
Amsterdam from  to . He and Locke had become acquainted in Paris around 
and met regularly again during the latter’s exile in the Dutch Republic. Cf. Corr. , II, p.
, n. .
 Corr. , VII, p. , n. .
 Corr. , VII, p. : ‘Monsieur le Clerc m’a dit que vous travaillez a un nouvel ouvrage,
pour decouvrir les maladies de l’esprit, c’est une nouvelle obligation que le public vous aura,
quel bien ne sera ce pas, si vous pouvez guerir les hommes de leur fausses idees, et les mettre
par methode dans le chemin de la verité!’
 Corr. , VII, pp. -: ‘mes amis qui ont lu vótre traitté de l’entendement me demandent
souvent, sur ce qu’on leur a fait esperer, si vos reflexions sur les erreurs de lentendement
verront bien tost le jour. il jugent par l’excellence de ce que vous avez publiez, que le public
vous en sera fort obligé.’
 Corr. , VIII, pp. -. De Beer assumes that the MS is MS Locke e.. The Observator
was a newspaper.
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[] Letter from Locke, dated  and  October , written shortly before his
death on  October in the same year, with final instructions concerning his MSS
to Peter King.
You will find amongst my papers several subjects proposed to my thoughts, which are
very little more than extemporary views, layd down in suddain and imperfect draughts,
which though intended to be revised and farther looked into afterwards, yet by the
intervention of business, or preferable enquiries happend to be thrust aside and so lay
neglected and sometimes quite forgotten. Some of them indeed light upon me at such
a time of leisure and in such a temper of mind that I laid them not wholy by upon
the first interruption, but took them in hand again as occasion served, and went on
in pursuance of my first designe till I had satisfied my self in the enquiry I at first
proposed. of this kind is
(…)
° The Conduct of the understanding I have allways thought ever since it first came into
my mind to be a subject very well worth consideration, though I know not how, it
seems to me for any thing that I have met with to have been almost wholy neglected:
what I have done in it is very far from a just treatise. All that I have done has been,
as any miscarriage in that point has accidentaly come into my minde, to set it downe,
with those remedies for it that I could think of. This method though it makes not that
hast to the end which one could wish, is yet perhaps the onely one can be followed in
the case, it being here as in physick impossible for a physitian to describe a disease or
seek remedies for it till he comes to meet with it. But those particulars that have occurd
to me and I have set down being as I guess sufficient to make men see some faults in
the conduct of their understandings, and suspect there may be others you may also doe
with as you think fit. For they may perhaps serve to excite others to enquire farther
into it, and treat of it more fully than I have done. But the heads and chapters must be
reduced into order.427
. A short history of the Conduct, -
[] Locke’s letter to Molyneux from  April  (see above, []), suggests this
date minus ‘a few days’ as the start of work on the Conduct.
[] Locke’s work on the Conduct was resumed on several occasions in the years
from  until his death in . MS e. shows signs of different layers of
corrections and additions (see []). In his final letter to King (see []) Locke
ranged the Conduct amongst those projects that he had not laid ‘wholy by upon
the first interruption’ but taken ‘in hand again as occasion served’. King’s letter to
Locke of  January  (see []), where the former announces the transfer by
Francis Masham of ‘a manuscript concerning the Conduct of the Understanding’
from London to, presumably, Oates, may mark one such an occasion.
 Corr. , VIII, pp. -.
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[] The earliest major interruption of work on the Conduct was probably caused
by Locke’s controversy with Stillingfleet (see above, Context, §). Mr. Locke’s
Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his Letter was
finished  June .428 On  September in the same year Locke complained
to Molyneux that the ‘triﬄing quarrel of the Bishop’ kept him from work on
additions to Education and the Essay (see []). This is not necessarily a reference
to the Conduct. Other projected additions to the Fourth Edition of the Essay,
apart from a chapter on the ‘Conduct’, were the chapters on ‘Association’ and
on ‘Enthusiasm’ (MS e. contains substantial parts of these additions, see []).
However, work on these subjects had probably started already at about April 
(see ‘Context’, first paragraph).
[] The Conduct was not started in MS e.. At least part of MS e. is a copy from
another MS. The progressive series of numbers in the margin of pp. - of MS
e. (see [] ()) probably refer to the page numbers of an earlier MS that is now
lost. The progression of the marginal numbers matches the progression in page
numbers -.
[] MS e. was not originally one single note book. It consists of a collection of
quires of unequal size (see []). These quires had been tied together already at
some time before they were transferred to the Bodleian Library (see []). However,
this was not yet the case when Locke started writing. If it had been, he would
have had no reason to mark the first and the last page of most quires with their
relevant signature. So, there is good reason to assume that at least not all the
quires of MS e. were tied together when Locke started entering text on their
pages. The leaves of each of the quires A-N were kept together by the provisional
device of a pin (see []).
[] Since MS e. was originally not a note book but a series of unbound quires,
we should at least consider the possibility of Locke discussing different subjects of
the Conduct on different quires at the same time, resulting in a non-chronological
order of the text after the pages of MS e. had been bound together. However,
this is not a likely possibility. Had this been the case, then:
. It might be possible to find in the MS some additions appearing on pages
with a lower number than that of the page to which they were added.
. One would expect to see the start of new subjects on the first even-
numbered page of some quires and a gap between such a new entry and
the end of the text on the previous quire.
 Yolton, John Locke a Descriptive Bibliography, nr. , p. .
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Yet:
. All additions as listed in Table  appear on pages with a higher number
than that of the page to which they were added; most page numbers
are in Locke’s own hand (see []), and he took care to clearly mark the
connection between original entries and later additions (see []).
. The first even-numbered pages of all quires from B onwards simply
continue the text of the last even-numbered page of the previous quire.
No quire marks any break in the running sequence of the text. (An
exception is quire H; its first even-numbered page, p. , starts with
two introductory paragraphs to the Conduct, pars.  and  of the present
edition. This entry ends on p. , leaving a blank space, after which the
text of the next paragraph, par. , starts on p. . These introductory
paragraphs stand isolated from what comes before and after. However,
the text of the last even-numbered page of the previous quire G is
continued — not on the first even-numbered page of quire H, but on
the first odd-numbered page of quire H.)
To summarize: the impression is that Locke entered his text as if the quires of MS
e. already formed a note-book, i.e. that he started writing on the first page of the
first quire and ended on the last (written) page of the last quire, even although
the final pattern was complicated by numerous corrections and additions.
[] MS e. gives the text of the Conduct on pp. -. However, there is one
interruption: on p.  Locke enters a short addition to Essay IV.xii. and on p. 
an addition to III.vi. (see []), after which he proceeds again with the Conduct.
He gives page numbers and line numbers of the Third Edition to stipulate the
intended place of these additions within the existing text of the Essay, and this
is indeed exactly where they appear in print in the Fourth Edition.429 So, they
were produced at the latest shortly before this edition went to the press, which
according to Nidditch was in late June or July .430 Assuming that Locke had
already produced the text of the Conduct on pp. - by the time he had reached
pp. - to produce these two small fragments (see []), it follows that the
part of the Conduct comprised by pp. - of MS e. ( odd-numbered pages
out of a total of ) must have been on paper by June/July  at the latest.
[] For a further attempt at dating MS e. we first need to substantiate the
proposed identification of William Shaw as the scribe who copied the Conduct-
part on ‘Association’ to pp. - of MS e. (see []). I already mentioned Shaw
 Cf. Essay, notes on p.  and p.  respectively.
 Nidditch, ‘Introduction’ to Essay, p. xxix.
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also as the scribe who copied paragraphs of the Conduct from MS e. to fols.
- of MS c. (see []). Although the handwritings on MS e. pp. -
and on MS c. fols. - at first sight seem to differ from each other (compare
ills.  and ), there a good reasons for attributing both to Shaw. The solution
starts with MS Locke f., which is a small account book that contains a series of
entries in which Locke’s servants entered payments on behalf of their master. The
first entries are by Sylvester Brownover. The entries from  July  (fol. v) up
to and including  August  (fol. r) are first headed by ‘J:Locke’, but from
 April  onwards by ‘Wm Shaw’. The entries from fol. v onwards show
a clear resemblance with the handwriting of the scribe who filled pp. - of
MS e. (compare ill.  with ill. ).431 Now, it can be proved that the entries on fol.
v-r and onwards in MS f. are by Shaw. Consider the entries on fol. r:
MR J: Locke Cr
 Jul.  By a Guinea lent me   
 By M. : lent me   
 By ditto   
Sept  By money paid me    12
The money that Locke lent to Shaw was not only noted down by Shaw, but also
by Locke himself. MSS Locke c.- consist of two ledgers, containing Locke’s
accounts, -. These accounts were ordered per person. MS c. contains
the accounts for the period -. Consider the following fragment from the
entries booked under the name of William Shaw, p.  (see ill. ):
William Shaw Dr
 July   To Cash lent him    
Sept   To ditto    12
So, an entry of the money received by Shaw from the creditor Locke is mirrored
by an entry of the money given by Locke to the debtor Shaw (the sums of £
-- and £ -- that Shaw had entered separately were taken together by Locke
and entered as £ --). So much on the resemblances between the handwriting
of the scribe in MS e. pp. - and in MS f. fols. v-r, and on the
attribution of this hand to Shaw. The handwriting in the subsequent pages of
MS f. starts to change; it closely resembles the hand that filled MS c. fols.
- (compare ill.  with ill. ). The corresponding entries in Locke’s ledger
confirm that these later entries in MS f. are still by Shaw. In addition, we have
 The first entry on fol. v and the entries on fol. r are in the hand of Locke, who can be
seen here initiating his new servant in the art of book-keeping.
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a copy of a letter from Locke to Dr. Daniel Whitby,  September ,432 that
resembles the handwriting in MS c. fols. - and that according to De
Beer was by William Shaw (compare ill.  with ill. ). To conclude: although the
handwritings in MS e. pp. - and in MS c. fols. - differ from each
other, they can both be safely attributed to William Shaw.433 In the early modern
period it was not at all unusual for one scribe to use different scripts at different
occasions.434 Shaw seems to use an ‘every-day’ script in MS e. pp. - and a
neat English copperplate script in MS c. fols. -. As a scribe Shaw is a very
likely candidate. It is known that at the end of his life Locke intended to make
use of his services in transcribing (part of ) his Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles
of St. Paul even although the man must have been rather lazy.435 Yet Locke was
to keep this servant until his death. In his last will ( April ) he bequeathed
to Shaw ‘five pounds and all my wearing apparell if he shall be in my service at
the time of my death’436 and the latter duly signed for having received both the
money and the clothes on  November .437
[] If William Shaw was the scribe of MS e. pp. -, than the moment
that this man went into Locke’s service can be used for further dating of MS
e.. De Beer states that Shaw succeeded James Dorrington as Locke’s servant in
the Summer of .438 Indeed, the first entry in Shaw’s hand in MS f., the
account book mentioned above (see []), is dated  July  and the first entry
in Locke’s Journal relating to Shaw can be found on  July : ‘Lent Will £
--’439 (see [] for this transaction in Locke’s ledger). Also, the last mention
 MS Locke c., fol. r, Corr. , VII, pp. -.
 The identification of Shaw as the scribe of MS c. fols. - is mine; however, credit for
the identification of Shaw as the scribe of MS e. pp. - as well, and the subsequent
use of Locke’s ledgers to test (and confirm) both hypotheses goes to Prof. M. A. Stewart. In
addition, Prof. C. Dekker was so kind as to submit both hypotheses to careful paleographical
scrutiny; he could confirm that both hands belong to the same person.
 Cf. Greetham, Textual Scholarship, p.  and pp. -.
 Cf. Locke’s farewell letter to P. King,  and  October , Corr. , VIII, p. : ‘If
my Paraphrase and notes on the Ephesians are not wholy transcribed before I dye (as I fear
they will not. For however earnestly I have pressed it again and again I have not been able
to prevaile with Will to dispatch the two first Chapters in three months) you must get it to
be transcribed out of my filed papers after I am dead, that so it may be in a condition to be
in a condition to be printed. Will after all I think be the fitest to transcribe them because he
can read my hand and knows my way of writeing with the use of the references.’
 Corr. (no number) VIII, p. .
 MS Locke c., fol. v.
 Corr. , VIII, p. , n. .
 MS f., p. .
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made of Dorrington is  June  in Locke’s ledger440 and  June of the same
year in Locke’s Journal: ‘paid James Dorington £ -- 12 ’.441
[] Assuming again a chronological order within MS e. (see []), and further
assuming that Shaw wrote MS e. pp. - (see []) and that this man went
into Locke’s service in June/July  (see []), it follows that the last part of
MS e., starting with the paragraphs copied by Shaw on p. , was not written
earlier than June/July .
[] If pp. - of MS e. were written June/July  at the latest (see []) and
pp. - in June/July  at the earliest (see []), then there is a period of
at least two years in which Locke did not write more than pp. -. (He had
been very busy as Commissioner for Trade; he handed over this function in May
, thus freeing time to spend his waning energies again more fully on scholarly
pursuits.) The existence of a period of at least two years with hardly any work
done on the Conduct, covered by pp. -, is confirmed by four characteristics
of MS e. that all either start or end in pp. -. Firstly, quire M (pp. -)
is the last quire that has a signature on both its first and its last page, quire N (pp.
-) has only a signature on its first page and the remaining quires O-R have
no signature at all (see []). Secondly, quire N is the last quire to show traces of
having had a pen trough its leaves (see []). Thirdly, although the quires all vary
in size, the length of the quarter sheets of quires N-R is considerably shorter than
that of the previous quires (see []). Fourthly, from p.  onwards, headwords
started in the margin are continued into the space reserved for the main text,
while no more keywords are given (see [] ()).
[] So far, the genesis of the text of the Conduct as contained by MS e. has been
divided into three major periods: the text up to and including p.  was written
in June/July  at the latest; pp. - were written between June/July 
or later and June/July  or later; and the last part, pp. -, was written
between June/July  or later and Locke’s death in October . This rough
chronology is largely confirmed and further refined by the story that is told by
the watermarks in the paper of the quires of MS e. (see []). The quires fall into
 categories (assuming that quires ð and N-O belong in the same category), each
with a specific combination of one watermark and one countermark. Each of
these  combinations has been traced back in letters and other dated MS material
of Locke, thus enabling a tentative dating of the corresponding quires (results
 MS c., p. .
 MS f., p. .
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cannot be more than tentative because it is not possible to determine the amount
of time that passed between Locke’s purchase and his actual use of a sheet of
paper). The results of this exercise are shown in Table , at the end of this chapter.
[] MS e. was not stitched when Locke started work on it (see []), but it was
stitched at some later moment (see []). The continuous way in which he entered
some additions on the last even-numbered page on one quire and then proceeded
with this same correction on the first odd-numbered page of the next quire, makes
it likely that these quires were tied together by the time Locke started to make
these relatively late additions. Clear examples of such additions can be found on
pp. - (quires D/E), pp. - (quires I/K), pp. - (quires K/L) and pp.
- (quires Q/R).
[] The ‘working order’ of the Conduct in MS e. was not meant as a definitive
order. On fols. - of MS c. Locke made a start with the task outlined by
himself on page i of MS e. (see []): ‘Mem: That these following discourses are
to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be
numberd and ranged according to their natural order’. Folios - contain two
chapters, ‘Introduction’ (numbered ‘I’) and ‘Of Reasoning’ (unnumbered), both
consisting of paragraphs that can be found on different places in MS e. (see []).
Each chapter was stitched separately (see []). Locke himself only wrote the first
words of these chapters, while the rest of the work was done by William Shaw.
However, Locke’s hand keeps appearing on fols. - in order to make some
additions (see []).
[] Folios - of MS c. are clearly copied from MS e.; the numbers in
the margins of fols. - (see []) correspond with the pages of the respective
passages in MS e. (for a similar procedure see []). The pages in MS e. that
were copied in MS c. are marked by a vertical line in the margin of MS e. (see
[] ()).
[] It is not clear when Locke started work on fols. - of MS c., but
it must have been after practically all of MS e. had been written. One of the
passages covered by fols. - of MS c. is on pp. - of MS e.. The
only thing that Locke was to write in MS e. after these pages was the unfinished
last paragraph on ‘Custom’ on p. . If the manuscript sent from London to
Oates in January  (see []) was MS e., then Shaw’s partial transcription of
this MS to fols. - of MS c. and Locke’s writing of ‘Custom’ in MS e.
probably took place between this time and the latter’s death on  October .
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[] The next folios of MS c., fols. - (quires D-F ), differ from the previous
fols. - (quires ð-ð and A-C) in various respects. Folios - no longer
show any trace of Locke’shandwriting.Also, there are no signs of previous binding
(see []). Finally, the size of the quires that contain fols. - is different from
the previous quires (see []). Locke had probably started to work on fols. -
only during the last six months of his life (see []). In his farewell letter to Peter
King (see []) he confirmed that his instructions on the first page of MS e. (see
[]) still had to be carried out. The last sentence in this letter about the Conduct
gains extra urgency by the fact that it was inserted later and in a different colour
of ink than the rest of the letter: ‘But the heads and chapters must be reduced
into order.’ Since Peter King was the recipient of these instructions, he is the
most likely candidate for being their executor. After Locke’s death he took over
responsibility for the transcription of MS e. to MS c.. Whereas fols. -
had still been produced under Locke’s own direction, King was responsible for the
production of fols. -; this explains the differences between fols. - and
fols. -. The task of transcribing the text of MS e. to MS c. fols. -
was not carried out by King himself, but by a scribe in his service. However,
King did set up the chapter ‘Of Mathematicks’ on fol. v for this scribe (as
had been the habit of Locke himself ). These few lines on fol. v show indeed a
close resemblance with King’s hand, which can be found in various Locke MSS
in the Bodleian Library (compare ill.  with ill. ). Locke must have died even
before he had been able to thoroughly check and correct Shaw’s transcription on
fols. -. This task was finished by King, which explains why these folios bear
witness to interventions in the hands of both Locke and King.
[] King was probably the editor of the Conduct as it would appear for the first
time in O-. The passage about the Conduct in Locke’s farewell letter to King
(see []) was repeated almost verbatim in the ‘Advertisement to the Reader’ to
O-:
The Conduct of the Understanding he always thought to be a Subject very well worth
Consideration. As any Miscarriages in that point accidentally came into his Mind, he used
sometimes to set them down in Writing, with those remedies that he could then think of.
This Method, tho’ it makes not that Haste to the End which one would whish, yet perhaps
[is] the only one that can be followed in the Case. It being here, as in Physick, impossible
for a Physician to describe a Disease, or seek Remedies for it, till he comes to meet with it.
Such Particulars of this kind as occurr’d to the Author at a time of Leisure, he, as is before
said, sat down in Writing; intending, if he had lived, to have reduc’d them into Order
and Method, and to have made a complete Treatise; whereas now it is only a Collection
of casual Observations, sufficient to make Men see some Faults in the Conduct of their
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Understanding, and suspect there may be more, and may perhaps serve to excite others to
enquire farther into it, than the Author hath done.442
[] Neither MS e. nor MS c. fols. - functioned as printer’s copy for the
Conduct in O-, but both were used as a source. MS e. is the main source,
but O- has a (slightly altered) passage that was added in Locke’s hand on fol.
r of MS c. (see [] () and below, []), but that is absent in MS e.. This
suggests that MS c. was also used as a source.
[] Peter King did make a start with task of ordering and correcting the text
of the Conduct. He corrected Shaw’s work on fols. - of MS c. and he
was responsible for the transcription by what was probably his own scribe on
fols. - of the same MS (see []). However, it is clear that King did not
finish his job. The elements of MS e. that were presented as the Conduct in
O- were not ‘writ out … into distinct Chapters’, nor were they ranged
‘according to their natural order’ (see []). King must have felt that this task
went above his capacities. Locke’s instructions, combined with such information
as King could have gathered from marginal headwords and keywords (see [])
and from the content of the rather loose remarks that make up the Conduct, did
not provide him with the necessary information. Instead, he presented the parts
of MS e. in roughly the same chronological order as they had been written down
by Locke, without any additional ordering. He divided these parts into  rather
arbitrary sections (whose headings were derived from the marginal headwords and
keywords in MS e.) and omitted the unfinished last paragraph on p. . There
is even an example of King undoing a case of Locke’s own ordering in MS c..
Locke had ranged three parts of MS e., one on p.  (headword ‘Introduction’),
the next on pp. - and the last on pp. - (headword ‘Parts’) together
in chapter , ‘Introduction’, of MS c., fols. r-r. King decided to ignore
this ordering and to go back to a more fragmented presentation. He presented
the first two parts as ‘§ Introduction’ and the third as ‘§ Parts’.443 Since King
failed to order Locke’s ‘discourses’ into chapters, it is only fitting that his edition
does not consist of chapters, but of sections. We have seen ([] ()) that at the
end of chapter  in MS c., fol. r. Locke had added the following sentence:
‘Some of them [errors] I shall take notice of and endeavour to point out proper
remedies for in the following Chapters.’ King decided to include this sentence
in O-, but since he had not ordered the material of MS e. into chapters he
 Op. cit. no page number.
 This fact confirms my assertion that MS c. did not function as printer’s copy for C-.
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duly substituted the word ‘Discourse’ for ‘Chapters’. He knew his task but he
also understood that he had been unable to fulfil it.
. The relation between the Conduct and the Essay
The Conduct was projected as an addition to the Essay. The title ‘Of the Conduct
of the understanding’ in MS e. p.  is preceded by its planned chapter number
in the Essay: ‘B:IV C:XX’. This heading was never deleted. Also, on pp. -
Locke gives the following instructions about the desired place of two introductory
paragraphs to the Conduct on pp. - (these instructions may have been added
later, so we cannot be sure about their chronology in relation to the rest of the
text): ‘NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this
Chapter of the conduct of the understanding’. The implication of this entry is
that the Conduct is here still regarded as a chapter of the Essay. However, MS e.
provides us with proof for a change of mind concerning the status of the Conduct.
Occasionally, in the Conduct Locke refers back to the Essay. There are at least
four clear cases in MS e. of corrections or additions that amount to changing
an internal reference to the Essay into an external reference.444 By the time that
these conversions were made, Locke must have decided that the Conduct would
not be a part the Essay.
() On p.  of MS e. (par. ) Locke writes: ‘Those hindrances of our under-
standings in the pursuit of knowledg I have sufficiently enlarged upon in an other
place so that noe thing more needs here to be said of those matters’. However, the
MS shows that he first wrote ‘other parts of this treatise’ and only later changed
this in ‘an other place so’.
() On p.  of MS e. (par. ) Locke briefly mentions the problem of the relation
between words and ideas: ‘… what I have said in the d booke of my Essay will
excuse me from any other answer to this question’. Initially he had written ‘this
Essay’, and replaced ‘this’ only later by ‘my’.
() On p.  of MS e. (par. ) we read: ‘I have copiously enough spoken of the
abuse of words in an other place …’ He first wrote ‘spoken in this tract’. Probably
he then substituted ‘treatise’ for ‘tract’, then deleted ‘in this treatise’ and finally
added ‘in an other place’.
() The clearest indication for a parting of ways between Essay and Conduct is
given by the paragraphs on ‘Association’ (pars. -). We have already noted
 For what probably amounts to an internal reference to the Essay that was left unchanged,
see par. : ‘this essay’.
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(‘Context’, first paragraph) that Locke probably started work on some projected
additions for the Fourth Edition of the Essay in about April ; that one of these
projected additions was on ‘Association’, comprising pp. - of MS e.; and that
he only included the first part of this material in the Fourth Edition of the Essay,
while the remaining part was to be included in the Conduct (see ‘Context’, §).
It is now time to look into this matter with greater detail. Consider the following
passage in MS e., pp. -:
[] when two things [] in them selves disjoynd appear to the sight constantly united.
if the eye sees those things rivited which are loose where will you begin to rectifie the
mistakes that follow [*] from it. Tis a [**] hard thing to convince any one that things
are not soe, & naturaly soe as they constantly appear to him
The part from p.  until * on p.  was included in Book II, Chapter xxxiii ‘Of
the Association of Ideas’ in the Fourth Edition of the Essay. In this edition (and
in subsequent editions), the text until * was continued with the following words
(section ), which cannot be found in MS e.:
[*] in two Ideas, that they have been accustom’d so to join in their Minds, as to substitute
one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves?
Since the Fourth Edition went to the press in June/July  (see []), it was
at the latest by then that Locke decided not to include pp. - of MS e. on
‘Association’ in the new chapter for the Essay. It was only later that he decided to
use this remaining material for the Conduct.445 By the time he ordered William
Shaw to copy the remaining material on ‘Association’ to pp. - of MS e.,
it was June/July  at the earliest (see []). It is certain that Shaw copied at
least part of the text on pp. - from another source than pp. - (see
[]). However, it is likely that Shaw’s unknown source was similar to pp. -
of MS e., in that the Conduct-part on ‘Association’ was not yet set apart from
the previous Essay-part on the same subject. This meant that Locke first had to
provide an acceptable beginning for a new paragraph in the Conduct. He could
not simply ask Shaw to start at (the place in the unknown source that was parallel
to) ** on p.  in MS e.. Something had to be entered before ** in order to
produce a decent introductory sentence for what in the Conduct was to be the
new subject on ‘Association’. This is what Locke added in his own hand on pp.
- of MS e.:
 That pp. - give a part of the Conduct seems to have escaped Long, A Summary Catalogue,
although he remarks, p. : ‘The draft [containing both the Essay-part and the Conduct-part]
is longer than the printed version [containing only the Essay-part].’
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[] Though I have in the d book of my Essay concerning humane understanding
treated of the Association of Ideas yet haveing donne it there historicaly as giveing a view
of the understanding in this as well as its several other ways of operateing rather than
designeing there to enquire into the remedies ought to be applied to it, It will under
this later consideration afford other matter of thought to those who have a minde to
instruct them selves throughly in the right way of conducting their understandings and
that the rather because this if I mistake not is as frequent a cause of mistake and error
in us as perhaps [] any thing else that can be named, and is a disease of the mind as
hard to be cured as any. It being a very [**]
With these words he had set up a new paragraph for Shaw, who could now start
at ** with copying the text from (the unknown source that ran parallel to) MS
e. pp. - to pp. MS e. -. It is not clear why exactly Locke chose to
include in the Conduct a part on ‘Association’ that he first had discarded as an
addition to the Essay, but wrong association of ideas is certainly an important
aspect of the central theme of the Conduct, i.e. that of errors relevant for his logic
of ideas. Given the intimate connection between the Essay and the Conduct in
general, and the Essay-part and the Conduct-part on ‘Association’ in particular, it
is doubtful whether Locke’s characterization of these parts in the quotation above
amounts to much more than a posterior rationalization. What is clear however,
is that for all practical purposes he had started to regard the Conduct as a work
separate from the Essay. All this provides detailed confirmation of John Yolton’s
remark that ‘In some ways, the Conduct picks up from the Essay chapter on the
association of ideas …’446
. Choice of copy-text
Either MS e. or MS c., fols. - can be chosen as copy-text for an edition
of the Conduct. Another candidate, the text in O- (used for all subsequent
editions of the Conduct), must be discarded. It is a posthumous text that is based
on these two sources. MS c. gives a copy of the draft version in MS e.. However,
MS c. covers only a small part of the text presented in MS e.. I will chose MS
e. pp. -/- as copy-text for the present edition of the Conduct. The
Conduct-part on ‘Association’ demands special attention, since it appears twice in
MS e.. The first version on pp. - is in Locke’s own hand. The second version
appears on pp. -; it is in the hand of William Shaw, but contains corrections
in the hand of Locke. Shaw’s copy follows in most cases the wording of Locke’s
holograph, but is probably copied from another version that has been lost (see
[]). Shaw’s copy differs from Locke’s holograph in punctuation, orthography,
and in some wordings. In addition, this copy has one sentence (at the end of par.
 ‘Introduction’ to C-, p. vii.
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 in the present edition) that is absent from Locke’sholograph. Although Shaw’s
copy is more recent than Locke’s holograph and although it contains corrections
in Locke’s hand, the choice for this copy as copy-text would imply that Shaw’s
orthography and punctuation would be given priority over Locke’s own writing
on pp. -. The fact that Locke did not bother to correct Shaw’s orthography
and punctuation does not imply that he preferred his scribe’s idiosyncrasies to his
own habits. However, Locke’s corrections indicate that he did check the wording
of the text. I have therefor taken Locke’s holograph of as copy-text, but in the
few cases of differences in wording I have opted in most cases for Shaw’s copy (in
cases where substantive differences are likely to be due to scribal errors that Locke
failed to correct, preference has been given to Locke’s holograph). The complete
sentence that is present in Shaw’s copy but not in Locke’s holograph, is included
in the present edition (it is also included in O-). Differences in wording
between Locke’s holograph and Shaw’s copy are registered in the annotation.
. The order of the text
I have concluded that, apart from additions and corrections on odd-numbered
right-handed pages, the text of the Conduct on pp. -, - of MS e. is
in chronological order (see []); that this was not meant to be a definitive order;
that Locke started ordering the material of MS e. on fols. - of MS c.
(see []); and that King failed to complete this job (see []). A modern editor of
the Conduct has two choices. He can either try to finish King’s job or present the
parts of MS e. in the ‘working order’ in which they have come down to posterity.
The former option presents us with grave difficulties. We are in no better position
than King was, and I have noted that he did not have the necessary information
to bring the job to a successful and unambiguous end (see []). I therefore choose
for the second possibility, which is also the disposition to which King eventually
fell back. Once this general choice is made, some particular problems still remain
to be solved.
It is only on p.  of MS e. that we meet the starting paragraph of the
Conduct, headed ‘Introduction’ by a marginal entry and preceded by ‘B:IV C:
XX Of the Conduct of the understanding’. The text that follows from this point
onwards contains the bulk of the Conduct and runs to the end on p. . I will
call this ‘A’. However, before p.  there are already two Conduct-fragments. The
question is what place should be assigned to these fragments relative to A. Pages
- contain the Conduct-part on ‘Association’ (see above, §). It is not difficult
to give this a part an acceptable place. It reappears in a second version on pp.
-, where it is included in the running text of A. So, in the present edition
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the Conduct-part on ‘Association’ will be given the place that corresponds with
the place of pp. - relative to the previous and subsequent pages in A (this
is also the place given to ‘Association’ in O-).
The second Conduct-fragment before p.  is an entry on ‘Reasoning’ (pp.
-). It is continued with a late addition on pp. -. Pages - and pp.
- make up what I will call ‘B’. The text on pp. - is clearly marked
by Locke as a continuation of the first part of B on pp. -. There can be
no doubt about B being a part of the Conduct. The two subfragments, pp. -
 and pp. -, were taken together by Locke and copied by Shaw as the
chapter ‘Of Reasoning’ on fols. - of MS c.. At the top of the margin of
fol. r Locke himself wrote ‘Conduct’ (see []). However, the number of this
chapter was repeatedly and conspicuously left open (see []). Apparently Locke
had not yet made up his mind about its definitive place in a finished version of
the Conduct. This leaves us with the problem of where to place B in relation to
A. There are three options: B can be placed before, somewhere within, or after
A. The obvious start of the Conduct is formed by its introduction as given in
A, which eliminates the first possibility. King settled for the second alternative.
He inserted B as § between § and § of his edition (where it has remained
in all subsequent editions), i.e. between pars.  and  of the present edition.
However, neither MS e. nor MS c. contain any justification for this solution.
We can only guess here at King’s motives. So far as we know, ‘Of Reasoning’ (=B)
is the only chapter in MS c. fols. - that was ordered by Locke himself,
apart from the introductory chapter. This may have prompted King to place B
immediately after this introductory chapter (i.e. after §- in his own edition),
thus starting his edition with the only two chapters that were arranged by Locke
himself. However, it is clear that the place assigned by King to B is not only
unmotivated but also destroys the connection between pars.  and  in A. Par. 
ends with a remark about the errors that are caused by a lack of exercise of our
mental faculties: ‘And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many
faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the mind which hinders
them in their progresse and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives.’ And
par.  continues with the importance of exercising these faculties (‘powers’): ‘We
are borne with faculties and powers capable almost of any thing such at least as
would carry us farther then can be easily imagined. But tis only the exercise of
those powers which gives us ability and skill in any thing and leads us towards
perfection’. The MS material does not provide us with clear cues for another
place of B within A. What remains is the third option: placing B after A.
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An easier problem is that of the internal order of the introductoryparagraphs.
We have seen that p.  of MS e. gives a paragraph marked ‘Introduction’, but
that there are also two introductoryparagraphs on pp. - of the same MS, also
marked ‘Introduction’ in the margin. These latter paragraphs are unconnected
with the entries before and after them (see []). However, Locke himself had
entered the following instructions concerning these introductory paragraphs on
pp. - : ‘NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin
this Chapter of the conduct of the understanding’. Does this mean that the
introductory paragraphs on pp. - should precede even the introductory
paragraph on page , or should they be placed after this paragraph? When
Locke asked Shaw to copy this material as the chapter called ‘Introduction’ on
fols. - of MS c., he chose for the latter possibility. This order was also
taken by King in O- and it is the order for which I have opted as well.
Finally, in addition to the text comprising A and B, MS e. contains some
secondary material pertaining to the Conduct (see []). This material is included
as items C-K in an appendix to the main text. The Ciceronian motto on page
iv of MS e., ‘Quid tam …’, cannot with certainty be regarded as the motto of
the Conduct. However, it is included as such in the present edition (as it was also
included in O-). Its subject is that of error, which very well fits the main
theme of the Conduct.
The order of the present edition, with the exception of the place assigned to
B, is the same as the one given by King in O-. However, since I have not
ordered the material into chapters and since an ordering into sections, as practised
by King, is bound to remain an arbitrary procedure, I have taken the successive
paragraphs (as marked by Locke himself ) as the basic unit for this edition (the
well-established section numbers are also given, in the inner margin of the text).
These paragraphs will be referred to by means of Arabic numbers. For the sake of
easy reference the series of paragraph numbers that starts with the first paragraph
of A, will be continued with the two paragraphs of B. The over-all result is a
text that starts where it should, that continues in an order that is based on the
evidence provided by the MSS and that does not assume more than the evidence
warrants.
. Editorial principles447
This edition of the Conduct is annotated by three footnote apparatuses. The first
apparatus gives text-critical notes with information on alterations, emendations,
 In choosing editorial principles I have made grateful if not always unaltered use of the
Clarendon-edition of Locke’s Drafts by Nidditch and Rogers.
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and other characteristics of the copy text MS not covered in the edited text itself.
In order to relieve the text from an abundance of superscript markings, the lines
of the text are numbered in the margin, with the footnotes of this first apparatus
keyed to the line numbers. The second apparatus, which elucidates the content
of the Conduct, uses reference numbers in the text. The first and the second
apparatus are given at the bottom of the main text. The third apparatus contains
collations of the copy-text in MS e. with MS c. and is made up of endnotes
that are keyed to the line numbers; this third apparatus is given in a separate
section, ‘Collation of MS Locke e. with MS Locke e.’. The ‘scribe’ is Locke
himself or his amanuensis William Shaw.
() All additions in MS e. are marked between ` ´ in the relevant text-critical
note:
a. Interlineated words or letters are marked between ` ´, followed by ‘il.’
b. Additions on another page (often this will be on the odd-numbered
right-hand page opposite the relevant even-numbered left-hand page)
are marked between ` ´, followed by ‘add.’, followed by the page(s) on
which the addition is entered.
c. Additions that start on one page but that are continued on another page
are marked between ` ´, followed by add., followed by ‘cont.’, followed
by the page(s) on which the addition is continued. If the continued
addition is an interlineation, then the text between ` ´ is followed by ‘il.’,
followed by ‘cont.’, followed by the page(s) on which the interlineation
is continued. The point where the addition leaves its original page and
continues on the other page is marked by a ‘|’ within the addition as it
is presented in the text-critical note.
d. Marginal additions are marked between ` ´, followed either by ‘l.’ (=left)
or by ‘r.’ (=right), followed by ‘marg.’
() Scribal deletions are marked by [ ] in the text-critical note.
() Scribal cancellation by superimposition of correction is included selectively
and marked between [[ ]].
() Unfinished or conjectural lettering in the MS is indicated in the annotation
by ‘subimposed’ dots: ‘.’.
() Indecipherable letters are registered in the annotation by subimposed dots
that are not accompanied by letters, every dot roughly corresponding with one
letter.
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() Editorial insertions and correctionsof mistakes are indicated by angle brackets
in the text: h i.
() Cases of editorial deletions in the text (which are rare), for instance where the
scribe mistakenly repeats one or more words or where a period impedes a fluent
reading of the text, are indicated between { } in the annotation.
() The sign for an editorially inserted stop, used to facilitate a fluent reading of
the text, is a superscripted dot: ‘.’.
() Each paragraph in this edition is preceded by a number between brackets: ( ).
() The section numbers used by King in O- are given in the inner margin,
also between brackets. However, in King’s edition there are two cases of misnum-
bered sections (numbers  and  were used twice). In later editions these errors
have been corrected. I will give these corrected section numbers.
() All marginal headwords and keywords in the text of the Conduct of MS
e. are presented in the outer margin, even where this implies repetitions (these
headwords/keywords are listed in Table ).
() Page numbers of MS e. are also entered in the outer margin. These numbers
are given as they appear in the MS, misnumberings included (see above, § []).
Page breaks in MS e. are marked by a | in the text of the present edition.
The fact that the text of this MS was written on the even-numbered left-hand
pages, while the odd-numbered right-hand pages were used for additions, calls
for special attention. If an addition to a left-hand page is started or continued
on the corresponding right-hand page and also ends on this same page, as is very
frequently the case, this has not been separately marked in the margin by a change
in page number (however, these cases of transition from one page to the opposite
page are registered in the annotation, see above, point c). If an addition to a
left-hand page spills over from the corresponding right-hand page to (an)other
page(s), or if the addition is started or continued on any other page than on
the corresponding right-hand page, then all page numbers of the addition are
marked in the margin.
() Locke often uses cross-references when he gives an addition to a section on
later pages in the MS (see above, § []). These cross-references will not be
registered; jumps become immediately apparent from the page numbers given in
the outer margin.
 general introduction
() The general header Conduct, used by Locke on most pages of MS e. (see
above, § [] ()), has been used throughout in the header of text of the Conduct.
() Information concerning quires and marginal numbers has been given above
(§ [] and []) and will not be included in the transcription.
() Pages ending with text that is continued on the next page in most cases have
a catchword; these cases are not registered, but exceptions to this rule are noted.
() Locke’s lineation is neither retained nor recorded.
() Locke’s erratic word division is retained as far as possible.
() Line breaks are indicated by ‘-/’ or ‘/-’ in the annotation if a hyphen was
used and by ‘/’ if no hyphen was used. Line breaks are only registered where this
is relevant. For instance, since Locke wrote both ‘thereby’ and ‘there by’, it is
relevant to enter ‘there/-by’. Furthermore, if the text in the present edition gives
a hyphen to indicate a line break while no such break appeared in the original
MS, the relevant word will be entered in the annotation without break.
() Locke’s abbreviations are expanded. I print and for &, the for ye, that for yt,
which for wch, what for wt, again for agn, you for yu, your for yr, against for agt,
part for pt, account for acct, said for sd, -ment for -mt, natural for naal , Lord for
Ld, atque for atq and quod for qd. Exception: ambiguous abbreviations, listed in
the annotation, are not expanded.
() Italics in the main text reflect cases of underlining by the scribe himself.
() The list of collations in the third apparatus only includes differences in
actual wording between MS e. and MS c., but does not include differences
in orthography, punctuation or other differences caused by minor errors of the
scribes employed by Locke or King.448 The list also ignores the differences between
MS e. and MS c. that were already noted above, § [] and [].
 For similar collational principles cf. Wainwright, ‘Introduction’ to Locke, A Paraphrase and
Notes, Vol. I, p. .
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The relation between the paragraph numbers in the








































 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
  
 ,  
  
 ,  
 ,  
  
 ,  













 ,  
  r 
 , , ,  r-r 
 ,  r 













 , , ,  v-r
‘Of Mathematics’
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 ,  v-v
‘Of Religion’

 ,  v-r
‘Of Religion’

 ,  
 ,  
 , ,  
 ,  
  
 , ,  
 , ,  
 ,  
  
 , ,  















 ,  
 , ,  -
 , ,  
  
 ,  
 , ,  
 , , , ,
, , 
-
 , ,  
  
 ,  
  
  
 ,  
 , ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  





 , ,  -
 , ,  
 , , ,  
 , , ,  -
 , , , ,

-
 , , ,  -
  
  
 ,  















 ,  
 , , ,  
  
 ,  
 , , ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
  
 , , ,  
 ,  
  
 ,  
 , ,  
  
  
 ,  
  
 , ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 
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 Fundamental verities 
 Bottoming 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ill. : the Ciceronian motto of the Conduct and some miscellaneous entries pertaining to the
Conduct (MS Locke e., p. iv and p. ).
 illustrations
Ill. : the beginning of the chapter ‘Of the Conduct of the understanding’ in MS Locke e.,
pp. -.
illustrations 
Ill. : Shaw’s copy of the end of par.  and the beginning of par.  of the Conduct (MS
Locke e., p. ).
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Ill. : the beginning of the chapter ‘Of the Conduct of the understanding’ in MS Locke
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Ill. : Locke’s ledger, MS Locke c. (covering the period -), p. , giving the ac-
counts that William Shaw had with him.
illustrations 
Ill. : first page of William Shaw’s copy from Locke’s letter to Dr. Daniel Whitby, 
September  (MS Locke c., fol. r, see Corr. , VII, pp. -).
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(For detailed explanations, see General Introduction, ‘Text’, §.)
` ´ scribal addition
[ ] scribal deletion
[[ ]] scribal cancellation by superimposition of correction
.a . the sign ‘a’ is conjectural or written incompletely, and the next is indecipherable
h i editorial insertion or substitution
{ } editorial omission
/ editorial end-of-line marker
. editorial stop





Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravi-iv
tate atque constantiâ, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quod
non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ullâ
dubitatione defendere? Cic: de Nat: deorum l. .1, 2
 For a photographic copy from MS e., p. iv, see ill. .
 Cicero, De natura deorum, Bk. I, §: ‘what is so ill-considered or so unworthy
of the dignity and seriousness proper to a philosopher as to hold an opinion
that is not true or to maintain with unhesitating certainty a propostion
not based on adequate examination, comprehension and knowledge?’ Transl.
H. Rackham. The quotation is part of a context where Cicero stresses the
importance of Academic suspension of judgement in the face of insufficient
proof; cf. the second motto on the title-page of the Essay concerning Human
Understanding, also taken from ND, Bk. I, § : ‘Quam bellum est velle
confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque
ipsum sibi displicere!’ Locke’s library was filled with a substantial collection
of works by Cicero. Harrison/Laslett do not mention a separate edition of
ND, but they do mention two general editions of Cicero’s works (nr. , p.
 and nr. q, p. ).

AB: IV C: XX 3, 4 
Of the Conduct of the understanding
(.) The last resort a man has recourse to in the conduct of himself(§) Introduction
is his understanding for though we distinguish the faculties of the
 minde and give the supreme command to the Will as to an agent
yet the truth is the man which is the agent determins him self to
this or that voluntary action upon some precedent knowledg or
appearance of knowledg in the understanding. no man ever sets
himself about any thing but upon some view or other, which serves
 him for a reason for what he does And whatso ever faculties he
imploys the understanding with such light as it has well or ill informd
constantly leads and by that light true or false all his operative powers
are directed. The will it self how absolute and uncontrouleable so
ever it may be thought never fails in its obedience to the dictates
 under[standing]standing  {I} [Conduct] Introduction (l. marg.)  is the
[minde] [ .o.r] `man which is the agent´ (il.) determins [it self ] him self – or
[reashoni] appearance .– . of knowledg [in the understanding. There is
noe action that of Choice a man sets about but he has to him self some reason
for doing of it and tis some light in the minde such as it is that always guides and
which we all follow in [all] every step we take.] `in the understanding. [he n] `no
man´ (il.) ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or other, which
serves him for a reason for what he does´ (add. p. , after next add., also on p. )
`[Whatsoever a man sets himself about [tis always] tis always in pursuance of some
view he has] `And whatso ever faculties he imploys´ (il.) [[T]]the understanding …
ready submission´ (add. p. )  `light´ (il.)  false [the will and all [[th]]is
other [faculties] `powers´ (il.) are directed] all
 For a photographic copy from MS e., p. , see ill. .
 The Conduct was originally intended to form the penultimate chapter of
Book IV of the Essay; see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, § and ‘Text’, §.
 conduct, pars. 1–2
of the understanding,5 Temples have their sacred images and we see
what influence they have always had over a great part of mankinde.
But in truth the Ideas and images in mens mindes are the invisible
powers that constantly governe them and to these they all universally
pay a ready submission. It is therefor of the higest concernement that 
great care should be taken of the understanding to conduct it right
in the search of knowledg and in the judgments it makes.
(.) The Logick now in use has soe long possessed the chair asIntroduction

the only art taught in the Schools for the direction of the minde in
the study of the Arts and sciences that it would perhaps be thought 
an affectation of Noveltie to suspect that rules that have served
the learned world these two or three thousand years and which
without any complaint of defects the learned have rested in are not
sufficiente to guide the understanding. And I should not doubt but
this attempt would be censured as vanity or presumption did not the 
Great Lord Verulams authority justifie it. Who not servilely thinkeing
learneing could not be advanced beyond what it was because for
many ages it had not been did not rest in the lazy approbation and
applause of what was because it was: but enlarged his minde to
what might be. In his preface to his Novum Organum concerning 
 of the [mind] understanding,  understanding, [and what ever complements
may be made to those in the temples [tis] the images and Ideas in their mindes
[that as if these were] are the invisible powers [the .y] `that´ ( il.) men really
pay] Temples [&] have  had [in the world] over  mindes [`.. ..... .......´]
are  and `in´ (il.) the  Preceded by a separate remark on pp. -: NB
what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this Chapter | of
the conduct of the understanding (see Gen. Introd.: ‘Text’, § )  Chair [and]
`as´ (il.) – thought [vanity or presumption] an affectation  to [thing
the understanding] [think] `suspect´ (il.)  years [were not sufficient to] and
 of [their deficiency] `defects´ (il.)  the[y] `learned´ (il.)  in [sh] are
 would [`quichklyi´ (il.)] be  in the [admiration of whhati] lazy
 On understanding and will see Essay, II.xxi.: : ‘These Powers of the Mind,
viz. of Perceiving, and of Preferring, are usually call’d by another Name: And the
ordinary way of Speaking is, That the Understanding and Will are two Faculties
of the mind …’ On the will following the dictates of the understanding, see
ibid. p. . Cf. the priority given by Locke to the understanding over the will
with Descartes, e.g. Principia philosophiæ, I.xxxviii, AT VIII-I, p. : ‘Quòd
autem in errores incidamus, defectus quidem est in nostrâ actione sive in
usu libertatis, sed non in nostrâ naturâ …’ and Malebranche, e.g. Recherche,
Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. ii, Sect. ii, p. : ‘Que les jugemens & les raisonnemens
dépendent de la volonté.’
conduct, pars. 2–4 
Logick he pronounces thus Qui summas Dialecticæ partes tribuerunt
atque inde fidissima Scientiis præsidia comparari putarunt verissime et
optime viderunt intellectum humanum sibi permissum merito suspectum
esse debere. Verum infirmior omnino est malo medicina; nec ipsa mali
 expers. Si quidem Dialectica, quæ recepta est, licet ad civilia et | artes, 
quæ in sermone et opinione positæ sunt, rectissime adhibeatur; naturæ
tamen subtilitatem longo intervallo non attingit, et prensando, quod
non capit, ad errores potius stabiliendos et quasi figendos, quam ad viam
veritati aperiendam valuit.6
 (.) They says he who attributed soe much to Logick perceived very
well and truly that it was not safe to trust the understanding to it self
without the guard of any rules. But the remedy reachd not the evil but
became a part of it. For the Logick which tooke place though it might
doe well enough in civil affairs and the Arts which consisted in talke and
 opinion, yet comes very far short of the subtilty in the reall performances
of nature and catching at what it cannot reach has served to confirme
and establish errors rather than to open a way to truth. And therefor
a little after he says. That it is absolutely necessary that a better and
perfecter use and imployment of the minde and understanding should
 be introduced. Necessario requiritur ut melior et perfectior mentis et
intellectus humani usus et adoperatio introducatur.
(.) There is tis visible great variety in mens understandings.

(§) Parts
And their natural constitutions put soe wide a difference between
some men in this respect that art and industry would never be able
 `though it´ (il.)  yet [reaches not by much the nice and subtil] comes
– subtilty [and secrets] `in the reall performances´ (il.)  served [rather]
to confirme – understandings. [[T]]And
 Cf. Bacon, Works, I, . The preface is to the Instauratio Magna, of which the
Novum Organum was designed to be a part. For Bacon on investigations that
go beyond ‘civilia et artes, quæ in sermone et opinione positæ sunt’, see Of the
Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, Works, III, : ‘For those whose conceits
are seated in popular opinions, need only to prove or dispute; but those whose
conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make
themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate …’ While
Bacon denies the old logic philosophical or scientific use, but concedes that
it can render practical services, Locke in Essay, III.x.:  more radically
also denies the Peripatetic logic any use in ‘Humane Life and Society’. On
the anti-scholastic purport of the Conduct see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §; on
Aristotelian logicians see ibid. §.
 conduct, pars. 4–6
to master and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise
on it that which other men easily attein unto. | Amongst men of

Parts
equall education there is great inequality of parts. And the woods
of America as well as the Schools of Athens produce men of severall
abilitys in the same kinde.7 
(.) Though this be soe yet I imagin most men come very short
of what they might attein unto in their severall degrees by a neglect of
their understandings. A few rules of Logick are thought sufficient in
this case for those who pretend to the highest improvement whereas
I thinke there are a great many natural defects in the understanding 
capable of amendment which are over looked and wholy neglected.
And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults
in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the minde which
hinder them in their progresse and keep them in ignorance and error
all their lives. 
(.) We are borne with faculties and powers capable almost of

(§)Practise
any thing such at least as would carry us farther then can be easily
imagined.8 But tis only the exercise of those powers which gives us
ability and skill in any thing and leads us towards perfection. A
midle aged plough man will scarce ever be brought to the cariage and 
language of a Gentleman though his body be as well proportioned his
joynts as supple and his natural parts not any inferior. The | legs of a
danceing master and the fingers of a musitian fall as it were naturaly
– raise [[[t]]on] on  unto (catchword but not repeated on p. )  End
of paragraph marked by vertical line.  many [faults] natural  defects
[and] in  `it is easy to perce|ive´ (il. cont. on p. ; revision made across
division between quires D and E)  hinder[s]  keep[s]  to`wards´ (il.)
 perfect.ion – as [handsomely made and his hands as capable of any
motion] `well proportioned his jo|ynts as supple´ (il. cont. on p.; revision made
across divison between quires D and E)  any [way] inferior
 Locke’s tabula-rasaconception of the mind implied no denial of the ‘different
Inclinations, and particular Defaults’ (Education, §, p. ) that can be
found in children (or adults).
 Cf. Essay, IV.iii.: : ‘that Humane Knowledge, under the present Circum-
stances of our Beings and Constitutions may be carried much farther, than
it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind,
employ all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the means of
discovering Truth, which they do for the colouring or support of Falshood,
to maintain a System, Interest, or Party, they are once engaged in.’
conduct, pars. 6–7 
without thought or pains into regular and admirable motions.9 bid
them change their parts and they will in vain endeavour to produce
like motions in the members not used to them and it will require
length of time and long practise to atteine but some degrees of a like
 ability. what incredible and astonishing actions doe we finde rope
dancers and tumblers bring their bodys to. not but that sundry in
almost all manual arts are as wonderfull but I name those which the
world takes notice of for such because on that very account they give
money to see them. All these admired motions beyond the reach and
 almost the conception of unpractised spectators are noething but the
mere effects of use and industry in men whose bodys have noething
peculiar in them from those of the amazed lookers on.10
(.) As it is in the body soe it is in the minde practise makes Practise
it what it is, and most even of those excellencys which are looked
 on as naturall endowments will be found when examined into more
narrowly to be the product of exercise and to be raised to that pithcih
only by repeated actions.11 Some men are remarked for pleasantnesse
in raylery others for apalogues and apposite diverting storys. this is
apt to be taken for the effect of pure nature and that the rather because
 it is not got by rules: and those who excelle | in either of them never 
purposely set themselves to the study of it as an art to be learnt. But
yet it is true that at first some lucky hit which tooke with some body
 endeavour{s}  sundry [i .n] in – these [admird and unimitable by the
unpractised] `admired … spectators´ (add., p. )  `apposite´ (il.)  `got´
(il.)  No catchword.  in [it] `either of them´ (il.)  `it is true that´ (il.)
.– . tooke [with the company brought [that way] them into a likeing of
it, made them afterwards forwards to offer at that way bend their thoughts to it
and insensibly `without designe´ (il.) get a facility in it] `with | some body …
practise.´ (add. cont. on p. )
 Cf. Essay, II.xxxiii.: : ‘A Musician used to any Tune will find that let it
but once begin in his Head, the Ideas of the several Notes of it will follow
one another orderly in his Understanding without any care or attention, as
regularly as his Fingers move over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune
he has begun, though his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a wandering.’
 For Locke on exercise or practice, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 For comparisons between body and mind cf. Essay, II.xxi.: : ‘As it is in
the motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds; where any
one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the
preference of the Mind, there we are at liberty’; Education, §, p. ; and ‘Of
Study’, p. . See also Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 conduct, pars. 7–8
and gaind him commendation encouraged him to trye again inclined
his thoughts and endeavours that way till at last he insensibly got a
facility in it without perceiving how, and that is attributed wholy to
nature which was much more the effect of use and practise. I doe not
deny that natural disposition may often give the first rise to it but 
that never carrys a man far without use and exercise and tis practise
alone that brings the powers of the minde as well as those of the body
to their perfection. Many a good poetick vein is buried under a trade
and never produces any thing for want of improvement. We see the
ways of discourse and reasoning are very different even concerning 
the same matter at Court and in the university. And he that will
goe but from Westminsterhall to the Exchange will finde a different
genius and turne in their ways of talkeing and yet one cannot thinke
that all whose lot fell in the citty were borne with different parts from
those who were brad at the university or Innes of court.12 
(.) To what purpose all this but to shew that the difference soeHabits
observable in mens understandings and parts doe not arise soe much
from their naturall faculties as acquired habits. He would be laughed
at that should goe about | to make a fine dancer out of a country
hedger at past fifty. And he will not have much better successe who 
shall endeavour at that age to make a man reason well or speake
handsomly who has never been used to it, though you should lay
before him a collection of all the best precepts of Logick or Oratory.
Noe body is made any thing by hearing of rules or laying them up in
his memory, practise must setle the habit of doeing without reflecting 
on the rule, and you may as well hope to make a good painter or
musitian extempore by a lecture and instruction in the arts of musick
and painting as a coherent thinker, or a strict reasoner by a set of
rules shewing him where in right reasoning consists.13
 last [without perceiving how] he  those of the[ir] body  buried [in]
`under´ (il.)  `who´ (il.)  their [nall] `naturall´ (add. p. ; abbreviation
expanded for copyist)  about (catchword not repeated on p. )  well [who
has never been] or speake  musitian [by] extempore  lecture [of ] `and´
(il.) – `in the arts of musick and painting´ (add. p. ) – reasoner
[about truth] {b} `by a set of rules … consists´ (add. p. )
 Westminster Hall was the seat of the Law Courts and the Royal Exchange
was London’s centre of trade.
 On ‘right reasoning’ cf. Essay, IV.xvii.-: - and ‘Some Thoughts
concerning Reading’, p. . On the limited use of rules in learning how to
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(.) This being soe that the defects and weaknesse in mens Practise
understandings as well as other faculties comes from want of a right
use of their owne mindes I am apt to thinke the fault is generaly
mislaid upon nature and there is often a complaint of want of parts
 when the fault lies in want of a due improvement of them. we see
men frequently dextrous and sharp enough in makeing a bargain who
if you reason with them about matters of religion appear perfectly
stupid.
(.) I will not here in what relates to the right conduct and Ideas(§)
 improvement of the understanding repeat again the geting clear
and determined Ideas14 and the imploying our thoughts rather | 
about them than about sounds put for them. Nor of setleing the
signification of words which we use with our selves in the search of
truth or with others in discoursing about it. Those hindrances of
 our understandings in the pursuit of knowledg I have sufficiently
enlarged upon in an other place so that noe thing more needs here
to be said of those matters.15
(.) There is an other fault that stops or misleads men in their(§) Principles
knowledg which I have also spoken some thing of but yet is necessary
 to mention here again that we may examin it to the bottom and see the
root it springs from and that is a custom of takeing up with principles
that are not self evident and very often not soe much as true.16 Tis not
unusual to see men rest their opinions upon foundations that have
noe more certainty nor solidity than the propositions built on them
 and imbraced for their sake. Such foundations are these and the like
– generaly [ill] `mis´laid (il.)  men [oft] frequently  clear and [distinct]
`determined´ (il.)  No catchword.  of [setleing] setleing  in [other
parts of this treatise] `an | other place so´ (add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. )  that
[bettheri] we  men [build] `rest´ (il.) their  upon [certain facile suppo-
sitions which are as doubtfull as the] foundations .–. propositions
[that are imbraced for their sake. As that the] `built … viz The´ (add. p. )
reason well, cf. par.  below; Education, §, p. ; ibid. §, pp. -;
and ibid. §, p. : ‘For I have seldom or never observed any one to get
the Skill of reasoning well, or speaking handsomly by studying those Rules
which pretend to teach it …’
 On ‘clear and determined Ideas’, cf. Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, § and §.
 See Essay, III.ix-xi: -.
 Cf. Essay, IV.xx.-: - on ‘Propositions that are not in themselves certain
and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for Principles.’ On principles, see
Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 conduct, pars. 11–13
viz The founders or leaders of my party are good men and therefor
their tenets are true: It is the opinion of a sect that is erroneous
therefor it is false: It hath been long received in the world therefor it
is true: or It is new and therefor false.
(.) These and many the like which are by noe means the mea- 
sures of Truth and falshood the generality of men make the standards
by which they accustome | their understanding to judg, And thus
they falling into an habit of determining of truth and falsehood by
such wrong measures tis noe wonder they should embrace error for
certainty and be very positive in things they have noe ground for.17 
(.) There is not any who pretends to the least reason but whenPrinciples
any of these his false maximes18 are brought to the test but must
acknowledg them to be fallible and such as he will not allow in those
that differ from him and yet after he is convinced of this you shall
see him goe on in the use of them and the very next occasion that 
offers argue again upon the same grounds. Would one not be ready to
thinke that men are willing to impose upon them selves and mislead
their owne understandandinghsi who conduct them by such wrong
measures even after they see they cannot be relied on. But yet they
will not appear soe blamable as may be thought at first sight; for I 
thinke there are a great many that argue thus in earnest and doe it
not to impose on them selves or others, they are perswaded of what
they say and thinke there is weight in it though in a like case they
have been convinced there is none. but men would be intolerable
to them | selves and contemptible to others if they should imbrace 
opinions without any ground and hold what they could give noe
manner of reason for. True or false solid or sandy the minde must
have some foundation to rest it self upon and as I have remarkd in an
 true: [that] [[i]]It  false: [That] [[i]]It hath  true: or [[i]]It  false. [&c]
 judg, [by which] `And | thus´ (add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. )  of [judging]
determining [by such wrong rules] of  wrong [rules] `measures´ (add. p. )
 doe `it´ (il.)  in a[.] like – there is none at first ended this paragraph,
followed by a new paragraph starting with [Men must have something to rely on]
however, these words were deleted and replaced by the following il. that did not start a
new paragraph, but continued the original paragraph `but men would be intolerable
to them´ (il.)  No catchword.
 On habit as a cause of error, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 On ‘maximes’ in general, cf. Essay, IV.vii: -.
conduct, pars. 13–15 
other place19 it noe sooner enterteins any propositionbut it presently
hastens to some hypothesis to bottom it on. till then it is unquiet
and unsetled. soe much doe our owne very tempers dispose us to a
right use of our understandings if we would follow as we should the
 inclinations of our nature.
(.) In some matters of concernment espetialy those of religion Principles
men are not permitted to be always wavering and uncertain, they
must embrace and professe some tenents20 or other, and it would be
a shame nay a contradiction tohoi heavy for any ones minde to lye
 constantly under for him to pretend seriously to be perswaded of the
truth of any religion and yet not to be able to give any reason of
ones beleif or to say any thing for his preference of this to any other
opinion, and therefor they must make use of some principlesor other
and those can be noe other than such as they have and can manage
 and to say that they are not in earnest perswaded by them and doe
not rest upon those they make use of is contrary to experience, and
to allege that they are not mislead when we complain they are.
(.) If this be soe it will be urged why then doe they not rather
make use of sure and unquestionable principles rather than rest on
 such grounds as may deceive them and will as is visible serve to
 owne [natural] `very´ (il.)  tenents{.} – contradiction [not to be
borne] `tohoi heavy … for him {to}´ (add. p. )  for [the.] `his´ (il. in diff.
ink) – `and therefor they must m|ake use … complain they are´ (add.
cont. on p. )  upon [them is to say they doe not reason .a .m.i.s.s.e] `those they
make … complain they are´ (add. in diff. ink)  it will `be´ (il. in diff. ink)
 unquestionable [foundhationsi] principles
 Cf. Essay, IV.xii.:  on hypotheses: ‘that we should not take up any one
too hastily, (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of
Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do,) …’ See also Bacon,
Novum Organum, Bk. I, Aph. xlviii, Works, I, pp. -: ‘Gliscit intellectus
humanus, neque consistere aut acquiescere potis est, sed ulterius petit; at
frustra. (…) At majore cum pernicie intervenit hæc impotentia mentis in
inventione causarum: nam cum maxime universalia in natura positiva esse
debeant, quemadmodum inveniuntur, neque sunt revera causabilia; tamen
intellectus humanus, nescius acquiescere, adhuc appetit notiora.’
 ‘tenent’ = tenet (OED)
 conduct, pars. 15–16
support error as well as truth. To this I answer the reason why they
doe not make use of better and surer principles is because they
can not: but this inability proceeds not from want of natural parts
(for these few | whose case that is are to be excused) but for want
of use and exercise, Few men are from their youth accustomed to 
strict reasoning, and to trace the dependence of any truth in a long
train of consequences to its remote principles and to observe its
connection.21 And he that by frequent practise has not been used toPractise
this imployment of his understanding tis noe more wonder that he
should not when he is grown into years be able to bring his minde 
to it than that he should not be on a suddain able to grave or designe
dance on the ropes or write a good hand who has never practised
either of them.
(.) Nay the most of men are soe wholy strangers to this thatSuffisance
they doe not soe much as perceive their want of it. they dispatch the 
ordinary business of their callings by roat22 as we say as they have
learnt it and if at any time they miss success they impute it to any thing
rather than want of thought or skil, that they conclude, (because they
know noe better) they have in perfection. or if there be any subiect
that interest or phancy has recommended to their thoughts, their 
reasoning about it is still after their own fashion. be it better or worse
it serves their turns and is the best they are acquainted with and
there for when they are lead by it into mistakes and their businesse
 truth. [and] To – answer [because they cannot, not from want of ] `they
do not make use | of better and surer principles´ il. cont. on p. ; this first addition
is followed by a later addition (in diff. ink), consisting of two parts, the first part `the
reason why´ is an il. on p. , at a place before the first il., and `is because … want
of natural [phartsi]´ is an add. on p. , at a place after the first il.  few [..]
whose  No catchword.  `more´ (il.)  suddain [be] able – want of
it. [What is the cheife businesse that takes up their thoughts [necessity .d.......] they
reason about well enough to serve their turns after their fashion] [`The businesse of
their [particular] `proper´ (il.) callings and [imploiments some particular subiect
that interest phansy has engaged them in] may perhaps employ their thoughts: and
[they sometimes reason about some particular subiect] that interest or phansy has
engaged them in they at times reason about´ (add. p. )] `th|ey dispatch … own
fashion´ (add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. )  about `it´ (il.)  they [know]
`are acquainted with´ (il. in diff. ink)
 Cf. Locke on demonstrative knowledge, which is ‘made out by a long train
of Proofs’, Essay, IV.ii.: . See also Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 ‘roat’ = rote (OED)
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succeeds accordingly, they impute it to any crosse accident or default
of others rather than to their owne want of understanding.23 That
is what noe body discovers or complains of in him self.24 What so
ever made his business miscary it was not want of right thought
 and judgment in him self. he sees noe such defect in himself But
is satisfied that he carrys on his designes well enough by his owne
reasoning or at least should have done had it not been for unlucky
traverses not in his power. Thus being content with this short and
imperfect use of his understandhingi he never troubles him self to
 seek out methods of improveinghis mind and lives all his life without
any notion of close reasoning | in a continued connection of a long 
train of consequences from sure foundations, such as is requisite for
the makeing out and clearing most of the speculative truths25 most
men owne to beleive and are most concernd in. not to mention here
 what I shall have occasion to insist on by and by more fully.26 viz that
in many cases tis not one series of consequences will serve the turne
 impute[d]  or [miscariage] `default´ (il. in diff. ink) – [That is what
noe body] (deleted, together with next deletion, then undeleted by underdotting) [in
himself `finds´ (il.) a want of. Everyone] `discovers or complains of in himself.
What so ever made his business miscary it was not. want of [understanding] `right
thought and judment in him self´ (il. in diff. ink) he sees noe such defect in himself
But is satisfied that he´ add. p.  followed by a deleted add. in diff. ink: [`never
[ .h.a.s] troubles himself about any methods of improveing his mind and lives all his
life without´ (add.)] carries on  designes [pretty whelli] [pretty] well `enough´
(il.)  for [crosse travehrsesi] unlucky  power. [and] `Thus´ (il. in diff. ink)
– and [very] imperfect – understand[ing has never] `he never … life
without´ (add. p.  in diff. ink)  No catchword.  continued [connection]
[`.s .e.r.i.e.s´ (il. in diff. ink)] `connection´ (il. in diff. ink) – here [that I] what I
 occasion to [mention] `insist on´ (il.)  one [.t.r.a.i .n] `series´ (il. in diff. ink)
 Cf. Essay, IV.xx.: -.
 Cf. Descartes, Discours de la méthode, Pt. I, AT VI, pp. -: ‘Le bons sens
est la chose du monde la mieux partagée: car chascun pense en estre si bien
pouruû, que ceux mesme qui sont les plus difficiles a contenter en toute autre
chose, n’ont point coustume d’en desirer plus qu’il en ont.’
 ‘Speculative truths’ are the goal of the first category (natural philosophy)
in Locke’s tripartite division of the sciences. This category embraces ‘The
Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Consti-
tutions, Properties, and Operations, whereby I mean not only Matter, and
Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and
Operations as well as Bodies’, Essay, IV.xxi.: .
 See below, esp. pars. -.
 conduct, pars. 16–17
but many different and opposite deductions must be examined and
laid to geather before a man can come to make a right judgment27
of the point in question. What then can be expected from men that
neither see the want of any such kinde of reasoning as this nor if they
doe know they how to set about it or could performe it. you may as 
well set a country man who scarce knows the figures and never cast
up a sum of three particulars, to state a merchants long account and
finde the true ballance of it.
(.) What then should be done in the case? I answer. we shouldPractise
always remember what I said above28 that the faculties of our soules 
are improved and made usefull to us just after the same manner
that the powers of our bodys are. would you have a man write or
paint dance | or fence well or performe any other manual operation
dextrously and with ease, let him have never soe much vigor and
activity, supplenesse and addresse naturaly yet noe body expects this 
from him unlesse he has been used to it and has imployd time and
pains in fashoning and formeing his hand or outward parts to those
motions. Just soe it is in the minde. would you have a man reason
well you must use him to it betimes exercise his minde in observeing
the connection of Ideas and following them in train. Noe thing does 
this better than Mathematicks which therefor I thinke should beMathematicks
taught all those who have the time and oportunity, not soe much to
make them mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures.29
for though we all call our selves soe because we are borne to it if
 `many´ (il.)  `deductions´ (il.)  right [use] judgment  of [reason-
ing][imployment as this] reasoning – if they [did] `doe´ (add.) kn[e]`o´w (il.
in diff. ink) `they´ (il. in diff. ink)  perf .orm{o.r .m.e}  `what I said above´ (il.)
 are [all] improved  `fashioning and´ (il.)  thing [I think] (deleted in
diff. ink) does
 Cf. Essay, IV.xvii.: : ‘Judgment, is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree,
or disagree, by the invention of one or more Ideas, whose certain Agreement,
or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but has observed to be
frequent and usual.’
 Par. .
 On this ‘collateral’ use of mathematics, cf. Bacon, Of the Advancement of
Learning, Bk. II, Works, III, p. : ‘So that as tennis is a game of no use in
itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put
itself into all postures; so in the Mathematicks, that use which is collateral
and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended.’
See also Introduction: ‘Context’, §.
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we please, yet we may truly say nature gives us but the seeds of it.
we are borne to be if we please rational creatures but tis use and
exercise only that makes us soe, and we are indeed soe noe farther
than industry and application has caryed us. And therefor in ways of
 reasoning which men have not been used to he that will observe the
conclusions they take up must be satisfied they are not at all rational.
(.) This has been the lesse taken notice of because every one Rational
in his private affairs uses some sort of reasoning or other enough
to denominate him reasonable. But the mistake is that he that is
 found reasonable in one thing is concluded to be soe in all and to
th|ink or say other wise is thought soe unjust an affront and soe 
senselesse a censure that noebody ventures to doe it. It lookes like the
| degradation of a man below the dignity of his nature. It is true that 
he that reasons well in any one thing has a minde naturaly capable
 of reasoning well in others and to the same degree of strength and
clearnesse and possibly much greater had his understanding been soe
imploid. But tis as true that he who can reason well to day about
one sort of matters cannot at all reason to day about others though
perhaps a year hence he may. But wherever a mans rational faculty
 fails him and will not serve him to reason there we cannot say he
is rational how capable soever he may be by time and exercise to
become soe. Trie in men of low and mean education who have never
elevated their thoughts above the spade and the plough nor lookd
beyond the ordinary drudgery of a day-labourer. Take | the thoughts 
 of such an one, used for many years to one tract, out of that narrow
 reasoning [they] `which men´ (il.) – one [uses reason enough] in his private
affairs [to denominate him reasonable] uses – he that [is thought] [`passes
for´ (il.)] `is found´ (il.)  in [.a] one – all and t[[is]]o (cancellation with
the aim of making a connection with the next non-deleted add.) [concluded] [looked
on as a degradation of his | [of ] nature `and the highest affront´ (il.) to be tought
otherwise. whereas if you take [those men] whohsei th[[e..]]ougts for a long time
`have´ (l. marg.) been used to one tract and that within a narrow compasse you
finde them noe more capable of reasoning about matters of a larger view] `th|ink
or say … day-labourer. Take´ (add. cont. on pp. , )  thought [[u]]soe unjust
[and senselesse] an  {degra} | degradation (catchword dation)  of [subject]
matters  cannot [ .n .o.t] at  mans [reason] rational – faculty [will
not] fails  soe. [Take] Trie  thoughts [behyondi] above  day-/labourer
.– . of [men] `such [an on[[.]]e] an one,´ (il.) used … narrow compashsie
[they] his ha[[ve]]s been all [their] `his´ (il.) li[[.v.e.s]]fe confinded to you will finde
[them] `him´ (il.)
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compasse his has been all his life confined to. you will finde him noe
more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural. Some one or
two rules on which their conclusions immediately depend you will
finde in most men have governd all their thoughts, these true or false
have been the maximes they have been guided by. take these from 
them and they are perfectly at a losse. their compas and pole star are
gon and their understanding is perfectly at a nonplus and therefor
they either immediately returne to their old maximes again as the
foundations of al truth to them not with standing all that can be said
to shew their weaknesse; or if they give them up to your reasons, they 
with them give up all truth and further enquiry and thinke there is
noe such thing as certainty. For if you would enlarge their thoughts
and setle them upon more remote and surer principles they either
cannot easily apprehend them; or if they can, know not what use to
make of them, for long deductions from remote principles is what 
they have not been used to and can not manage.30
(.) What then can grown men never be improved or enlargedPractise
in their understandings? I say not soe. But this I | thinke I may say,
that it will not be done without industry and application which will
require more time and pains then grown men setled in their course 
of life will allow to it and therefor very seldome is done. and this very
capacity of atteineing it by use and exercise only brings us back to
that which I laid down before.31 that it is only practise that improves
our minds as well as bodys, and we must expect noething from our
understandings any farther than they are perfected by habits. The 
 `almost a´ (il.)  natural[s].  rules [on which] on which – depend
[has] `you will find in most men´ (il.) have [been] [guided] `governd´ (l. marg.,
in diff. ink)  nonplus and [are apt to conclude] therefor  all `that´ (il.)
can  from [general [maxims] `views´ (il.)] `remote principles´ (add. p. )
 understandings  without [time] industry  noething [from] [therefor]
from  habits (followed by a deleted vertical stroke) The
 Cf. Nicole, Discourses (Locke’s own partial translation of Nicole’s Essais), II.
, pp. -: ‘What does a Cannibal, Iroquois, Brazilian, Negro, Caffre,
Greenlander, or Laplander, think on during his whole life? (…) Talk to them
of God; heaven or hell; religion or morality; they understand not what you
say, or forget it as soon as said. Their minds return presently into their old
road, which is confined within that circle of gross objects, they have been
used to.’ A ‘Caffre’ = a member of a South African race of blacks belonging
to the great Bantu family (OED ).
 See above, par. .
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Americans are not all borne with worse Understandings than the
Europeans though we see none of them have such reaches in the
arts and sciences. And amongst the Children of a poor country man
the lucky chance of education and geting into the world gives one
 infinitely the superiority in parts over the rest who continueing at
home had continued also just of the same sizhei with his brethren.
(.) He that has to doe with yonge scholars espetialy in Mathe- Practise
maticks may perceive how their mindes open by degrees and how it
is exercise alone that opens them. Some times they will stick a long
 time at a part of a demonstration not for want of will or application
but realy for want of perceiveing the connection of two Ideas that to
one whose understanding is more exercised is as visible as any thing
can be. The same would be with a grown man begining to study
Mathematicks, the understanding | for want of use often sticks in 
 very plain wayhsi and he himself that is soe puzzeld, when he comes
to see the connection wonders what it was he stuck at in a case so
plain.
(.) I have mentioned mathematicks as a way to setle in the Mathematicks(§)
minde an habit of reasoning closely and in train. not that I thinke it
 necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that have-
ing got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the
minde to they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledg
as they shall have occasion. For in all sorts of reasoning every sin-
gle argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration,
 the connection and dependence of Ideas should be followed till the
minde is brought to the sourse on which it bottoms and observes the
coherence all along, though in proofs of probability one such train is
not enough to setle the judgment as in demonstrative knowledg.32
 understanding`s´ (add. in diff. ink)  none [have] of them  `continueing´
(il.)  has [ever had] to – Mathematicks [can] may  and [.t .h] how
 stick [at] a – wayhsi and [the man who sees that connection] `he himself
[when he comes to] that is soe puzz|eld, when he comes to see the connection´ (il.
cont. on p. )  bring`s´ (add. in diff. ink)  tran`s´fer (add. in diff. ink)
 `and dependence´ (il.) – till [they are brought] the minde  End
of par. marked by vertical stroke.
 Cf. Essay, IV.xv.: : ‘As Demonstration is the shewing the Agreement, or
Disagreement of two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more Proofs, which
have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another: so
Probability is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement, or Disagree-
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(.) Where a truth is made out by one demonstration thereProbability
needs noe farther enquiry but in probabilitys where there wants
demonstration to establish the truth beyond doubt, there tis not
enough to trace one argument to its source and observe its strength
and weaknesse but all the arguments after haveing been soe examind 
on both sides must be laid in ballance one against another and upon
the whole the understanding determin its assent.
(.) This is a way of reasoning the understanding should be
accustomed to which is soe | different from what the illiterate are
used to that even learned men often times seeme to have very little or 
noe notion of it, nor is it to be wonderd since the way of disputeing
in the schools leads them quite away from it by insisting on one
topical argument33 by the successe of which the truth or falshood of
the question is to be determind; and victory adjudgd to the opponent
or defendant, which is all one as if one should ballance an account by 
one sum charged and discharged when there are an hundred others
to be taken into consideration.
(.) This therefor it would be well if mens mindes were ac-Counter-
ballance customed to and that early that they might not erect their opinions
upon one single view when soe many other are requisite to make up 
the account and must come into the reconning before a man can
forme a right judgment. This would enlarge their mindes and give
 [where thhei] `Where´ (add. in the space that previously marked the indention of
the new par.) a truth  there [wants] (deleted, then undeleted by underdotting)
{`wants´} (il.)  `after … examined´ (add. p. )  This `is´ (il.)  No
catchword.  what `the´ (il.) illiterate [men] are  even [logihciansi] learned
 `often times´ (il. in diff. of ink)  of it, [if we may judg by [their [arguings]
[way.s of ] way where] [their ways of manageing the cause of truth which they
pretend either to propagate or defend wherein] nor is  sum [received] charged
 therefor `it´ (il.) would  not [fix] `erect´ (il.) – when [twenty other
thinks are to be taken into consideration wherein to] `soe many … a man can´
(add. p. )
ment, by the intervention of Proofs, whose connexion is not constant and
immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most
part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to
be true, or false, rather than the contrary.’
 In Topica II-VII Aristotle gave a collection of argumentative rules. Each of
these ôÞðïØ, ‘locations’ or ‘places’, is a device for discovering premises from
which to deduce a given conclusion. See also Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, § and
§.
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a due freedom to their understandings that they might not be lead
into error by presumption, lazynesse or precipitancy. for I thinke
noebody can approve such a conduct of the understanding as shall
mislead it from truth though it be never soe much in fashion to make
 use of it.
(.) To this perhaps it will be objected that to manage the
understanding as I propose would require every man to be a scholler
and to be furnished with all the | materials of knowledg and exercised 
in all the ways of reasoning. To which I answer that it is a shame
 for those that have time and the means to attein knowledg to want
any helps or assistance for the improvement of their understandings
that are | to be got and to such I would be thought here cheifly 
to speake. Those me thinks who by the industry and parts of their
ancestors have been set free from a constant drudgery to their backs
 and their bellys should bestow some of their spare time on their heads
and open their mindes by some trials and essays in all the sorts and
matters of reasoning. I have before mentiond Mathematicks where
in Algebra34 gives new helps and views to the Understanding. If I
 and to `be´ (il.)  the (catchword not repeated on p. )  im/provement
.– . that are (a) [to be got] (b) [and to such I would be thought here]
(c) [cheifly to speake. But besides that what I here propose] (d) is not of that vast
extent as may be imagined (e) `and soe comes not within the objection´ (f ) `to be
got´ (add. p. , deleted and then undeleted by underdotting) (g) `and to such I would
be thought here´ (add. p. ) (h) `cheifly to speake. Those me thinks … repeat it´
add. p. , cont. on p. , followed by dot, followed by vertical stroke indicating end of
par., followed by first part of new par., number  in present edition: (k) `. As to men
whose fortunes and time is narrower what may suffice them´ Locke first wrote a par.
ending with (a)-(b)-(c)-(d). He then mistakenly deleted (a), whereas he had intended
to delete (c). He deleted (c). He added (h)-(k) on pp.  and . He formulated (k) on p.
 in such a way as to enable reading to be continued with (d), which had already been
entered on p. , and which was then supplemented with (e). He restored the mistaken
deletion of (a) on p.  with the addition of the same words (f ) on p. . By now (b) was
an isolated undeleted phrase on p. , preceded by deleted (a) and followed by deleted
(c). On this place, i.e. on p. , (b) could not serve as connecting phrase between (f )
and (h), which are both on p. ; so, Locke deleted (b) and repeated the same words (g)
on p. , placing (g) between (f ) and (h) and thus producing the required connecting
phrase. However, in the process (f ) was mistakenly deleted, so that he had to undelete
it by underdotting. The overall result is par. , ending with (f )-(g)-(h) and par. ,
consisting of (k)-(d)-(e).  from [the] a constant  some [sort of ] trials
–  and [ways of reahoningi] matters
 On algebra see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
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propose these it is not as I said35 to make every man a through36
Mathematician or a deep Algebraist. But yet I thinke the study of
them is of infinite use even to grown men, first by experimentaly
convinceing them that to make any one reason well it is not enough
to have parts wherewith he is satisfied and that serve him well enough 
in his ordinary course, a man in those studys will see that however
good he may thinke his understanding yet in many things and those
very visible it may faile him. this would take off that presumption
that most men have of them selves in this part and they would not be
soe apt to thinke their mindes wanted noe helps to enlarge them that 
there could be noething added to the accutenesse and penetration
of their understandings. Secondly the Study of Mathematicks would
show them the necessity there is in reasoning to seperate all the
distinct Ideas and see the habitudes that all those concerned in the
present enquiry have to one an other, and to lay by those which 
relate not to the proposition in hand and wholy to leave them out of
the reconing. This is that which in other subjects of enquiry besides
Quantity is what is absolutely requisite to just reasoning, though in
them it is not soe easily observd, nor soe carefully practised. In those
parts of knowledg where tis thought Demonstration hath noe thing 
to doe men reason as it were | in the lump, and if upon a summary
and confused view or upon a partial consideration, they can raise
the appearance of a probabihliity they usualy rest content espetialy
if it be in a dispute where every little straw is laid hold on, and
every thing that can but be drawn in any way to give colour to the 
argument is advanced with ostentation. But that minde is not in a
posture to finde the truth that does not distinctly take all the parts a
sunder and omitting what is not at all to the point draw a conclusion
from the result of all the particulars which any way influence it.
There is another noe lesse usefull habit to be got by an application 
to Mathematical demonstrations and that is of useing the minde
 them [are] `is´ (il. in diff. ink)  thinke [it beneath them .u .n] their mindes
 `there is´ (il.)  habitudes [they all have one to an other] `that all those
concerned´ (il.)  and [wholy] to lay  be [[o]]in [conthroversyi] a dispute
 But y[.e]t – parts [..] `a´ (il. in diff. ink) sunder
 See above, par. .
 ‘through’ = thorough (OED )
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to a long train of consequences but haveing mentiond that already I
shall not here again repeat it.37
(.) As to men whose fortunes and time is narrower what may
suffice them | is not of that vast extent as may be imagined and soe 
 comes not within the objection.
(.) Noebody is under an obligation to know every thing.
knowledg and science in generall is the businesse only of those who
are at ease and leisure. Those who have particular callings ought to
understand them and tis noe unreasonable proposal nor impossible
 to be compassed that they should thinke and reason right about what
is their dayly imployment.38 This one cannot thinke them uncapable
of without leveling them with the brutes and chargeing them with a
stupidity below the rank of rational creatures.
(.) Besides his particular calling for the support of this life Religion(§)
 every one has a concerne in a future life which he is bound to looke
after. This engages his thoughts in religion and here it mightily lyes39
him upon to Understand and reason right. Men therefor cannot
be excused from understanding the words and frameing the general
notions relateing to religion right. The one day of | seven besides 
 other days of rest in the Christian world allows time enough for
this (had they noe other idle hours) if they would but make use
of these vacancys from their dayly labour and apply them selves to
an improvement of knowledg with as much diligience as they often
 For the constitution of par.  see text-critical annotation to par. .  objection
[Every man has his particular calling and noebhodyi] (entered as first sentence of a
new par. then deleted; cf. next par.)  science [is the businesse] in  Those who
[are] have  `particular´ (il.)  callings [may be] ought  unreasonable
[demand] `proposal´ (il.)  with`out´ (il.) leveling  Besides [this which]
his  in [religion] a  right. [And here] {m]]Men `therefor´ (il.)  of [all]
seven – `besides … world´ (il.) – if they [would but] `would …
labour and´ (add. p. )  the[[m]]se [and] vacancys – selves to [this]
`an improvement of knowledg´ (il.)  `often´ (il.)
 See above, par. .
 Cf. Essay, I.i.: : ‘Our Business here is not to know all things, but those
which concern our Conduct.’
 ‘to lye upon’ = to rest or be imposed as a burden, charge, obligation upon
(OED .f )
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doe to a great many other things that are uselesse, and had but
those that would enter them according to their several capacitys in
a right way to this knowledg. The original make of their mindes
is like that of other men and they would be found not to want
understanding fit to receive the knowledg of religion if they were 
a little incouragd and helpd in it as they should be. For there are
instances of very meane people who have raised their mindes to a
great sense and understanding of religion. And though these have not
been soe frequent as could be wished yet they are enough to clear that
condition of life from a necessity of grosse ignorance, and to shew 
that more might be brought to be rational creatures and Christians
(for they can hardly be thought realy to be soe who wearing the name
know not soe much as the very principles of that religion) if due care
were taken of them. For if I mistake not the pesantry lately40 in
France (a rank of people under a much heavier pressure of want and 
poverty than the day labourers in England) of the Reformed religion
understood it much better and could say more for it than those of
an higer condition amongst us.
(.) But if it shall be concluded that the meaner sort of people
must give them selves up to a bruteish stupidity in the things of their 
nearest concernment | which I see noe reason for, this excuses not
those of a freer fortune and education if they neglect their Under-
standings and take noe care to imploy them as they ought, and set
them right in the knowledg of those things for which principaly they
were given them. At least those whose plentifull fortunes allow them 
the oportunitys and helps of improvements are not soe few but that
 other [uselesse] things `that are uselesse´ (il.) –  had but [those that would
a little instruct them] `those | that `would´ (il.) enter them [as they were capable]
according … to this knowledg.´ (add. cont. on p. ) [(deleted start of new par.) But
if it shall be concluded that the meaner sort of people must give them selves up to
a bruteish stupidity in the things of their greatest concernement which I see noe
reason for] `The original make … knowledg of religion´ (add. p. )  have [d]
raised  condition of [men] `life´ (il.)  `grosse´ (il.)  for [I can not
thinke them] `they can hardly be thought´ (add. p. )  thought [them] realy
 who [assuming] wearing  `lately´ (il.)  care{.} to [set the.] imploy
 ‘lately’ i.e. in the time before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in ,
resulting in the emigration of around , Huguenots; a substantial part
of these refugees fled to the Dutch Republic, where Locke was also staying at
that time (-).
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it might be hoped great advancements might be made in knowledg
of all kindes espetialy in that of the greatest concerne and largest
views if men would make a right use of their faculties and study their
own Understandings.
 (.) Outward corporeal objects that constantly importune our Ideas(§)
senses and captivate our appetites faile not to fill our heads with lively
and lasting Ideas of that kinde. here the minde needs not be set upon
geting greater store. they offer themselves fast enough and are usualy
enterteind in such plenty and lodgd soe carefully that the minde
 wants room or attention for others that it has more use and need of.
To fit the understanding therefor for such reasoning as I have been
above speaking of care should be taken to fill it with moral and more
abstract Ideas.41 For these not offering them selves to the senses but
being to be Framed by the understanding | people are generaly soe 
 neglectfull of a faculty they are apt to thinke wants noe thing, that I
fear most mens mindes are more unfurnished with such Ideas than is
Imagined. They often use the words and how can they be suspected
to want the Ideas? what I have said in the d booke of my Essay will
excuse me from any other answer to this question.42 But to convince
 people of what moment it is to their understandings to be furnishd
with such abstract Ideas steady and setled in it give me leave to aske
how any one shall be able to know whether he be obleiged to be
 would [rightly apply their mindes to it] make  Par. ends with a diagonal
stroke, in diff. ink, which is followed by the deleted start of a new par.: [The objects of
sense]  corporeal [appet] objects  need`s´ (add. in diff. ink)  `geting´ (il.)
– greater [store. The fear is that the Ideas of sensible objects should cro .ud [int]
too much and be longd to carefully to the exclusion of others more usefull rather
than that there should be any want of them] `store they … need of´ (add. p. ;
revision made across division between quires F and G)  enterteind [with] `in´ (il.)
 `with´ (il.)  `selves´ (il.)  [[[I]]men] `people´ (catchword)  [underst]
[men] `people´ (il.)  of a [part] (deleted, then undeleted by underdotting, then
deleted again) [faculty] `faculty´ (il.) Sequence is probably: part originally written;
part immediately deleted and replaced by faculty on line; faculty deleted ; part restored
by underdotting; part again deleted and faculty restored interlinearly. – I
[suspect] fear –  is [usualy] Imagined  of [this] `my´ (il.)  from
[answer] any  such [clear and setled Ideas] `abstract Ideas steady and setled in
it´ (add. p. ) .– . to [Justice] `be Just´ (il.)
 On the importance of abstract ideas, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 Cf. Essay, III.ix-xi: -.
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Just, if he has not establishd Ideas in his minde of Obligation and
of Justice since that knowledg consists in noething but the perceived
agreement or disagreement of those Ideas and soe of all others the
like which concerne our lives and manners.43 And if men doe finde
a difficulty to see the agreement or disagreement of two angles which 
lie before their eyes unalterable in a diagram, how utterly impossible
will it be to perceive it in Ideas that have noe other sensible objects to
represent them to the minde but sounds with which they have noe
manner of conformity and therefor had need to be clearly setled in
the minde them selves if we would make any clear judgment about 
them. This therefor is one of the first things the minde should be
imploid about in the right conduct of the understanding, without
which it is impossible it should be capable of reasoning right about
those matters. But in these and all other Ideas care must be taken that
they harbour noe inconsistencies and that they have a real existence 
where reall existence is supposed and are not mere Chimæras with a
supposed existence.44
(.) Every one is forward to complain of the prejudices thatPrejudices (§)
mislead other men or partys as if | he were free and had none of
his owne, This being objected on all sides tis agreed that it is a 
 has not [setled] `establishd´ (il.)  that [`his´] knowledg  knowledg [`of
doin|g well or otherwise´ (add. cont. on p. )] consists –  `noething but´
(il.) the perceived agreement or disagreement of [`his actions with´ (il.)] those
– `and soe of all | others … manners´ (add. cont. on p. )  but [a] sound`s´
 things the [undherstandingi] minde  `right´ (il.) – `But in | these
and … existence.´ (add. cont. on p. ) – existence [and are not mere
Chimæras] where  Par. ends with diagonal stroke.  prejudices [of other
mens minds ...] that  if | `he´ (l. marg.)
 Cf. the definition of knowledge in Essay, IV.i.: : ‘Knowledge then seems
to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.’
 Cf. Essay, II.xxx.: : ‘By real Ideas, I mean such as have a Foundation in
Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of
Things, or with their Archetypes. Fantastical or Chimerical, I call such as
have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that reality
of Being, to which they are tacitly referr’d, as to their Archetypes’; and ibid.
III.x.: : ‘Only if I put in my Ideas of mixed Modes or Relations, any
inconsistent Ideas together, I fill my Head also with Chimæras; since such
Ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the Mind, much less any
real Being, be ever denominated from them.’
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fault and an hindrance to knowledg. what now is the cure?45 Noe
other but this that every man should let alone others prejudices and
examin his owne, Noe body is convinced of his by the accusation
of an other, he recriminates by the same rule and is clear. The only
 way to remove this great cause of ignorance and error out of the
world is for every one impartialy to examin him self. if others will
not deale fairly with their owne minds does that make my errors
truths? or ought it to make me in love with them and willing to
impose on my self? If others love chataracts on their eyes should
 that hinder me from couching of mine as soon as I could? Every
one declares against blindenesse, and yet who almost is not fond of
that which dims his sight and keeps the clear light out of his mind
which should lead him into truth and knowledg? False or doubtfull
positions relyd upon as unquestionable maximes keep those in the
 darke from truth, who build on them. Such are usualy the prejudices
imbibed from education party reverence Fashion Interest etc: This is
the mote which every one sees in his brothers eye, but never regards
the beame in his owne.46 For who is there almost that is ever brought
fairly to examin his owne principles, and see whether they are such
 as will beare the triall. But yet this should be one of the first things
every one should set about and be scrupulous in, who would rightly
conduct his understanding in the search of Truth and knowledg.
(.) To those who are willing to get rid of this great hinderance Prejudice

of knowledg (for to such only I write) To those who would shake off
 this great and dangerous impostor prejudice who dresses up falshood
in the likeness of Truth and soe dexterously hoodwinks mens minds
– convinced of [it by being rebuked by others every one may by fairely
examining himself, and the principles he goes on] `[[it]]his | by the accusation
… and knowledg´ (add. cont. on p. )  `an´ (il.) other[s],  self. [or]
if  deale [im] fairly  them [?] and  dims [their] `his´ (il.)  sight
[that] and  of [their mindes] his  positions [built] `relyd´ (il.)  as
[un] `un´questionable (il.)  keep[s] [peophlei] those  truth, [and.] `who
build on them.´ (il.) [These are] Such  usualy the [principles] `prejudices´ (il.)
 reverence [etc:] Fashion  `almost´ (il.)  be [very] scrupulous  Start
of par.  is after par. , also on p. .  write) [this] To  `prejudice´ (il.)
 On remedies against error see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 Matt. : .
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as to keep them in the darke with a beleif that they are more in
the light than any that doe not see with their eys I shall offer this
one marke whereby prejudice may be known. He that is | strongly
of any opinion must suppose (unless he be self condemned) that
his perswasion is built upon good grounds; and that his assent is 
noe greater than what the evidence of the truth he holds forces him
to and that they are arguments and not inclination or phansy that
make him soe confident and positive in his tenets. Now if after all
this profession he cannot bear any opposition to his opinion; if he
can not soe much as give a patient hearing much lesse examine and 
weigh the arguments on the other side, does he not plainly confesse
tis prejudice governs him, and tis not the evidence of truth but some
lazy anticipation some beloved presumption that he desires to rest
indisturbd in. For if what he holds be as he gives out well fenced
with evidence and he sees it to be true what need he fear to put it to 
the proof? If his oppinion be setled upon a firme foundation, if the
arguments that support it and have obteined his assent be clear good
and convinceing why should he be shie to have it tried whether they
be proof or not. He whose assent goes beyond his evidence owes this
excess | of his adherence only to prejudice, and does in effect own it 
when he refuses to hear what is offerd against it, declareing thereby
that tis not evidence he seeks but the quiet enjoyment of the opinion
he is fond of, with a forward condemnation of all that may stand
in opposition to it, unheard and unexamind. which what is it but
Prejudice Qui æquum statuerit parte inauditâ alterâ etiam si æquum 
statuerit haud æquus fuerit.47
 with a [perswasion] `beleif´ (il.) – they are [in broad daylight and see better
than anybody] `more | in the light … eys´ (il. cont. on p. )  soe [positive and]
confident  convinceing [what need he fheari] why  quiet [possession]
`enjoyment´ (add. p. )  fond of, [which without trial and examination]
with  forward [of ] `condemnation of´ (add. p. )  Vertical stroke marks
end of par.
 Locke’s own copy of L. & M. Annæi Senecæ Tragœdiæ, cum notis Th. Farnabii,
Amsterdam: I. Ianssonium,  (Harrison/Laslett nr. , p. ) gives the
following version of these two lines (, ) from the Medea: ‘Qui statuit
aliquid parte inaudita altera, / Æquum licet statuerit, haud æquus fuit’;
‘He who has judged aught, with the other side unheard, may have judged
righteously, but was himself unrighteous’, transl. F.J. Miller.
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(.) He that would acquit him self in this case as a lover of truth
not giveing way to any preoccupation or bias that may mislead him
must doe two things that are not | very common nor very easy. 
(.) First he must not be in love with any opinion, or wish it to Indifferency(§)
 be true till he knows it to be soe and then he will not need to wish it.
For noe thing that is false can deserve our good wishes, nor a desire
that it should have the place and force of truth and yet noething
is more frequent than this, Men are Fond of certain tenets upon
noe other evidence but respect and custome, and thinke they must
 maintein them or all is gon though they have never examind the
ground they stand on, nor have ever made them out to them selves
or can make them out to others. We shoud contend earnestly for the
truth but we shoud first be sure that it is truth, or else we fight against
god who is the god of truth,48 and doe the worke of the Devill who
 is the father and propagator of lies49 and our zeale though never soe
warme will not excuse us. For this is plainly prejudice.
(.) Secondly he must doe that which he will finde himself very Examin(§)
averse to as judging the thing unnecessary or him self uncapable of
doing of it, He must trie whether his principles be certainly true or
 noe and how far he may safely relye upon them. This whether fewer
have the heart or | skill to doe I shall not determin: But this I am 
sure this is that which every one ought to doe who professes to love
truth and would not imposse upon him self which is a surer way to
be made a foole of than by being exposed to the Sophistrye of others.
 The disposition to put any cheat upon our selves works constantly
and we are pleased with it but are impatient of being banterd or
–  He that would … must doe on p.  replaces the following passage on p. ,
although this passage has not been deleted : But here he must [avoid] `doe´ (il.)
–  mislead him [must as I have said] must  must [pr] doe  Vertical stroke
marks end of par.  be [fond or] in  tenets [whose] upon  god [of truth]
who – must `doe that which [he requires | of others viz] he will [either]
finde … of it. He must´ (il. cont. on p. )  that [......] which – foole
of [than the Bantering [`........´ (il.)] of others for this works] `[th.a .n | sophistrie]
than by being … constantly´ (add. cont. on p. ) {constantly}  `banterd or´
(il.)
 Cf. Deut. : : ‘He is the Rock, his work is perfect: for all his ways are
judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.’
 Cf. John : : ‘When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a
liar, and the father of it.’
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mislead by others. The inability I here speak of is not any natural
defect that makes men uncapable of examining their own principles:
To such, rules of conducting their understandings are uselesse, and
that is the case of very few; The great number is of those whom the
ill habit of never exerting their thoughts has disabled, The powers 
of their mindes are starved by disuse and have lost that reach and
strength which nature fited them to receive from exercise. Those who
are in a condition to learne the first rules of plaine Arithmatick and
could be brought to cast up an ordinary sum are capable of this if
they had but accustomd their mindes to reasoning. But they that 
have wholy neglected the exercise of their understandings in this way
will be very far at first from being able to doe it and as unfit for it
as one unpractised in figures to cast up a shop booke and perhaps
thinke it as strange to be set about it. and yet it must neverthelesse be
confessd to be a wrong use of our understandings to build our tenets 
(in things where we are concerned to hold the truth) upon principles
that may lead us into error. We take our principles at haphazard upon
trust and without ever haveing examined them, and then beleive a
whole systeme upon a presumption that they are true and solid, and
what is all this | but childish shamefull senslesse Credulity. 
(.) In these two things viz an equall indifferency for all truth IIndifferency
meane the receiveing it in the love of it as truth, but not loveing it for
any other reason before we know it to be true. And in the examination
of our principles and not receiveing any for such nor building on
them till we are fully convinced as rational creatures of their solidity 
truth and certainty,consists that freedom of the understandingwhich
is necessary to a rational creature and without which it is not truly
an Understanding: Tis conceit phansy extravagance any thing rather
than understanding if it must be under the constraint of receiveing
 makes [them] `men´ (il.) – and `that´ (il.) – very few; [whom their
own negligence and an ill habit has `not´ (il.) disabld] `The great n|umber …
from exercise´ (il. cont. on p. )  starved `by´ (il.) – reach and [vigor]
`strength´ (il.)  them [for] to – who [are] [have parts] are  sum [of ]
[of di] `are´ (il.) {are}  `in this way´ (il.)  doe it [and it will seem] `and
as unfit for it´ (il.)  `in figures´ (il.)  tenets (in [this of concernment]
things  hap/hazard  then [`thereupon´] beleive – beleive [all the
rest] `a whole systeme´ (il.)  Preceded by two deleted words of an abortive new
par.: [The two] (cf. first sentence of par.  )  things [viz not allowing to any
opinions a stronger assent nor a greater affection than the evidence of their truth
demand] viz  under [the imposition of ] [ten receiveing] the constraint
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and holding opinions by the authority of any thing but their owne not
phansied but perceived evidence. This was rightly called Imposition
and is of all other the worst and most dangerous sort of it. For | 
we impose upon our selves which is the strongest imposition of all
 others; And we impose upon our selves in that part which ought with
the greatest care to be kept free from all imposition. The world is apt
to cast great blame on those who have an indifferency for opinions
espetialy in religion. I fear this is the foundation of great error and
worse consequences. To be indifferent which of two opinions is true
 is the right temper of the minde that preserves it from being imposed
on and disposes it to examin with that indifferency till it has done its
best to finde the truth and this is the only direct and safe way to it.
But to be indifferent whether we imbrace falshood for truth or noe is
the great road to Error. Those who are not indifferent which opinion
 is true are guilty of this. They suppose without examining | that what 
they hold is true, and then thinke they ought to be zealous for it.
Those tis plain by their warmth and eagernesse are not indifferent for
their own opinions, but methinks are very indifferent whether they
be true or false since they cannot endure to have any doubts raised or
 objections made against them, and tis visible they never have made
any them selves, and soe never haveing examind them know not, nor
are concerned as they should be to know whether they are true or
false.
(.) These are the common and most general miscariages which 
 I thinke men should avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their
understandings and should be particularly taken care of in education
the businesse whereof in respect of knowledg is not as I thinke to
perfect a learner in all or any one of the sciences but to give his minde
that freedom that disposition and those habits that may enable him
 to attein | any part of knowledg he shall apply him self to or stand 
in need of in the future course of his life. This and this only is
well principleing, and not the instilling a reverence and veneration
 holding [any] opinions – `For | we impose … or false´ (add. cont. on
pp. , )  is the [true freedom] right  on and [lays on it] disposes
 `They´ (il.) suppose [what] without  should [take care to rectifie] avoid
 be [espetialy] `particularly´ (il.)  care of [`early´ (il.)] in [the formeing of
their mindes] education  perfect [the scholer] a learner  in [any one] all
 `freedom that´ (il.)  life [` .&´ (add. in l. marg.)] This
 conduct, pars. 37–39
for certain dogmas under the specious title of principles which are
often soe remote from that truth and evidence which belongs to
Principles that they ought to be rejected as false and erroneous, and
is often the cause to men soe educated when they come abroad into
the world and finde they cannot maintein the principles soe taken 
up and rested in, to cast of all principles and turne perfect scepticks
regardlesse of knowledg and virtue.
(.) There are several weaknesses or defects in the understanding
either from the natural temper of the minde or ill habits taken up
which hinder it in its progresse to knowledg. Of these there are as 
many possibly to be found if the minde were throughly studyd as
there are diseases of the body, each whereof clogs and disables the
understanding to some degree and therefor deserve to be looked after
and cured. I shall set down some few to excite men espetialy those
who make knowledg their businesse to looke into them selves and 
observe whether they doe not indulge some weaknesse allow some
miscariage in the management of their intellectuall faculty which is
prejudicial to them in the search of truth.
(.) Particular matters of fact are the undoubted foundationsObservation (§)
on which our civill and natural knowledg is built. The benefit the 
understanding makes of them is to draw from them conclusions
which may be as standing rules of knowledg and consequently of
practise. The minde often makes not that benefit it should of the
information it receives from the accounts of Civil or natural historians
in being too forward or too slow in makeing observations on the 
particular facts recorded | in them. There are those who are very
assiduous in reading, and yet doe not much advance their knowledgReading
by it, They are delighted with the storys that are told and perhaps
can tell them again for they make all they read noe thing but history
to themselves. But not reflecting on it, not makeing to themselves 
 evidence [that] which – `, and is of|ten the cause … virtue´ (add. cont.
on. p. )  are [besides] several  `Of these´ there are [ .p.e.r .h.a .p.s] (deleted,
undeleted by underdotting, deleted again) as  possibly `[of these] to be found …
studyd´ (add. p. )  w`h´ereof (il.)  men [to] espetialy  `indulge
some wea|knesse´ (il. cont. on p. )  practise. [He that] The  `very´
(il.)  reading [of history] [who `and make all they read history to them but´
(il.)] `and yet [d .o.e ...]´ (il.) doe not –  tell [them again But] `them again
… it, not´ (add., p. ) .– . themselves [noe] observations
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observations from what they read they are very litle improved by all
that croud of particulars that either passe through or lodg themselves
in their understandings.50 They dream on in a constant course of
reading and craming themselves, but not digesting any thing it pro-
 duces noe thing but a heap of cruditys. If their memories reteine well
one may say they have the materials of knowledg, but like those for
building they are of noe advantage, if there be noe other use made
of them but to let them lie heaped up togeather. Opposite to these
there are others who loose the improvement they should make of
 matters of fact by a quite contrary conduct. They are apt to draw
general conclusions and raise axioms from every particular they meet Conclusions
with. These make as little true benefit of history as the other nay
being of forward and active spirits receive more harme by it. It being
of worse consequence to steer ones thoughts by a wrong rule than
 to have none at all, error doeing to busy men much more harme
then ignorance to the slow and slugish. Between these those seeme
to doe best who takeing materiall and usefull hints sometimes from
single matters of fact cary them in their mindes to be judgd of by
what they shall finde in history to confirme or reverse these imper-
 fect observations which may be establishd into rules fit to be relyd
on when they are justified by a sufficient and wary induction51 of
 from [them] `what they read they´ (il.)  that [clouhdi] croud –  their
understand[ings]`in|gs. They dream … heap of cruditys.´ (add. cont. on p. )
 digesting{,} [[[it i]]any] `any´ (il.) – it [[[p]]was but] produces  retein
[them] well  noe [use if they only] advantage  takeing [us] materiall
 Cf. Locke, ‘Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study’, p. : ‘But the
next step towards the improvement of his understanding must be to observe
the connection of these ideas in the propositions which those books hold
forth and pretend to teach as truths; which till a man can judge whether
they be truths or no his understanding is but little improved, and he does
but think and talk after the books that he hath read without having any
knowledge thereby. And thus men of much reading are greatly learned, and
but little knowing’; and Malebranche, Recherche, Vol. I, Bk. II, Pt. II, Ch. iv,
p. : ‘Car il ne faut pas s’imaginer, que ceux qui vieillissent sur les Livres
d’Aristote & de Platon, fassent beaucoup d’usage de leur esprit. (…) Ils ne
sçavent que des Histoires & des faits, & non pas des véritez évidentes; & ce
sont plûtôt des Historiens, que de véritables Philosophes, des hommes qui ne
pensent point, mais qui peuvent raconter les pensées des autres.’
 The first clear sign of Locke’s reading of Bacon’s Novum Organum does not
appear before , which is after he wrote the Essay but before he started work
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particulars. He that makes noe such reflections | on what he reads
only loades his minde with a rapsodie of tales fit in winter nights for
the enterteinment of others. And he that will improve every matter
of fact into a maxime will abound in contrary observations that can
be of noe other use but to perplex and pudder52 him if he compares 
them or else to misguide him if he gives himself up to the authority
of that which for its novelty or for some other phansy best pleases
him.
(.) Next to these we may place those who suffer their owne (§)Bias
natural tempers and passions they are possessed with to influence 
their judgments espetialy of men and things that may any way relate
to their present circumstances and interests.53 Truth is all simple all
pure will bear noe mixture of any thing else with it. Tis rigid and
inflexible to any bye interests and soe shoud the understanding be
whose use and excellency lies in conformeing it self to it. To thinke 
of every thing just as it is in it self is the proper businesse of the
understanding.54 Though it be not that which men always imploy
it to. This all men at first hearing allow is the right use every one
should make of his understanding. Noe body will be at such an
open defiance with common sense as to professe that we should not 
endeavour to know and thinke of things as they are in them selves,
and yet there is noe thing more frequent than to doe the contrary
and men are apt to excuse them selves and think they have reason to
 fit [for] in  `to´ (il.) – be [that would conforme it self to] whose
 that [to] which  This [every one] `all men at first hearing´ (il.) allow[s]
 `as to professe´ (il.)
on the Conduct (see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §). Given this background, it
is not surprising that in the Conduct Locke uses the word ‘induction’, while
this is completely is absent from the Essay. Cf. Locke’s ‘sufficient and wary
induction of particulars’ with Bacon’s ‘Inductio legitima et vera’, Novum
Organum, Bk. II, Aph. x, Works, I, p. .
 ‘to pudder’ = obs. or dial. var. of to pother = to confuse (OED ).
 On passion as a cause of error, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §. On ‘bias’, cf.
Essay, II.xxi.: : ‘But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our
desires, the moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our Understand-
ings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment, being
that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true Happiness depends;
’tis in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours.’
 We have ‘an Idea of the thing, as it is in it self ’, when we have perceived its
primary qualities; see Essay, II.viii.: . See also Gen Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
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doe soe if they have but a pretence that it is for god or a good cause
| that is in effect for them selves their own perswasion or party, for 
to those in their turns the several sects of men espetialy in matters of
religion entitle god and a good cause. But god requires not men to
 wrong or misuse their faculties for him nor to lie to others or them
selves for his sake, which they purposely doe who will not suffer their
understandings to have right conceptions of the things proposed to
them and designedly restrain them selves from haveing just thoughts
of every thing as far as they are concerned to enquire.55 And as for
 a good cause that needs not such ill helps. If it be good truth will
support it and it has noe need of fallacy or falshood.
(.) Very much of kin to this is the hunting after arguments Arguments(§)
to make good one side of a question and wholy to neglect and
refuse those which favour the other side. what is this but willfully to
 misguide the understanding and is soe far from giveing truth its due
value that it wholy debases it, espouse opinions that best comport
with their power, profit or credit and then seek argument to support
them. Truth light56 upon this way is of noe more availe to us than
error. For what is soe taken up by us may be false as well as true and
 he has not done his duty who has thus stumbled upon truth in his
way to preferment.
(.) There is an other but more innocent way of collecting
arguments very familiar amongst bookish men which is to furnish
them selves with the arguments they meet with pro and con in the
 questions they study.57 This helps them not to judg right nor argue
 religion [ .b.e]`en´title (il.)  sake, [which they even of designe] `which
they purposely´ (il.) – `espouse … support them´ (add. l. marg.) [For]
Truth  Truth [light] [`stumbled´] `light´ (il.)  `us may´ (il.)  `thus´
(il.) – `in´ (il.) [.t]his way `to preferment´  amongst [studious]
`bookish´ (il.) – con in [any question they consider] the questions
.– . `questions they … implicit knowledg.´ (Add. cont. on p. ; since
this add. is on the first odd-numbered page of a new quire, H, this add., and probably
the whole par., was entered after the introductory pages (pars. - of the present edition)
that start on the first even-numbered page of this quire, i.e. p. . See also Gen. Introd.:
‘Text’, § [])
 On religious sectarianism as a source of error, see also Essay, IV.xix: -,
‘Of Enthusiasm’.
 ‘to light upon’ = to chance upon (OED .d)
 Cf. Locke, ‘Of Study’, p. : ‘This grand miscarriage in our studies draws
after it another of less consequence, which yet is very natural for bookish men
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strongly but only to talk copiously on either side without being steady
and setled in their owne judgment. For such arguments gatherd from
other mens thoughts floating onely in the memory are there ready
indeed to supply copious talke with some appearance of reason but
are far from helping us to judg right. such variety of arguments only 
distract the understanding that relyes on them unlesse it has gon
farther than such a superficial way of examining. This is to quit truth
for appearance only to serve our vanity. The sure and only way to
get true knowledg is to forme in our mindes clear and setled notions
of things with names annexed to those determined Ideas. These we 
are to consider with their several relations and habitudes and not
amuse our selves with floating names and words of indetermined
signification which we can use in several senses to serve a turne. Tis
in the perception of the habitudes and respects our Ideas have one to
an other that reall knowledg consists and when a man once perceives 
how far they agree or disagree one with an other he will be able to
judg of what other people say and will not need to be lead by the
arguments of others which are many of them noe thing but plausible
sophistry. This will teach him to state the question right and see
where on it turnes, and thus he will stand upon his own legs and 
know by his own understanding. Whereas by collecting and learning
arguments by heart he will be but a reteiner to others, and when any
one questions the foundations they are built upon he will be at a non
plus and be fain to give up his implicit knowledg.58
 only {only}  on  supply [us with] `copious´ (il.)  right. [talk unlesse
they are examind to the bottom .o.r unlesse they are soe examind as to shew us
the true] such – `This is … vanity.´ (il.)  mindes [true] `clear´ (il.)
–  things [and when we would [consider] know the truth] `with names …
These we are [to]´ (il.) to consider –  consider [them] {and} [not the words
that are set for them] [this is the only way to perceive their habitudes and respects
one] `with their … have one´ (il.)  relations [respects] and habitudes  `Tis´
(il.)  that [where in consists] reall knowledge `consists´ (il.)  other [the
arguments of others, which are for the most part but talkeing sophihstryi] he will
 others which [for the most part] are  `many of them´ (il.)  This [and]
will  they [are] are
to run into, and that is in the reading of authors very intently and diligently
to mind the arguments pro and con they use, and endeavour to lodge them
safe in their memories to serve them upon occasion …’
 For ‘implicit knowledg’ cf. below, par.  on ‘second hand or implicit knowl-
edge’; par. , note ; and Essay, I.iv.: : ‘some (and those the most)
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(.) Labour for labours sake is against nature the understanding Hast

(§)
as well as all the other facultys chooses always the shortest way to
its end; would presently obtein the knowledg it is about and then
set upon some new enquiry: But this whether lazynesse or hast
 often misleads it and makes it content it self with improper ways of
search and such as will not serve the turne. Sometimes it rests upon
testimony where testimony, of right, has noe thing to doe because it Testimony
is easier to beleive than to be scientificaly instructed.59 Sometimes it
contents it self with one argument and rests satisfied with that as if it One proof
 were a demonstration where as the thing under proof is not capable
of demonstration and therefor must be submitted to the trial of
probabilities and all the material arguments pro and con be examined
and brought to a Ballance. In some cases the minde is determined
by probable topicks in enquiries where demonstration may be had, Topicks
 all those and several others which lazynesse impatience custom and
want of use and attention leade men into are misapplications of the
understanding in the search of truth. In every question the nature
and manner of the proof it is capable of should be first considerd
to make our enquiry such as it should be. This would save a great
 | deale of frequently misimploid pains and lead us sooner to that 
discovery and possession of truth we are capable of. The multiplying
varietie of arguments espetialy frivolous ones such as are all that are
meerly verbal is not only lost labour, but cumbers the memory to
noe purpose and serves only to hinder it from seiseing and holding
 of the truth in all those cases which are capeable of demonstration.
in such a way of proof the truth and certainty is seen and the minde
fully possesses it self of it when in the other way of assent it only
 nature. the [mind] understanding  self{.}  with [those ways of search]
improper  where [ .o.f right] testimony, `of right,´ (il.)  Ballance. [Some-
times] In some  probable [conjectures] [thoughhtsi] `topicks´ (il.) `in en-
quiries´ (il.) where [in] demonstration  `of´ (il.)
taking things upon trust, misimploy their power of Assent, by lazily enslaving
their Minds, to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which
it is their duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit faith,
to swallow …’; for a non-pejorative use of the term ‘implicit Knowledge’, cf.
Essay, I.ii.: -.
 For ‘testimony’ cf. Essay, IV.xv-xvi: -.
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hovers about it, is amused with uncertaintys. In this superficial way
indeed the minde is capable of more varietie of plausible talke but
is not inlarged as it should be in its knowledg. Tis to this same
hast and impatienhcie of the minde also that a not due traceing of
the arguments to their true foundation is oweing, men see a little 
presume a great deale and soe jump to the conclusion. this is a short
way to phansy and conceit and (if firmly imbraced) to opiniatrity:60
But is certainly the farthest way about to knowledg. For he that will
know must by the connection of the proofs see the truth and the
ground it stands on and therefor if he has for hast skipt over what he 
should have examind he must begin and goe over all again or else he
will never come to knowledg.
(.) Another fault of as ill consequence as this which proceedsDesultory (§)
also from lazynesse with a mixture of vanity, is the skiping from one
sort of knowledg to an other. Some mens tempers are quickly weary 
of any one thing, constancy and assiduity is what they cannot bear,
the same study long continued in is as intolerable to them as the
appearing long in the same clothes or fashion is to a court Lady,
Others that they may seem universally knowing get a litle smattering (§)
in every thing. Both these may fill their heads with superficial notions Smattering
of things but are very much out of the way of atteineing truth or
knowledg. I doe not here speake against the takeing a tast | of every
sort of knowledg. It is certainly very usefull and necessary to forme
the minde but then it must be done in a different way and to a
different end. Not for talke and vanity to fill the head with shreds of Universality (§)
all kinde that he who is possessed of such a frippery may be able to
match the discourses of all he shall meet with as if noe thing could
come amisse to him and his head was soe well a stored Magazin
– uncertaintys. [Is] [`Th|is´ (add. cont. on p. )] `In this `superficial´ (il.) way
indeed the minde [the minde] is´ (add. p. )  capable [indeed] of  more
[superficial] varietie of [superficial] `plausible´ (il.)  not [at all] inlarged  its
[knowledg. To] `kno|wledg. Tis to´ (add. cont. on p. ) – `impatienhci|
e (letter between hi obliterated by binding) of the minde … knowledg. (add. cont.
on p. )  soe [run to the conclusion] jump  about [if any at all to truth
knhowledgi] to knowledg  therefor [must] if he  `for hast´ (il. )  begin
[all again] and  other. [w] Some  these [filhli] may  takeing [the]
`a´ (il.)  with [patchhesi] shreds  `kinde | that he … be able´ (add. cont.
p. )
 ‘opiniatrity’ = stubbornness (OED)
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that noething could be proposed which he was not master of and was
readily furnishd to entertein any one on. This is an excellency indeed
and a great one too to have a reall and true knowledg in all or most
of the objects of contemplation. But tis what the minde of one and
 the same man can hardly attein unto and the instances are soe few of
those who have in any measure approachd towards it, that I know not
whether they are to be proposed as examples in the ordinary conduct
of the understanding. For a man to understand fully the businesse of
his particular calling in the commonwealth and of Religion which is
 his calling as he is a man in the world is usualy enough to take up
his whole time, and there are few that informe them selves in these,
which is every mans proper and peculiar businesse, soe to the bottom
as they should doe. But though this be soe and there are very few men
that extend their thoughts towards universal knowledg, yet I doe not
 doubt but if the right way were taken and the methods of enquiry
were orderd as they should be men of little businesse and great leisure
might goe a great deale farther in it than is usualy done. To returne
to the bussinesse in hand The end and | use of a little insight into 
those parts of Knowledge which are not a mans proper businesse is
 to accustome our mindes to all sorts of Ideas and the proper ways
of examining their habitudes and relations. This gives the minde a
freedom and the exerciseing the understanding in the several ways
of enquiry and reasoning which the most skilfull have made use
of teaches the minde sagacity and warynesse and a supplenesse to
 apply it self more closely and dextrously to the bents and turns of
the matter in all its researches. Besides this universal tast of all the
sciences with an indifferencie before the minde is possesd with any
one in particular and grown into love and admiration of what is
made its dareling will prevent an other evill very commonly to be
 obsehrived in those who have from the begining been seasond only
by one part of knowledg. Let a man be given up to the contemplation
of one sort of knowledg and that will become every thing. The minde
will take such a tincture from a familiarity with that object that every
–  indeed [in those who] `and a great one too to´ (il.)  have `a ´ (il.)
– `one and | the same´ (il. cont. on p. )  `particular´ (il.)  in th[[is]]e
world{.} – up [every mans] `his whole´ (il.)  were [better] [`rightly´
(il.)] orderd .– . dextrously [in all its researches. This is a variety of
knowledg. And] `to the ben|ts and turns … each of them´ (il. cont. on p. )
 indifferencie[s]
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thing else how remote soever will be brought under the same view.
A metaphysitian will bring plowing and gardening immediatly to
abstract notions. the history of nature shall signifie noe thing to him.
an Alchymist on the contrary shall reduce Divinity to the maximes of
his laboratory explain Morality by Sal Sulphur and Mercury,61 and 
allegorize the Scripture it self and the sacred mysterys thereof into the
philosophers stone. And I heard once a man who had a more than
ordinaryexcellency in musick seriously accomodate Moses seven days
of the first week to the notes of Musick as if from thence had been
taken the measure and method of the Creation. Tis of noe small 
consequence to keep the minde from such a possession. which I
thinke is best done by giveing it a fair and equall view of the whole
intellectuall world, wherein it may see the order ranke and beauty of
the whole, and give a just allowance to the distinct provinces of the
several sciences in the due order and usefulnesse of each of them. If 
this be that which old men will not thinke necessary nor be easily
brought to Tis fit at least that it should be practised in the breeding
of the yonge. The businesse of Education as I have already observed
is not as I thinke to make them perfect in any one of the sciences
but soe to open and dispose their mindes as may best make them 
capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it.62 If men are
for a long time accustomd only to one sort or method of thoughts,
theyr mindes grow stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other. Tis
therefor to give them this freedom that I thinke they should be made
looke into all sorts of knowledg and exercise their understandings in 
soe wide a variety. But I doe not propose it as a variety and stock
of knowledg but a varietie and freedom of thinkeing as an increase
– him. `an´ (add.)  the [.r .u.l.e.s] `maximes´ (il.)  laboratory [and] explain
 musick [several] seriously  accomodate [the] Moses – of the [role]
whole, – necessary [and] nor `be´ (l. marg.) easily [be] brought  in
the [education] `breeding´ (add.)  business [whereof ] `of | Education´ (add.
cont. on p.) `as I have already observed´ (il.)  `one´ (il.)  for [a lhongi]
`a long time´ (il.)  sort [of knowhledgei thoughts] or – in [th] soe
 ‘Sal Sulphur and Mercury’: basic elements (the tria prima) in the (al)chemical
theory of Paracelsus (=Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast von Ho-
henheim, -) and his followers, see Debus, The Chemical Philosophy,
Vol. I, pp. -.
 See above, par. .
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of the powers and activity of the minde, not as an enlargement of its
possessions.63
(.) This is that which I thinke great Readers are apt to be Reading

(§)
mistaken in. Those who have read of every thing are thought to
 understand every thing too. But it is not alway soe. Reading furnishes
the minde only with the materials of knowledg tis thinkeing makes
what we read ours. we are of the ruminating kinde and tis not enough
to cram our selves with a great load of collections unlesse we chew
them over again they will not give us strength and nourishment.
 There are indeed in some writers visible instances of deepe thought,
close and accute reasoning and Ideas well pursued, The light these
would give would be of great use if their readers would observe and
immitate them. All the rest at best are but particulars fit to be turned
into knowledg. but that can be done only by our owne meditation
 and examining the reach force and coherence of what is said and
then as far as we apprehend and see the connection of Ideas soe far it
is ours. without that it is but soe much loose matter floating in our
brain. the memory may be stored but the judgment is little better
and the stock of knowledg not increasd by being able to repeat what
 others have said or produce the arguments we have found in them.
such a knowledhgi as this is but knowledhgi by hear say. And the
ostentation of it is at best but talking by roat and very often upon
weake and wrong principles. For all that is to be found in bookes is
not built upon true foundations, nor always rightly deduced from
– not as [a store and collection of knowledg.] `an enlargement of its posessions´
(add.)  soe [th] Reading  thinkeing [and rumihnatingi] makes – makes
[it] `what we read´ (il.)  of the [..........] `ruminating´ – tis not [enough
to load ourselves with large [coll] `budget full of´ (add. p. )] `enough … of
coll´ (add. pl. ) – chew [it] `them´ (il.)  they [it] will  give [ust]
us  writers [inhstancesi] visible  accu[ste]`te´ (il.)  `at best´ (il.)
– owne [thinking] `meditation … is ours´ (add. p. )  then [.. it] as
far – our [brain but ...] brain  others [of ] `have´ (il.)  or [urge]
produce – them. [But this is noe more than] `su|ch a knowledhgi… best
but´ (add. cont. on p. )  upon [right] true [principles] `foundations´ (il.)
 Cf. Montaigne, ‘De l’institution des enfans’, in: Essais, p. , on the im-
portance of a governor who has ‘plutost la teste bien faicte que bien pleine’.
On the importance of this kind of formal training see also Gen. Introd.:
‘Context’, §.
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the principles it is pretended to be built on. such an examen as is
requisite to discover that every readers mind is not forward to make
espetialy in those who have given them selves up to a party | and
only hunt for what they can scrape togeather that may favour and
support the tenets of it. Such men wilfully exclude them selves from 
truth and from all true benefit to be received by reading. Others of
more indifferency often want attention and industry. The minde isLazynesse
backwards in it self to be at the pains to trace every argument to its
original and to see upon what Basis it stands and how firmly. But yet
it is this that gives soe much the advantage to one man over an other 
in reading. The minde should by severe rules be tied down to this at
first uneasy taske, use and exercise will give it facility, soe that those
who are accustomed to it readily as it were with one cast of the eye
take a view of the argument and presently in most cases see where it
bottoms. Those who have got this faculty one may say have got the 
true key of books and the clue to lead them through the mizmaze64
of variety of opinions and authors to truth and certainty. This yonge
beginners should be enterd in and shewd the use of that they might
profit by their reading. Those who are strangers to it will be apt to
thinke it too great a clog in the way of mens studys and they will 
suspect they shall make but small progresse if in the books they read
they must stand to examin and unravell every argument and follow it
step by step up to its ori|ginal. I answer This is a good objection and
ought to weigh with those whose reading is designed for much talke
and little knowledg and I have noething to say to it. But I am here 
enquireing into the conduct of the understanding in its progresse
towards knowledg and to those who aime at that I may say that he
who fair and softly goes steadily forward in a course that points right
– built on. [The minde is not forward always to trace these] `su|ch an examen
… to make´ (add. cont. on p. )  for [argument that] `what they can scrape
togeather that´ (il.)  and [upon] how  minde [at first] should – eye
[as] tak[[es]]e  see[s]  them [out of the maze] through  `suspect
they shall´ (il.)  ginal (catchword)  objection [for those] and  who
[gently] fair
 ‘mizmaze’ = labyrinth (OED )
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will sooner be at his journeys end, then he that runs after every one
he meets though he gallop all day full speed.65
(.) To which let me adde that this way of thinkeing on and
profiting by what we read will be a clog and rub to any one only
 in the begining. when custome and exercise has made it familiar it
will be dispatchd in most occasions without resting or interruption
in the course of our reading, the motions and views of a minde
exercised that way are wonderfully quick, and a man used to such
sort of reflections sees as much at one glimps as would require a long
 discourse to lay before an other and make out in an entire and gradual
deduction. Besides that when the first difficultys are over the delight
and sensible advantage it brings mightily incourages and enlivens the
minde in reading which without this is very improperly caled Study.
(.) As an help to this I thinke it may be proposed that for(§)
 the saveing the lazy progression of the thoughts to remote and first
principles in every case the minde should provide it selfe several
stages that is to say intermediate principles which it might have Intermediate
principles
recourse to in the | examining those positions that come in its way.

These though they are not self evident principles yet if they have
 been made out from them by a wary and unquestionable deduction
may be depended on as certain and infallible truths and serve as
unquestionable truths to prove other points depending on them by
a nearer and shorter view than remote and general maximes. These
may serve as land markes to shew what lies in the direct way of truth
 or is quite besides it. And thus Mathematicians doe who doe not in
every new problem run it back to the first axioms through all the
whole train of intermediate propositions. Certain theorems that they
have setled to themselves upon sure demonstration serve to resolve to
them multitudes of propositions which depend on them and are as
– and [improveing] profiting  be [only] a clog  to [us ohnlyi] any  .i .n
 sees [more] `as much´ (add. p. )  entire [deduction.] and – `Besides
that when the | first … Study´ (add. cont. on p. )  lazy [train of ] progression
 the [minde] thoughts  stages [and resting places] that – as [Crite-
rions .t .o judg of other points] `un|questionable … on them´ (add. cont on p.)
 other [truthhsi] points  what [are] lies  back [to sohmei thrhoughi]
to  propositions. [They] [The] Certain
 Cf. Descartes, Discours de la méthode, AT VI, p. : ‘ceux qui ne marchent que
fort lentement, peuuent auancer beacoup dauantage, s’ils suiuent tousiours
le droit chemin, que ne sont ceux qui courent, & qui s’en esloignent’.
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firmly made out from thence as if the minde went afresh over every
link of the whole chain that ties them to first self evident principles.
Only in other sciences great care is to be taken that they establish
those intermediate principles with as much caution exactnesse and
indifferency as mathematicians use in the setleing any of their great 
theorems. Where this is not done, but men take up their principles
in this or that science upon credit inclination interest etc in hast
without due examination and most unquestionable proof they lay
a trap for themselves, and as much as in them lyes captivate their
understandings to mistake falshood and error. 
(.) As there is a partiality to opinions | which as we havePartiality (§)

already observed66 is apt to mislead the understanding soe there is
often a partiality to studyes which is prejudicial also to knowledg
and improvement. Those sciences which men are particularly versed
in they are apt to value and extol as if that part of knowledge which 
every one has acquainted him self with were that alone which was
worth the haveing and all the rest were idle and empty amusement,
comparatively of noe use or importance. This is the effect of igno-
rance and not knowledg the being vainly puffed up with a flatulency
ariseing from a weake and narrow comprehension. Tis not amisse 
that everyone should relish the science that he has made his pecu-
liar study: A view of its beautys and a sense of its usefulnesse carys
a man on with the more delight and warmth in the pursuit and
improvement of it. But the contempt of all other knowledg as if it
were noething in comparison of law or physick of Astronomie or 
Chymistrie or perhaps some yet meaner part of knowledg where in
I have got some smattering or am some what advanced, is not only
the marke of a vain and little minde, but does this prejudice in the
conduct of the understanding, that it coops it up within narrow
bounds and hinders it from lookeing abroad into other | provinces 
 if [they] the minde  first [m] self – exactnesse and [evidence] indifferency
 that [sort of knowledg] `science´ (il.)  them [[l .ov]]lyes  there `is ´ (il.)
 `particularly´ (il.)  to [extol and] value  if [those alone] that part
– which [he] `every one´ (add. p. ) – which w[[ere]]as  use
[nor worth.] `or importance.´ (add. p. ) – flatulency [of some ..] [of ]
`ari|seing from´ (add. cont. on p. ) – his [particular] `peculiar´ (add. p.
)  that it [hinders it from lookeing] coops
 Par. .
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of the intellectual world more beautyfull possibly and more fruitfull
than that which it had till then labourd in, wherein it might finde
besides new knowledg ways or hints whereby it might be inabled the
better to cultivate its owne.67
 (.) There is indeed one Science (as they are now destinguishd) Theologie(§)
incomparably above all the rest where it is not by corruption narrowed
into a trade or faction for meane or ill ends and secular interests, I
meane Theologie, which conteining the knowledg of god and his
creatures, our duty to him and our fellow creatures and a view of our
 present and future state is the comprehension of all other knowledg
directed to its true end i.e. the honour and veneration of the Creator
and the happynesse of man kinde. This is that noble study which is
every mans duty and every one that can be called a rational creature
is capable of. The workes of nature and the words of the Revelation
 displai it to mankinde in Characters soe large and visible that those
who are not quite blind may in them read and see the first principles
and most necessary parts of it and from thence as they have time helps
and industry may be inabled to goe on to the more abstruse parts
of it and penetrate into those infinite depths filld with the treasures
 of wisdome and knowledg. This is that Science which would truly
enlarge mens |minds were it studyed or permitted to be studyed 
every where with that freedom, love of truth and charity which it
teaches, and were not made contrary to its nature the occasion of
strife faction, malignity and narrow impositions. But I shall say noe Imposition
 more here of this but that it is undoubtedly a wrong use of my
 world [where by it might not only] more  labourd in, [but from whence it]
wherein – finde [ways and helps for the better cultivateing its owne.] `[per-
haps] besides new knowledg´ (add. p. )  be [help.] [in better] inabled  End
of par. marked by vertical line. – destinguishd) [infinihtelyi] incomparably
 not [for] by  `or ill´ (il.)  every [man that] one – `would´ (il.)
truly enlargehsi  mens [y.t] (probably catchword but not repeated on next page)
 Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, Aph. I., liv, Works, I, p. : ‘Adamant homines
scientias et contemplationes particulares; aut quia authores et inventores se
earum credunt; aut quia plurimum in illis operæ posuerunt, iisque maxime as-
sueverunt. Hujusmodi vero homines, si ad philosophiam et contemplationes
universales se contulerint, illas ex prioribus phantasiis detorquent et cor-
rumpunt (…) Chymicorum autem genus, ex paucis experimtentis fornacis,
philosophiam constituerunt phantasticam et ad pauca spectantem.’
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understanding to make it the rule and measure of an other mans, a
use which it is neither fit for nor capable of. This par|tiality where it (§)
Partiality
is | not permitted an authority to render all other studys insignificant
or contemptible is often indulgd soe far as to be relied upon and
made use of in other parts of knowledg to which it does not at all 
belong, and wherewith it has noe manner of affinity. Some men have
soe used their heads to mathematical figures that giveing a preference
to the methods of that Science they introduce lines and diagrams into
their study of divinity or politique enquirys as if noe thing could be
known without them68 and others accustomd to retired speculations 
run natural philosophie into methaphysical notions and the abstract
generalitys of Logique and how often may one meet with religion
and morality treated of in the termes of the Laboratory and thought
to be improved by the methods and notions of Chymistry. But he
that will take care of the conduct of his understanding to direct it 
right to the knowledg of things must avoid these undue mixtures
and not by a fondness for what he has found usefull and necessary in
one, transfer it to an other science where it serves only to perplex and
confound the understanding. It is a certain truth that res nolunt male
administrari.69 tis noe less certain res nolunt male intelligi.70 Things 
them selves are to be considerd as they are in them selves and then
they will shew us in what way they are to be understood. For to have
right conceptions about them we must bring our understandings to
| the inflexible natures and unalterable relations of things and not
endeavour to bring things to any præconceived notions of our own. 
| There | is an other partiality very commonly observable in men of

study noe lesse prejudicial nor ridiculous than the former and that
– `This par|tiality where´ (add. cont. on p. ) `{where} it is … of our own
{There in an}´ (add. pp. , , continuation of previous add.)  their [specula-
tions ... in] `study of´ (il.)  others [used] accustomd to [abstract generalitys]
`retired speculations´ (il.)  with [the k] religion  treated of {treated
of}  what [is] `he has found´ (il.)  `male intelligi´ (il.)  th[[em]]ings
.– . `There | is an other … in them´ (add. cont. on pp. , )  very
[ordinary] commonly  that is a[n]
 For a discussion of the application of mathematical method outside the narrow
field of mathematics itself in the second half of the seventeenth century, cf.
Arndt, Methodo scientifica pertractatum, esp. pp. -.
 ‘Things are unwilling to be badly managed.’
 ‘Things are unwilling to be badly understood.’
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is a phantastical and wilde attributeing all knowledg to the Ancients
alone or to the Modernes.71 This raveing upon antiquity in matter
of poetry Horace has wittily described and exposed in one of his
Satyrs,72 The same sort of madnesse may be found in reference to all
 the other Sciences. Some will not admit an opinion not authorized
by men of old who were then all Giants in knowledg. noe thing is
to be put into the treasury of Truth or knowledg which has not the
stamp of Greece or Rome upon it and since their days will scarchei
allow that men have been able to see thinke or write. Others with a
 like extravigancy contemn all that the ancients have left us, and being
taken with the moderne inventions and discoverys lay by all that went
before as if whatever is calld old must have the decay of time upon
it, and truth too were lyable to mould and rottennesse. Men I thinke
have been much what the same for natural indowments in all times,
 Fashon discipline and Education have put eminent differences in the
ages of several countrys and made one generation much differ from
an other in arts and sciences. But Truth is always the same, time alters
it not nor is it the better or worse for being of ancient or modern
tradition. Many were eminent in former ages of the world for their
 discovery and delivery of it but though the knowledg they have left
us be | worth our study yet they exhausted not all its treasure. They 
 `who were … knowledge´ (il.)  into the [the] treasury  of [knowlhedgi]
Truth  will [....] scarchei  able [write or thinke] to  moderne [and]
inventions  whatever [wahsi] is  put [differences] eminent  is
[unalterably] `always´ (il.)
 Cf. Locke’s Valedictory Speech as censor of moral philosophy, ‘An secundam
naturam quisquam potest esse fælix in hac vita? Negatur’, in: Locke, Essays
on the Law of Nature’, p. : ‘Sunt, fateor, qui prioris sæculi laudes perpetuo
crepant, quibus nihil eximium nihil mediocre nisi quod antiquum audit, in
quibus omnia forte antiqua reperies præter mores; quasi majores nostri tantum
fælicitate nos præirent quantum tempore’; and Bacon, Novum Organum,
Bk. I, Aph. lvi, Works, I, p. : ‘Reperiuntur ingenia alia in admirationem
antiquitatis, alia in amorem et amplexum novitatis effusa; pauca vero ejus
temperamenti sunt ut modum tenere possint, quin aut quæ recte posita sunt
ab antiquis convellant, aut ea contemnant quæ recte afferuntur a novis’.
Locke wrote the Conduct during the Quarrel between the Ancients and the
Moderns; his library contained Perrault’s Parallèle des anciens et des modernes
(Harrison/Laslett, nr. , p. ) and Wotton’s Reflections upon Ancient and
Modern Learning (ibid. nr. , p. ). See also Foster Jones, Ancients and
Moderns, passim.
 Reference is probably to Horace’s Epistolæ, Bk. II, Ep. i.
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left a great deale for the indistry and sagacity of after ages and soe
shall we. That was once new to them which any one now receives
with a veneration for its antiquity nor was it the worse for appearing
as a novelty and that which is now imbraced for ithsi newness will
to posterhitiy be old but not there by be lesse true or lesse genuin. 
There is noe occasion on this account to oppose the ancients and
the modernes to one an other or to be squemish on either side. He
that wisely conducts his minde in the pursuit of knowledg will gather
what light and get what helps, he can from either of them from whom
they are best to be had without adoreing the errors or rejecting the 
truths which he may finde mingled in them.
(.) Another partiality may be observed in some to vulgar in
others to Haterodox tenets. Some are apt to conclude that what is
the common opinion cannot but be true, so many mens eyes they
thinke cannot but see right soe many mens understandingsof all sorts 
cannot be deceived and therefor will not venture to looke beyond
the received notions of the place and age nor have soe presumtious
a thought as to be wiser than their neighbours. they are content to
goe with the croud and soe goe easily which they thinke is goeing
right or at least serves them as well.73 But however vox populi vox 
dei74 has prevailed as a Maxime yet I doe not remember wherever
god deliverd his oracles by the multitude, or nature her truths by the
heard. On the other side some flie all common opinions as either
 which [we] `any one´ (il.)  ithsi [novelty] `newness´ (il.) – genuin.
[Knowledg is not to be valued by the hand it comes from but its evidence and
usefulnesse.] There  `to one an other´ (il.)  can [`indifferenthlyi´ (il.,
deleted caret marker is after either of them)] from  them. [all]  Par. 
is a continuation of add. to par.  on pp. , .  others to [lesse received
opinions] `Haterodox tenets´ (il.)  common [cannot but] opinion  true,
so[me]  `of all sorts´ (il.) –  beyond the [vulgar] `received notions of
the place and age´ (il.)  nor [be] have [a th.o .u .ghhti] soe  than [all] their
 however [the] vox  prevailed [by] as  `all´ (il.)
 For the history of the argument ‘that what is the common opinion cannot
but be true’, see Schian, Untersuchungen über das ‘argumentum e consensu
omnium’, passim.
 ‘Vox populi vox dei’, ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God’, possibly
by Alcuin (c. -) to Charlemagne. Locke uses this saying also to start
the fifth essay, ‘An lex naturæ cognosci potest ex hominum consensu?’, of his
Essays on the Law of Nature, p. .
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false or frivilous. The title of many headed beast75 is a sufficient
reason to them to conclude that noe | truths of weight or consequence 
can be lodgd there. vulgar opinions are suited to vulgar capacities
and adapted to the ends of those that governe. he that will know the
 truth of things must leave the common and beaten tract which none
but weake and servil mindes are satisfied to trudge along constantly
in. Such nice palats relishe noe thing but strange notions quite out of
the way, whatever is commonly received has the marke of the beast76
on it and they thinke it a lessening to them to hearken to it or receive
 it, their minde runs only after paradoxes these they seeke these they
imbrace these alone they vent and soe, as they thinke, distinguish
them selves from the vulgar. But common or uncommon are not
the markes to distinguish truth or falshood and therefor should not
be any bias to us in our enquirys, we should not judg of things
 by mens opinions but of opinions by things. The multitude reason
but ill and there for may be well suspected and cannot be relied
on nor should be followed as a sure guide. But philosophers who
have quitted the Orthodoxie of the communitie and the popular
doctrines of their countrys have fallen into as extravagant and as
 absurd opinions as ever common reception countenanced. Twould
be madnesse to refuse to breath the common air or quench ones
thirst with water because the rabble use them to those purposes,
and if there are conveniencys of life which common use reaches not
tis noe reason to reject them because they are not grown into the
 ordinary fashion of the country and every villager doth not know
them. Truth whether in or out of fashon is the measure of knowledg
and the businesse of the Understanding. whatsoever is besides that
 `to them´ (il.)  governe [them] he  which [to keepe constantly in]
none  Such [there for] `nice palats´ (il.)  relish[[es]]e  to [.] `them´
(il.)  `it´ (il.)  `vent´ (il.)  opinions [nor] `but´ (il.)  multitude
[judg] `reason´ (il.)  `nor should be followed´ (il.)  ever [possessed]
common  `refuse to´ (il.) – reaches not [they are not to be rejected]
tis – into the [common] `ordinary´ (il.)  of [truthhi] knowledg
 Rev. : : ‘And I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast rise up out
of the sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns,
and upon his heads the name of blasphemy.’
 Rev. : : ‘And that no man might buy or sell, save that he had the mark, or
the name of the beast, or the number of his name.’
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however authorized by consent or recommended by raretie is noe
thing but | ignorance or some thing worse.
(.) Another sort of partiality there is whereby men impose upon
them selves and by it make their reading little usefull to them selves.
I mean the makeing use of the opinions of writers and laying stresse 
upon their authorities wherever they find them to favour their own
opinions.77
(.) There is noe thing almost has donne more harme to men
dedicated to letters than the giveing the name of Study to Reading
and makeing a man of great reading to be the same with a man of 
great knowledg or at least to be a title of honour. All that can be
recorded in writeing are | only facts or reasonings. Facts are of three
sorts
hoiMeerly of Natural agenthsi observable in the ordinary operations
of bodys one upon an other whether in the visible course of things 
left to themselves, or in experiments made by men applying agents
and patients to one an other after a peculiar and artificial manner.
o Of voluntary agents more espetialy the actions of men in Society
which makes civil and moral history.
o Of Opinions. 
(.) In these three consists as it seems to me that which com-
monly has the name of learning. To which perhaps some may adde
a distinct head of Critical writeings which indeed at bottom is noe
thing but matter of fact and resolves it self into this that such a man
or set of men used such a word or phrase in such a sense. i.e. that 
they made such sounds the marks of such Ideas.
(.) Under reasonings I comprehendall the discoverysof general
truths made by humane reason whether found by intuition demon-
 Start of an add. comprising pars. -.  `there is whereby´ (add. p. )
 selves `and´ (il.) by [and] it  opinions of [others] writers  than the
[calling] giveing  to `be´ (il.) a  record[ed]`ed´ (il.)  `whether´ (il.)
 Par.  is preceded by the deleted first words of an abortive par.: [There is indeed]
 of {of}  discoverys [made and set down] of  truths [whether] [bade]
made
 For Locke on the argumentum ad verecundiam, cf. Essay, IV.xvii.: .
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stration or probable deductions.78 And this is that which is if not
alone knowledg (because the truth or probability of particular propo-
sitions may be known to) yet is as may be supposd most properly the
business of those who pretend to improve their understandings and
 make themselves knowing by reading.79
(.) Books and reading are lookd upon to be the great helps
of the understanding and instruments of knowledg, as it | must be 
allowed that they are. And yet I beg leave to question whether these
doe not prove an hindrance to many and keep several bookish men
 from attaining to solid and true knowledg. This I think I may be
permitted to say, that there is noe part where in the understanding
needs a more carefull and wary conduct than in the use of books,
without which they will prove rather innocent amusements than
profitable imployments of our time, and bring but smal additions to
 our knowledg.
(.) There is not seldom to be found even amongst those who
aim hati knowledg who with an unwearied industry imploy their
whole time in books, who scarce allow them selves time to eat or
sleep but read and read, and read on but yet make noe great advances
 in reall knowledg, though there be noe defect in their intellectual
faculties to which their little progress can be imputed. The mistake
here is that it is usualy supposd that by reading the authors knowledg
 or [probability.] probable –  which is [properly cald knowledg viz the per-
ception of the truth or falshood probability or improbability] `if | not alone … by
reading´ (add. cont. on p. )  `as may be supposd´ (il.)  those who [would
make themselves knowing] `pretend to´ (il.)  are [soe]. And – whether
[there be any one thing that [`more´ (il.)] hinders many] `these doe … book-
ish men´ (add. p. )  that [noe thing] there – than [as] profitable
 aim {and} hati (also added in O-)  `reall´ (il.)  knowledg, [which]
though
 This division of ‘general truths’ reflects the taxonomy given in the Essay; Book
IV treats ‘Of Knowledge and Opinion’, and (general) knowledge is intuitive or
demonstrative, ibid. IV.ii.-: -.
 Cf. Essay, IV.ii.: -: ‘These two, (viz.) Intuition and Demonstration,
are the degrees of our Knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these,
with what assurance soever embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, but not
Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. There is, indeed another Perception
of the Mind, employ’d about the particular existence of finite Beings without us;
which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either
of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge.’
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is transfusd into the Readers understanding and soe it is, but not by
bare reading but by reading and understanding what he writ, whereby
I mean not barely comprehending what is affirmd or denied in each
proposition, (though that great readers doe not always think them
selves concerned precisely to doe) but to see and follow the train of 
his reasonings, observe the strength and clearness of their connection
and examin upon what they bottom. without this a man may read
the discourses of a very rational author writ in a language and in
propositions that he very well | understands and yet acquire noe one
jot of his knowledg, which consisting only in the perceived certain 
or probable connection of the Ideas made use of in his reasonings,
the readers knowledg is noe farther increased than he perceives that.
soe much as he sees of this connection soe much he knows of the
truth or probability of that authors opinions. All that he relyes on
without this perception he takes upon trust upon the authors credit 
without any knowledg of it at all. This makes me not at all wonder
to see some men soe abound in citations and build soe much upon
authorities, it being the sole foundation on which they bottom most
of their own tenets, soe that in effect they have but a second hand
or implicit knowledg. i.e. are in the right if such an one from whom 
they borrowed it were in the right in that opinion which they took
from him, which indeed is noe knowledg at all. Writers of this or
former ages may be good witnesses of matters of fact which they
deliver, which we may doe well to take upon their authoritie, but
their credit can goe noe farther than this, it can not at all affect the 
truth and falshood of opinions, which have an other sort of trial
by reason and proof which they themselves made use of to make
themselves knowing and soe must others too that will partake in
their knowledg.80 Indeed tis an advantage that they have been at the
 bare reading [his sense in] but  what `he´ (il.)  see [the connection] `and
| follow the train´ (add. cont. on p. )  author [in a lanhguagei] writ  `as´
(il.)  foundation [of ] `on which they bottom´ (il.)  knowledg [which
m]. i.e.  deliver, [but] which  `doe well to´ (il.)  proof [`and | not
by vote and testimony´ (add. cont. on p. )] which
 Cf. Locke’s Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester, in: W-, IV, p. : ‘In
matters of fact, I own we must govern ourselves by the testimonies of others;
but in matters of speculation, to suppose on, as others have supposed before
us, is supposed by many to be only a way to learned ignorance, which enables
to talk much, and know but little.’
conduct, pars. 56–57 
pains to finde out the proofs and lay them in that order that may
shew the truth or probability of their conclusions, and for this we owe
them great acknowledgments for saveing us the pains in searching
out those proofs which they have collected for us and which possibly
 after all our pains we might not have found nor been able to have set
them in soe good a light as that | which they left them us in. Upon 
this account we are mightily beholding to judicious writers of all
ages for those discoverys and discourses they have left behind them
for our instruction if we know how to make a right use of them;
 which is not to run them over in an hasty perusal and perhaps lodg
their opinions or some remarkable passages in our memorys. but to
enter into their reasonings examin their proofs and then judg of the
truth or falshood probability or improbability of what they advance,
not by any opinion we have enterteind of the Author, but by the
 evidence he produces and the conviction he affords us drawn from
things themselves. Knowing is seeing and if it be soe it is madnesse
to perswade our selves that we doe soe by an other mans eyes let
him use never soe many words to tell us that what he asserts is very
visible, till we our selves see it with our own eyes, and perceive it by
 our own understandings. we are as much in the dark and as void of
knowledg as before let us beleive any learned author as much as we
will.
(.) Euclid and Archimedes are allowed to be knowing, and to
have demonstrated what they say. And yet whoever shall read over
 their writeings without perceiveing the connection of their proofs,
and seeing what they shew though he may understand all their words
yet he is not the more knowing. He may beleive indeed but does not
know what they | say. and soe is not advanced one jot in mathematical 
knowledg by all his reading of those approved Mathematicans.81
 pains [and] to  `out´ (il.)  `which they have collected for | us and´ (il.
cont. on p. )  to {to}  ju`di´cious (il.)  and [inforhmationi] discourses
 make [use] a right –  but to [examihni] enter  proofs and [judg] then
 falshood{.}  themselves [To these we]. Knowing  percieve `it´ (il.)
 understanding.s  `as much´ (il.) – dark [as much] `[& and] and
as void | of knowledg´ (il. cont. on p. )  beleive [him] `any learned author´
(il.)  their [boohksi] writeings  soe [are] `is´ (il.)  all [their] his
 `his´ (il.)  End of add. comprising pars. -.
 Cf. Malebranche, Recherche,Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. I, Ch. i, pp. -: ‘Comme
il ne suffit pas pour être bon Géomètre, de sçavoir par mémoire toutes les
 conduct, par. 58
(.) The Eagernesse and strong bent of the minde after knowledg

(§)Hast
if not warily regulated is often an hindrance to it. It still presses on
to farther discoverys and new objects and catches at the variety ofVariety
knowledg and therefor often stays not long enough on what is before
it to looke into it as it should for hast to pursue what is yet out of 
sight. He that rides post through a country may be able from that
transient view to tell how in general the parts lye and may be able to
give some loose discription of here a mountain and there a plain here
a morasse and there a river, woodland in one part and Savanas in an
other. such superficial Ideas and observations as these he may collect 
in galloping over it. But the more usefull observations of the Soyle
plants, animals and inhabitans with their several sorts and properties
must necessarily scape him and tis seldom men ever discover rich
mines without some diging.82 nature commonly lodges her treasure
and Jewells in rocky ground. If the matter be knotty and the sense 
lyes deep the minde must stop and buckle to it | and stick upon it
with labour and thought and close contemplation. And not leave it
till it has masterd the difficulty and got possession of truth. But here
care must be taken to avoid the other extrem, A man must not stick
at every uselesse nicety and expect mysteries of science in every trivial 
question or scruple that he may raise. He that will stand to pecke83 up
– `and new … of knowledg´ (il.) – that [hasty] `transcient´ (il.)  dis-
cover [the] rich  mines [of treasure] without  diging. [and] nature
 contemplation. [But] And – stick [and] `at´ (il.)
démonstrations d’Euclide, de Pappus, d’Archimede, d’Appolonius, & de tous
ceux qui ont écrit de la Géometrie: Ainsi ce n’est pas assez pour être sçavant
Philosophe d’avoir lû Platon, Aristote, Descartes, & de sçavoir par memoire
tous leurs sentimens sur les questions de Philosophie.’
 Cf. Malebranche, Recherche, Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. I, Ch. v, pp. -: ‘Car de
même qu’il y a autant ou plus de sentiment dans la vûë sensible d’un objet,
que je tiens tout proche de mes yeux & que j’examine avec soin, que dans la
vûë d’une campagne entiére, que je regarde avec négligence & sans attention;
de sorte que la netteté du sentiment que j’ai de l’objet qui est tout proche
de mes yeux, récompense l’étenduë du sentiment confus que j’ai de plusieurs
choses, que je voi sans attention dans une campagne: ainsi la vûë que l’esprit a
d’un seul objet, est quelque-fois si vive & si distincte, qu’elle renferme autant
ou même plus de pensée, que la vûë des rapports qui sont entre plusieurs
choses.’
 ‘to pecke up’ should probable be read here as: ‘to picke up’.
conduct, pars. 58–59 
and examine every peble that comes in his way is as unlikely to
returne inrichd and laden with Jewels as the other that travelled full
speed. Truths are not the better nor the worse for their obviousnesse
or difficultie, but their value is to be measurd by their usefulnesse
 and tendency. Insignificant observations should not take up any of
our minutes and those that inlarge our view and give light towards
farther and usefull discouverys should not be neglected though they
stop our course and spend some of our time in a fixed attention.
(.) There is an other hast that does often and will mislead the 
 minde if it be left to its self and its own conduct. The understanding
is naturally forwards not only to enlarge its knowledg by variety
(which makes it skip over one to get speedily to another part of
knowledg,) but also eager to enlarge its views by running too fast into
general observations and conclusions without a due examination of
 particulars enough whereon to found those general axiomes.84 This
seems to enlarge their stock but tis of phansies not realities, such
Theories built upon narrow foundations stand but weakely and if
they fall not of themselves are at least very hardly to be supported
against the assaults of opposition. And thus men being to hasty to
 erect to them selves general notions and ill grounded theories finde
them selves deceived in their stock of knowledg when they come to
examine their hastily assumed maximes themselves or to have them
attacked by others. General observations drawn from particulars are
the Jewels of knowledg comprehending great store in a little roome.
 But they are therefor to be made with the greater care and caution,
– unlikely to [enrich himself with Jewehlsi] returne  speed. [Observations]
`Truths´ (il.) – up [much] `any´ (il.) of our [time] `minutes´ (il.)  f .a.r.ther
 neglected [what time] though  course [in a long] and .–. There
is an other … between them (add. pp. , ; this add. was written around an
add. to p.  on p.  and around an add. to p.  on p. ; these additions both
belong to par. ; so, par.  postdates par. )  conduct. [It is not only we] The
 also [.] eager  with`ou´t[he] `a due´ (il.)  realities, [and] such
 Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, Bk. I, Aph. xx, Works, I, p. : ‘Eandem
ingreditur viam (priorem scilicet) intellectus sibi permissus, quam facit ex
ordine dialecticæ. Gestit enim mens exilire ad magis generalia, ut acquiescat;
et post parvam moram fastidit experientiam’, and ibid. Bk. I, Aph. xxv, Works,
I, p. : ‘Axiomata quæ in usu sunt ex tenui et manipulari experientia et paucis
particularibus, quæ ut plurimum occurunt, fluxere; et sunt fere ad mensuram
eorum facta et extensa …’
 conduct, pars. 59–60
least if we take counterfeit for true our losse and shame be the greater
when our stock comes to a severe scrutiny. One or two particulars
may suggest hints of enquiry and they doe well who take those hints.
But if they turne them into conclusions and make them | presently
general rules they are forward indeed but it is only to impose on 
themselves by propositions assumed for truths without sufficient
warranty. To make noe observations is as has been already remarked
to make the head a magazin of materials, which can hardly be called
knowledg or at least tis but like a collection of Lumber not reduced
to use or order.85 And he that makes every thing an observation has 
the same useless plenty and much more falshood mixed with it. the
extreams on both sides are to be avoided and he will be able to give
the best account of his studys who keeps his understanding in the
right mean between them.
(.) Whether it be a love of that which brings the first light Anticipation

(§)
and information to their minds and want of vigor and industrie to
enquire, or else that men content them selves with any appearance
of knowledg right or wrong which when they have once got they
will hold fast this is visible that many men give them selves up to
the first anticipations of their mindes and are very tenacious of the 
opinions that first possesse them. They are often as fond of their first
conceptions as of their first borne and will by noe means recede from
the judgment they have once made or any conjecture or | conceit,
which they have once enterteind. This is a fault in the conduct of the
understanding since this firmnesse or rather stifnesse of the minde 
is not from an adherence to truth but a submission to præjudice.
Tis an unreasonable homage paid to prepossession whereby we shew
a reverence not to (what we pretend to seeke), Truth; but what by
hap hazard we chance to light on be it what it will. This is visibly a
præpostrous use of our faculties and is a downright prostituteing of 
 ma`ga´zin (il.)  order. .A .n .d  knowledge [ri] right – `which
when they have once | got they will hold fast´ (il. cont. on p. )  up[t .o]
to – of the [first] opinions – possesse the[[ir]]m [minds and will
not easily] `They [seem] `are often´ (il.) as … means´ (add. p. )  or [which
....] conceit,  enterteind. [This firmnesse of minde.] [`by the .. ... people´
(il.)] This is  Tis [a fondnesse] an  we [pay] `shew´ (il.)  we [should
seek] pretend  is a [kinde] downright
 See above, pars.  and .
conduct, pars. 60–61 
the minde to resigne it thus and put it under power of the first comer.
This can never be allowd or ought to be followed as a right way to
knowledg till the understanding (whose businesse it is to conforme
it self to what it findes in the objects without) can by its owne
 opiniatrity change that and make the unalterable nature of things
comply with its owne hasty determinations which will never be.
What ever we phansy things keepe their course and their habitudes
correspondencies and relations keepe the same to one an other.
(.) Contrary to these but by a like dangerous excesse on the Resignation(§)
 other side are those who always resigne their judgment to the last
man they heard or read. Truth never sinkes into these mens minds
nor gives any tincture to them but camelion like they take the colour
of what is laid before them and as soon loose and resigne it to the next
that happens to come in their way.86 The order where in opinions are
 proposd to or received by us is noe rule of their rectitude nor ought
to be a cause of their preference. First or last in this case is the effect
of chance and not the | measure of truth or falshood. This every one 
must confesse and therefor should in the pursuit of truth keepe his
minde free from the influence of any such accidents. A man may as
 reasonably draw cutts for his tenets and regulate his perswasion by
the cast of a die, as take it up for its noveltie or retein it because it
had his first assent and he was never of an other minde. well weighed
reasons are to determin the judgment. those the minde should be
always ready to hearken and submitt to; and by their testimony and
 suffrage entertein or reject any tenet indifferently whether it be a
perfect stranger or an old acquaintance.
 it [in the] `under´ (il.) – comer [and] `. This´ (add. p. )  to [the
nature.s of things] `what it findes in the objects without´ (il.)  change [them
and bring them to complye] that  the [nature] unalterable  comply [with
its... hasty phansys of the brain.] with – `determinations … one an other´
(add. p. )  their [opinion] judgment  read. [These men [`nev.e.r´ (il.)]
the tincture of truth let into their mindes] Truth  like `they´ (il.)  loose [it
by the intervention] `and´ (add.) resigne  in [things] `opinions´ (il.)  to
[our mindes] or – one [sees] must  from [all] `the´ (il.)  draw
[lots] `cutts´ (add. l. margin)  his [opinions] tenets  and [throu] regulate
 up [or lay it downe] for  because [he has] it  had [its] his  judgment.
[for which the understanding ought always to be ready] those  and [receive
or reject any proposihtioni tenet whether it be] by
 Cf. Education, §, p. : ‘We are all a sort of Camelions, that still take a
Tincture from things near us …’
 conduct, par. 62
(.) Though the faculties of the minde are improved by exercisePractise (§)
yet they must not be put to a stresse beyond their strength. quid
valeant humeri quid ferre recusent87 must be made the measure ofHumeri
every ones undertakeing who has a desire not only to performe
well, but to keepe up the vigor of his faculties and not to bauke88 
his understanding by what is too hard for it. The minde by being
engaged in a taske beyond its strength like the body strained by
lifting at a weight too heavy has | often its force broken and thereby
gets an unaptnesse or an aversion to any vigerous attempt ever after.
a sinew cracked seldom recovers its former strength, or at least the 
tendernesse of the sprain remains a good while after and the memory
of it longer and leaves a lasting caution in the man not to put the part
quickly again to any robust imployment. soe it fares in the minde
once jaded by an attempt above its power, it either is disabled for
the future or else checks at any vigorous undertakeing ever after at 
least is very hardly brought to exert its force again on any subject
that requires thought and meditation, The understanding should be
brought to the difficult and knotty parts of knowledg that trie the
strength of thought and a full bent of the minde by insensible degrees
and in such a gradual proceeding noe thing is to hard for it. Nor let 
it be objected that such a slow progresse will never reach the extent
of some sciences. It is not to be imagind how far constancy will carry
a man. however it is better htoi walke slowly in a rugged way than to
breake a leg and be a cripple. He that begins with the calf may carry
the ox but he that will at first goe to take up an ox may soe disable 
 his [minde] `faculties´ (il.)  by [jadeing of it] `what is | too hard for it´
(add. cont. on p. ; revision made across the divion between quires I and K )
 minde [being] by  taske [to hard it for `it´ (il.)] `beyond its strength´ (il.)
 weight [above its strength] `too heavy´ (il.) [has] (deleted, then undeleted by
underdotting)  Page number  miswritten as .  often [its fohrcei] its
 ever{y}  cracked [.] seldom  tendernesse [and memory] of  remains
[and hinders [it from] the part from being] `a good while | after´ (add. cont. on p.
)  put [[it]] `the | part´ (add. cont. on p. )  the [.] minde  its
[force] `power´ (il.)  least `is´ (il.)  that [..] such  im.a .g.i .nd  man.
[but] however  with [..] the  ox [whilli] may
 Horace, Ars Poetica, II, -: ‘Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam
/ viribus et versate diu, quid ferre, recusent, / quid valeant umeri’, ‘Take a sub-
ject, ye writers, equal to your strength; and ponder long what your shoulders
refuse, and what they are able to bear’, transl. H. Rushton Fairclough.
 ‘to bauke’ = to balk = to hinder (OED a).
conduct, pars. 62–63 
himself as not to be able to lift a calf after that. When the minde by
insensible degrees has brought it self to attention and close thinkeing
it will be able to cope with difficultys and master them without
any prejudice to it self and then it may | goe on roundly, every 
 abstruse probleme every intricate question will not baﬄe discourage
or breake it. But though putteing the minde unprepared upon an
unusuall stresse that may discourage or damp it for the future ought
to be avoided, yet this must not run it by an overgreat shinesse of
difficuhlities into a lazy sauntering about ordinaryand obvious things
 that demand noe thought or application, this debases and enarvates
the understanding makes it weake and unfit for labour. This is a sort
of hovering about the surface of thinhgis without any insight into
them or penetration. and when the minde has been once habituated
to this lazy recumbency and satisfaction on the obvious surface of
 things it is in danger to rest satisfied there and goe noe deeper since
it can not doe it without pains and diging. He that has for some time
accustomed himself to take up with what easily offers it self at first
view has reason to fear he shall never reconcile himself to the fatigue
of turning and tumbling things in his minde to discover their more
 retired and more valuable secrets.
(.) Tis not strange that methods of learning which schollers
have been accustomed to in their begining and entrance upon the
sciences should influence them all their lives and be setled in their
mindes by an over ruleing reverence espetialy if they be such as
 universal use has established. Learners must at first be beleivers and
their masters rules haveing been once made axioms to them tis noe
wonder they should keepe that dignitie, and by the authoritie they
have once got mislead those who thinke it sufficient to excuse them
if they goe out of their way in a well beaten tract. I have copiously(§)
 When [a man] the  No catchword.  breake it. [This though it be soe
yet care must be taken that the avoiding.] But  minde `[...] unprepared´ (il.)
 future [be to] ought  thin{k}hgis – `and when the {the} | minde has
… valuable secrets´ (add. cont. on p. )  once [lazily used to it will seldom
goe deeper] habituated  things [where it accustomed it self ] it  shall [like
the fatigue] never  not [wonderhfuli] `strange´ (il.)  `espetialy´ (il.)
 dignitie, and [be in authoritie] by  who [have been] thinke  have
[ab] copiously
 conduct, par. 63
enough spoken of the abuse of words in an other place89 and thereforWords
shall upon this reflection that the sciences are full of them warne those
that would conduct their understandings right not to take any turne
howso ever authorised by the language of the schools | to stand for
any thing till they have an Idea of it. And A word may be of frequent 
use and great credit with several authors and be by them made use of
as if it stood for some real being, but yet if he that reads cannot frame
any distinct Idea of that being, it is certain to him a mere empty
sound without a meaning, and he learns noe more by all that is said
of it, or attributed to it, than if it were affirmed only of that bare 
empty sound. They who would advance in knowledg and not deceive
and swell them selves with a little articulated air should lay down this
as a fundamental rule, not to take words for things nor suppose that
names in books signifie real entities in nature till they can frame clear
and distinct Ideas of those Entities. It will not perhaps be allowed if I 
should set down substancial formes and Intentional species as such that
may justly be suspected to be of this kind of insignificant termes.90
But this I am sure to one that can forme noe determined Ideas of
what they stand for they signifie noe thing at all, and all that he
thinks he knows about them is to him soe much knowledg about 
noe thing and amounts at most but to a learned ignorance.91 Tis not
without all reason supposed that there are many such empty termes
to be found in some learned writers to which they had recourse
 spoken [in this [tract] `treatise´ (il.)] of the abuse of words `in an other place´
(il.)  upon [the occasion] [the] `this´ (il.)  of it. And [to conclude that
if in several places of different authors where it occurs it has noe perceiveable
distinct meaning it will be fit to conclude there is noe such thing in nature as that
sound pretends to stand for. It will perhaps `not´ (add. r. margin) be allowed if
I should `for such´ (il.). name `substantial´ ( il.) Formes, [Sympathie] Intentional
species and a great many other `terms´ (il.) currant in learned writers] [.f .o.r such]
`A word | may be … from things´ (add. cont. on p. )  without `a´ (il.)
–  deceive [them selves] and  take [names] words  allowed [that]
if  should [m.ehntioni] set  as [termes] `such´ (il.)  and [to him]
all .–. he [has learned about the] thinks [abohuti] he  is [soe
mhuchi] to him soe  `some´ (il.)  writers `to´ (il.)
 See above, par. , note .
 Cf. Essay, III.x.: , where the error of taking words for things is illustrated
in a similar anti-scholastic way by pointing to the terms ‘peripatetick Forms’
and ‘intentional Species’.
 See Nicholas of Cusa (-), De docta ignorantia ().
conduct, pars. 63–64 
to etch out their Systems where understandings could not furnish
them with conceptions from things. But yet I beleive the supposeing
of some realities in nature answering those and the like words have
much perplexd some and quite mislead others in the Study of nature.
 That which in any discourse signifies I know not what92 should be
considerd I know not when. Where men have any conceptions they
can if they are never soe abstruse or abstracted explain them and the
termes they use for them. For our Conceptions being noe thing but
Ideas which are all made up of simple ones, If they cannot give us
 the Ideas their words stand for tis plain they have none. To what
purpose can it be to hunt after his conceptions who has none or
none distinct? He that knew not what he himself meant by a learned
terme cannot make us know any thing by his use of it let us beat our
heads about it never soe long. Whether we are able to comprehend
 all the operations of nature and the manners of them it matters not
to enquire. but this is certain that we can comprehend noe more of
them than we can distinctly conceive and therefor to obtrude termes
where we have noe distinct conceptions as if they did | contein or 
rather conceale some thing is but an artifice of learned vanity to cover
 a defect in an hypothesis or our understandings. Words are not made
to conceale but to declare and shew some thing. Where they are by
those who pretend to instruct otherwise used they conceale indeed
something but that that they conceale is noe thing but the ignorance
error or sophistry of the talker for there is in truth noe thing else
 under them.
(.) That there is constant succession and flux of Ideas in our Wandering(§)
mindes I have observed in the former part of this essay and every one
–  supposeing [ .o .n.e] of  `and the like´ (il.)  the`ir´ – none. [And it
can never be worth while] `To what purpose can it be´ (add., p. )  `meant´
(il.) –  learned [...] terme  by [our] `his´ (il.)  to [conceive]
`comprehend´ (il.)  distinctly [to] conceive  learned [ignorance] `vanity´
(il.) – they [are] `are by those who pretend to instruct´ (add., p. )
– indeed [but it] something  is [in truth] noe – ignorance [or]
error
 Cf. Essay, II.xxiii.: : ‘So that if any one will examine himself concerning
his Notion of pure Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it at
all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities,
which are capable of producing simple Ideas in us …’
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may take notice of it in himself.93 This I suppose may deserve some
part of our care in the conduct of our understandings and I thinke
it may be of great advantage if we can by use get that power over
our mindes as to be able to direct that train of Ideas that soe since
there will new ones perpetualy come into our thoughts by a constant 
succession we may be able by choise soe to direct them that none may
come in view but such as are pertinent to our present enquiry and in
such order as may be most usefull to the discovery we are upon. Or
at least if some foraigne and unsought Ideas will offer themselves that
yet we might be able to reject them and keepe them from takeing off 
our minde from its present pursuit and hinder them from running
away with our thoughts quite from the subject in hand. This is not
I suspect | soe easy to be done as perhaps may be imagined, and yet
for ought I know this may be if not the cheif yet one of the great
differences that carry some men in their reasoning soe far beyond 
others where they seeme to be naturaly of equall parts. A proper and
effectual remedie for this wandering of thought I would be glad to
finde. He that shall propose such an one would doe great service
to the studious and contemplative part of man kinde and perhaps
help unthinkeing men to become thinkeing. I must acknowledg that 
hitherto I have discoverd noe other way to keepe our thoughts close
to their businesse but the endeavouring as much as we can, and by
frequent attention and application geting the habit of attention and
application. He that will observe children will finde that even when
they endeavour their uttermost they cannot keep their minds from 
stragling.94 The way to cure it I am satisfied is not angry chideing
or beating for that presently fils their heads with all the Ideas that
 into [the minde] our  are [usehfuli] pertinent [and usefull] to  that[th]
 mind[[.e.s]].e from [their] its  and [run away] hinder  keepe [them]
(deleted, then undeleted by underdotting) [`it´ (il.)] –  not I [imhaginei] suspect
 perhaps [I] may – yet [perhaps] for  `soe far´ (il.) –  `and
effectual´ (add. p. )  get`ing´ (il.)  endeavour [the contrary] `their ut|
termost they´ (add. cont. on p. ) cannot [be kept] `keep´ (il.) [from stragling]
 Cf. Essay, II.vii.: : ‘For if we look immediately into our selves, and reflect
on what is observable there, we shall find our Ideas always, whilst we are
awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming,
without intermission.’ See also ibid. II.xiv ‘Of Duration, and its simple Modes’,
pp. -.
 Cf. Education, §, pp. -.
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fear dread and confusion can offer to them. To bring back gently
their wandering thoughts by leading them into the path and goeing
befor them in the train they should pursue, without any rebuke or
soe much as takeing notice (when it can be avoided) of their roveing
 I suppose would sooner reconcile and inure them to attention than
all | those rougher methods which more distract their thought and 
hindering the application they would promote introduce a contrary
habit.95
(.) Distinction and Division are (if I mistake not the import Distinctions(§)
 of the words) very different things the one being the perception of a
differance that nature has placed in things the other our makeing a
division where there is yet none.96 At least if I may be permitted to
consider them in this sense I thinke I may say of them, that one of
them is the most necessary and conducive to true knowledg that can
 be. the other when too much made use of serves only to puzzell and
confound the understanding. To observe every the least difference
that is in things argues a quick and clear sight and this keepes the
understanding steady and right in its way to knowledg. But though
it be usefull to discerne every variety is to be found in nature, yet
 it is not convenient to consider every difference that is in things
and divide them into distinct classes under every such difference.
this will run us if followed into particulars (for every individuall
 fear [and] dread  `gently´ (il.) –  into the [track they should goe in]
`path | and [shewing them the way] {and} goeing … pursue,´ (add. cont. on p. )
 avoid.e .d  sooner [bring them] reconcile  all (catchword not repeated on p.
)  promote [confirme th] introduce  other [..] `our´ (il.)  where
[nature has made] `there is yet [...]´ (il.) –  to [use] consider  `when
too much made use of´ (il.)
 Cf. Education, §, p. : ‘gently correct, and weed out any Bad Inclinations,
and settle in him good Habits’.
 This sentence is rather confusing; Locke’s point seems to be that division
concerns ‘the perception of a differance that nature has placed in things’, and
distinction ‘our makeing a division where there is yet none’. Cf. Essay, III.x.:
 about artificial ‘curious Distinctions, and acute Niceties’, and Education,
§, p. : ‘it will be of great use to his [the tutor’s] Pupil to accustome him
to distinguish well, that is, to have distinct Notions, where-ever the Mind can
find any real difference, but as carefully to avoid distinctions in terms, where
he has not distinct and different clear Idea’s’. See also Sanderson, Logicæ artis
compendium, Pt. I, Ch. , p. : ‘Divisio est latioris in angustiora deductio.
Quæ si sit Nominis, Distinctio; si Rei, Divisio magis propriè appellatur.’
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has something that differences it from an other) and we shall be
able to establish noe general truths or else at least shall be apt to
perplex the minde about them. The collection of several things into
several classes gives the minde more general and larger views, but
we must take care to unite them only in that and soe far as | they 
doe agree for soe far they may be united under one consideration.
Entity it self that comprehends all things as general as it is may
afford us clear and rational conceptions. If we would well weigh
and keep in our mindes what it is we are considering that would
best instruct us when we should or should not branch into farther 
distinctions which are to be taken only from a due contemplation
of things to which there is noe thing more opposite than the art
of verbal distinctions made at pleasure in learned and arbitrarily
invented termes to be applyd at a venture without comprehending or
conveying any distinct notions, and soe altogeather fitted to artificial 
talke or empty noise in dispute without any clearing of difficulties,
or advance in knowledg. What soever subject we examin and would
get knowledg in, we should I thinke make as general and as large as
it will bare, nor can there be any danger of this if the Idea of it be
setled and determined, for if that be soe we shall easily distinguish 
it from any other Idea though comprehended under the same name.
For it is to fence against the intanglement of equivocal words and
the great art of Sophistry which lies in them that distinctions have
been multiplied and their use thought soe necessary. But had every
distinct abstract Idea a distinct knowne name there would be little 
need of these multiplied scholastick distinctions, though there would
be never the lesse as much need still of the mindes observeing the
differences that are in things, and discriminateing them thereby one
from an other. Tis not therefor the right way to knowledg to hunt
after and fill the head with aboundance of artificial | and scholastick 
 it [..] from  gives [us] `the minde´ (il.)  them [in] only – considera-
tion. [For] [[e]]Entity  us [from the constitution] when  thing [soe]
`more´ (add.)  than the [artificial and verbal distinctions which consists] art
– `to [artificihali] artificial talke´ (add. cont. on p. )  setled and [clear
and distinct] `determined´ (add. p. )  against the [imposition] intanglement
 `which | lies in them´ (add. cont. on p. )  been [principally made use
of and have been made] `multiplied and their use | thought´ (il. cont. on p. )
 dis[cerneing]`criminateing´ (il.)  there-/by  knowledg to [fill the]
hunt
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distinctions where with learned mens writeing are often filled, and
we sometimes finde what they treat of soe divided and subdivided
that the minde of the most attentive reader looses the sight of it, as it
is more than probable the writer himself did. for in things crumbled
 into dust tis in vain to affect or pretend order, or expect clearnesse.
To avoid confusion by too few or too many divisions is a great skill in
thinkeing as well as writeing which is but the copying our thoughts
but what are the boundarys of the meane between the two vitious
excesses on both hands I thinke is hard to set down in words, Clear
 and distinct Ideas is all that I yet know able to regulate it. But as
to verball distinctions received and applyd to common termes i.e.
equivocal words they are more properly I thinke the businesse of
Criticisme and dictionarys than of real knowledg and Philosophie
since they for the most part only explain the meaning of words and
 give us their several significations. The dexterous management of
termes and being able to Fend and prove with them I know has and
does passe in the world for a great part of learning But it is learning
distinct from knowledg For knowledg consists only in perceiveing
the habitudes and relations of Ideas one to an other which is done
 without words, the intervention of a sound helps noething to it, and
hence we see that there is least use of distinctions where there is
most knowledg I mean in Mathematics where men have determined
Ideas with known names to them and soe there being noe roome
for equivocations there is noe need of distinctions. In argueing the
 opponent uses as comprehensive and equivocal termes as he can to
involve his adversary in the doubtfulnesse of his expressions this is
expected and therefor the answerer on his side makes it his play to
destinguish as much as he can and thinkes he can never doe it too
much, nor can he indeed in that way wherein victory may be had
 without truth and without knowledg. This seems to me to be the
art of disputeing, use your words as captiously as you can in your
–  learned [mens writeings are often filled They] `me|ns writeing … words they´
(add. cont. on p. ; written across the division between quires K and L)  filled
[with], and  of `it´ (il.)  distinctions [affixed] received  knowledg and
[the] Philosophie  `for the most part´ (il.) only [give us] explain  learning
[But where] But  we [finhdi] see  have [clear and distinct] `determined´
(il.)  Ideas [and] with  names [for] `to´ (il.)  `need´ (il.)  can
[by] to  of [..] his  where `in´ (il.)
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argueing on one side, and apply distinctions as much as you can on
the other side to every terme to nonplus your oponent soe that in this
sort of scholarship there being noe bounds set to distinguishing some
men have thought all accutenesse to have | lain in it and therefor
in all they have read or thought on their great businesse has been 
to amuse themselves with distinctions and multiplie to themselves
divisions at least more than the nature of the thing required. There
seems to me as I said to be noe other rule for this but a due and
right consideration of things as they are in them selves.97 He that
has setled in his minde determined Ideas with names affixed to them 
will be able both to discerne their differences one from an other
which is realy distinguishing and where the penury of words affords
not termes answering every distinct Idea will be able to apply proper
distinguishing termes to the comprehensive and equivocal names he
is forced to make use of. This is all the need I know of distinguishing 
termes and in such verbal distinctions each terme of the distinction
joynd to that whose signification it distinguishes is but a new distinct
name for a distinct Idea, where they are soe and men have clear and
distinct conceptions that answer their verbal distinctions they are
right and are pertinent as far as they serve to clear any thing in the 
subject under consideration. And this is that which seems to me
the proper and only measure of distinctions and divisions, which he
that will conduct his understanding right must not look for in the
accutenesse of invention nor the authoritie of writers but will finde
only in the consideration of things themselves whether they are lead 
into it by their owne meditations or the information of books.
(.) An aptnesse to Jumble things together wherein can be
found any likenesse is a fault in the understanding on the other side
which will not faile to mislead it and by thus lumping of thinghsi
 on[e] one  side and [distinguish as much] apply – `on the other side´
(il.)  lain `in it´ (il.) – .h.a.s been to [muhlitiplie to themselves distinctions
and divisions] amuse – There [is] `seems´ (il.) to `me | as I said´ (add. cont.
on p. )  minde [clear `and real´ (il.) Ideas] [true and clear] `determined´
(il.)  able [to [dihscernei] only to dishernei] both – differences [which]
`one from another which´ (add. p. )  termes [which] and  verbal [....]
distinctions  to that [which it] whose  new [...] `distinct´ (il.)  answer
[them] their  must [finde not in the] not  Par. preceded by deleted words
of a new par.: [A lumping of things togeather whherei]
 See above, pars.  and .
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hinder the minde from distinct and accurate conceptions of them.98
To which let me here add an other neare of kin to this at least in(§)
name and that is leting the minde upon the suggestion of any new
notion run immediately after similies to make it the clearer to it self, Similes
 which though it may be a good way and usefull in the explaining our
thoughts to others yet it is by noe means a right method to settle true
notions of any thing in our selves, because similes always faile in some
part and come short of that exactnesse which our conceptions should
have to things if we would thinke aright. This indeed makes men
 plausible talkers for those are always most acceptable in discourse,
who have the way to let in their thoughts in to other menhsimindes
with the greatest ease and facility, whether those thoughts are well
formed and correspond with things matters not, few men care to be
instructed but at an easy rate. They who in their discourse strike the
 phansy and take the hearers conceptions along with them as fast as
their words flow, are the applauded talkers and goe for the only men
of clear thoughts. noe thing contributes soe much to this as similes |
whereby men thinke they themselves understand better because they 
are the better understood.99 But it is one thing to think right and
 an other thing to know the right way to lay our thoughts before
others with advantage and clearnesse be they right or wrong. well
chosen similes metaphors and allegories with method and order doe
 other [something of the same family and that is] neare  minde [run] upon
 simile.s  thinke [righhti  whether [thoughhtsi] those  few [h.....] men
[scarce] care  who[se] `in their´ (il.) – discourse [reach] `strik[[es]]e´
(il.) the phansy and tak[[es]]e  talkers [and] `and | goe for´ (add. cont. on
p. )  similes (catchword not repeated on p. .)  `is´ (il.)  `with
advantage and clearn|esse´ (il. cont. on p. )  allegories [doe this the bhesti]
with .– . `doe this´ (il.)
 Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, Pt. I, Aph. lv, Works, I, p. : ‘Maximum et
velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philosophiam et scientias, illud
est; quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias,
alia ad notandas rerum similitudines. (…) Utrumque autem ingenium facile
labitur in excessum, prensando aut gradus rerum aut umbras.’
 Cf. Essay, IV.xix.:  on enthusiasts: ‘This is the way of talking of these
Men: they are sure, because they are sure: and their Perswasions are right,
only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is strip’d of
the Metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet these
Similes so impose on them, that they serve them for certainty in themselves,
and demonstration to others.’
 conduct, pars. 66–67
this the best of any thing. because being taken from objects already
known and familiar to the understanding they are conceived as fast
as spoken. and the correspondence being concluded the thing they
are brought to explain and elucidate is thought to be understood
too. Thus phansy passes for knowledg, and what is prettily said is 
mistaken for solid. I say not this to decrie | metaphor or with designe
to take away that ornament of speech. my business here is not with
Rhetoricians and Orators but with philosophers and lovers of truth to
whom I would beg leave to give this one rule whereby to trie whether
in the application of their thoughts to any thing for the improvement 
of their knowledg they doe in truth comprehend the matter before
them really such as it is in it self. The way to discover this is to observe
whether in the laying it before themselves or others they make use
only of borrowed representations and Ideas forreigne to the thing
which are applyd to it by way of accomodation as bearing some 
proportion or imagined likeness to the subject under consideration.
Figured and metaphorical expressions doe well to illustrate more
abstruse and unfamiliar Ideas which the minde is not yet throughly
accustomed to, but then they must be made use of to illustrate Ideas
that we already have, not to paint to us those which we yet have not. 
| such borrowed and allusive Ideas may follow reall and solid truth
to set it off when found but must by noe means be set in its place and
taken for it. If all our search has yet reached noe farther than simile
and metaphor we may assure our selves we rather phansy than know
and are not yet penetrated into the inside and reality of the thing 
be it what it will. but content our selves with what our imaginations
not things themselves furnishes us with.
(.) In the whole conduct of the understanding there is noeAssent (§)

thing of more moment than to know when and where and how
 from [things known and] `objects´ (il.) – already [familiarly] known
– `I say not this to decrie | metaphor or … us with´ (add. p. , cont. p.
)  in the [representing it to themselves or] laying  before [others]
themselves – thing [it only] `[..] which are´ (il.)  `throughly´ (il.)
 but [they must .s.e.e .k allusive representations] `then they´ (il.) – not.
[Such borrowed and] | such – `but … us with´ (add.)  with `what´
(il.)  thing [there is noe thing] of
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far to give assent and possibly there is noething harder.100 Tis very
easily said and noe body questions it. That giveing and witholding
our assent and the degrees of it should be regulated by the evidence
which things carry with them and yet we see men are not the better for
 this rule. Some firmly imbrace doctrines upon slight grounds some
upon noe grounds and some contrary to appearance. Some admit of
certainty and are not to be moved in what they hold, others waver
in every thing and there want not those that reject all as uncertain.
What then shall a novice, an enquirer a stranger doe in the case? I
 answer use his eyes, there is a correspondence in things and agreement
and disagreement in Ideas discernable in very different degrees | and 
there are eyes in men to see them if they please, only their eyes may
be dimned or dazeld and the discerneing sight in them impaired or
lost. Interest and passion dazels,101 the custome of argueing on any
 side even against our perswasions dims the understanding and makes
it by degrees loose the facultie of discerneing clearly between truth
and falshood and soe of adhereing to the right side. Tis not safe to
play with error and dresse it up to our selves or others in the shape
– for [it] `this rule´ (il.)  shall a [travellar doe in the case] novice  enquirer
a [traveller doe in] stranger  is [an evidence in things] a correspondence
–  agreement [[ .o.r]]and disagreement  `very´ (il.)  be [dazled or their
phansys] dimned  [sight] (deleted, then undeleted by underdotting) [`faculty´
(il.)]  custom.e – argue[/ing]`in|g on any side even´ (add. cont. on
p. )
 Cf. Essay, IV.xv.: : ‘Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation
of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or
Proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the Mind
gives this sort of Propositions, is called Belief, Assent, or Opinion, which is the
admitting or receiving any Proposition for true, upon Arguments or Proofs
that are found to perswade us to receive it as true, without certain Knowledge
that it is so’ and ibid. IV.xvi.: -: ‘The grounds of Probability, we have
laid down in the foregoing Chapter, as they are the Foundations on which
our Assent is built; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are,
or ought to be regulated : only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds
of Probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on the Mind, which
searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear …’
 Cf. Malebranche, Recherche, Vol. I, Bk. I, Chap. iv, p. : ‘Mais nos inclinations
& nos passions agissent encore tres-fortement sur nous: elles ébloüissent nôtre
esprit par de fausses lueurs, & elles le couvrent, & le remplissent de ténèbres.’
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of truth. The minde by degrees looses its natural relish of real solid
truth is reconciled insensibly to any thing that can but be dressed up
into any faint appearance of it. and if the phansy be allowed the place
of the judgment at first in sport it after wards comes by use to usurp
it, and what is recommended by this flatterer (that studys but to 
please) is received for good. There are soe many ways of fallacie. such
arts of giveing colours appearances and resemblances by this Court
dresser the phansy, that he who is not very wary to admitt noe thing
but truth it self, very carefull not to make his minde subservient to
any thing else cannot but be caught. He that has a minde to beleive 
has half assented already and he that by often argueing against his
owne sense imposes falshoods on others is not far from beleiveing
himself. This takes away the great distance there is betwixt truth and
falshood, it bringhsi them almost to geather and makes it noe great
odds in things that approach soe near which you take. and when 
things are brought to that passe passion or interrest etc easily and
without being perceived, determin which shall be the right. I have (§)
said above that we should keep a perfect Indifferency for all opinions,Indifferency
not wish any of them true or trie to make them appear soe but being
indifferent receive and imbrace them according as Evidence and 
that allone gives the attestation of truth.102 They that doe thus i.e.
keep their mindes indifferent to opinions to be determined only by
evidence, will always finde the understanding has perception enough
to distinguish between evidence or noe evidence, betwixt plain and
doubtfull and if they neither give nor refuse their assent but by that 
–  natural [abhorrence] [`taste [and] for truth´ (il.)] `re|lish of real solid truth
is reconciled `insensibly´ (il.) to … appearence of it.´ (add. cont. on p. ) {of
it} and `if´ (il.)  sport `it´ (il.) – recommended by [this Court dresser
that alway pleases is received for good:] `this flatterer … the right´ (add., p. )
– phansy that [the minde] he who (a) [has a] (b) `is not very wary to admitt noe
|thing but truth it self, very carefull not to make his´ (il.) (c) [minde] (deleted, then
undeleted by underdotting)(d) [to be caught [cannhoti] may easily be deceived ..] (e)
`subservient to any thing else´ (il.) Original text: (a)-(c)-(d); (a)-(c)-(d) deleted; (b)
added; (c) undeleted; (e) added.  is [and should be] betwixt  them [near]
`almost´ (il.)  `.e.t .c´ (il.)  not [tr.] wish  according [to] `as´ (il.)
 allone [recommends them to us as] `gives the attestation of´ (il.)  their
[undherstandingsi] mindes  `neither´ (il.)  refuse [not] their
 See above, par. .
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measure, they will be safe in the opinions they have. which being
perhaps but few this caution will have also this good in it that it
will put them upon considering and teach them the necessity of
examining more than they doe. without which the minde is but a
 receptacle of inconsistencys not the storehouse of truths. They that
doe not keep up this indiffehreincy in themselves for | all but truth 
not supposed but evidenced to themselves, put colourd spectacles
before their eyes and looke on things through false glasses and then
thinke themselves excused in following the false appearances which
 they themselves put upon them. I doe not expect that by this way
the assent should in every one be proportioned to the grounds and
clearnesse where with every truth is capable to be made out, or
that men should be perfectly kept from error. That is more than
human nature can by any means be advanced to. I aime at noe such
 unatteinable priviledg. I am only speaking of what they should doe
who would deale fairly with their owne mindes and make a right
use of their faculties in the pursuit of truth. We faile them a great
deale more than they faile us. Tis mismanagement more than want
of abilities that men have reason to complain of. and which they
 actualy doe complain of in those that differ from them. he that by
an indifferency for all but truth suffers not his assent to goe faster
than his evidence nor beyond it will learne to examin and examin
fairly instead of presumeing, and noe body will be at a losse or in any
danger for want of imbraceing those truths which are necessary in his
 station and circumstances. In any other way but this all the world are
borne to orthodoxie they imbibe at first the allowed opinions of their
country and party and soe never questioning their truth not one of
an hundred ever examines. They are applauded for presumeing they
are in the right. He that considers is a foe to Orthodoxie because
 possibly he may deviate from some of the received doctrines there.
 have. [and] which  this [ .m.e.t .h .o .d] caution – that [that] doe  for |
[but] all  supposed [beforhei] but  excused [by] in  appearances [of
things] which  not [thinke that by] expect  can `b[[e]]y´ (add.) [in any
wa{r}y means be priviledgd form.] [I am] [Tis not that is to be aimed at] any (first
words represent different layers of correction: () be in any wa{r}y; () by any means
be; () by any priviledgd form.) – `and which | they actualy doe [`d s.e.e´
(il.)]complain of in those that differ from them´ (add. cont. on p. ) – `or
in any danger´ (il.)  .i .mbraceing  world [and all in it] are  borne
`to´ (il.)  `never questioning their truth´ (il.)
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And thus men without any industry or acquisition of their own |
inherit local truths (for it is not the same every where) and are inured
to assent without Evidence. This influences farther than is thought.
For what one of an hundred of the zealous bigots in all partys ever
examined the tenets he is soe stiff in? or ever thought it his businesse 
or duty soe to doe?103 It is suspected of Lukewarmnesse to suppose
it necessary and a tendency to Apostacy to goe about it:104 And if a
man can bring his minde once to be positive and feirce for positions
whose evidence he has never once examined and that in matters of
greatest concernement to him, what shall keepe him from this short 
and easy way of being in the right in cases of lesse moment? Thus we
are taught to clothe our mindes as we doe our bodys after the fashon
in vogue and tis accounted phantasticalnesse or some thing worse
not to doe soe. This custome, (which who dares oppose?) makes the
short sighted bigots and the warier scepticks as far as it prevailes and 
those that breake from it are in danger of heresie. for takeing the
whole world how much of it doth Truth and Orthodoxie possesse
togeather, Though tis by the last alone (which has the good luck to
be every where) error and heresye are judgd of. For argument and
Evidence signifie noe thing in the case. And excuse noe where but are 
sure to be borne down in all societies by the infallible Orthodoxie of
the place. Whether this be the way to truth and right assent let the
opinions that take place and prescribe in the several habitable parts
of the Earth declare. I never saw any reason yet why truth might not
– own | [men are borne to] (catchword [men] deleted as well ) `inherit´ (il.)
 stiff in [,]?  doe? [suspected, of ] `It | is suspected of´ (add. cont. on p. )
[Apostacy or at least] Lukewarmnesse  for [tenets] `po|sitions´ (add. cont. on p.
)  are [accusthomedi] taught – fashon [of the place or] in  world
[`togeather´ (il.)] how  tis `by´ (il.)  where) [ .b.y .w.
c .h] error  And
[are] excuse – `but [...] are sure | to be borne downe [everywhere] `in all
societies´ (il.) by the infallible Orhodoxie of the place´ (il. cont. on p. )
 Cf. Essay, IV.xx.: : ‘if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of
the Partisans of most of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning
those Matters they are so zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their
own: much less would he have Reason to think, that they took them upon
the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability’.
 Cf. Locke, ‘Error’, in: King, II, p. : ‘As soon as it is perceived that he quits
the implicit faith, expected though disowned by the Church, his orthodoxy
is presently questioned, and he is marked out for a heretic.’
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be trusted to its own evidence. I am sure if that be not able to support
it there is noe fence against error; and then Truth and falshood are
but names that stand for the same things. Evidence therefor is that
by which alone every man is (and should be taught) to | regulate his 
 assent who is then and then only in the right way when he follows it.
(.) Men deficient in knowledg are usualy in one of these three
states either wholy ignorant: or as doubting of some proposition they
have either imbraced formerly, or at present are inclined to: or lastly
they doe with assurance hold and professe without ever haveing
 examined and being convinced by well grounded arguments. The
first of these are in the best state of the three by haveing their mindes
yet in their perfect freedom and indifferency the likelier to pursue
truth the better, haveing noe bias yet clapd on to mislead them. For(§)
ignorance with an indifferency for truth is nearer to it, than opinion Indifferency
 with ungrounded inclination which is the great source of Error. And
they are more in danger to goe out of the way who are marching
under the conduct of a guide that tis an hundred to one will mislead
them, than he that has not yet taken a step and is likelyer to be
prevaild on to enquire after the right way. The last of the three sorts
 are in the worst condition of all. For if a man can be perswaded
and fully assured of any thing for a truth without haveing examined,
what is there that he may not imbrace for truth? and if he has given
himself up to beleive a lie what means is there left to recover one
who can be assured without examining? To the other two This I
 crave leave to say. That | as he that is ignorant is in the best state 
of the two, soe he should pursue truth in a method suitable to that
state. i.e. by enquiring directly into the nature of the thing it self
without mindeing the opinions of others or troubleing himself with
their questions or disputes about it but to see what he himself can
 sincerely searching after truth finde out. He that proceeds upon others
 sure if [it cannot may not] that  error; [and Truth] `and then Truth´ (add. p.
) – things. [This therefor alone ought to] `Evidence therefor … taught)
to´ (add. p. )  therefor [alone] is  regulate [our assent] [every mans]
`his´ (il.)  Par.  is preceded by the deleted start of a new par.: [I have said
above p. [.]  that] the marginal entry that accompanies this abortive par. is not
deleted: \¶ðÛłåØî. Par.  itself starts with a deleted marginal entry: [Questions]
 knowledg [may be considerd] are – lastly [that] they  by [being yet]
haveing  `clapd on´ (il.)  ignorance [ .o.f] with  `after´ (il.)  and
[when] if  is [fully] ignorant  `after´ (il.)
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principles in his enquiry into any sciences though he be resolved to
examin them and judg of them freely, does yet at least put himself
on that side and post himself in a party which he will not quit till
he be beaten out. by which the minde is insensibly engaged to make
what defence it can and soe is unawares biassed. I doe not say but a 
man should embrace some opinion when he has examined, else he
examines to noe purpose, But the surest and safest way is to have
noe opinion at all till he has examined and that without any the least
regard to the opinions or Systems of other men about it. For example
were it my Businesse to understand physick would not the safer and 
readier way be to consult nature her self | and informe my self in
the history of diseases and their cures than espouseing the principles
of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists105 engage in all the
disputes concerning either of those systemes and suppose it true till I
have tried what they can say to beat me out of it. Or supposeing that 
Hippocrates or any other booke infallibly conteines the whole art of
physick would not the direct way be to study read and consider that
booke weigh and compare the parts of it to finde the truth rather than
espouse the doctrines of any party who though they acknowledg his
authority have already interpreted and wiredrawn all his text to their 
owne sense the tincture whereof when I have imbibed I am more
in danger to misunderstand his true meaning than if I had come
to him with a minde unprepossessed by doctors and commentators
 principles in [any science] his  way [t.ill] is  it. [Religion every mans
businesse gives us.] For  understand [Aristotles Philosophie aright, would it
not be the natural and Genuin way to begin with reading what he himself writt]
physick  Chymists [examhinei] engage  and [trye what] suppose  it.
[Espetihallyi] Or  `infallibly´ (il.)  wire-/drawn  `when´ (il.) I have
imbibed [and] `I am | more´ (add. cont. on p. ) [therefor]
 Locke here mentions three schools of medicine: the dogmatists were followers
of Hippocrates (c.  BC—c.  BC); the Methodical School was possibly
founded by Themison of Laodicea (fl. st century BC), who himself was a
pupil of Asclepiades of Bithynia ( BC—st century BC); and the main
inspirator of the chymists was Paracelsus (see above, par. , note . For
more on dogmatists and methodists see Phillips, Greek Medicine, pp. -;
for chymists see Debus, The Chemical Philosophy, passim.
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of my sect, whose reasonings interpretation and language which I
have been used to will of course make all chime that way and make
another and perhaps the genuine meaning of the author seeme harsh
straind and uncouth to me. For words haveing naturaly none of their
 owne cary that signification to the hearer that he is used to put upon
them what ever be the sense of him that uses them. This I thinke is
visibly soe and if it be, he that begins to have any doubt of any of his
tenets which he received without examination ought as much as he
can to put himself wholy into this state of ignorance in reference to
 that question and throwing wholy by all his former notions and the
opinions of others examin with a perfect indifferency the question
in its source without an inclination to either side, or any regard to
his or others unexamined opinions. This I owne is noe easy thing to
doe, But I am not enquiring the easy way to opinion but the right
 way to truth which they must follow | who will deale fairly with their 
own understandings and their own soules.
(.) The indifferency that I here propose will also enable them Question(§)
to state the Question right which they are in doubt about without
which they can never come to a fair and clear decision of it.
 (.) Another fruit from this indifferency and the considering Persivereance(§)
things in themselves abstract from our owneopinions and other mens
notions and discourses on them will be that each man will pursue his
thoughts in that method which will be most agreeable to the nature
of the thing and to his apprehension of what it suggests to him.106
 in which he ought to proceed with regularity and constancy untill he
come to a well grounded resolution wherein he may acquiesce. If it
– my sect, [whose language [and] reasonings `and interpretations´ (il.) I haveing
been used to will of course make that of the country appear to me more harsh
straind and uncouth] [`or questions re|lateing there unto´ (il. cont. on p. )]
`whose reasonings … uses them´ (add. p. )  reasonings [language and]
interpretation – `which´ (il.) I have[ing]  signification [every one] `to
the hearer that he´ (il.)  doubt [in] of  tenets [ought as .mhuchi] which
 side, [but that which to] or  others [opinions] unexamined  follo .w
– their [ .u .nhderstandingsi] own  propose [is that too that] will `also´ (il.)
 indifferency [is the] and – considering [thin[[k]]gs] things  that
[we] each  that [searhchi] method
 On the dependance of method on the kind of object under investigation, see
Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
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be objected that this will require every man to be a schollar and to
quit all his other businesse and betake him self wholy to study. I
answer. I propose noe more to any one than he has time for. Some
mens state and condition requires noe great extent of knowledg.
The necessary provision for life swallows the greatest part of their 
time But one mans want of leisure is noe excuse for the oscitancy
and ignorance of those who have time to spare. And every one has
enough to get as much knowledg as is required and expected of him,
and he that does not that is in love with ignorance and is accountable
for it. 
(.) The variety of distempers in mens minds is as great as ofPresumption (§)
those in their bodys some are epidemic few scape them and every one
too if he would looke into himself would finde some defect of his par-
ticular Genius. There is scarce any one without some idyosyncrasie
that he suffers by. This man presumes upon his parts that they will 
not faile him at time of need and soe | thinks it superfluous labour
to make any provision befor hand. His understanding is to him like
Fortunatus’s purse107 which is always to furnish him without ever
puteing any thing into it before hand. And soe he sits still satisfied,
without endeavouring to store his understanding with knowledg. Tis 
the Spontaneous product of the country and what need of labour in
tillage? Such men may spread their native riches before the ignorant
But they were best not come to stresse and triall with the skilfull.
We are borne ignorant of every thing. The superficies of things that
surround them make impressions on the negligent but noe body 
penetrates into the inside without labour attention and Industry.
Stones and timber grow of them selves but yet there is noe uniforme
pile with symmetry and convenience to lodg in whithout toile and
pains. God has made the intellectual world harmonious and beau-
tifull without us but it will never come into our heads all at once. 
we must bring it home peice meale and there set it up by our owne
 `that´ (add. p. )  require [`th´ (il.)] every  `all´ (il.)  provision[s]
 him [and] at  `is to him´ (il.)  Fortunatus’s [p..] purse  which
`is´ (il.)  furnish{es}  to [furnish] `store´ (il.)  tillage? [.] Such
 with the [kn.] skilfull – `that surround them´ (il.) – Industry
[Labohuri]. Stones  whith`out´ (il.)  home [peace] peice
 Fortunatus: a hero of mediaeval legend, derived from Eastern sources, who
possessed an inexhaustible purse or wishing-capability.
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industry or else we shall have noe thing but darknesse and a Chaos
within what ever order and light there be in things without us.
(.) On the other side there are others that depresse their owne Despondency(§)
mindes despond at the first difficulty and conclude that the geting an
 insight in any of the sciences or makehingi any progresse in knowledg
farther then serves their ordinary businesse is above their Capacities,
These sit still because they thinke they have not legs to goe, as the
others I last mentioned doe because they thinke they have winges
to flie and can soare on high when they please. To these latter one
 may for answer apply the proverb Use legs and have legs. Noe body
knows what strenght of parts he has till he has tried them. And of
the understanding one may most | truly say That its force is greater 
generaly than it thinks till it is put to it. viresque acquirit eundo.108
(.) And therefor the proper remedie here is but to set the minde 
 to worke and apply the thoughts vigorously to the businesse for it
holds in the struggles of the minde as in those of warr dum putant se
vincere vicere109 a perswasion that we shall overcome any difficultys
that we | meet with in the sciences seldom failes to carry us through 
them. Noe body knows the strength of his minde and the force of
 steady and regular application till he has tried. This is certain he that
sets out upon weake legs, will not only goe farther but grow stronger
too than one who with a vigerous constitution and firme limbs only
sits still.
(.) Something of kin to this men may observe in them selves
 when the mind frights it self (as it often does) with any thing reflected
on in grosse and transiently viewd confusedly and at a distance,
Things thus offerd to the mind carry the shew of noe thing but
 that [despond of their owne] depresse – the [lookeing into] `get|ing an
insight in´ (add. cont. on p. )  in [knowledg] knowledg  [[[&]]A] And
therefor  businesse [for it holds] for  we [may w] {v} shall  and
[athletick] `firme´ (il.)  may [often] observe
 Virgil, Æneas, iv.-: ‘mobilitate viget viresque adquirit eundo; / parva
metu primo, mox sese attollit in auras’, ‘Speed lends her strength, and she
wins vigour as she goes; small at first through fear, soon she mounts up to
heaven’, transl. H. Rushton Fairclough.
 Livy, Historiarum Libri, Vol. I, Bk. II, Ch. , ‘believing themselves to be
conquering, they conquered’, transl. B.O. Forster. Locke’s own edition (Ley-
den, ; see Harrison/Laslett, nr. , p. ) gives: ‘Impetu facto, dum se
putant vincere, vicere’.
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difficulty in them and are thought to be wrapd up in impenetrable
obscurity But the truth is these are noe thing but specters that the
understanding raises to it self to flatter its own lazynesse, it sees
noe thing distinctly in things remote and in an huddle and therefor
concludes too faintly that there is noe thing more clear to be discoverd 
in them. Tis but to approach nearer and that mist of our own raiseing
that inveloped them will remove and those that in that mist appeard
hideous giants not to be grappled with will be found to be of the
ordinary and naturall size and shape. Things that in a remote and
confused view seem very obscure must be aproached by gently and 
regular steps and what is most visible easy and obvious in them first
considerd. reduce them into their distinct parts and then in their
due order bring all that should | be known concerning every one
of those parts into plain and simple questionhsi and then what was
thought obscure perplexd and too hard for our weak parts will lay it 
self open to the understanding in a fair view and let the minde into
that which before it was awed with and kept at a distance from as
wholy mysterious. I appeale to my readers Experience whether this
has never happend to him espetialy when busy on one thing he has
occasionaly reflected on another. I aske him Whether he has never 
thus been scared with a suddain opinion of mighty difficulties which
yet have vanished when he has seriously and methodicaly applied
himself to the consideration of this seeming terrible subject and there
has been noe other matter of astonishment left but that he amused
himself with soe discourageing a prospect of his owne raiseing about 
a matter which in the handleing was found to have noe thing in it
more strange nor intricate than several other things which he had
long since and with ease masterd. This experience should teach us
how to deale with such Bug bears an other time which should rather
serve to excite our vigor than enervate our industry. The surest | 
way for a learner in this as in all other cases is not to advance by
 `to be´ (il.) – raiseing [will disappear] `that inveloped them will remove´
(il.) – `in that mist´ (il.) appeard `[in that mist] hideous´ (il.) – shape.
[Let them be taken into consideration by regular steps] `Things that … first
considered´ (add. ) – what [appeard] `was thought´ (il.)  and
[mysterious] `too hard for our weak parts´ (il.)  `and kept at a distance from´
(il.)  but [of wonder] that  soe [terrhifyingi] discourageing  handleing
[had] was  with [the] `such´ (il.)  time [and] `which should´ (il.)
 than [abate] enervate
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jumps and large strides. let that which he sets himself to learn next be
indeed the next i:e: as nearly conjoynd with what he knows already
as is possible. let it be distinct but not remote from it. Let it be
new and what he did not know before, that the understanding may
 advance. but let it be as little at once as may be, that its advances
may be clear and sure. All the ground that it gets this way it will
hold. This distinct gradual growth in knowledg is firme and sure, it
carys ihtis own light with it in every step of its progression in an easy
and orderly train than which there is noe thing of more use to the
 Understanding. And though this perhaps may seem a very slow and
lingering way to knowledg yet I dare confidently affirm that whoever
will trye it in himself or any one he will teach shall finde the advances
greater in this method than they would in the same space of time
hhavei been in any other he could have taken. The greatest part of
 true knowledg lies in a distinct perception of things in them selves
distinct. And some men give more clear light and knowledg by the
bare distinct stateing of a question than others by talkeing of it in
gross whole hours togeather. In this they who soe state a question
doe noe more but seperate and disintangle the parts of it one from
 an other, and lay them when soe disintangled in their due order.
This often without any more adoe resolves the doubt and shews
the minde where the truth lies. The agreement or disagreement of
the Ideas in | question when they are once seperated and distinctly 
considerd is in many cases presently perceived and thereby clear and
 lasting knowledg gaind, where as things in gross taken up togeather
and soe lyeing togeather in confusion can produce in the minde
but a confused which in effect is noe knowledg or at least when it
comes to be examined and made use of will prove little better than
none. I therefor take the liberty to repeat here again what I have said
 else where110 That in learning any thing as little should be proposed
 before, [but let] that  this [ .m.a.y] perhaps  hhavei (also added in O- )
– of [.a.lhli] true  `clear´ (il.)  `thereby´ (il.) clear [knohwledgei] and
– togeather [conteining t] and
 See pars.  and ; see also Education, §, p. : ‘Give them first one simple
Idea, and see that they take it right, and perfectly comprehend it before you
go any farther, and then add some other simple Idea which lies next in your
way to what you aim at, and so proceeding by gentle and insensible steps,
Children without Confusion and Amazement, will have their Understanding
opened, and their Thoughts extended farther, then could have been expected.’
 conduct, pars. 74–76
at once to the mind as is possible and that being understood and
fully masterd to proceed to the next adjoyning part yet unknown
simple unperplexd proposition belonging to the matter in hand, and
tending to the clearing what is principally designed.
(.) Analogie is of great use to the minde in many cases espetialy Analogie

(§)
in natural philosophie and that part of it cheifly which consists in
happy and succesfull experiments.111 But here we must take care
that we keep our selves within that wherein the analogie consists. For
example The acid oyle of Vitriol is found to be good in such a case
therefor the Spirit of Niter or Vinegar may be used in the like case. 
If the good effect of it be oweing wholy to the acidity of it the trial
may be justified, but if there be some thing else besides the acidity in
the oyle of vitriol which produces the good we desire in the case, we
mistake that for analogie which is not, and suffer our understanding
to be misguided by a wrong supposition of analogie where there is 
none.
(.) Though I have in the d book of My Essay concerningAssociation

(§)
humane understanding treated of the Association of Ideas yet haveing
donne it there historicaly as giveing a view of the understanding
in this as well as its several other ways of operateing rather than 
designeing there to enquire into the remedies ought to be applied
to it, It will under this later consideration afford other matter of
thought to those who have a minde to instruct them selves throughly
in the right way of conducting their understandings and that the
rather because this if I mistake not is as frequent a cause of mistake 
and error in us as perhaps | any thing else that can be named, and is
a disease of the mind as hard to be cured as any.112 It being a very
hard thing to convince any one that things are not soe, and naturaly
soe as they constantly appear to him.
 in [natural] many  philosophie  acid [spirit] oyle  `wholy´ (il.)
 there [rather] historicaly  giveing [an account of the way of operation] a
view
 Cf. Essay, IV.xvi.: : ‘In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the
great Rule of Probability’ (header of section); ibid. IV.iii.: -; and ibid.
IV.viii.: .
 For Locke on the importance of wrong association as a cause of error see
Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §. For the relation between the ‘Conduct-part’ on
association and the ‘Essay-part’ on the same subject, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Text’,
§ ().
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(.) By this one easy and unheeded miscariage of the under-
standing sandie and loose foundations | become infallible principles 
and will not suffer them selves to be touchd or questiond. Such un-
natural connections become by custom as natural to the minde, as
 sun and light, fire and warmth goe togeather and soe seem to carry
with them as natural an evidence as self evident truths themselves.
And where then shall one with hopes of successe begin the cure?
Many men firmly embrace falshood for truth not only because they
never thought otherwise but also because thus blinded as they have
 been from the beginning they never could think otherwise, at least
without a vigor of minde able to contest the empire of habit, and
looke into its own principles, a freedom which few men have the no-
tion of in them selves and fewer are allowed the practise of by others.
It being the great art and businesse of the teachers and Guides in
 most sects to suppresse as much as they can this fundamentall duty
which every man owes him self and is the first steady step towards
right and truth in the whole train of his actions and opinions. | This 
would give one reason to suspect that such teachers are conscious to
them selves of the falshood or weaknesse of the Tenets they professe
 | since they will not suffer the grounds where on they are built to be 
examined, when as those who seek truth only and desire to own and
 become infallible principles … Text from this point on p.  of MS e. onwards
was copied by William Shaw (see ill. ) and runs up to and including p.  (par. 
of the present edition). This text has corrections in Locke’s hand. There is an earlier
version of this text, entirely in Locke’s own hand, on pp. - of the same MS. At least
part of Shaw’s copy is not directly from Locke’s text on pp. -, but from yet another
version that is now lost. The copy-text for pars. - is on pp. -. However, the last
sentence of par.  is absent in Locke’s holograph and has been taken from Shaw’s copy.
Also, in the case of substantive differences (i.e. differences in wording), preference is in
most cases given to Shaw’s copy over Locke’s holograph. Cases of substantive differences
between Locke’s holograph and Shaw’s copy are registered in this annotation, below.
See also Gen. Introd.: ‘Text’, §.  become [ .p.r.i .n.c.i .p..] infallible  become [as]
by  natural `to´ (add.) [`....´ (il.)] the  `go|e togeather´ (add. cont. on p.
)  to [have] carry  cure Locke’s holograph; Shaw’s copy, p. , gives: cures
 `firmly´ (il.)  to [to] contest  of by Shaw’s copy, p. ; Locke’s holograph
gives: of it by  art and [businesse] `busi|nesse of the teachers and Guides´ (add.
cont. on p. )  most Shaw’s copy, p. ; Locke’s holograph gives: all erroneous
 `as much as they can this´ (il.) –  duty [which every] which [is .y.
e] every
 `steady´ (il.) .–. This would … and allow. (Shaw’s copy, fails in
Locke’s holograph)  No catchword.  `examined´ (probably inserted in space
that at first was left blank)
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propagate noe thing else freely expose their principles to the test, are
pleased to have them examined, give men leave to reject them if they
can and if there be any thing weak and unsound in them are willing
to have it detected that they them selves as well as others may not lay
any stress upon any received proposition beyond what the evidence 
of its truth will warrant and allow.
(.) There is I know a great talke amongst | all sorts of people

of principleing their children and Schollers well, which at last when
lookd into amounts to noe more but makeing them imbibbe their
teachers notions and tenets by an implicit faith, and firmly to adhere 
to them whither true or false. What colours may be given to this or of
what use it may be when practised upon the vulgar destined to labour
and given up to the service of their bellys, I will not here enquire. But
as to the ingenuous part of man kinde whose condition allows them
leisure and letters and enquiry after truth, I can see noe other right 
way of principleing them but to take heed as much as may be that in
their tender years Ideas that have noe natural cohesion come not to
be united in their heads and that this rule be often inculcated to them
to be their guide in the whole course of their lives and studys viz That
they never suffer any Ideas to be joynd in their understandings in 
any other or stronger combination than what their own nature and
correspondence give them. And that they often examin those that
they finde linked togeather in their minds. whether this assotiation
of Ideas be from the visible agreement that is in the Ideas them selves
or from the habitual and prevaileing custom of the minde joyning 
them thus togeather in thinking.
(.) This is for caution against this evil | before it be throughly
rivited by custom in the understanding, but he that would cure it
when habit has establishd it, must nicely observe the very quick and
 else [truly] `freely´ (add. p. , in Locke’s hand )  `and´ (add. in Locke’s hand )
 `unsound´ (add. in Locke’s hand )  dete`cted´ (il. in Locke’s hand)  `stress´
(il. in Locke’s hand ) – `received proposition | beyond … and allow´ (add.
cont. on p. , in Locke’s hand )  Th[[is]]ere `is´ (il.)  talke Locke’s holograph;
Shaw’s copy, p. , gives: faulte – their [notions] teachers  may be
given to this Shaw’s copy, p. ; Locke’s holograph gives: this may bear  vulgar
[designed] destined  years [that] Ideas [are not unitehdi] that – in [a
stronger combihnationi] any  from [ .o .w .nhei] the – in th[[...]]e [`Ideas
them selves´ (add. p. )] Ideas them selves or from [their owne custom of joyning
them togeather in thinking] the  in the [minde] `understanding´ (il.)
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almost imperceptible motions of the minde in its habitual actions.113
what I have said in an other place about the change of the Ideas of
sense into those of judgment may be a proof of this.114 let any one
not skild in painting be told when he sees bottles and tobaco pipes
 and other things soe painted, as they are in some places shown that
he does not see protuberancys and you will not convince him but by
the touch he will not beleive that by an instantaneous legerdemain of
his own thoughts one Idea is substituted for the other. How frequent
instances may one meet with of this in the argueings of the learned
 who not seldom, in two Ideas that they have been accustomed to joyn
in their mindes, substitute one for the other and I am apt to think
often without perceiveing it them selves. This whilst they are under
the deceit of it makes them uncapeable of conviction. And they
applaud themselves as zealous Champions for truth when indeed
 they are contending for Error. And the confusion of two different
Ideas which a customary connection of them in their mindes hath
made to them almost one fills their heads with false views and their
reasonings with false consequences.




 ence to truth and that in the perception of the visible or probable
agreement or disagreement of Ideas as they are affirmed or denyd
one of an other. From whence it is evident that the right use and
conduct of the understanding whose business is puerly truth and
noe thing else, is that the mind should be kept in a perfect indif-
 of [sensible Ideas into t] the Ideas  a proof Locke’s holograph; Shaw’s copy, p.
, gives: proof  told [that] when – sees [a globe or a bunch of grapes
well painted] `.. | bottles and pipes and [such] other things `soe´ (il.) painted as
they were shewn [.a.t] in Holborn´ Add. cont. on p. ; Shaw’s copy, p. , gives
tobaco pipes where Locke’s holograph gives pipes and Shaw’s copy, p. , gives are
in some places shown where Locke’s holograph gives were shewn in [.a.t] Holborn
– `of his own thoughts´ (il.)  is [a consequence and] substituted  for
[an] Error  `different´ (il.)  made to them Shaw’s copy, p. ; Locke’s
holograph gives: `to them´ (il.) made  one [with them] fills  an other.
[In this resp.ehcti] From
 For this mechanical explanation for the acquisition of habits and customs in
general, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 A reference to ‘Molyneux’s problem’; see Essay, II.ix.-: -: ‘Ideas of
Sensation often changed by the Judgment ’ (marginal heading).
 For a comparison of Locke’s discussion of fallacies with the same subject in
Aristotelian works on logic, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
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ferency not inclineing to either side any farther than evidence setles
it by knowledg or the overbalance of Probability gives it the turn of
assent and beleif. But yet it is very hard to meet with any discourse
where in one may not perceive the author not only maintain (for
that is reasonable and fit) but inclined and biassed to one side of 
the question with marks of a desire that that should be true. If
it be asked me how Authors who have such a bias and lean to it
may be discovered. I answer by observeing how in their writeings
or argueings they are often lead by their inclinations to change the
Ideas of the question either by changeing the termes or by addeing 
and joyning others to them, where by the Ideas under consideration
are soe varied as to be more serviceable to their purpose and to be
thereby brought to an easier and nearer agreement or more visible
and remoter disagreement one with an other. This is plain and direct
Sophistry. But I am far from thinking that wherever it is found, it 
is made | use of with designe to deceive and mislead the readers. It
is visible that mens prejudices and inclinations by this way impose
often upon them selves. And their affection for truth under their
prepossession in favour of one side is the very thing that leads them
from it. Inclination suggests and slides into their discourse favourable 
termes which introduce favourable Ideas till at last by this means
that is concluded clear and evident thus dressed up which taken
in its native state by makeing use of none but precise determind
Ideas would find noe admittance at all. The puting those glosses
on what they affirme, these as they are thought handsome easy and 
gracefull explications of what they are discourseing on is soe much
the Character of what is called and esteemd writeing well that it is
very hard to think that authors will ever be perswaded to leave what
serves soe well to propagate their opinions and procure them selves
credit in the world, for a more jejune and drie way of writeing by 
 evidence [or the greater probability determins] `setles´ (il.) – knowledg
or [gains assent and beleif ] [`the greater probability´ (il.)] `the | overbalance …
beleif´ (add. cont. on p. )  to [read] meet – how [this shall be known]
`Authors … discovered.´ (add. p. )  `are´ (il.)  question [[and]]either
 other. [I ... am far from thinkhingi] This – found, it `is´ (il.)  to
[mislheadi] deceive  mens [prepossessions] `prejudices´ (add. p. )  their
[zeale] `affection´ (il.)  side [misleads] `is the very thing that leads´ (add. p.
)  but [the] precise  Ideas [in question] would  `as they are
thought´ (il.)  `easy´ (il.)  `selves´ (il.)
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keeping to the same termes precisely annexd to the same Ideas, a
sower and blunt stifness tolerable in mathematicians only, who force
their way and make truth prevail by irresistable demonstration.
(.) But yet if Authors can not be prevailed with to quit the
 looser though more insinuateing ways of writeing if they will not
think fit to keep close to truth and instruction by unvaried termes
and plain unsophisticated arguments, yet it concerns readers not htoi
be imposed on by fallacies and the prevailing ways of insinuation.
To doe this the surest and most effectual remedye: is to fix in the
 minde the clear and destinct Ideas of the question | stripped of words 
and soe likewise in the train of argumentation to take up the authers
Ideas neglecting his words observeing how they connect or separate
those in the question. He that does this will be able to cast off all that
is superfluous: He will see what is pertinent what coherent, what is
 direct to, what slides by the question. This will readily shew him all
the forain Ideas in the discourse and where they were brought in,
and though they perhaps dazled the writer yet he will perceive that
they give noe light nor strength to his reasonings.
(.) This though it be the shortest and easiest way of reading
 books with profit and keeping ones self from being mislead by great
names or plausible discourses, yet it being hard and tedious to those
who have not accustomed them selves to it, it is not to be expected
that every one (amongst those few who realy pursue truth) should
this way guard his understanding from being imposed on by the
 wilfull or at least undesigned Sophistrie which creeps into most of
the books of argument. They that write against their conviction or
that next to them are resolvd to maintain the tenents of a party they
are engaged in can not be supposed to reject any arms that may
help to defend their cause and therefor such should be read with the
 greatest caution. And they who write for opinions they are sincerely
 blunt [way] [of writeing] [`..... ..... .d.i.s.c .o .u.r.s´ (il.)] `stifness´ (add. p. )
 tolerable [only] in  and [establish truth] make  if [`it´ (il.) cannot
be hoped that] Authors  can [should] `not´ (il.) – quit the [the..
insihnuateingi] looser  by [plain] unvaried  plain [ .u .n.a .d .o.r .n .d] `unso-
phisticated´ (il.)  concerns [those] readers [who would] not  htoi (also
added in O- )  question [and]  like-/-wise  argumention `to´
(il.)  discourse `and´ (il.)  `he will perceive that´ (il.)  or [.s .k.i.l.f .u.l.l]
plausible  `ac´-/[..........]`customed´ – `they | are engaged in´ (il. cont.
on p. )
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perswaded of, and beleive to be true, think they may soe far allow
themselves to indulge their laudable affection to truth as to permit
their esteem of it to give it the best colours and set it off with the
best expressions and dress they | can. there by to gain it the easiest
enterance in to the minds of their readers and fix it deepest there. 
(.) One of those being the state of mind we may justly suppose
most writers to be in tis fit their readers who apply to them for
instruction should not lay by that caution which becomes a sincere
pursuit of truth and should make them always watchfull against what
ever might conceale or misrepresent it. If they have not the skil of 
representing to them selves the authors sense by pure Ideas seperated
from sounds and thereby divested of the false lights and deceitfull
ornaments of speech this yet they should doe, they should keep the
precise question steadily in their minds. carry it along with them
through the whole discourse and suffer not the least alteration in 
the termes either by addition substraction or substituteing any other.
This every one can doe who has a mind to it. And he that has not
a mind to it, tis plain makes his understanding only the warehouse
of other mens lumber I mean false and unconcludeing reasonings
rather than a repository of truth for his own use which will prove 
substantiall and stand him in stead when he has occasion for it. And
whether such an one deals fairly by his own mind and conducts his
own understanding right I leave to his own understanding to judg.
(.) The mind of man being very narrow and soe slow in
Fundamental
verities (§)
making acquaintance with things | and takeing in new truths that 
noe one man is capable in a much longer life than ours to know
all truths, it becomes our prudence in our search after knowledg
to imploy our thoughts about fundamental and material questions
carefully avoiding those that are trifleing and not suffering our selves
to be diverted from our main even purpose by those that are merely 
 give [to] it  can [and] `there by to´ (il.) – easiest [interest and .....
possession in the minds of their readers] enterance  `of mind´ (il.)  be in
[when treating of any subject] tis  becomes [th.ose] a  `pure´ (il.)  Ideas
[divested of the false lights and ornaments .d.i .v.e.s.t .e .d of sounds] seperated  lights
[.] and – them [.i .n] through  it, [....] tis  only the [repository]
warehouse  than [.......... a storehouse of truth] a repository  substantiall
and [usefull] stand  has [use of ] `occasion for´ (il.)  and [far from
being capable to know all things even] soe  mak[[.]]`ing´ (il. in diff. ink)
 trifleing [.] and
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incidentall. How much of many yonge mens time is thrown away
in purely logical enquirys I need not mention. This is noe better
than if a man who was to be a painter should spend all his time
in examining the threads of the several clothes he is to paint upon,
 and counting the hairs of each pencil and brush he intends to use in
the laying on of his colours: Nay it is much worse than for a yonge
painter to spend his apprentiship in such useless nicetys for he at
the end of all his pains to noe purpose finds that it is not painting,
nor any help to it, and soe is realy to noe purpose whereas men
 designed for scholars have often their heads soe fild and warmed with
disputes on logical questions that they take those airy useless notions
for real and substantial knowledg, and think their understanding
soe well furnishd with science that they need not looke any farther
into the nature of things, or descend to the mechanical drudgery of
 experiment and enquiry. This is soe obvious a mismanagement of
the understanding and that in the professed way to knowledg that
| it could not be passed by, to which might be joynd abundance 
of questions and the way of handleing of them in the schools. what
faults in particular of this kind every man is or may be guilty of would
 be infinite to enumerate. It suffices to have shewn that superficial and
slight discoverys and observations that contein noe thing of moment
in them selves, nor serve as clues to lead us into farther knowledg
should be lightly passed by and never thought worth our searching
after. There are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom as the bassis
 upon which a great many others rest and in which they have their
consistency, these are teeming truths rich in store with which they
furnish the mind, and like the lights of heaven are not only beautiful
and enterteining in them selves, but give light and evidence to other
things that without them could not be seen or known. Such is that
 admirable discovery of Mr Newton that all bodys gravitate to one
an other which may be counted as the basis of natural philosophie,
which of what use it is to the understanding of the great frame of
our solar Systeme he has to the astonishment of the learned world
shewn, and how much farther it would guid us in other things if
 he [uses] intends  descend [..] to  `in particular´ (il.)  every
[particular] man  `that lie at | the bottom as´ (il. cont. on p. )  others
[bottom] rest  like [luminhousi] the  tha{d}hti
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rightly pursued is not yet known.116 Our Saviours great rule that
we should love our neighbour as our selves117 is such a fundamental
truth for the regulating humane society that I think by that alone
one might without difficulty determin all the cases and doubts in
Social morality.118 These and such as these are the truths | we should 
endeavour to finde out and stere our minds with, which leads me to
an other thing in the conduct of the understanding that is noe lesse
necessary viz
(.) To accustom our selves in any question proposed to examinBottoming (§)
and find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the difficulties that 
come in our way when well considerd and traced lead us to some
proposition which known to be true clears the doubt and gives an
easy solution of the question, whilst topical and superficial arguments
of which there is store to be found on both sides filling the head with
varietie of thoughts and the mouth with copious discourse serve 
only to amuse the understanding and entertein company without
comeing to the bottom of the question the only place of rest and
stability for an inquisitive minde whose tendency is only to truth
and knowledge. For example if it be demanded whether the grand
Signior can lawfully take what he will from any of his people119 this 
question can not be resolved without comeing to a certainty whether
all men are naturaly equal for upon that it turns and that truth well
 truth [in morality] for  regulating [all..] humane  out [..] upon  true
[resolves] clears  are [ .b .o.r .n .e .q .u.a.l whether all are .....] naturaly
 Newton’s Principia mathematica was published in ; the review of this
work in the Bibliothèque universelle & historique,  (March ), pp. -
, was probably by Locke; see Axtell, ‘Locke’s Review of the Principia’,
passim and Rogers, ‘Locke’s Essay and Newton’s Principia’, p. , note .
 Matt. : .
 Cf. Essay, IV.iv.: : ‘that moral Knowledge is as capable of real Certainty, as
Mathematicks. For Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement, or
Disagreement of our Ideas; and Demonstration nothing but the Perception
of such Agreement, by the Intervention of other Ideas, or Medium, our moral
Ideas, as well as mathematical, being Archetypes themselves, and so adaquate,
and complete Ideas, all the Agreement, or Disagreement, which we shall find
in them, will produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.’
See also Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 Cf. the second of the Two Treatises, §, p. : ‘The Supream Power cannot
take from any Man any part of his Property without his own consent.’
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setled in the understanding and caried in the minde through the
various debates concerneing the various rights of men in societie will
| goe a great way in puting an end to them and sheweing on which 
side the truth is.
 (.) There is scarce any thing more for the improvement of Transferring
of thoughts
(§)
knowledg for the ease of life and the dispatch of business, than for a
man to be able to dispose of his own thoughts and there is scarce any
thing harder in the whole conduct of the understanding than to get
a full mastery over it. The mind in a wakeing man has always some
 object that it applys it self to which when we are lazy or unconcerned
we can easily change and at pleasure transfer our thoughts to an
other and from thence to a third which has no relation to either
of the former. Hence men forwardly conclude and frequently say
noe thing is so free as thought and it were well it were so. But the
 contrary will be found true in several instances, and there are many
cases wherein there is noe thing more resty and ungovernable than
our thoughts. They will not be directed what objects to pursue nor
be taken off from those they have once fixd on, but run away with a
man in pursuit of those Ideas they have in view let him doe what he
 can.120
(.) I will not here mention again what I have above121 taken
notice of how hard it is | to get the mind narrowed by a custome 
of  or  years standing to a scanty collection of obvious and
common Ideas to enlarg it self to a more copious stock, and grow
 into an acquaintance with those that would afford more aboundant
matter of usefull contemplation tis not of this I am here speaking.
The inconveneience I would here represent and find a remedie for
 in the [minde] understanding  `men´ (il. in diff. ink)  it. [.a.s] The
 contrary [is] will  in [...] several  more [cop.eous] `aboundant´ (il.)
 contemplatio .n – sp`e´[[.]].aking. (il.) [That which] The  I [am
here] would
 Cf. Essay, II.xxi.: : ‘As it is in the motions of the Body, so it is in the
Thoughts of our Minds; where any one is such, that we have power to take
it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we are at
liberty. (…) But yet some Ideas to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body,
are such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence
by the utmost effort it can use’; and Education, §, p.  on the importance
of the mind getting ‘an habitual Dominion over it self ’.
 See par. .
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is the difficulty there is sometimes to transfer our minds from one
subject to an other in cases where the Ideas are equaly familiar to us.
(.) Matters that are recommended to our thoughts by any of
our passions take possession of our minds with a kind of authority
and will not be kept out or dislodgd, but as if the passion that rules 
were for the time the Sherif of the place and came with all the posse,
the understanding is ceised and taken with the object it introduces as
if it had a legal right to be alone considerd there.122 There is scarce any
body I think of so calm a temper who hath not sometime found this
tyrany on his understanding, and sufferd under the inconvenience 
of it. who is there almost whose mind at some time or other Love,
or Anger Fear or Greif has not soe fastend to some clog that it could
not turn if self to any other object. I call it a clog for it hangs upon
the minde so as to hinder its vigor and | activity in the pursute
of other contemplations, and advances it self little or not at all in 
the knowledg of the thing which it so closely huggs and constantly
pores on. Men thus possessed are sometimes as if they were so in the
worst sense, and lay under the power of an inchantment. They see
not what passess before their eyes; hear not the audible discourse of
the company; And when by any strong application to them they are 
roused a little they are like men brought to themselves from some
remote region whereas in truth they come noe farther than their
secret cabinet within where they have been wholy taken up with the
puppet which is for that time appointed for their enterteinment.
The shame that such dumps cause to wellbred people when it carrys 
them away from the company where they should bear a part in
the conversation is a sufficient argument that it is a fault in the
conduct of our understanding not to have that power over it as
to make use of it to those puposes and on those occasions where
in we have need of its assistance. The mind should be always free 
 possession[s]  if [any] the – this [inconvenience] tyrany  almost
[that] `whose mind´ (add. p. )  other [the] Love,  Anger [ .o.r] .Fear
 to [any] any  object. [..] I  for it [onely] hangs  minde [`so | as
to´ (add. cont. on p. )] [hinder its pursute of other things fit to be consider] so
as  advances [but] it  are [some times] [are so] sometimes  `when´
(il.)  `than´ (il.)  when [they] it
 Cf. Essay, II.xxi.: -: ‘sometimes a boisterous Passion hurries our
Thoughts, as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the liberty of
thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse’.
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and ready to turn it self to the variety of objects that occur and allow
them as much consideration as shall for that time be thought fit. To
be ingrossed so by one object as not to be prevailed on to leave it
for an other that we judg fiter for our contemplation is to make it of
 noe use to us. Did this state of mind remain always so | every one 
would without scruple give it the name of perfect madnesse.123 And
while it does last at what ever intervals it returns such a rotation of
thoughts about the same object no more carrys us forwards to wards
the attainment of knowledg, than geting upon a milhorse whilst he
 jogs on in his circular tract would carry a man a journey.
(.) I grant some thing must be allowed to legitimate passions
and to natural inclinations. Every man besides occasional affections
has beloved studys and those the mind will more closely stick to. But
yet it is best that it should be always at liberty and under the free
 disposal of the man to act how and upon what he directs. This we
should endeavour to obtain unless we would be content with such
a flaw in our understandings, that some times we should be as it
were without it for it is very little better than so in cases where we
cannot make use of it to those purposes we would and which stand
 in present need of it.
(.) But before fit remedies can be thought on for this disease
we must know the several causes of it and thereby regulate the cure
if we will hope to labour with succes.
(.) One we have already instanced in where of all men that
 reflect have so general a knowledg and so often an experience in
themselves that noe body doubts of it.124 A prevaileing passion so
pins down our thoughts to the object and concerne of it | That a man 
passionately in love can not bring himself to think of his ordinary
affairs, nor a kind mother drooping under the loss of a child is not
 able to bear a part as she was wont in the discourse of the company
or conversation of her friends.
 `so´ (add.)  Did [it] `this state of mind´ (il.)  thoughts [upon] about
 more [goes] `carrys us´ (il.)  occasional [passions] affections  directs.
Th[[.e]]is[e]  purposes [it] we  general a {a}  `is´ (il.)  bear
[and] `a´ (il.)  End of par. indicated by vertical stroke.
 For the topic of madness and foolishness in Locke’s analysis of error see Gen.
Introd.: ‘Context’, §.
 See par. .
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(.) But though passion be the most obvious and general yet it
is not the onely cause that binds up the understanding and confines
it for the time to one object from which it will not be taken off.
Besides this we may often find that the understanding when it has
a while imploid it self upon a subject which either chance or some 
slight accident offerd to it without the interest or recommendation
of any passion, workes it self into a warmth and by degrees gets into
a career wherein like a bowle down at hill it increases its motion by
goeing and will not be stopd or diverted, though when the heat is
over it sees all this earneste application was about a trifle not worth 
a thought and all the pains imploid about it lost labour.
(.) There is a third sort if I mistake not yet lower than this. Tis
a sort of Childishness if I may soe say of the understanding where in
dureing the fit it plays with and dandles some insignificant puppet
to noe end nor with any designe at all, and yet cannot easily be 
got off from it. Thus some trivial sentence or a scrap of poetry will
sometimes | get into mens heads and make such a chimeing there
that there is no stilling of it, no peace to be obteind nor attention
to any thing else, but this impertinent guest will take up the mind
and possess the thoughts in spight of all endeavours to get rid of it. 
Whether every one hath experimented in them selves this trouble
some intrusion of some frisking Ideas which thus importune the
understanding and hinder it from being better imploid I know not.
But persons of very good parts and those more than one I have heard
speake and complain of it in them selves. The reason I have to make 
this doubt is from what I have known in a case some thing of kin to
this though much odder, and that is of a sort of visions that some
people have lieing quiet but perfectly awake in the darke or with
their eyes shut, It is a great variety of faces most commonly very odde
ones that appear to them in train one after an other so that haveing 
had just the sight of one it immediately passes away to give place to
an other that the same instant succeeds and has as quick an exit as its
leader and soe they march on in a constant succession nor can any one
 `and general´ (il.) – off. [(deleted vertical stroke)] Besides  while [go]
implo.id  accident [set] offerd  passion, [gets] workes  mistake [not]
not  `with´ (il.)  or [the parts] a scrap  into [their] `mens´ (il.)
– there that [it can not be got out nor will let the mind quietly attend to any
thing else] `there is … of it´ (add. p. )  some [importunity] `intrusion´
(il.)  other [wherhei] so  had [..] just
conduct, pars. 93–95 
of them by any endeavour be stopd or retaind beyond the instant
of its appearance but is thrust out by its follower which will have
its turne. Concerning this phantashtiical phænomenon I have talked
with several people where of some have been perfectly acquainted
 with it and | others have been soe wholy strangers to it; that they 
could hardly be brought to conceive or beleive it. I knew a Lady of
excellent parts who had got past thirty without haveing ever had the
least notice of any such thing. She was so great a stranger to it that
when she heard me and an other talkeing of it could scarce forbear
 thinkeing we banterd her. But some time after drinkeing a large dose
of dilute Tea (as she was orderd by a physitian) goeing to bed she
told us at next meeting that she had now experimented what our
discourse had much a doe to perswade her of. she had seen a great
variety of faces in a long train succeeding one an other as we had
 discribed. they were all strangers and intruders, such as she had noe
acquaintance with before nor sought after then and as they came of
them selves they went too, none of them staid a moment nor could
be deteinhedi by all the endeavours she could use, but went on in
their solemn procession just appeard and then vanished. This odd
 phenomenon seems to have a mechanical cause and to depend upon
the matter and motion of the bloud or animal spirits.125
(.) When the Phansy is bound by passion I know noe way to
set the mind free and at liberty to prosecute what thoughts the man
would make choise of but to allay the present passion or counter-
 ballance it with an other which is an | art to be got by Study and 
acquaintance with the passions.
(.) Those who find them selves apt to be carried away with the
spontaneous current of their own thoughts not excited by any passion
or interest must be very wary and carefull in all the instances of it
 `of them´ (il.)  but [makes] is  turne. [Th.ose] Concerning  could
[scarse] `hardly´ (il.)  had [been maried the better part of twenty years] got
 was [a] `so´ (il.) great `a´ (il.)  what [we] our  seen [an in] a  all
[intruders] strangers  to [be from] have  and [set it] at  but `to´
(il.) allay[ing] – counterballance[/ing]  interest [hast.e] must
 T. Forster, Original Letters of John Locke, p. lxxv, thinks this paragraph may be
autobiographical and adds: ‘It is probable that most literary men, and persons
of sedentary and studious habits, are subject to these phantoms.’ On ‘animal
spirits’ cf. above, par. , note .
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to stop it and never humer their minds in being thus triflingly busy.
Men know the value of their corporal liberty and therefore suffer not
willingly fetters and chains to be put upon them. To have the mind
captivated is for the time certainly the greater evil of the two, and
deserves our utmost care and endeavours to preserve the freedom of 
our better part, And in this case our pains will not be lost. Striveing
and strugling will prevail if we constantly in all such occasions make
use of it. We must never indulge these trivial attentions of thought.
As soon as we find the mind makes it self a business of noe thing, we
should immediately disturb and check it, introduce new and more 
serious considerations and not leave till we have beaten it off from the
pursuit it was upon. This at first, if we have let the contrary practise
grow to an habit, will perhaps be difficult, But constant endeavours
will by degrees prevail and at last make it easy. And when a man
is pretty well advanced and can command his mind off at pleasure 
from incidental and undesigned pursuits | it may not be amiss for
him to goe on farther and make attempts upon meditationsof greater
moment, that at the last he may have a full power over his own mind
and be soe fully master of his own thoughts as to be able to transfer
them from one subiect to an other with the same ease that he can 
lay by any thing he has in his hand and take some thing else that he
has a mind to in the room of it. This liberty of mind is of great use
both in business and study and he that has got it will have noe small
advantage of ease and dispatch in all that is the chosen and usefull
imployment of his understanding. 
(.) The d and last way which I mentiond the mind to be
sometimes taken up with I mean the chimeing of some particular
words or sentence in the memory and as it were makeing a noise in
the head and the like seldom happens but when the mind is lazy or
very loosly and negligently imploid. It were better indeed be without 
such impertinent and useless repetitions, any obvious Idea when it is
roveing causlesly at a venture being of more use and apter to suggest
something worth consideration, than the insignificant buz of purely
empty sounds. But since the rouseing of the mind and seting the
 and [ .g.. .t .h.e ......] never  them[[,]]. [[t]]To  part, [to] And  `such´ (il.)
 thought[s]. –  endeavours will [.a.t] by  all [that] that – chosen
[business] `and usefull imployment´ (il.)  `and the like´ (il.)  useless
[repetitions] repetitions  Idea[s]  roveing [at a vhenturei] causlesly
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understanding on worke with some degrees of vigor does for the
most part | presently set it free from these idle companions, it may 
not be amisse when ever we find our selves troubled with them to
make use of soe profitable a remedie that is always at hand.
 (.) Custome haveing that influence upon our senses as to make Custome

that which at first was indifferentor perhaps even nautious to become
in time pleasant and agreeable as we see in the Raguos, parfumes and
Musick of several nations. The palates of men are soe differently set
by the diet and cookery they have been used to, that they eat that
 with delight and gusto which one not accustomed to can hardly bring
him self to tast and would sooner fast than make a meale of.126 By
the same dominion of Custome actions that were at first very hard
and uneasy to us become
 with [any sort] `so|me degrees´ (add. cont. on p. )  `does´ (il.)  and
[.c .o .o .k] cookery  accustomed .to  MS e. ends here.
 Cf. Essay, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, p. : ‘We have our Understandings no less
different than our Palates; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equaly
relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the
same sort of Cookery...’ and Locke in letter to W. Molyneux,  January ,
Corr. , VI, pp. -: ‘If I could think that discourses and arguments
to the understanding were like the several sorts of cates to different palates
and stomachs, some nauseous and destructive to one, which are pleasant and
restorative to another; I should no more think of books and study, and should
think my time better imploy’d at push-pin than in reading or writing. But I
am convinced of the contrary …’

B(.) Besides the want of determined Ideas and of Sagacity and

(§) Reasoning
exercise in finding out and laying in intermediate Ideas127 There are
three miscariages that men are guilty of in reference to their Reason,
whereby this faculty is hinderd in them from that service it might
 doe and was designed for: And he that reflects upon the Actions and
discourses of | mankinde will finde their defects in this kind very 
frequent and very observable.
hoi The first is of those who seldom reason at all but doe and thinke
according to the example of others whether parents neighbours min-
 ister or who else they are pleased to make choise of to have an
implicit faith in for the saveing of them selves the pains and trouble
of thinkeing and examining for themselves.
o The second is of those who put passion in the place of reason
and being resolvd that shall governe their actions and arguments
 neither use their owne nor hearken to other peoples reason any
farther then it suits their humer interest or party, and these one may
observe commonly content them selves with words which have noe
distinct Ideas to them though in other matters that they come with
an unbiassed indifferency to, they want not abilities to talke and hear
– `Besides the want of determined Ide|as and … intermediate Ideas´ (il. cont.
on p. )  exercise [and] `in´ (il.) – three [defects which narrow and
restrain this Faculty whereby it is hinderd from doing mankinde that service it
might.] `mis|cariages that … designed for:´ (add. cont. on p. )  `from´ (il.)
 `doe´ (il.)  of (catchword, not repeated on p.  )  `defects in this | kind´
(il. cont. on p. ) –  they [are pleased for the saveing themselves the pains
of thinkeing and examining to have an implicit faith in] `are | `pleased´ (il.) to
make … for themselves´ (add. cont. on p. )
 Cf. Essay, IV.ii.: : ‘A quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate
Ideas, (that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other,) and
to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called Sagacity’ and ibid.
IV.xvii.: -.
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reason where they have noe secret inclination that hinders them from
being untractable to it.
o The third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason
but for want of haveing that which one may call large sound round
about sense have not a full view of all that relates to the question and 
may be of moment to decide it. We are all short sighted and very
often see but one side of a matter. our views are not extended to all
that has a connection with it. From this defect I thinke noe man is
free. We see but in part and we know but in part | and therefor tis
noe wonder we conclude not right from our partiall views.128 This Partial views
might instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts how usefull
it is to talk and consult with others even such as came short of him
in capacity quicknesse and penetration for since noe one sees all and
we generaly have different prospects of the same thing according
to our different as I may say positions to it tis not incongruous to 
thinke nor beneath any man to trie whether an other may not have
notions of things which have scaped him and which his reason would
make use of if they came into his minde. The faculty of Reasoning
seldom or never deceives those who trust to it. its consequences
from what it builds on are evident and certain but that, which it 
oftenest if not only misleads us in, is that the principles from which
we conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are
but a part some thing is left out which should goe into the reconing
to make it just and exact. Here we may imagin a vast and almost
infinite advantage that angels and seperate spirits may have over us. 
Who in their severall degrees of elevation above us may be indowed
with more comprehensive faculties and some of them perhaps have
perfect and exact views of all finite beings that come under their
consideration handi can as it were in the twinkleing of an eye collect
togeather all their | scatterd and almost boundlesse relations.129 A 
 may [cl.] call  from [phartialli] our  generaly [take dhifferenti] have
 `as I may say´ (il.)  man `to´ (il.)  imagin [and] a  angels and
[seperhatei..] [several degrees of ] seperate  with [larger] more
 Cf. I Cor. : : ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to
face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.’
 Cf. Essay, II.x.:  on the amazing memory of Pascal: ‘For this of Mr. Pascal
was still with the narrowness, that humane Minds are confin’d to here, of
having great variety of Ideas only by succession, not all at once: Whereas
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minde soe furnishd what reason has it to acquiesce in the certainty
of its conclusions? In this | we may see the reason why some men 
of study and thought that reason right and are lovers of truth doe
make noe great advances in their discoverys of it, Error and truth
 are uncertainly blended in their minds; their decisions are lame and
defective; and they are very often mistaken in their judgments. The
reason where of is. They converse but with one sort of men they
read but one sort of books. They will not come in the hearing but
of one sort of notions. The truth is They canton out to them selves
 a little Goshen130 in the intellectual world where light shines and as
they conclude day blesses them. but the rest of that vast expansum
they give up to night and darkeness and so avoid comeing near it.
They have a pretty trafick with known correspondents in some litle
creek within that they confine themselves and are dexterous managers
 enough of the wares and products of that Corner with which they
content themselves but will not venture out into the great Ocean of
knowledg to survey the riches that nature hath stored other parts with
noe less | genuine, noe less solid, no less usefull than what has fallen to 
their lot in the admired plenty and sufficiency of their own little spot
 which to them conteins whatso ever is good in the universe. Those
who live thus mued up within their owne contracted terretorys and
will not looke abroad beyond the boundarys that chance conceit or
lazyness has set to their enquirys but live seperate from the notions
discourses and attainments of the rest of mankind may not amiss
 be represented by the Inhabitants of the Marian Islands131 which
.–. `In this | we may … understandings.´ (add. cont. on p. ; this add.
is continued by the next par.)  `some´ (il.)  advances [of ] in – `They
will not come | in … The truth is´ (il. cont. on p. )  creek [.... .e.x.c.e.l.l] within
 their [contracted Systeme] own  their [ .n .o.t.i .o .n.s ..] `en|quirys´ (add. cont.
on p. ) – notions [.r.e.a.s .ohningsi] discourses
the several degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, and some of
them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set
before them, as in one Picture, all their past knowledge at once’; see also ibid.
IV.xvii.: .
 Gen. : : ‘And Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt, in the country of Goshen;
and they had possessions therein, and grew, and multiplied exceedingly.’
 Archipelago in the Pacific Ocean, , km east of the Philippines, discovered
in  by Ferdinand Magellan, named initially ‘Ladrones Islands’, but not
colonized until  by Jesuit missionaries, who changed its name to honour
Mariana of Austria, then regent of Spain.
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being separate by a large tract of sea from all communion with the
habitable parts of the earth thought themselves the onely people
of the world and though the straitness of the conveniencys of life
amongst them had never reachd so far as to the use of fire till the
Spaniards not many years since in their voyages from Acapulco to 
Manilia brought it amongst them, yet in the want and ignorance of
almost all things they looked upon themselves even after that the
Spaniards had brought amongst them the notice of variety of nations
abounding in sciences arts and conveniencys of life of which they
knew no thing they looked upon themselves | I say as the happyest 
and wisest people of the universe. But for all that noe body I think
will imagin them deep naturalists or Solid metaphysitians. noe body
will deem the quickest sighted amongst them to have very enlarged
views in Ethicks or politiques. Nor can any one allow the most
capable amongst them to be advanced so far in his understanding 
as to have any other knowledg but of the few little things of his
and the neigbouring Islands with in his commerce but far enough
from that comprehensive enlargement of mind which adornes a soule
devoted to truth assisted with letters and a free consideration of the
several views and sentiments of thinking men of all sides. Let not 
men therefore that would have a sight of what every one pretends
to be desireous to have a sight of truth in its full extent narrow and
blind their own prospect. Let not men think there is noe truth but in
the Sciences that they study or the books that they read. To prejudg
other mens notions before we have looked into them is not to shew 
their darkness but to put out our own eys.Trie all things hold fast that
which is good132 is a divine rule comeing from the father of light and
truth, and tis hard to know what other way men can come at truth to
lay hold of it if they doe not dig and search for it as for gold and hid
 separate [frhomi] by  of [this .e.a.r.t .h] [whorldi] the world  them the
[news] `notice´ (il.)  of [other] nations  life o[[r]]f  advanced [[t]]so
[any competent] far  `in´ (il.)  enla`r´gement (il.)  which [ .b.e.c .o .m.e.s]
`adornes´ (il.) – truth [which he makes it his business sincerely [`sincerely´
(il.)] in love with it and [.s.i .n.c.e.r.e.l .y] diligently seeking after it] `assisted with … all
sides´ (add. p. )  `truth in its full extent´ (il.)  `dig and´ (il.)  for
it [fhori] as
 I Thess. : : ‘Prove all things; hold fast that which is good.’
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treasure,133 but he that does soe must turn much earth and rubish
before he gets the pure mettle. Sand and pebbles and | dross usualy 
lye blended with it, but the gold is never the less gold and will inrich
the man that imploys his pains to seek and separate it. Neither is
 there any danger he should be deceived by the mixture. Every man
carys about him a touch stone if he will make use of it, to distinguish
substantial gold from superficial glitterings; truth from appearances.
And indeed the use and benefit of this touch stone which is natural
reason is spoiled and lost onely, by assumed prejudices overweening
 presumption and narrowing our minds. The want of exerciseing it
in the full extent of things intelligible is that which weakens and
extinguishes this noble faculty in us. Trace it and see whether it be
not soe. The day labourer in a country village has commonly but
a small pittance of knowledg because his Ideas and notions have
 been confined to the narrow bounds of a poor conversation and
imployment. The low mechanique of a country town does some
what out doe him. Porters and coblers of great Cittys surpass them.
A country Gent who leaveing Latin and learning in the university
removes thence to his mansion house and associates with neighbours
 of the same strain who relish no thing but hunting and a bottle, with
these alone he spends his time, with these alone he converses and
can away with no company whose discourse goes beyond what claret
and dissoluteness inspires. Such a patriot formed in this happy way
of improvement cannot fail as we see to give notable decisions upon
 the bench at quarter sessions, and eminehnit proofs of his skil in
politiques, when the strength of his purse and party have advanced
him to a more conspicuous station. to such a | one truly an ordinary 
Coffee house gleaner of the Citty is an arrant States man and as much
 must [remove] turn  and (catchword, not repeated on p. )  lye [mixed]
blended (il.)  it, [the right] to distinguish  in [the] `a´ (il.) country
[`village usualy´ (il. no caret)] [has] `village has | commonly´ (il. cont. on p. )
 knowledge [for] because – removes [to the Societys whose business
is hunting and a bottle, and can away with noe company whose discourse goes
beyond what Claret and intemperance inspire [`such an one´ (il.)] gives.] `thence
to his | mansion house … to give´ (il. cont. on p. )  alone [they] he
spends [their] `his´ (il.)  goes [beyonhdi] beyond  such a[n] | one
.–. much [exceeds] `superior too´ (il.)
 Cf. Prov. : -.
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superior too as a man conversant about Whitehall134 and the Court
is to an ordinary shop keeper.135 To carry this a little farther Here is
one muﬄed up in the zeale and infallibility of his own sect and will
not touch a booke or enter debate with a person that will question
any of those things which to him are Sacred. Another surveys our 
differences in religion with an equitable and fair indifferency and so
finds probably that none of them are in every thing unexeptionable,
These divisions and systemes were made by men and carry the marke
of fallible on them and in those whom he differs from and till he
opend his eyes had a general prejudice against he meets with more 
to be said for a great many things than before he was aware of or
could have imagined. Which of these two now is most likely to judg
right in our religious controversies and to be most stored with truth
the marke all pretend to aime at? All these men that I have instanced
in thus unequally furnishd with truth and advanced in knowledg I 
suppose of equall natural parts. all the oddes between them has been
the different Scope that has been given to their understandings to
range in, for the gathering up of information and furnishing their
heads with Ideas notions and observations wheron to imploy their
minds and forme their understandings. 
(.) It will possibly be objected. Who is sufficient for all this? I
answer more than can be imagined. Every one knows what his proper
business is and what according to the Character he makes of | him
self the world may justly expect of him, and to answer that he will
find he will have time and opertunity enough to furnish him self if he 
will not deprive him self by a narrowness of Spirit, of those helps that
are at hand. I doe not say to be a good Geographer that a man should
visit every mountain river promontory and creeke upon the face of
the Earth view the buildings and survey the land every where as if he
– Court [does this] `is to an ordinary´ (il.) – `probably that none | of
them [infallible] `are in every thing unexceptionable´ (il.), [[t]]These divisions …
meets with´ (il. cont. on p. )  thus [differently] `un|equally´ (add. cont. on
p. )  all the [difference] `oddes between them´ (il.) .–. Par.
 continues addition to the previous par.  Earth [and] view
 ‘Whitehall’: street in Westminster, London, seat of principal government
offices and, in Locke’s time, of the English court.
 For similar acid remarks on the aristocracy, cf. Malebranche, Recherche, Vol.
II, Bk. V, Ch. vii, p. .
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were goeing to make a purchase. But yet every one must allow that
he shall know a country better that makes often salleys into it and
traverses it up and down, than he that like a mill horse goes still round
in the same tract or keeps within the narrow bounds of a feild or two
 that delight him. He that will enquire out the best books in every
science and informe himself of the most material authers of the several
sects in Philosophie and religion will not find it an infinite worke
to acquaint himself with the sentiments of mankind concerning
the most weighty and comprehensive subjects, Let him exercise the
 freedom of his reason and understanding in such a latitude as this
and his mind will be strengthened, his capacity inlarged his facultys
improved. And the light which the remote and scatterd parts of truth
will give to one another | will so assist his judgment that he will 
seldom be widely out or miss giveing proof of a clear head and a
 comprehensive knowledg. At least this is the onely way I know to
give the understanding its due inprovement to the full extent of its
capacity, and to distinguish the two most different things I know in
the world a logical chicanner from a man of reason. Onely he that
would thus give the mind its flight, and send abroad his enquirys
 into all parts after truth must be sure to setle in his head determined
Ideas of all that he imploys his thoughts about, and never fail to judg
himself and judg unbiassedly of all that he receives from others either
in their writeings or discourses. Reverence or prejudice must not be
sufferd to give beauty or deformity to any of their opinions.
 tract [and] or  and `his´ (il.) mind [inlarged his] `will be´ (add. p. )
– miss [being thought a knowing man. Only he] `give|ing proof of … after




The following parts of MS e. clearly pertain to the Conduct although
they do not strictly belong to the text itself. Deleted entries are given
between [ ].
C
Page i starts with the last entries of a list to the contents of MS e., every
entry on a new line. The preceding leaf is now lost (see Gen. Introd.:
‘Text’, §[]). All entries, except the last, are followed by numbers. These






Reasoning right in narrow and in large views 
Custome
D
Instructions concerning the Conduct, entered at the middle of p. i.
Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their
several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd and




E-I were all entered on p.  of MS e. (see ill. ). They are given here
as seperate items because they may have been entered at different times
and because their mutual connexion is tenuous. The one word forming
E may have been intended as header.
Misconduct
F
A partially deleted list with subjects that Locke was going to address in
the Conduct.
[Jadeing the minde by things too difficult, or deposeing it by a
confinement to things too easy, or stoping at the first difficulty or
lazily siting still]136
Hunting after similes137 
[Makeing too much haste with conclusion and not goeing by gradual
steps]138
[Learning of arguments]139
[Allowing too much to first impressions]140
[some take all some reject all popular opinions]141 
[some wholy assert novelty others antiquitie]142
G
G-I also contain subjects that Locke was going to address in the Conduct.
Thinking of things transciently and in gros we fright our selves with
supposed difficulties which vanish where we come to examine things
by their distinct parts143
 .w .h .o.l.y asse.rt
 See par. .
 See par. .
 See pars.  and .
 See par. .
 See par. .
 See par. .
 See par. .
 See par. .
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H
To read books for arguments: The right way to knowledge and
improvement is to setle determind Ideas in our minds and then to
observe and finde out their relations and habitudes in the knowledg
of self evident propositions. all men that are rational creatures are
 equall, the difference of men in their parts is a sagacity to finde out
the intermediate Ideas that shew the agreement or disagreement of
others. And the difference of men in knowledg is the actualy haveing
discoverd the agreement or disagreement of more Ideas.144
I
The mind often frights it self with things seen in grosse in confusion
 and at a distance and soe forbears application which comeing to be
viewd nearer and by parts would be as easy as other things that are
masterd145
K
Page , the first page of a new quire, contains a deleted list similar to F.
[Variety of Ideas and those abstract espetialy146
Freedom of minde for truth147
 Examin our own principles: which we demand of others148




 To sit still lazy is noe conduct at al153]
 s.t .oping
 See pars.  and .
 See par. .
 See pars.  and .
 See pars. , , , , ,  and .
 See pars. , , , , , ,  and .
 See pars. , ,  and .
 See par. .
 See pars. ,  and .
 See par. .
 See pars. , ,  and .

COLLATION OF MS LOCKE E.1
WITH MS LOCKE C.28
Each entry starts with two numbers, followed by one or more words, followed by the
lemma-symbol ‘]’, followed again by one or more words. The numbers refer to the
page number and line number in the present edition. The word(s) to the left of the
lemma-symbol form the version as it is presented in the present edition, based on MS
e., while the entry to the right of this symbol gives the variant as given by MS c..
Collation of MS e., pp. , -, - (pars. -) with MS c., fols. r-r
p. , l. : Dialecticæ] Dialectica
p. , l. : hinder] hinders
p. , l. : keep] keeps
p. , l. : Addition in Locke’s hand in MS c. fol. r, not in MS e.: Some of them I shall
take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for in the following Chap-
ters. (see Gen. Introd.: ‘Text’, § [] ())
Collation of MS e., pp. - (par. , second half, and pars. -) with MS c.,
fols. r-r
p. , l. : ease, let him … start of collation
p. , l. : the time] time
p. , l. : for though] in MS c. a space is left open at this place (see above, Gen. Introd.:
Text, §, [] ())
p. , l. : year] years
p. , l. : compasse his] compasse he
p. , l. -: and therefor they] they
p. , l. : your] their
p. , l. : he himself that] that
p. , l. : connection] connection himself
p. , l. : MS c. continues with a deleted sentence: [I have mentiond mathematicks as a
way to setle in the minde an habit of reasoning closely and in train, not that I thinke it
necessary that all men should be deep Mathematicians.] (this sentence is repeated at the
start of the next par., which is also the place where it can be found in MS e.)
p. , l. : and dependence] [of ] dependence
p. , l. : is what is] is
p. , l. : be in a] be a
p. , l. : by an] by
p. , l. : fortunes and time is] fortunes are
 collation
p. , l. : things that] that
p. , l. : are] be
p. , l. : in that of ] of that in
Collation of MS e., pp. -, - (pars.  and ) with MS c., fols. 
r-r
p. , l. : talk and] talke or
p. , l. : we] one
p. , l. : expansum] expansion (Locke’s hand )
p. , l. : way] may
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1. EDITIONS OF THE CONDUCT
This section contains separate editions of the Conduct (C),1 editions of the Conduct together
with the Essay (E), of the Conduct with other works, either by Locke or by other authors (O),
of the Conduct in editions of Locke’s works (W), of abridgements, abstracts or selections from
the Conduct (AS), and of translations that consist of or comprise the Conduct (Tr). Each entry is
given an identification code consisting of the abbreviation for the category to which it belongs,
followed by the year in which it appeared; for instance ‘C-’ means: a separate edition of the
Conduct that appeared in . No claim to completeness is made. Information was extracted
primarily from Jean Yolton’s monumental John Locke. A Descriptive Bibliography (largely confined
to titles that appeared before ) and from John C. Attig’s The Works of John Locke (for titles not
covered by Yolton). Reference to entries in these bibliographies is by ‘Yolton’ or ‘Attig’, followed
by the number given by these authors to the relevant title. Attig does not always specify the exact
relation between a given title and a previous title from which it is somehow derived, in which
case it is not clear whether he is referring to a new edition, a reprint or a reissue. In these cases
the new edition/reprint/reissue is given a note with a noncommittal ‘As’, followed by the earlier
edition/reprint/reissue from which it is derived. For instance, the existence of a relation between
C- and C- is established by a note to C-, saying ‘As C-’. Copies that I have been
able to inspect are marked with a * after the year of appearance. The library signatures of inspected
copies that appeared before  are given between [ ]; BOD = Bodleian Library Oxford and
UBU = Universiteitsbibliotheek Utrecht.
Seperate editions of the Conduct
C-
Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. Particularly, Of
Parts, Reasoning, Practice, Habits, Ideas, Principles, Mathematicks, Religion, Ideas, Prejudices,
Indifferency, Examination, Observation, Biass, Arguments, Haste, Desultory, Smattering, Uni-
versality, Reading, Intermediate Principles, Partiality, Theology, Partiality, Haste, Anticipation,
Resignation, Practice, Words, Wandering, Distinctions, Similies, Assent, Indifference, Perseverance,
Presumption, Despondency, Analogy, Association, Fallacies, Fundamental Verities, Transferring of
Thoughts. By John Locke Esq. [s.l.: s.d.] .* [BOD Vet. A f.] Ref. Yolton . Note.
The list of topics in the title is taken from the marginal headings printed in O-.
C-
Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. By John Locke Esq;
Glasgow: R. Urie, .* [BOD .k.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of C-.
 Includes issues of the Conduct with other works in one volume, in cases where the Conduct
and the other work each have their own title page and sequence of page numbers, e.g. C-.
 editions of the ‘conduct’
C-
Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. By John Locke, Esq;
London: Printed and Sold by all the Booksellers, . Ref. Yolton .
C-
Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. By John Locke, Esq;
Glasgow: Printed for the booksellers, .* [BOD Vet. A. f.()] Ref. Yolton .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding. Dublin: W. Wilson, .* [BOD Vet. A e.] Ref.
Yolton .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. A New Edition, Divided under Heads.
Dedicated to the Right Hon. Earl Spencer. London: Daniel Elzevir, .* [BOD Vet.A
f.] Ref. Yolton .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding. For a man to understand fully the business of his particular
calling, and of his religion, is usually enough to take up his whole time. See sect. xix. A New
Edition. Divided under Heads. Dedicated to the Right Hon. Earl Spencer. London: E. Jeffery,
.* [BOD Vet.A g.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of C-.
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. A New edition. London: W. Baynes,
.* [BOD  e.] Ref. Attig .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. A New edition, Divided under Heads.
London: M. Jones, .* [BOD  g.] Ref. Attig .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth by John Locke, Esq. New edition.
London: W. Creech, . Ref. Attig .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. A New Edition, Divided under Heads.
To which is Prefixed, a Sketch of the Life of the Author. London: Sherwood, .* [BOD
 f.] Ref. Attig .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. New Edition, Divided under Heads.
London: J. Bumpus, . Ref. Attig .
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent. Boston: R.P. & C.
Williams, . Ref. Attig . Issued with Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Fran-
cis Bacon.
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Gent. Boston: T. Bedlington,
. Ref. Attig . Note. Issued with Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Ba-
con. As C-.
C-(a)
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent. Boston: T. Bedlington,
. Ref. Attig . Note. Issued with Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Ba-
con. Reprint of C-.
C-(b)
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent. Boston: C.D. Strong,
. Ref. Attig . Note. Issued with Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Ba-
con. As C-.
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; to which is now added a
sketch of his life. New Edition. Boston: C.D. Strong, . Ref. Attig .
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; to which is now added a
sketch of his life. New Edition. Boston: Water Street Bookstore, . Ref. Attig . Note. As
C-.
C-
‘On the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq.’, The Republic of Letters: a
Weekly Republication of Standard Literature  () -. Ref. Attig .
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke Esq. A New Edition, Divided under Heads.
Birmingham: J. Russell, .* [BOD Vet. A g.] Ref. No reference found in Attig.
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; to which is now added a
sketch of his life. New Edition. Boston: T.H. Carter, . Ref. Attig . Note. As C-.
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; to which is now added a
sketch of his life. New Edition. Boston: Weeks, . Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note.
As C-.
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; to which is now added
a sketch of his life. New Edition. [Hartford, Conn.]: S. Andrus, . Ref. Attig  (Attig:
unverified). Note. As C-.
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; to which is now added
a sketch of his life. New Edition. Hartford, Conn.: S. Andrus, . Ref. Attig . Note. As
C-.
 editions of the ‘conduct’
C-
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; to which is now added
a sketch of his life. New Edition. Hartford, Conn.: S. Andrus, . Ref. Attig . Note. As
C-.
C-
Of the Conduct of the Understanding, by John Locke, ed. Bolton Corney, M.R.S.L. London:
Bell and Daldy, .* [BOD . C.] Ref. Attig .
C--
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq., ed. Joseph Devey. New York: J.B.
Alden [-?]. Ref. Attig . Note. Issued with Francis Bacon, Essays.
C-
Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Thomas Fowler. Oxford: Clarendon Press, .*
[BOD . f.] Ref. Attig .
C-(a)
Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, nd ed., corrected and revised, by Thomas Fowler. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, . Ref. Attig . Note. nd ed. of C-.
C-(b)
‘Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke’, ed. Henry Barnard, in: American Journal of
Education  () -. Ref. Attig .
C-(c)
Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Syracuse, New York: C.W. Bardeen, . Ref.
Attig . Note. Separate reissue of C-(b).
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. New York: J.B. Alden, .* [BOD
 f.] Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of O--. Issued with Francis Bacon, Essays.
C-
Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, rd ed., corrected and revised by Thomas Fowler. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, . Ref. Attig . Note. rd ed. of C-.
C-
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, ed. J.A. St. John. New York: J.B. Alden,
.* Ref. Attig . See also: W-.
C-
Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, rd ed. by Thomas Fowler. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
. Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note. th ed. of C-.
C-(a)
Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, th ed. by Thomas Fowler. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
.* Ref. Attig . Note. th edition of C-.
C-(b)
Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. A. Louise Gilbert. New York: Maynard, . Ref.
Attig .*
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
C-
John Locke’s Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Francis W. Garforth. New York: Teach-
ers College Press, .* Ref. Attig .
C-
Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. John J. Yolton. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, .*
Note. Repr. of O-, of the part comprised by the Conduct.
Editions of the Conduct together with the Essay
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. The Nineteenth Edi-
tion. To which are now first added, I. An Analysis of Mr. Locke’s Doctrine of Ideas, on a large
Sheet. II. A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Opinion concerning Personal Identity, with an Appendix. III.
A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding. IV. Some Thoughts concerning Reading and
Study for a Gentleman. V. Elements of Natural Philosophy. VI. A New Method of a Common-
Place Book. Extracted from the Author’s Works ( vols.). London: T. Longman,  (th
ed.).* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD Vet. A e. ] Ref. Yolton . Note. Text of the
Essay is a reprint of the  edition.
E-(a)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; with Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing. By John Locke, Esq. Collated with Desmaizeaux’s Edition. To which is prefixed, The Life
of the Author. In Three Volumes. London: C. Bathurst,  (st issue).* Conduct : Vol. , pp.
-. [BOD Vet A e. ] Ref. Yolton A.
E-(b)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; with Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing. By John Locke, Esq. Collated with Desmaizeaux’s Edition. To which is prefixed, The Life of
the Author. In Three Volumes. London: C. Bathurst,  and also London: Allen & West,
 (both nd issue). Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. Ref. Yolton B. Note. As E-(a).
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. The Twentieth Edi-
tion ( vols.). London: T. Longman, .* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD  e.-
] Ref. Yolton . Note. As E- (q.v. for complete title), extracted from W-.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; with Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing. By John Locke, Esq. Collated with Desmaizeaux’s Edtion. To which is prefixed, The Life of
the Author. In Three Volumes. Edinburgh: Mundel & Son, .* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -
. [BOD Vet.A e.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of E-(a/b).
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; with Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing. By John Locke, Esq. Collated with Desmaizeaux’s Edition. To which is prefixed, the Life of
the Author. In Three Volumes. Edinburgh: Mundel & Son, . Ref. Attig .
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent., to which are now added,
I. An Analysis of Mr. Locke’s Doctrine of Ideas, on a Large Sheet, II. A Defence of Mr. Locke’s
 editions of the ‘conduct’
Opinion concerning Personal Identity, with an Appendix, III. A Treatise on the Conduct of the
Understanding, IV. Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, V. Elements
of Natural Philosophy, VI. A New Method of a Common-Place-Book, extracted from the Au-
thor’s Work; to which is prefixed the Life of the Author, st American from the th London ed.
( vols.). Boston: Thomas & Andrews, . Ref. Attig .
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. The Twenty-first Edi-
tion. Extracted from the Author’s Works ( vols.). London: J. Johnson, .* Conduct : Vol. ,
pp. -. [BOD  e.] Ref. Attig . Note. As E- (q.v. for complete title), ex-
tracted from W-.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent., nd American ed. ( vols.).
Brattleboro, Vt.: Thomas & Andrews, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E-, q.v. for
complete title.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent., st ed. ( vols.).
London: W. Otridge, . Conduct : Vol. . Ref. Attig . Note. As E- (q.v. for complete
title), extracted from W-.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent ( vols.). Boston: Cummings
& Hilliard, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E-, q.v. for complete title.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. A New Edition. In
Three Volumes. Edinburgh: Doig & Stirling, .* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD 
e.] Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for complete title, extracted from W-.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent., th ed. ( vols.).
Dublin: B. Smith, . Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for complete title, extracted from
W-.
E-(a)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. The Twenty-third
Edition. In Two Volumes. London: F.C. and J. Rivington, .* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -.
[BOD  e.] Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for complete title, extracted from W-
.
E-(b)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent., th ed. ( vols.).
London: W. Baynes, . Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for complete title, extracted
from W-.
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent ( vols.). New York: J. & J.
Harper, . Ref. Attig . Note. Three issues, published by Collings & Hannay, E. Duyck-
inck, and Richard Scott. Reprint of E-, q.v. for complete title.
E-(a)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. th ed. ( vols.)
London: W. Baynes, . Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note. As E-, q.v. for com-
plete title, extracted from W-.
E-(b)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. New Edition (
vols.). Edinburgh: J. Robinson, . Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for complete title,
extracted from W-.
E-(c)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. Also, Extracted from
the Author’s Works, I. Analysis of Mr. Locke’s Doctrine of Ideas, on a large Sheet. II. A Defence
of Mr. Locke’s Opinion concerning personal Identity. III. A Treatise on the Conduct of the Un-
derstanding. IV. Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman. V. Elements of
Natural Philosophy. VI. A New Method of a Common-Place Book. A New Edition. In Two Vol-
umes. Glasgow: D. M’Vean, .* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD  d.] Ref. No
reference found in Attig.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. New Edition (
vols.). [London]: T. Tegg, . Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for complete title, ex-
tracted from W-.
E-(a)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. The Twenty-fourth
Edition. Extracted from the Author’s Works. In Two Volumes. London: J. Rivington, .*
Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD  d.] Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for com-
plete title, extracted from W-.
E-(b)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent. New Edition. New York: V.
Seaman, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E-, q.v. for complete title. Two vols. in
one.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Gent. New Edition, corrected from a
late improved London copy ( vols.). New York: S. Marks, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint
of E-, q.v. for complete title.
E-(a)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Written by John Locke, Gent. Extracted from the
Author’s Works. A New Edition. In Three Volumes. London: T. Tegg, .* Conduct : Vol.
, pp. -. [BOD  i.] Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for complete title, ex-
tracted from W-.
 editions of the ‘conduct’
E-(b)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding: with the Author’s Last Additions and Corrections;
and an Analysis of the Doctrine of Ideas. Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentle-
man. Of the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent; with a portret of the author
and a general index. London: J.F. Dove, .* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD  d.] Ref.
Attig .
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Written by John Locke, Gent. New Edition. Ex-
tracted from the Author’s Works. A New Edition. In Three Volumes. London: T. Tegg, .*
Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD  e.] Ref. Attig . Note. As E-, q.v. for
complete title, extracted from W-.
E--
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: J. Kay, [-]. Ref. Attig .
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: J. Kay, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Kay & Troutman, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Kay & Troutman, . Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note. Reprint
of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Kay & Troutman, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Troutman & Hayes, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Troutman & Hayes, . Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note. Reprint
of E--.
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Troutman & Hayes, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. And A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent. Complete in One Volume, with the Author’s Last Additions and Correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Hayes & Zell, .* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD  d.] Ref. Attig
. Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Hayes & Zell, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Hayes & Zell, . Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note. Reprint of
E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Hayes & Zell, . Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
E-
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Hayes & Zell, . Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note. Reprint of
E--.
E--
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understand-
ing by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and correc-
tions. Philadelphia: Zell, -?. Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of E--.
Editions of the Conduct together with other works by Locke or by other authors
O-
Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke: viz. I. Of the Conduct of the Understanding. II. An Ex-
amination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing all Things in God. III. A Discourse of Miracles.
IV. Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration. V. Memoirs relating to the Life of Anthony first Earl
of Shaftsbury. To which is added, VI. His New Method of a Common-Place-Book, written Orig-
inally in French, and now translated into English. London: A. and J. Churchill, .* [BOD
Godw. Subt. ] Ref. Yolton .
 editions of the ‘conduct’
O-(a)
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. To which is added, an Abstract of Mr.
Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. Cambridge: J. Nicholson,  (st issue).* Conduct :
pp. -. [BOD Buchanan e.] Ref. Yolton .
O-(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. To which is added, an Abstract of Mr.
Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. Cambridge: J. Nicholson,  (nd issue). Conduct :
pp. -. Ref. Yolton .
O-–
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical & Political by
Francis Bacon. London: C. Daly, [–?]. Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig . Note. As O-
(b).
O-
Philosophical Beauties selected from the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of
the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, an A
Discourse on Miracles; with several other Subjects treated on by this Great Philosopher; to which
is prefixed some account of his life. London: T. Hurst, . Ref. Attig .
O-
The Conduct of the Understanding. By John Locke, Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Polit-
ical. By Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of
England. With sketches of the lives of Locke and Bacon. London: J. Walker, .* Conduct : pp.
-. [BOD Johnson f.] Ref. Attig .
O-
Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding and Bacon’s Essays. London: J. Walker, .* Conduct :
pp. -. [BOD  g.] Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of O-.
O-
On the Conduct of the Understanding; with other pieces by John Locke. London: J. Sharp,
.* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD Don. f.] Ref. Attig . Note. Also contains ‘Some
Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman’ and ‘Elements of Natural Phi-
losophy’.
O-
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical, & Political
by Lord Bacon; with sketches of the lives of Locke and Bacon. Edinburgh: J. Anderson, .
Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig .
O-
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political
by Lord Bacon; with sketches of the lives of Locke and Bacon. New York: S. King, . Ref.
Attig .
O-(a)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. Essay, Moral, Economical, and Political
by Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of England.
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
With Sketches of the Lives of Locke and Bacon. London: C. and J. Rivington, .* Conduct :
pp. -. [BOD Vet. A. f.] Ref. Attig . Note. As O-.
O-(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political
by Lord Bacon; with sketches of the lives of Locke and Bacon. New York: S. King, . Ref.
Attig . Note. Reprint of O-.
O-(c)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical and Political
by Francis Bacon...; with sketches of the author’s lives. London: Baynes, . Ref. Attig .
O-(a)
Philosophical Beauties selected form the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of
the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman,
and A Discourse on Miracles; with several other Subjects treated on by this Great Philosopher;
to which is prefixed some account of his life. New York: Langdon, . Ref. Attig .
O-(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding by Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Lord
Bacon; with a biographical preface. London: Joseph Smith, . Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig
.
O-(a)
On the Conduct of the Understanding. With other pieces by John Locke. Chiswick: Th. Tegg,
.* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD . f.] Ref. Attig . Note. Also includes ‘Some
Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman’ and ‘Elements of Natural Phi-
losophy’. Issued together with the Rev. W. Jone’s Letters to his Pupils. London: J. Sharpe, .
O-(b)
Philosophical Beauties selected from the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of
the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and
A discourse on Miracles; with several other subjects treated on by this great philosopher; to which
is prefixed some account of his life. New York: S. & D.A Forbes, . Ref. Attig  (Attig:
unverified). Note. As O-(a).
O-
The Conduct of the Understanding; by John Locke Esq. Essays, Moral, Economical, & Political;
by Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban’s, and Lord High Chancellor of Eng-
land. Dove’s English Classics. London: [s.d.]* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD  f.] Ref. No
reference found in Attig, but cf. Attig . Note. According to Bodleian catalogue, date of
publication is c. .
O-(a)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke and Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political
by Francis Bacon. London: Scott, . Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig .
O-(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical & Political by Lord
Bacon; with prefaces. Edinburgh: P. Brown, . Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig .
 editions of the ‘conduct’
O-(a)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke and Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political
by Francis Bacon. London: Scott, . Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of
O-(a).
O-(b)
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical & Political by
Francis Bacon. London: C. Daly, . Ref. Attig .
O-
The Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke. Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by
Francis Bacon. London: T. Allman, [?]. Ref. Attig . Note. As O-(a).
O-
Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. The Conduct of the Understanding by
John Locke, Esq.; with an introductory essay, by A. Potter. New York: Harper, [?]. Conduct :
pp. -. Ref. Attig .
O-(a)
Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. The Conduct of the Understanding by
John Locke, Esq.; with an introductory essay, by A. Potter. New York: Harper, . Ref. Attig
. Note. Reprint of O-.
O-(b)
Philosophical Beauties selected form the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of
the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and
A Discourse on Miracles; with several other subjects treated on by this great philosopher; to which
is prefixed some account of his life. Cooperstown, [New York]: H. & E. Phinney, . Ref.
Attig . Note. As O-(a).
O-
Bacon’s Essays and Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding with Memoirs of the Authors. London:
W. and R. Chambers [sd.].* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD .g.] Ref. Attig . Note. At-
tig suggests  as date of publication.
O-
Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political by Francis Bacon. The Conduct of the Understanding by
John Locke, Esq.; with an introductory essay, by A. Potter. New York: Harper, . Conduct :
pp. -. Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of O-.
O-
The Educational Writings of John Locke, ed. John William Adamson. New York: Longmans,
. Ref. Attig .
O-
The Educational Writings of John Locke, nd ed. by John William Adamson. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, .* Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig . Note. nd ed. of
O-.
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
O-
Some Thoughts concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, eds. Ruth W.
Grant and Nathan Tarcov. Indianapolis: Hackett, .*
The Conduct in editions of Locke’s Works
W-
The Works of John Locke Esq. In Three Volumes. London: J. Churchill, .* Conduct : Vol. .
[BOD H. Th] Ref. Yolton .
W-
The Works of John Locke Esq; The Second Edition ( vols.). London: A. Churchill, .* Con-
duct : Vol. . [BOD .c] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of W-.
W-(a)
The Works of John Locke Esq; rd ed. ( vols.). London: A. Bettesworth,  (st issue).*
Conduct : Vol. . [BOD Vet.A.c.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of W-.
W-(b)
The Works of John Locke Esq; rd ed. ( vols.). London: E. Parker,  (nd issue). Conduct :
Vol. . Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of W-. As W-(a)
W-
The Works of John Locke, Esq; th ed. ( vols.). London: E. Parker, .* Conduct : Vol. .
[BOD Vet. A.c.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of W-.
W-
The Works of John Locke, Esq., th ed. ( vols.). London: S. Birt, .* Conduct : Vol. .
[BOD Vet.A.c.] Ref. Yolton . Note. New typesetting based on W-.
W-
The Works of John Locke, Esq; In Three Volumes. The Sixth Edition. To which is added, The
Life of the Author; and a Collection of several of his Pieces published by Mr. Desmaizeaux. Lon-
don: D. Browne, .* Conduct : Vol. . [BOD Vet.A.c.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of
W-.
W-(a)
The Works of John Locke in Four Volumes. The Seventh Edition. London: H. Woodfall...I.
Shuckburgh...,  (st issue). Conduct : Vol. . Ref. Yolton .
W-(b)
The Works of John Locke in Four Volumes. The Seventh Edition. London: H. Woodfall...A. and
J. Shuckburgh...,  (nd issue).* Conduct : Vol. . [BOD Vet.A.d.] Ref. Yolton .
Note. As W-(a).
W-
The Works of John Locke, in Four Volumes. The Eight Edition. London: W. Strahan, .*
Conduct : Vol. . [BOD ˚BS.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Reprint of W-(a/b).
 editions of the ‘conduct’
W-
The Works of John Locke, in Nine Volumes. The Ninth Edition. London: T. Longman, .*
Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD Vet. A.e.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Vols.  and  are
as E-.
W-
The Works of John Locke, in Ten Volumes. The Tenth Edition. London: J. Johnson, .* Con-
duct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD  e.] Ref. Attig .
W-
The Works of John Locke: in Ten Volumes, th ed. London: W. Otridge, . Ref. Attig .
W-
The Works of John Locke. A New Edition, Corrected ( vols.). London: Th. Tegg, . Ref.
Attig . Conduct : Vol. , pp. -.
W-
The Works of John Locke, in Nine Volumes. The Twelfth Edition. London: C. and J. Rivington,
.* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of W-.
W-
The Works of John Locke: in Nine Volumes. The Twelfth Edition. London: C. and J. Rivington,
. Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of W-.
W-
The Philosophical Works of John Locke. With a Preliminary Discourse and Notes, by J.A. St.
John, Esq. Author of ‘The Hisotry of the Manners, Customs, Arts, &c. of Ancient Greece. The
Conduct of the Understanding. Essay on the Human Understanding. An Examination of P. Male-
branche’s Opninion of Seeing All Things in God; with Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris’s Books.
Elements of Natural Philosophy. Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman.
London: G. Virtue, .* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD .] Ref. Attig .
W-(a)
The Works of John Locke: in Nine Volumes. The Twelfth Edition. London: C. and J. Rivington,
. Ref. Attig . Note. Reprint of W-.
W-(b)
The Works of John Locke. With a Preliminary Essay and Notes by J.A. St. John, Esq. ( vols.).
London: H.G. Bohn, .* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD  e.] Ref. Attig .
Note. As W-, q.v. for complete title.
W-
The Works of John Locke. Philosophical Works, ed. J.A. St. John, Esq. ( vols.). London: Bell
& Daldy, . Ref. Attig . Note. As W-, q.v. for complete title.
W-
The Works of John Locke. Philosophical Works, ed. J.A. St. John, Esq. ( vols.). London: Bell
& Daldy, . Ref. Attig . Note. As W-, q.v. for complete title.
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
W-
The Philosophical Works of John Locke, ed. J.A. St. John, Esq. ( vols.). London: G. Bell,
. Ref. Attig . Note. As W-, q.v. for complete title.
W-
The Works of John Locke. A New Edition, Corrected ( vols.). Aalen: Scientia,  (repr. of
W-).* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -.
Abridgements, abstracts or selections containing the Conduct
AS-
[Anonymous], ‘Posthumous Works of Mr. John Lock’, History of the Works of the Learned, 
no.  (June ) -.* Ref. Yolton . Note. Abstract of O-, including the Con-
duct.
AS-
[le Clerc, Jean], ‘Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke’, Bibliothèque choisie, pour servir à
la bibliothèque universelle () , -.* [UBU AB: A oct.  T  ()] Ref. Yolton
. Note. Review and comprehensive abstract of O-, including the Conduct.
AS-
[Wolff, Christian], ‘Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke. h.e. Joannis Lockii Opera
Posthuma’, Acta Eruditorum () -.* [UBU AB: A qu  T  ()] Ref. Yolton
. Note. Short review and abstract of O-, including the Conduct. For the identity of
the reviewer, cf. Zart, Einfluß der englischen Philosophen seit Bacon, p. .
AS-
Simm, Alexander, Miscellaneous Tracts; or, Select Passages, Historical, Chronological, Moral, &c.
Extracted from Eminent Authors, Ancient and Modern. Containing An Abstract of Mr. Locke’s
Conduct of the Understanding. For the Benefit of younger Scholars. By Mr. Alexander Simm, late
Schoolmaster at Bathgate. Quædam breviare permittur. Quintil. Edinburgh: W. Gray, .*
Conduct : -. [BOD  f.] Ref. Yolton .
AS-
The Beauties of Locke, Consisting of Selections from his Philosophical, Moral, and Theological
Works. By Alfred Howard, Esq. London: T. Davison [].* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD
 f.] Ref. no reference found in Attig.
AS-(a)
Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding. Condensed under the Superintendence of A.J. Valpy.
London: A.J. Valpy, .* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD . k.] Ref. Attig . Note. Con-
duct is abridged as well.
AS-(b)
Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding, Condensed under the Superintendence of A.J. Valpy.
London: Whittaker, . Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig . Note. See AS-(a).
AS-
The Conduct of the Understanding also Some Thoughts concerning Education by John Locke.
With a Memoir of the Author and his Writings. Edinburgh: W. and R. Chambers, .* Con-
 editions of the ‘conduct’
duct : pp. -. [BOD  d.] Ref. Attig . Note. Abridgment with other works by
various other authors.
AS-
The Conduct of the Understanding; also Some Thoughts concerning Education by John Locke;
with a memoir of the author and his writings. Edinburgh: W. and R. Chambers, . Ref.
Attig . Note. Reprint of AS-.
AS-
The Conduct of the Understanding; also, Some Thoughts concerning Education. Philadelphia:
Lippincott, c. . Ref. Attig  (Attig: unverified). Note. Abridged versions?
AS-
‘John Locke (-)’, in: The Library of the World’s Best Literature, Ancient and Modern,
ed. Charles Dudley Warner. New York: R.S. Peale and J.A. Hill, . Ref. Attig . Note.
Contains selections from the Conduct.
AS-
Essays of British Essayists: Including Biographical and Critical Sketches, ed. Chauncey C. Stark-
weather. New York: Colonial Press, . Pages devoted to Locke, Vol. , pp. -, contain
selections from the Conduct. Ref. Attig .
AS-
‘Of the Understanding’, in: English Prose, ed. W. Peacock. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
. Ref. Attig . Note. Selections from the Essay and the Conduct.
AS-
‘Of the Conduct of the Understanding: John Locke’, in: Century Readings in the English Es-
say, ed. Louis Wann. New York: Century, c . Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig .
AS-
‘Of the Conduct of the Understanding: John Locke’, in: Century Readings in the English Es-
say, ed. Louis Wann. New York: Century, c . Ref. Attig . Note. As AS-
AS-
‘Of Reading’, in: The Treasure Chest: an Anthology of Contemplative Prose, ed. J. Donald
Adams. New York: E.P. Dutton, . Ref. Attig .
AS-
‘Of the Conduct of the Understanding’, in: Toward Liberal Education, rev. ed., by Louis G.
Locke, William M. Gibson and George Arms. New York: Rinehart, c . Ref. Attig .
Conduct : pp. -.
AS-(a)
Some Thoughts concerning Education, ed. F.W. Garforth. London: Heinemann, . Ref. At-
tig . Note. Abridged version. Includes selections from the Conduct in the Appendix.
AS-(b)
Some Thoughts concerning Education, ed. F.W. Garforth. Woodburry, New York: Barron’s Ed-
ucational Series, []. Ref. Attig . Note. Abridged version. As AS-(a).
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
AS-
Locke on Politics, Religion and Education, ed. Maurice Cranston. New York: Collier Books,
. Ref. Attig . Note. Contains selection(s) from the Conduct.
Translations that consist of or comprise the Conduct
Tr(Du)-
Leidraad voor het verstand, eds. Jeanne Marie Noël and Henk de Wolf. Meppel: Boom,
.* Ref. Attig . Note. Yolton  mentions an earlier Dutch translation (Korte inhoud
Van een Werk genaamt Wysgeerige Proeven, Aangaande het Menschelyk Verstand, Door den Heer
Jan Locke. Antwerpen: W. Jugla,  [UBU AB-THO: -]); however, this is not a trans-
lation of the Conduct, but of the Abrégé of the Essay.
Tr(Fr)-
Œuvres diverses de Monsieur Jean Locke. Rotterdam: Fritsch and Böhm, .* [BOD Vet.
B f.] Conduct : pp. - (De la conduite de l’esprit dans la recherche de la verité). Ref.
Yolton . Note. Modelled after O- but printing the first French translation of the ‘tol-
eration’ letter from the Latin edition (instead of the incomplete fourth letter), and omitting
the ‘Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion’. According to Yolton , the editor is proba-
bly Jean Frédéric Bernard, who is also the publisher of Tr-(Fr.). Divided into  sections,
instead of the  sections in O-.
Tr(Fr)-
Œuvres diverses de Monsieur Locke. Nouvelle Edition considérablement augmentée ( vols.). Am-
sterdam: J. F. Bernard, .* [BOD Vet. B f.] Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. Ref. Yolton
. Note. As Tr(Fr)-, plus the ‘Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul’s Epistles’, the
‘Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion’, and selected correspondence with Philippus van
Limborch. According to Yolton, the editor is probably Jean Frédéric Bernhard, who is also
the publisher.
Tr(Fr)-
Œuvres philosophiques de Locke. Nouvelle édition revue par M. Thurot ( vols.). Paris: F. Di-
dot, -.* Conduct : Vol. , pp. -. [BOD  j.] Ref. Attig .
Tr(Fr)-
De la conduite de l’entendement, ed. Yves Michaud. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin,
.* Ref. Attig .
Tr(Ger)-
Johann Lockens Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes zur Erkäntniß der Wahrheit nebst dessel-
ben Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. Aus dem Englischen überstzt von George David Kypke.
Königsberg: J.H. Hartung, .* [BOD Vet. A e.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Divided into
 sections, unlike the  sections in O- and most subsequent editions. Also contains
the ‘Discourse on Miracles’.
Tr(Ger)-
Die Leitung des Verstandes, ed. Bertha Leopold. Hamburg: [publisher not given], . Ref.
Attig .
 editions of the ‘conduct’
Tr(Ger)-
Locke’s Leitung des Verstandes, ed. Jürgen Bona Meyer. Heidelberg: G. Weiss, . Ref. Attig
.
Tr(Ger)-
Über den richtigen Gebrauch des Verstandes, ed. Dr. Otto Martin. Leipzig: F. Meiner, .*
Ref. Attig .
Tr(Ger)-
Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes. Eine Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. In der
Übersetzung Königsberg  von Georg David Kypke, ( vols.) eds. Terry Boswell, Riccardo
Pozzo und Clemens Schwaiger. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, .* Note.
Vol.  gives repr. of Tr(Ger)-.
Tr(It)-
Guida dell’ intelletto nella ricerca della verità. Opera postuma di Gio. Locke da Francesco Soave
C.R.S. Prof. di Filos. Mor. nel R. Ginnasio di Brera. Milano: G. Motta, .* [BOD Vet. F
e.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Text is not divided into  sections, as in O- and in most
subsequent editions, but into  ‘articoli’ that follow largely the division into  sections in
Tr(Fr)-.
Tr(It)-
Saggio filosofico di Gio: Locke su l’umano intelletto. Compendiato dal Dr. Winne, nd ed. by
Francesco Soave ( vols.). Venezia: Baglioni, . Conduct : Vol. . Ref. Attig . Note. Un-
like the first edition, this second edition of Wynne’s abridgement of the Essay contains the
Conduct as well.
Tr(It)-
Guida dell’ intelletto nella ricerca della verità. Opera Postuma di Gio: Locke. Tradotto, e Com-
mentato da Francesco Soave C.R.S. Prof. di Fil. nel Ginnasio di Brera. Terza Edizione Veneta.
Venezia: Baglioni, .* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD Vet. f f.] Ref. Yolton . Note. Con-
duct is Vol.  after two previous volumes, containing a translation of Wynne’s abridgement of
the Essay. The inspected volume of the Conduct was bound together with Vol. , containing
the abridgements of Books III and IV of the Essay. Division is into  ‘articoli’, see Tr(It)-
. Attig: as Tr(It)-.
Tr(It)-
Guida dell’intellectto nella ricerca della verità. Opera postuma di Gio: Locke. Tradotta, e Com-
mentata da Franceso Soave C.R.S. Prof. di Fil. Mor. nel R. Ginnasio di Brera. Quarta Edizione
Veneta. Tomo Terzo. Venezia: Baglioni, .* Conduct : pp. -. [BOD  f.] Ref. Attig
. Note. As Tr(It)-, however, in this case the inspected copy of the Conduct is bound
together with both previous volumes containing Wynne’s abridgement of the Essay.
Tr(It)-
Guida dell’intelletto di Gio: Locke su l’humano intelletto compendiato dal Dr. Winne. Tradotto,
e Commentato da Francesco Soave C.R.S. Professor di Filosofia Morale nel R. Ginnasio di Brera.
Quinta Edizione Veneta. Tomo Terzo. Venezia: Baglioni, . Conduct : pp. -. Ref. Attig
. Note. As Tr(It)-. The remark ‘compendiato dal Dr. Winne’ applies probably to the
two previous volumes containing the abridged versions of the Essay, but not to the volume
containing the Conduct.
editions of the ‘conduct’ 
Tr(It)-
Della guida dell’intelligenza nella ricerca della verità, ed. Eugenio Cipriani. Lanciano: R.
Carabba, []. Ref. Attig .
Tr(It)-
Scritti filosofici e religiosi, ed. Mario Sina. Milano: Rusconi, . Ref. Attig .
Tr(Jap)-
Chisei no Tadashii Michibikikata, ed. Kiyoshi Shimokawa. Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo, .*
Tr(Pol)-
Rozwazania dotyczace rozumu ludzkiego, ed. Czeslaw Znamierowcki ( vols.). Krakowie:
Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, .* [BOD  e.] Ref. Attig . Note. Trans-
lation of the Essay that contains also a translation of the Conduct : ‘O wlasciwym uzywaniu
rozumu’, Vol. , pp. -.
Tr(Rus)-
Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedeniia, eds. I.S. Narskogo and A.A. Makarovskogo ( vols.).
Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Sotsial’no-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury, . Ref. Attig . Note. Trans-
lation of W-.
Tr(Sp)-
Del gobierno civil; seguido de Carta sobre la tolerancia por Locke. Paris: en casa de Rosa, .
Ref. Attig .
2. MANUSCRIPTS
Amsterdam University Library, MS R.K., J a. Letter by Damaris Cudworth Masham to J.
le Clerc,  January .
London, Public Record Office, PRO //, fols. -. Thomas Sydenham / John Locke, De
arte medica.
—, PRO ///, fols. -. Thomas Sydenham / John Locke, Anatomia.
Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Locke c.-. Ledgers containing Locke’s accounts, -.
—, MS Locke c.. Letters and drafts of letters of Locke, -, arranged in alphabetical
order of the addressees’ names.
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. ‘Observations on a discourse concerning natural and re-
vealed Religion [A Discourse of Natural and Revealed Religion in Several Essays ()]
by S[tephen] N[ye] []’.
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. Notes made by Locke for the Reasonableness of Christianity
(), including (fol. ) three addenda inserted in the second edition of .
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. ‘Revelation. Its several ways under the old Testament []’,
quotations written out by Locke.
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. ‘Resurrectio et quæ sequuntur’, by Locke [c. ].
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. ‘Christianæ Religionis Synopsis []’, by Locke.
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. An early draft by Locke of An Essay for the Understanding of
St. Paul’s Epistles by Consulting St. Paul himself (), with notes on the chronology of
the epistles.
—, MS Locke c., fols. - and -. ‘Epitome’ of Locke’s manuscript of the Essay in the
hand of S. Brownover with a few corrections and additions by Locke.
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. Additions by Locke for the Essay [c. ].
—, MS Locke c., fols. -. Partial copy of the Conduct, copied from MS Locke e..
—, MS Locke c.. Acknowledgements of receipts by persons to whom Locke had bequeated
money or property.
—, MS Locke c.. Letters from Locke to Peter King, -.
—, MS Locke e.. Drafts for additions to the Essay, including the Conduct.
—, MS Locke f.. Journal, -.
—, MS Locke f.. Journal, .
—, MS Locke f.. Journal, .
—, MS Locke f.. Journal, -.
—, MS Locke f.. Journal, -.
—, MS Locke f., fols. v-. Account book that includes accounts of money received from
and disbursed for Locke’s pupils at Christ Church, -.
—, MS Locke f.. Notebook.
—, MS Locke f.. An early notebook containing entries in an unidentified hand.
—, MS Locke f.. Three small account books, one of which is: (C) fol.  ff.: Account
book of William Shaw.
Oxford, Christ Church, Christ Church Collection Book (-), shelfmark li.b.. Reading
lists for individual students.
3. PRIMARY LITERATURE
Aristotle, Ethica nicomachea, ed. I. Bywater. Oxford: Clarendon Press, .
—, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes ( vols.). Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, .
—, Les réfutations sophistiques, ed. Louis-André Dorion. Paris: J. Vrin, .
—, Topica et sophistici elenchi, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, .
Arnauld, Antoine, Des vrayes et des fausses idées, contre ce qu’enseigne l’auteur de La Recherche
de la Vérité. Cologne: N. Schouten, .
—, Nouveaux éléments de géométrie, contenant des moyens de faire voir quelle lignes sont in-
commensurable, in: Œuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld. Vol. XLII, pp. -. Paris: S.
d’Arnay, .
—, ‘Solution d’un des plus célebres et des plus difficiles problèmes d’arithmatique, appellé
communément les quarrés magiques’, in: Œuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld. Vol. XLII,
pp. -. Paris: S. d’Arnay, .
[Arnauld, Antoine], L’Art de penser. La logique de Port-Royal, eds. Bruno Baron von Freytag
Löringhof and Herbert E. Brekle ( vols.). Stuttgart: F. Frommann, - (Vol. I is
repr. of Paris: J. Guignart, ).
—, La Logique ou l’Art de Penser. Contenant, Outre les Regles communes, plusieurs observations
nouvelles, propres à former le jugement [=La Logique de Port-Royal]. Paris: En la Bou-
tique de Ch. Savreux, Chez G. des Prez, .
Arnauld, Antoine and Pierre Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking. Containing, besides common
rules, several new observations appropriate for forming judgment, transl. and ed. by Jill
Vance Buroker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, .
Bacon, Francis, The Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding e.a. ( vols.). Stuttgart:
Fromman,  (repr. of London: Longman, -).
[Bentham, Edward], An Introduction to Logick, Scholastick and Rational. Menston: Scholar
Press,  (repr. of Oxford: W. Jackson, ).
Blount, Thomas-Pope, Censura Celebriorum Authorum: sive Tractactus in quo Varia Viro-
rum Doctorum de Clarissimis cujusque Seculi Scriptoribus judicia traduntur. London: R.
Chiswel, .
Cicero, Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes. Vol. XIX: De natura deorum. Academica, ed. H. Rack-
ham. London: W. Heineman, .
Clericus, Johannes [= Jean le Clerc], Logica: sive ars ratiocinandi. London: A. & J. Churchill,
.
Comenius, J.A., Magna didactica, ed. Fredericus Carolus Hultgren. Farnborough: Gregg, 
(repr. of Lipsia: Siegismund & Volkening, ).
Coste, Piere, ‘Lettre de Mr. Coste à l’Auteur de ces Nouvelles, à l’occasion de la mort de
Monsieur Locke’, in: Nouvelles de la République des Lettres  (-) -. Genève:
Slatkine Reprints,  (repr. of Nouvelles de la République des Lettres () -).
Crackanthorp, Richard, Logicae libri quinque. Huc acc. Introductio in metaphysicam. London:
Robert Young, .
Descartes, René, Œuvres de Descartes, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery ( vols.). Paris: J.
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